timothy frye | Columbia University (original) (raw)

Papers by timothy frye

Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 14, 2002

Examines how institutional features combine with other factors to exacerbate one particular threa... more Examines how institutional features combine with other factors to exacerbate one particular threat to democracy—the expansion of presidential power. It identifies three key conditions under which presidents in societies undergoing regime change expand their formal powers: first, that economic reforms producing concentrated benefits may lead the winners from those reforms to seek institutional change in the powers of the presidency; second, that countries with fragmented parliaments tend to experience an increase in presidential powers; third, that presidents in countries with newly crafted constitutions are just as likely to seek expansion of their powers as those in countries with revised versions of communist‐era constitutions. It then reviews the generally negative consequences of increases in presidential power for democracy, with examples from various formerly communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

World Politics, Mar 28, 2014

We explore how modern autocrats win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees t... more We explore how modern autocrats win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees to vote for the regime and thereby subvert the electoral process. Using two original surveys of employers and workers conducted around the 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia, we find that just under one quarter of employers engaged in some form of political mobilization. We then develop a simple framework for identifying which firms engage in voter mobilization and which workers are targeted for mobilization. We find that large, financially dependent firms in sectors characterized by asset immobility or slack labor markets whose managers are "core" supporters of the regime can offer their votes to the regime at the lowest cost and therefore are especially likely to mobilize their workers. By identifying the conditions under which workplace mobilization occurs in authoritarian regimes, we contribute to the longstanding debate about the economic bases of democratization. In addition, we explore an understudied means of subverting elections in contemporary autocracies: the use of economic coercion to mobilize voters. Moreover, our research finds that clientelist exchange can thrive in the absence of deeply embedded political parties when it is brokered by employers. JEL Classification: D72.

Social Science Research Network, 2017

There is a large literature on the causes of clientelism, but fewer studies examine its effective... more There is a large literature on the causes of clientelism, but fewer studies examine its effectiveness. We argue that the effectiveness of clientelism depends on 1) the identity of the broker who mediates clientelist exchange and 2) the type of inducement that is used. Using framing experiments and direct questions placed on surveys in Venezuela and Russia, we find that respondents are most likely to respond to turnout appeals from employers. Employers have significant levers of influence over employees, are able to monitor voter behavior, and are engaged in repeated interactions with voters. This makes them effective vote brokers. We also find that negative inducements (e.g. threats and intimidation) usually outperform positive inducements (e.g. gifts and rewards), and that threats made to collectives resonate more strongly than those made to individuals. These results suggest that the clientelism literature could benefit by paying more attention to employers, negative inducements, and threats against organizations.

For three weeks in June, 2011, Columbia University hosted "America Engages Eurasia: Studies,... more For three weeks in June, 2011, Columbia University hosted "America Engages Eurasia: Studies, Teaching, and Resources," a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute. This Institute examined the evolution of "academic" engagement with Eurasia: the historic personalities, institutions, organizations, and research resources that collectively constituted the foundation of Eurasian studies in America. These components were considered within the broad framework of the geopolitical relations of America and Eurasia over more than 150 years, with the goal of establishing a more broadly applicable paradigm of area studies development in the United States (for Middle Eastern, East Asian, African, Latin American studies, etc.), suggesting avenues of comparative research. This presentation was delivered on June 17, 2011, by Timothy M. Frye, Marshall Shulman Professor and Director, The Harriman Institute, Columbia.

Problems of Post-Communism, 2015

Language, ethnicity, and policy orientation toward Europe are key cleavages in Ukrainian society,... more Language, ethnicity, and policy orientation toward Europe are key cleavages in Ukrainian society, but there is much debate about their relative importance. Based on a survey experiment of 1000 residents of Ukraine that manipulated three features of a fictional candidate running for parliament, I find that a candidate’s ethnicity and language had little impact on reported vote choice, whereas economic policy orientation toward Europe was strongly associated with vote preference. Despite the intense politicization of both ethnicity and language and the violence in eastern Ukraine vote choice has not been reduced to an ethnic or linguistic census.

An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, 2015

There is a strong consensus that secure property rights are critical for economic development, bu... more There is a strong consensus that secure property rights are critical for economic development, but tricky issues about the direction of causation and measurement have made it difficult to demonstrate this relationship empirically. In recent years, scholars have made progress on these issues. In the future, scholars can profitably turn their attention to four issues: (i) why privatization is so unpopular, (ii) how politics shapes property rights, (iii) the distributional consequences of property rights, and (iv) the impact of violence on property rights and economic development. Keywords: property rights; institutions; violence; transaction costs

Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe

This project addresses issues of law and the institutional management of violent inter-group conf... more This project addresses issues of law and the institutional management of violent inter-group conflict. Many argue that secure constitutional rules are a key mechanism for managing political conflict and ensuring a peaceful transition from authoritarian rule, but we have few empirical studies of the determinants of constitutional change. This project begins to fill this gap by exploring the dynamics of presidential power in 20 postcommunist countries over the last decade. It asks: why have some presidents in the region expanded their powers dramatically, while others have not? Presidents in postcommunist countries who came to power in competitive elections increased their formal powers nine times between 1989 and 1998, with 6 of these 9 cases involving violence.

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2003

ABSTRACT A political scientist examines the relationship between private property and elections, ... more ABSTRACT A political scientist examines the relationship between private property and elections, using a survey of 500 business elites in Russia. Specific attention is paid to how the type of property held by company managers influences their support for promarket parties and the holding of elections.

Europe-Asia Studies, 2002

CENTRAL TO THE POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATION is a redefinition of relations be-tween business and... more CENTRAL TO THE POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATION is a redefinition of relations be-tween business and the state. This redefinition has been particularly difficult in Russia, where policy makers and scholars alike have cited an incestuous relationship between business ...

Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2011

B began the great postcommunist transition with a favorable geography, a good balance of industry... more B began the great postcommunist transition with a favorable geography, a good balance of industry and agriculture, a homogenous population, a relatively high standard of living, and an industrial stock of comparatively recent vintage. In addition, its economy did not depend on exports of natural resources, a feature that has proven to be a significant obstacle to economic and political reform in the region. Despite these advantages, economic reform has been halting at best. Belarus routinely ranks near the bottom on the major index of economic reform of postcommunist countries produced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2011). In global terms, Belarus also fares poorly on international measures of the security of property rights and the extent of marketization (World Bank, 2011). The main narrative also stresses the poor performance of the Belarusian economy (Aslund, 2002, 2011). Ioffe and Yarushevich (2011) offer a different narrative. They recognize the dominance of the state in the Belarusian economy, but also point out that private firms dominate retail trade and the mobile phone sector, while tourism is mostly in private hands. In addition, they note that some private schools and hospitals operate alongside state-owned competitors. But their main contention is that the performance of the Belarusian economy has been much better than the common wisdom suggests. They argue that economic growth, labor productivity, and inflation have been far better in the state-dominated economy of Belarus than in the more market-oriented economies of neighboring Russia and Ukraine. Most provocatively, they conclude the article (ibid., 2011, p. 771) by positing that: “Belarus’s economic success is also rooted in a degree of harmony between much of its society and the political regime— a degree which is higher than in Russia and Ukraine.”2 These claims are reminiscent of an earlier debate with David Marples (2007) in this journal. Ralph Clem (2011) by contrast argues that when one includes Belarus’s other neighbors in the comparison —Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—economic performance under Mr. Lukashenka looks far less rosy. On almost all measures, the performance of the Belarusian economy lags well behind their more democratic and market oriented neighbors. Moreover, Clem adds that Belarus is very poorly positioned to handle the challenges of a modern economy given its economic dependence on Russia, low Internet penetration, and the government’s great fear of the free flow of information. These debates unfold in the midst of an epic collapse of the Belarusian economy. In the election year of 2010, banks acting largely on the instructions of the government increased lending by 38 percent and the government increased wages in the public sector by 50 percent

The Journal of Politics, Jul 1, 2019

How do flawed elections and post-election protest shape political attitudes? Taking advantage of ... more How do flawed elections and post-election protest shape political attitudes? Taking advantage of the largely exogenous variation in the timing of a survey conducted in Moscow, we examine the short-term impact of the parliamentary election of December 4 th , and the large protest of December 10 th on trust in the Russian government. The fraud-marred parliamentary election had little effect on attitudes toward government, perhaps because allegations of vote improprieties were not new information. In contrast, the large protest of December 10 th increased trust in government. Heightened trust arises largely from non-supporters of the ruling party updating their beliefs rather than from social desirability bias, a perceived improvement in government performance, or a "halo" effect. This finding is consistent with the view that autocrats can increase trust in government by unexpectedly allowing protest without repression. It also suggests that when evaluating trust in government citizens may cue not off the content of the protest, but off the holding of the protest itself.

Social Research: An International Quarterly

Perspectives on Politics, 2022

Are property rights obtained through dubious means forever tainted with original sin or can right... more Are property rights obtained through dubious means forever tainted with original sin or can rightholders make their ill-gotten gains legitimate by doing good works? This is a critical question for developing countries (and Russia in particular) where privatization is often opaque and businesspeople may receive property, but remain unwilling to use it productively due to concerns about the vulnerability of their rights to political challenge. Using a survey of 660 businesspeople conducted in Russia in February 2005, I find that the original sin of an illegal privatization is difficult to expunge. Property rights transferred through a legally questionable privatization are seen as illegitimate even a decade after privatization. Businesspeople, however, can improve the perceived legitimacy of property rights by doing good works, such as investing in the firm and by providing public goods for the region. Finally, managers that provide public goods for their region are more likely to inv...

The Journal of Politics, 2019

Comparative Political Studies, 2018

Do economic sanctions turn the public against the target government or cause it to rally around t... more Do economic sanctions turn the public against the target government or cause it to rally around the flag? How do sanctions affect attitudes toward the sanctioner? How does bad economic performance under sanctions shape support for the target government? Despite their importance, these questions have rarely been explored with survey data. Results from two surveys in Russia find that exposure to information about economic sanctions does not generate a rally around the flag, leads some groups to withdraw support from the target government, and reduces support for the sanctioner. Respondents also react more strongly to the reasons why sanctions were put in place—the annexation of Crimea—than to the sanctions themselves. These results suggest the need to reevaluate theories of the impact of economic sanctions and blame-shifting under autocracy.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017

Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers... more Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common brokers worldwide, party activists and employers, arguing the latter enjoy numerous advantages along both dimensions. Using survey-based framing experiments in Venezuela and Russia, the authors find voters respond more strongly to turnout appeals from employers than from party activists. To demonstrate mechanisms, the article shows that vulnerability to job loss and embeddedness in workplace social networks make voters more responsive to clientelist mobilization by their bosses. The results shed light on the conditions most conducive to effective clientelism and highlight broker type as important for understanding why clientelism is prevalent in some countries but not others.

The Architecture of Democracy, 2002

World Politics, 2006

Are property rights obtained through dubious means forever tainted with original sin, or can righ... more Are property rights obtained through dubious means forever tainted with original sin, or can right holders make their ill-gotten gains legitimate by doing good works? This is a critical question for developing and transition countries, where privatization is often opaque and businesspeople may receive property, but remain unwilling to use it productively due to concerns about the vulnerability of their rights to political challenge. Using a survey of 660 businesspeople conducted in Russia in 2005, the author finds that the original sin of an illegal privatization is difficult to expunge. Contrary to a “Coasian” view of privatization, property rights transferred through a legally questionable privatization are seen as illegitimate long after privatization. Busi-nesspeople, however, can improve the legitimacy of property rights by doing good works, such as providing public goods and using their assets well. Finally, managers who provide public goods for their region are more likely to...