Robert C Jones | California State University, Chico (original) (raw)
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Book Reviews by Robert C Jones
Review of Tzachi Zamir's Ethics and the Beast
Papers by Robert C Jones
The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat, 2015
Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key ... more Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key makes a number of conceptual, philosophical, and empirical errors that undermine his claim. Robert C. Jones rcjones@mail.csuchico.edu is Associate Professor of Philosophy at California State University. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on animal ethics, animal cognition, and food ethics, and has given over forty talks on animal ethics. http://myweb.csuchico.edu/~rcjones/ In his target article, "Why fish do not feel pain, " Key (2016) makes quite a number of conceptual, philosophical, and empirical missteps along the path to his conclusion denying fish pain. In this brief commentary, I will address only three. To begin with, Key's central premise — that human neocortical structures are required for pain — begs the question. Key's basic argument looks like this: P1. Neural structure N is required for mental/phenomenal state M in humans. P2. Thus, N is a necessary condition for M (that is, no N entails no M). P3. Fish lack N. C. Therefore, fish lack M. In other words, Key argues that because structure X is required for mental state M in humans, X is a necessary condition for M in fish. It's the move from (P1) to (P2) that is problematic. (Key might deny that he is making this move, but I see no other plausible way of reading his argument.) This move is problematic both empirically and philosophically. Biologically speaking, convergent evolution may implement similar functions in structures that are not homologous. For example, while it's true that the bone structure of the wings of bats is required for bats to fly, it does not follow that organisms lacking such structures, for example, bees, cannot fly. Philosophically, to say that these human structures are required for pain, again, begs the very question of whether fish are sentient. For even if those neocortical structures that Key cites are required for human pain experience, it does not follow that they are required for fish pain experience. As Colin Allen (2013, p. 36) notes, "[t]he possibility of convergent evolution at the behavioral and cognitive levels despite morphological and anatomical differences at the
The literature on social justice, and social justice movements themselves, routinely ignore nonhu... more The literature on social justice, and social justice movements themselves, routinely ignore nonhuman animals as legitimate subjects of social justice. Yet, as with other social justice movements, the contemporary animal liberation movement has as its focus the elimination of institutional and sys-temic domination and oppression. In this paper, I explicate the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the contemporary animal rights movement, and situate it within the framework of social justice. I argue that those committed to social justice – to minimizing violence, exploitation, domination, objectifi-cation, and oppression – are equally obligated to consider the interests of all sentient beings, not only those of human beings.
Do lobsters feel pain? I answer yes, inspired by David Foster Wallace's essay "Consider the Lobst... more Do lobsters feel pain? I answer yes, inspired by David Foster Wallace's essay "Consider the Lobster".
We argue that the recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine's 2011 report, Chimpanzees in... more We argue that the recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine's 2011 report, Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research: Assessing the Necessity, are methodologically and ethically confused. We argue that a proper understanding of evolution and complexity theory in terms of the science and ethics of using chimpanzees in biomedical research would have had led the committee to recommend not merely limiting but eliminating the use of chimpanzees in bio-medical research. Specifically, we argue that a proper understanding of the difference between the gross level of examination of species and examinations on finer levels can shed light on important methodological and ethical inconsistencies leading to ignorance of potentially unethical practices and policies regarding the use of animals in scientific research.
I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuma... more I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuman animals, highlighting their biological/physiological aspects. I then survey the most prominent empirical research on the physiological and cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, focusing primarily on sentience, but looking also at a few other morally relevant capacities such as self-awareness, memory, and mindreading. Lastly, I discuss two examples of current animal welfare policy, namely, animals used in industrialized food production and in scientific research. I argue that even the most progressive current welfare policies lag behind, are ignorant of, or arbitrarily disregard the science on sentience and cognition.
Review of Tzachi Zamir's Ethics and the Beast
The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat, 2015
Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key ... more Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key makes a number of conceptual, philosophical, and empirical errors that undermine his claim. Robert C. Jones rcjones@mail.csuchico.edu is Associate Professor of Philosophy at California State University. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on animal ethics, animal cognition, and food ethics, and has given over forty talks on animal ethics. http://myweb.csuchico.edu/~rcjones/ In his target article, "Why fish do not feel pain, " Key (2016) makes quite a number of conceptual, philosophical, and empirical missteps along the path to his conclusion denying fish pain. In this brief commentary, I will address only three. To begin with, Key's central premise — that human neocortical structures are required for pain — begs the question. Key's basic argument looks like this: P1. Neural structure N is required for mental/phenomenal state M in humans. P2. Thus, N is a necessary condition for M (that is, no N entails no M). P3. Fish lack N. C. Therefore, fish lack M. In other words, Key argues that because structure X is required for mental state M in humans, X is a necessary condition for M in fish. It's the move from (P1) to (P2) that is problematic. (Key might deny that he is making this move, but I see no other plausible way of reading his argument.) This move is problematic both empirically and philosophically. Biologically speaking, convergent evolution may implement similar functions in structures that are not homologous. For example, while it's true that the bone structure of the wings of bats is required for bats to fly, it does not follow that organisms lacking such structures, for example, bees, cannot fly. Philosophically, to say that these human structures are required for pain, again, begs the very question of whether fish are sentient. For even if those neocortical structures that Key cites are required for human pain experience, it does not follow that they are required for fish pain experience. As Colin Allen (2013, p. 36) notes, "[t]he possibility of convergent evolution at the behavioral and cognitive levels despite morphological and anatomical differences at the
The literature on social justice, and social justice movements themselves, routinely ignore nonhu... more The literature on social justice, and social justice movements themselves, routinely ignore nonhuman animals as legitimate subjects of social justice. Yet, as with other social justice movements, the contemporary animal liberation movement has as its focus the elimination of institutional and sys-temic domination and oppression. In this paper, I explicate the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the contemporary animal rights movement, and situate it within the framework of social justice. I argue that those committed to social justice – to minimizing violence, exploitation, domination, objectifi-cation, and oppression – are equally obligated to consider the interests of all sentient beings, not only those of human beings.
Do lobsters feel pain? I answer yes, inspired by David Foster Wallace's essay "Consider the Lobst... more Do lobsters feel pain? I answer yes, inspired by David Foster Wallace's essay "Consider the Lobster".
We argue that the recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine's 2011 report, Chimpanzees in... more We argue that the recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine's 2011 report, Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research: Assessing the Necessity, are methodologically and ethically confused. We argue that a proper understanding of evolution and complexity theory in terms of the science and ethics of using chimpanzees in biomedical research would have had led the committee to recommend not merely limiting but eliminating the use of chimpanzees in bio-medical research. Specifically, we argue that a proper understanding of the difference between the gross level of examination of species and examinations on finer levels can shed light on important methodological and ethical inconsistencies leading to ignorance of potentially unethical practices and policies regarding the use of animals in scientific research.
I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuma... more I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuman animals, highlighting their biological/physiological aspects. I then survey the most prominent empirical research on the physiological and cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, focusing primarily on sentience, but looking also at a few other morally relevant capacities such as self-awareness, memory, and mindreading. Lastly, I discuss two examples of current animal welfare policy, namely, animals used in industrialized food production and in scientific research. I argue that even the most progressive current welfare policies lag behind, are ignorant of, or arbitrarily disregard the science on sentience and cognition.