Wai-hung Wong | California State University, Chico (original) (raw)

Papers by Wai-hung Wong

The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud

Synthese, 2015

Although explanation is a central topic in the philosophy of science and several important models... more Although explanation is a central topic in the philosophy of science and several important models of scientific explanation have been developed and widely discussed, there is one issue concerning explanation that has drawn very little attention, namely, why some phenomena 1 need explanation while some do not. Some may think that any phenomenon that has not been explained needs explanation. Others may think that if we divide (heretofore unexplained) phenomena into those that need explanation and those that do not, it is merely because we are puzzled by, or curious about, the former phenomena but not the latter. According to this line of thinking, the question of why some phenomena need explanation while some do not is a psychological question in disguise: the question is in fact why some people are puzzled 2 by some, but not all, phenomena and want to have an explanation of them. In this paper we will argue that the distinction between phenomena that need explanation and those that do not need one is philosophical, not psychological, because the distinction can be drawn normatively. We will propose a normative account of the need for explanation.

The Possibility of Philosophical UnderstandingReflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, 2011

Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loophol... more Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for itself. One is often bewitched by a word. For example, by the word 'know'.

Synthese, 2005

Some philosophers understand epistemological skepticism as merely presenting a paradox to be solv... more Some philosophers understand epistemological skepticism as merely presenting a paradox to be solved, a paradox given rise to by some apparently forceful arguments. I argue that such a view needs to be justified, and that the best way to do so is to show that we cannot help seeing skepticism as obviously false. The obviousness (to us) of the falsity of skepticism is, I suggest, explained by the fact that we cannot live without knowledge-beliefs (a knowledge-belief about the world is a belief that a person or a group of people know that p, where p is an empirical proposition about the world). I then go on to argue for the indispensability of knowledge-beliefs. The first line of argument appeals to the practical aspects of our employment of the concept of knowledge, and the second line of argument draws on some Davidsonian ideas concerning understanding and massive agreement.

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2006

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2008

Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels c... more Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his argument is not a sorites argument; I explain why he has not given us any reason to accept the claim. It is obvious to most of us that when we feel cold, we are in a position to know that we feel cold, and when we do not feel cold, we are in a position to know that we do not feel cold. To deny it seems absurd. This does not mean that we are always in a position to know whether we feel cold or not, for it is not true that we either feel cold or do not feel cold  sometimes we feel something in between. The expression 'feels cold', like the expression 'bald', is vague and admits of borderline cases. Timothy Williamson in his Knowledge and Its Limits has, however, offered an argument trying to show that even when we clearly feel cold, we may not be in a position to know that we do (Williamson, 2000, Chapter 4). 1 In his terminology, feeling cold is not a luminous condition. As he defines it, a condition is luminous if and only if "whenever it obtains (and one is in a position to wonder whether it does), one is in a position to know that it obtains" (p.13). Williamson's more ambitious thesis is that "[f]or virtually no mental state S is the condition that one is in S luminous" (p.14). Although he does not offer a

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2009

One version of the argument for design relies on the assumption that the apparent fine-tuning of ... more One version of the argument for design relies on the assumption that the apparent fine-tuning of the universe for the existence of life requires an explanation. I argue that the assumption is false. Philosophers who argue for the assumption usually appeal to analogies, such as the one in which a person was to draw a particular straw among a very large number of straws in order not to be killed. Philosophers on the other side appeal to analogies like the case of winning a lottery. I analyze the two analogies and explain why the lottery analogy is the right one to use. In the light of such an analysis, we can see that although the cosmic feature of being life-permitting is rare, it does not allow life-permitting possible universes to stand out because there are other rare cosmic features that other possible universes have.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2007

Three distinct but related questions can be asked about the meaningfulness of one's life. The fir... more Three distinct but related questions can be asked about the meaningfulness of one's life. The first is 'What is the meaning of life?,' which can be called 'the cosmic question about meaningfulness'; the second is 'What is a meaningful life?,' which can be called 'the general question about meaningfulness'; and the third is 'What is the meaning of my life?,' which can be called 'the personal question about meaningfulness.' I argue that in order to deal with all three questions we should start with the personal question. There is a way of understanding the personal question which allows us to answer it independently of any consideration of the cosmic question, but which nonetheless helps us see why the cosmic question should be dismissed as a bad question. Besides, a recommendable answer to the general question can be derived from my understanding of how the personal question should be answered. Two notions are essential to my account, namely, the notion of identities and the notion of a biographical life. And the account can be epitomized in this enticing way: a person's life is meaningful if it contains material for an autobiography that she thinks is worth writing and others think is worth reading.

Erkenntnis, 2008

How does the skeptic arrive at the conclusion that we do not know anything about the external wor... more How does the skeptic arrive at the conclusion that we do not know anything about the external world? According to the standard story, the skeptic starts with a particular radical skeptical hypothesis, such as that we are brains-in-vats, and argues that we do not know that it is false; she then uses the principle that knowledge is closed under known entailment to show that since we do not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false, we do not know that an arbitrarily chosen proposition about the world, such as that we have hands, is true. Since the argument applies to any proposition about the world, the skeptical conclusion is that we do not know anything about the world. This is of course a simplified story, for it leaves out the part played by the concept of epistemic justification. This paper will discuss a problem concerning this part of the story that is crucial to understanding epistemological skepticism, a problem that has never been adequately addressed. I will first argue that skepticism about knowledge (of the world) requires skepticism about justification (of our beliefs about the world) if it is to be understood as a real threat to human knowledge rather than as merely presenting us with a paradox. I will then argue that the skeptic has to adopt an internalist conception of justification in her skepticism about justification. The main purpose of this paper is, however, to make explicit the following problem that the skeptic faces. She cannot, in order to bring out the real threat of skepticism, confines herself to arguing that even our seemingly best Forthcoming in Erkenntnis 2 justified beliefs about the world are actually unjustified. She has moreover to argue against our pre-philosophical or pre-theoretical conviction that we have perceptual access to the world. But if she argues against such a conviction, she will not, as I will try to show, have any reason for accepting an internalist conception of justification. Yet precisely such a conception is what she needs for her skeptical argument. 1 I. Skepticism about Justification and Skepticism about Knowledge The concept of justification plays an important role in skepticism. Standard arguments for skepticism assume the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. Let 'SK' be some proposition that expresses the skeptical hypothesis that the skeptic uses in her argument. On the assumption that knowledge is justified true belief, the skeptic argues that we are not justified in believing that ∼SK, hence that we do not know that ∼SK. Moreover, the skeptical conclusion that we do not know anything about the world is inseparable from the skeptical conclusion that all our beliefs about the world are unjustified. For, if some of these beliefs are justified, and if knowledge is justified true belief, then we may have knowledge of the world after all. Whether we have such knowledge would then be a matter of whether some of these justified beliefs about the world are in fact true. 2 Although the skeptic could still insist that no such justified beliefs

Philosophical Studies, 2012

In Williamson (2007), Timothy Williamson argues against "the tactic of criticizing confidence in ... more In Williamson (2007), Timothy Williamson argues against "the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory (not itself a logical truth) whose probability is not raised by the evidence" (232-233). He dubs it the consequence fallacy. In this paper, we will show that Williamson"s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson"s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (or at least more often used than the former tactic), but it is not a fallacy. The two readings of Williamson"s formulation of the tactic are: (T1) Arguing that the probability of a theory is not raised by the evidence by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. (T2) Arguing that a theory is not made likely to be true by the evidence by identifying a logical consequence of the theory that is not made likely to be true by the evidence. 1 Williamson"s use of the phrase "probability is not raised" suggests (T1), while his use of the word "confidence" suggests (T2). (T1) is a fallacy, but Williamson"s argument for its fallaciousness, though ingenious, is not completely satisfying. We will explain the weaknesses in his argument and try to improve on it. We will also show that (T2) is not a fallacy and explain why it is a more commonly used tactic than (T1). Williamson"s argument for the fallaciousness of the consequence fallacy  now understood as (T1)  is brief. Consider a theory h and evidence e. Assume that e is evidence for h in the sense that it raises the probability of h, although it does not make h certain. In symbols,

Interpretive Charity, Massive Disagreement, and Imagination

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1999

It is a main theme of Donald Davidson's theory of interpretation1 that interpretive charity ... more It is a main theme of Donald Davidson's theory of interpretation1 that interpretive charity is a sine qua non of interpretation. Interpretive charity is necessary for interpretation to get off the ground, for without being charitable, that is, without taking the speaker to be rational by ...

The Possibility of Philosophical UnderstandingReflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud

... Page 8. vi Contents 9. Dispositions and Rational Explanation 182 Jason Bridges subjectivism a... more ... Page 8. vi Contents 9. Dispositions and Rational Explanation 182 Jason Bridges subjectivism and reality 10. Colors as Secondary Qualities 217 John McDowell 11. Intelligible Causation 232 John Campbell 12. Unsettling Subjectivism about Value 249 Sarah Stroud 13. ...

Donald Davidson's theory of interpretation

Ratio, 2003

Strawson suggests an anti-sceptical strategy which consists in offering good reason for ignoring ... more Strawson suggests an anti-sceptical strategy which consists in offering good reason for ignoring scepticism rather than trying to refute it, and the reason he offers is that beliefs about the external world are indispensable to us. I give an exposition of Strawson's arguments for the indispensability thesis and explain why they are not strong enough. I then propose an argument based on some of Davidson's ideas in his theory of radical interpretation, which I think can establish the indispensability thesis. Finally, I spell out the force of Strawson's anti-sceptical strategy by arguing that we have good reason for ignoring scepticism not only because beliefs about the world are indispensable, but also because it is irrational to have both beliefs about the world and sceptical doubts.

The Problem of Insulation

Philosophy, 2002

In his essay 'The Sceptic in His Place and Time', MF Burnyeat begins with an example of... more In his essay 'The Sceptic in His Place and Time', MF Burnyeat begins with an example of a philosopher who puzzles about the real-ity of time, but who nonetheless applies for a research grant to work on the philosophical problem of time during next year's sabbatical without doubting ...

To Interpret, or to Be Omniscient

Philosophical Papers, 1993

Synthese (forthcoming)

Although explanation is a central topic in the philosophy of science, there is an important issue... more Although explanation is a central topic in the philosophy of science, there is an important issue concerning explanation that has not been discussed much, namely, why some phenomena need an explanation while some do not. In this paper we first explain why this is an important issue, and then discuss two accounts of the need for explanation that can be gathered from the literature. We argue that both accounts are inadequate. The main purpose of the paper is, however, to offer a normative account of the need for explanation. On this account, a demand for explanation is possible only against the background of a certain understanding of the world (call it a ‘map’). It is the map we are using that provides us with the concepts and beliefs in terms of which we can ask for an explanation. And a phenomenon needs explanation only when it does not fit the map --- the phenomenon’s not fitting the map is a good reason for us to look for an explanation of it. This account not only captures our pre-theoretical understanding of the need for explanation, but also is in accordance with our practice of demanding an explanation.

Philosophical Studies 165, pp.221-227

Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying... more Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it "the consequence fallacy". In this paper we will show that Williamson's formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson's formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (or at least more often used than the former tactic), but it is not a fallacy.

I argue that the contextualist anti-skeptical strategy fails because it misconstrues skepticism b... more I argue that the contextualist anti-skeptical strategy fails because it misconstrues skepticism by overlooking two important aspects of skepticism: first, all of our knowledge of the external world is brought into question at one fell swoop; second, skepticism depends on certain ideas about sense-perception and its role in our knowledge of the world. Contextualists may have solved 'the skeptical paradox' in their own terms, but such a solution cannot in any way make skepticism less threatening to human knowledge or to the philosophical understanding of human knowledge. I also discuss some important aspects of the practice of knowledge attribution in order to show that the more we can make sense of particular knowledge attributions, the less we can take skepticism seriously, and that the practice of knowledge attribution as we understand and engage in it presupposes that we have knowledge of the world.

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2009), pp.155-165