Giorgi Tskhadaia | Caucasus University (original) (raw)
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Analiza i Egzystencj, 2024
In this article, I set out to design a plausible liberal theory of political obligation that a) r... more In this article, I set out to design a plausible liberal theory of political obligation that a) revolves around the idea of voluntary consent, and b) explains why in certain instances, obligations toward political authorities may arise. To achieve this goal, I build upon and radically revise George Klosko’s theory of fair play, which is centered on the unavoidability of non-excludable goods. I argue that the theory of fair play suffers from a critical deficiency as it cannot withstand the libertarian charge f irst propounded by Robert Nozick. In particular, it cannot explain why certain nonexcludable goods should be held “presumptively beneficial,” regardless of actors’ preferences. I propose to abandon the notion of “presumptively beneficial” goods altogether. Instead, I contend that freedom (and the possibility of voluntary consent, for that matter) is severely curtailed in the hypothetical original position, in which individuals are supposed to pursue their economic activities; for this reason, the exchange of existentially necessary material goods cannot be based on consent. I underscore that such a conception of political obligation does not have an apodictic character. Moreover, it still suffers from several unresolved problems characteristic of general approaches to political obligation. However, it provides a promising starting point to develop a truly liberal justification for obeying modern state authority.
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2021
The neo-Kantian, deontological liberal theory seeks to overcome the paradoxes of tolerance. It cl... more The neo-Kantian, deontological liberal theory seeks to overcome the paradoxes of tolerance. It claims to accomplish this task by grounding tolerance in purportedly universal higher-order moral reasoning. I argue that in reality, such an approach cannot separate tolerance from particular ethical norms or empirical realities. For this reason, it cannot resolve the paradoxes of tolerance. However, I contend there is another path to account for the value of tolerating “others”. Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction provides us the way to retain the necessarily particularistic character of tolerance, without forfeiting its context-transcending, “universalistic” potential. In this article, I show that the paradoxes of tolerance need to be maintained as quasi-transcendental structures, instead of being discarded in the name of higher-order moral reasoning.
Jürgen Habermas famously argues that reason cannot be rejected or criticized by employing its too... more Jürgen Habermas famously argues that reason cannot be rejected or criticized by employing its tools. In other words, every critique of reason has to put forward certain universal generalizations about reality. Based on this, he suspects a performative contradiction in Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction – a claim which is largely dismissed by Derrida and his followers. Derrida aims at articulating the paradoxes inherent to being and justice, instead of proposing a general theoretical model of reality or a normative model of justice. In this article, I argue that there are certain generalizations at play in deconstruction. The standard Derridean interpretation of such generalizations is that they stem from the paradoxes which are at work in deconstruction. In contrast, I demonstrate that deconstruction’s belief in the paradoxes of being and morality are at least partially based on the generalizations that Derrida makes about reality. I argue that this does not deal a fatal blow to decon...
Problemos
In this article, I argue that a universalistic thrust of secularism should not be located in a Ha... more In this article, I argue that a universalistic thrust of secularism should not be located in a Habermasian deontological liberal principle of the priority of universal morality over particularistic ethical doctrines. I show that Habermas cannot plausibly demonstrate that this principle can be invariably applied across different cases. However, in order not to succumb to parochialism, the failure of the deontological model should not prompt us to give up on the search for a universalistic drive behind secularism. To this end, I advocate a Derridean critique of religion and secularism as an alternative solution. By deconstructing the Kantian dichotomy of faith vs. knowledge, Jacques Derrida shows that secularism is, paradoxically, both a concrete socio-political regime and a possibility for a radical change.
Analiza i Egzystencj, 2024
In this article, I set out to design a plausible liberal theory of political obligation that a) r... more In this article, I set out to design a plausible liberal theory of political obligation that a) revolves around the idea of voluntary consent, and b) explains why in certain instances, obligations toward political authorities may arise. To achieve this goal, I build upon and radically revise George Klosko’s theory of fair play, which is centered on the unavoidability of non-excludable goods. I argue that the theory of fair play suffers from a critical deficiency as it cannot withstand the libertarian charge f irst propounded by Robert Nozick. In particular, it cannot explain why certain nonexcludable goods should be held “presumptively beneficial,” regardless of actors’ preferences. I propose to abandon the notion of “presumptively beneficial” goods altogether. Instead, I contend that freedom (and the possibility of voluntary consent, for that matter) is severely curtailed in the hypothetical original position, in which individuals are supposed to pursue their economic activities; for this reason, the exchange of existentially necessary material goods cannot be based on consent. I underscore that such a conception of political obligation does not have an apodictic character. Moreover, it still suffers from several unresolved problems characteristic of general approaches to political obligation. However, it provides a promising starting point to develop a truly liberal justification for obeying modern state authority.
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2021
The neo-Kantian, deontological liberal theory seeks to overcome the paradoxes of tolerance. It cl... more The neo-Kantian, deontological liberal theory seeks to overcome the paradoxes of tolerance. It claims to accomplish this task by grounding tolerance in purportedly universal higher-order moral reasoning. I argue that in reality, such an approach cannot separate tolerance from particular ethical norms or empirical realities. For this reason, it cannot resolve the paradoxes of tolerance. However, I contend there is another path to account for the value of tolerating “others”. Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction provides us the way to retain the necessarily particularistic character of tolerance, without forfeiting its context-transcending, “universalistic” potential. In this article, I show that the paradoxes of tolerance need to be maintained as quasi-transcendental structures, instead of being discarded in the name of higher-order moral reasoning.
Jürgen Habermas famously argues that reason cannot be rejected or criticized by employing its too... more Jürgen Habermas famously argues that reason cannot be rejected or criticized by employing its tools. In other words, every critique of reason has to put forward certain universal generalizations about reality. Based on this, he suspects a performative contradiction in Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction – a claim which is largely dismissed by Derrida and his followers. Derrida aims at articulating the paradoxes inherent to being and justice, instead of proposing a general theoretical model of reality or a normative model of justice. In this article, I argue that there are certain generalizations at play in deconstruction. The standard Derridean interpretation of such generalizations is that they stem from the paradoxes which are at work in deconstruction. In contrast, I demonstrate that deconstruction’s belief in the paradoxes of being and morality are at least partially based on the generalizations that Derrida makes about reality. I argue that this does not deal a fatal blow to decon...
Problemos
In this article, I argue that a universalistic thrust of secularism should not be located in a Ha... more In this article, I argue that a universalistic thrust of secularism should not be located in a Habermasian deontological liberal principle of the priority of universal morality over particularistic ethical doctrines. I show that Habermas cannot plausibly demonstrate that this principle can be invariably applied across different cases. However, in order not to succumb to parochialism, the failure of the deontological model should not prompt us to give up on the search for a universalistic drive behind secularism. To this end, I advocate a Derridean critique of religion and secularism as an alternative solution. By deconstructing the Kantian dichotomy of faith vs. knowledge, Jacques Derrida shows that secularism is, paradoxically, both a concrete socio-political regime and a possibility for a radical change.