Jack Reynolds | Deakin University (original) (raw)

Books by Jack Reynolds

Phenomenology and naturalism are standardly thought of as philosophical opponents, and the histor... more Phenomenology and naturalism are standardly thought of as philosophical opponents, and the historical interaction between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century has sometimes been adversarial in nature. While the major phenomenologists have drawn deeply on science, they have often also sought to discipline the reach and ambition of science, with such attempts sometimes provocatively posed - e.g. science does not think. For the phenomenologist, the success of empirical science should be bracketed when doing philosophy, even if it is not so clear that considerations to do with the consequences of science for the life-world are quite so assiduously bracketed. Moreover, modes of reasoning that are characteristic of the empirical sciences (e.g. inference to the best explanation, reduction, causal explanation, etc.), and generally endorsed by the philosophical naturalist, are held to be non-phenomenological. In the opposite direction, phenomenology is frequently reproached by naturalists and scientists for being, as Daniel Dennett suggests, a theoretical trajectory with no agreed method and hence no agreed results; nothing that might play a role in engagement with science, as John Searle complains. On both of these commonly held views, then, phenomenology cannot be a potential research program in interaction with empirical sciences: the phenomenologist standardly embraces this; the naturalist typically bemoans it and suspects an untenable “first philosophy”.

In this book, however, I argue that these understandings of phenomenology (and indeed of naturalism) should not be taken to be the final word, and that they are premised upon an understanding of transcendental phenomenology that is ultimately untenable and in need of updating. Phenomenology, as I seek to reorient it, is compatible with what is called liberal naturalism, as well as with weak forms of methodological naturalism, in virtue of being committed to a relationship of “results continuity” with relevant sciences (albeit indexed to future scientific and epistemic results), and exhibiting due attentiveness to Quinean sensitivity requirements, as I contend in the opening methodological chapter. The burden of this book will be to positively develop this claim, this naturalising of phenomenology, in a manner that does not amount to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul.

To do this, the book is structurally organised around what I take to be core features of phenomenology. Although the book will not be predominantly expositional, or historical in focus, a remark from Maurice Merleau-Ponty best captures what I take to be these core features. In the Phenomenology of Perception he enigmatically remarks at one point: “if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand”. This seems like an outlandish statement in one sense, tantamount to a transcendental mysticism in which ambiguity is resolved and we access the real, once and for all. Of course, that is not what he means. He means that everything central to phenomenology is somehow ensnared in understanding the paradoxes of what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”, and also that the paradoxes of situated thought cannot be overcome for philosophical reflection, and indeed, existential experience in general. The book is organised around the key elements of any situation as Merleau-Ponty describes them: time; the body; world; thing; and others. They all admit of a third-person perspective. They all also apparently irremediably have a first-person perspective and transcendentally condition our access to objects. And yet on most construals of naturalism – e.g. for the ontological and scientific naturalist – we are told that there is no ‘here’ and ‘now’ in nature. My book argues for a hybrid account of phenomenology and naturalism that is able to simultaneously respect both of these views, something akin to the manifest image and the scientific image for Wilfrid Sellars, without resorting to strategies of methodological separatism/incompatibilism, which seek to preserve a proper and autonomous space for phenomenological and empirical science, such that the twain does not meet.

A battle over the politics (and philosophy) of time is a major part of what is at stake in the di... more A battle over the politics (and philosophy) of time is a major part of what is at stake in the differences between three competing currents of contemporary philosophy: analytic philosophy, post-structuralist philosophy, and phenomenological philosophy. Avowed or tacit philosophies of time define representatives of each of these groups and also guard against their potential interlocutors. However, by bringing the temporal differences between these philosophical trajectories to the fore, and showing both their methodological presuppositions and their ethico-political implications, this book begins a long overdue dialogue on their respective strengths and weaknesses. It argues that there are systemic temporal problems (chronopathologies) that afflict each, but especially the post-structuralist tradition (focusing on Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida and their prophetic future politics) and the analytic tradition (focusing on John Rawls and analytic methodology in general, particularly the tendency to oscillate between forms of atemporality and intuition-oriented “presentism”). What is required is a “middle-way” that does not treat the living-present and the pragmatic temporality associated with bodily coping as an epiphenomenon to be explained away as either a transcendental illusion (and as a reactive force that is ethically problematic), or as a subjective/psychological experience that is not ultimately real.

Analytic Versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy

Throughout much of the 20th Century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy... more Throughout much of the 20th Century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy has been one of disinterest, caution or hostility. Recent debates in philosophy have highlighted some of the similarities between the two approaches and even envisaged a post-continental and post-analytic philosophy. Opening with a history of key encounters between philosophers of opposing camps since the late 19th Century - from Frege and Husserl to Derrida and Searle - the book goes on to explore in detail the main methodological differences between the two approaches. This covers a very wide range of topics, from issues of style and clarity of exposition to formal methods arising from logic and probability theory. The final section presents a balanced critique of the two schools’ approaches to key issues such as Time, Truth, Subjectivity, Mind and Body, Language and Meaning, and Ethics. Analytic Versus Continental is the first sustained analysis of both approaches to philosophy, examining the limits and possibilities of each. It provides a clear overview of a much-disputed history and, in highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both traditions, also offers future directions for both continental and analytic philosophy.

Understanding Existentialism

This book examines the core thinkers of existential phenomenology: Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Pon... more This book examines the core thinkers of existential phenomenology: Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir.

Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity

While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with tha... more While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with that of Jacques Derrida, there has been no sustained book-length treatment of these two French philosophers. Additionally, many of the essays presuppose an oppositional relationship between them, and between phenomenology and deconstruction more generally. Jack Reynolds systematically explores their relationship by analyzing each philosopher in terms of two important and related issues—embodiment and alterity. Focusing on areas with which they are not commonly associated (e.g., Derrida on the body and Merleau-Ponty on alterity) makes clear that their work cannot be adequately characterized in a strictly oppositional way. Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity proposes the possibility of a Merleau-Ponty-inspired philosophy that does not so avowedly seek to extricate itself from phenomenology, but that also cannot easily be dismissed as simply another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence. Reynolds argues that there are salient ethico-political reasons for choosing an alternative that accords greater attention to our embodied situation.

Edited Books by Jack Reynolds

100 years of European Philosophy Since the Great War: Crisis and Reconfigurations

Examines the influence of the Great War upon core aspects of European thought in the subsequent c... more Examines the influence of the Great War upon core aspects of European thought in the subsequent century

This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the ... more This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the natural sciences. The contributors attempt to subvert and complicate the divide that has historically tended to characterize the relationship between the two fields. Phenomenology has traditionally been understood as methodologically distinct from scientific practice, and thus removed from any claim that philosophy is strictly continuous with science. There is some substance to this thinking, which has dominated consideration of the relationship between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century. However, there are also emerging trends within both phenomenology and empirical science that complicate this too stark opposition, and call for more systematic consideration of the inter-relation between the two fields. These essays explore such issues, either by directly examining meta-philosophical and methodological matters, or by looking at particular topics that seem to require the resources of each, including imagination, cognition, temporality, affect, imagery, language, and perception.

Contributors include:
Amanda Taylor Aiken
Shaun Gallagher
Aaron Harrison
Andrew Inkpin
Joel Krueger
Chris McCarroll
David Morris
Jack Reynolds
Richard Sebold
Marilyn Stendera
Michela Summa
John Sutton
Michael Wheeler

Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism

Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism, Jan 1, 2011

Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides

This is an important and original collection of essays examining the relationship between Analyti... more This is an important and original collection of essays examining the relationship between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Analytic and Continental philosophy have become increasingly specialised and differentiated fields of endeavour. This important collection of essays details some of the more significant methodological and philosophical differences that have separated the two traditions, as well as examining the manner in which received understandings of the divide are being challenged by certain thinkers whose work might best be described as post-analytic and meta-continental. Together these essays offer a well-defined sense of the field, of its once dominant distinctions and of some of the most productive new areas generating influential ideas and controversy. In an attempt to get to the bottom of precisely what it is that separates the analytic and continental traditions, the essays in this volume compare and contrast them on certain issues, including truth, time and subjectivity. The book engages with a range of key thinkers from phenomenology, post-structuralism, analytic philosophy and post-analytic philosophy, examines the strengths and weaknesses of each tradition, and ultimately encourages enhanced understanding, dialogue and even rapprochement between these sometimes antagonistic adversaries. "Continuum Studies in Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in all the major areas of research and study. The wholly original arguments, perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it an important and stimulating resource for students and academics from a range of disciplines across the humanities and social sciences.

Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts

Global Arts / Local Knowledge

Papers by Jack Reynolds

The phenomenology of psychedelic temporality: current knowledge, open questions, and clinical applications

Philosophical Psychology, 2024

Current evidence suggests that the efficacy of psychedelic therapy depends, in part, on the chara... more Current evidence suggests that the efficacy of psychedelic therapy depends, in part, on the character of psychedelic experiences themselves. One pronounced aspect of psychedelic experiences is alterations to the experience of time, including reports of timelessness or transcending time. However, how we should interpret such reports remains unclear, and this lack of clarity has philosophical and clinical implications. For instance, “true” timelessness may be considered antithetical to having any experience at all, and descriptions of experiences involving “timelessness” are known to be diverse and of varying clinical significance. In this article, we utilize a phenomenological approach to the study of temporality to highlight ambiguities in current constructs used to assess psychedelic experiences. In doing so, we advance some preliminary phenomenological accounts of psychedelic therapy’s mechanisms of action, such as psychedelic temporality acting as a kind of counterpoint for depressive temporality. We conclude by outlining how a dedicated phenomenological research program can provide a nuanced map of psychedelic temporality, guiding future research in a manner that addresses both philosophical and clinical ambiguities.

Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 2024

In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence... more In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus' arguments about the "frame problem" for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus' work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective.

Grace De Laguna, Joel Katzav, and the conservatism of analytic philosophy

Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2023

In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the cha... more In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the charge of conservatism against the analytic tradition. We differentiate that conservatism into three kinds: starting place; path dependency; and modesty. We also think again about gender in philosophy, consider the positive account of speculative philosophy presented by de Laguna and Katzav in comparison to some other naturalist trajectories, and conclude with a brief Australian addendum that reflects on a similar period in our own country which was also associated with the professional institutionalisation of analytic philosophy.

Critical Horizons, 2023

Despite rarely explicitly thematizing the problem of dirty hands, this essay argues that Merleau-... more Despite rarely explicitly thematizing the problem of dirty hands, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty’s political work can nonetheless make some important contributions to the issue, both descriptively and normatively. Although his political writings have been neglected in recent times, his interpretations of Marxism and Machiavelli enabled him to develop an account of political phronesis and virtù that sought to retain the strengths of their respective positions without succumbing to their problems. In the process, he provides grounds for generalizing the problem of “dirty hands” beyond Michael Walzer’s influential understanding that pertains primarily to “emergencies” and singular time-slice actions, and addresses concerns about the coherence of the very idea that there is justified action that one ought to do which remains wrong. Merleau-Ponty does this by emphasizing the diachronic relationship between theoretical principles and concrete political action over a period of time, thus imbuing the problem of dirty hands with a historicity that is not sufficiently recognized in the more static and action-focused discussions.

Synthese, 2020

The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the pr... more The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment—e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and ‘4e’ cognition—interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with emerging findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to rethink the relationship between embodiment and genetics, and we argue that the balance of current epigenetic research favours the extension of an enactivist approach to mind and life, rather than the extended functionalist view of embodied cognition associated with Andy Clark and Mike Wheeler, which is more substrate neutral.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2020

Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome (TS), we still lack substantial insig... more Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome (TS), we still lack substantial insight into first-personal aspects of "what it is like" to live with this condition. This is despite the fact that developments in phenomenological psychiatry have demonstrated the scientific and clinical importance of understanding subjective experience in a range of other neuropsychiatric conditions. We argue that it is time for Tourette Syndrome research to tap into the sophisticated frameworks developed in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology (qualitative research into the formal structures or the "how" of lived experience) for describing experience in a way that integrates discrete symptoms into an overarching experiential framework concerning the self, the body, and its modes of experience. Following a historical introduction that contextualises the pertinence of phenomenology to psychopathology, we distinguish this approach from the existing, psychologically oriented studies on TS that are also qualitative. We then outline gaps and opportunities for future research, including the sorts of questions that might be utilised in phenomenological interviews and why they are of potential benefit to research programs in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. In conclusion we address some of the broader implications for phenomenology of the body and philosophy of action.

Philosophy in Review, Dec 31, 2013

Philosophers disposed to thinking of phenomenology as a quaint historical antiquity would be well... more Philosophers disposed to thinking of phenomenology as a quaint historical antiquity would be well-advised to read the Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi. With a small caveat to follow, the book certainly realises Zahavi's expressed aim of providing a "representative sample of what is currently happening in phenomenology, and make it clear to philosophers from other traditions that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is quite alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought" (4). Of course, it is always possible to quibble regarding the "representative sample" claim for any such volume, and I think it is fair to say that this book actually has particular strengths that simultaneously preclude it being a wholly representative sample of the best of the field. One reason for this is that it is deliberately not a historically focused book, eschewing scholarly chapters on famous phenomenological names, as well as prolonged or detailed exposition for its own sake (3). Moreover, many of the essays also have what might be described as a problem-centred approach. This has its own benefits for those of us working within the field, and it also makes possible some quite detailed and compelling engagements with analytic philosophy.

Phenomenology and naturalism are standardly thought of as philosophical opponents, and the histor... more Phenomenology and naturalism are standardly thought of as philosophical opponents, and the historical interaction between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century has sometimes been adversarial in nature. While the major phenomenologists have drawn deeply on science, they have often also sought to discipline the reach and ambition of science, with such attempts sometimes provocatively posed - e.g. science does not think. For the phenomenologist, the success of empirical science should be bracketed when doing philosophy, even if it is not so clear that considerations to do with the consequences of science for the life-world are quite so assiduously bracketed. Moreover, modes of reasoning that are characteristic of the empirical sciences (e.g. inference to the best explanation, reduction, causal explanation, etc.), and generally endorsed by the philosophical naturalist, are held to be non-phenomenological. In the opposite direction, phenomenology is frequently reproached by naturalists and scientists for being, as Daniel Dennett suggests, a theoretical trajectory with no agreed method and hence no agreed results; nothing that might play a role in engagement with science, as John Searle complains. On both of these commonly held views, then, phenomenology cannot be a potential research program in interaction with empirical sciences: the phenomenologist standardly embraces this; the naturalist typically bemoans it and suspects an untenable “first philosophy”.

In this book, however, I argue that these understandings of phenomenology (and indeed of naturalism) should not be taken to be the final word, and that they are premised upon an understanding of transcendental phenomenology that is ultimately untenable and in need of updating. Phenomenology, as I seek to reorient it, is compatible with what is called liberal naturalism, as well as with weak forms of methodological naturalism, in virtue of being committed to a relationship of “results continuity” with relevant sciences (albeit indexed to future scientific and epistemic results), and exhibiting due attentiveness to Quinean sensitivity requirements, as I contend in the opening methodological chapter. The burden of this book will be to positively develop this claim, this naturalising of phenomenology, in a manner that does not amount to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul.

To do this, the book is structurally organised around what I take to be core features of phenomenology. Although the book will not be predominantly expositional, or historical in focus, a remark from Maurice Merleau-Ponty best captures what I take to be these core features. In the Phenomenology of Perception he enigmatically remarks at one point: “if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand”. This seems like an outlandish statement in one sense, tantamount to a transcendental mysticism in which ambiguity is resolved and we access the real, once and for all. Of course, that is not what he means. He means that everything central to phenomenology is somehow ensnared in understanding the paradoxes of what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”, and also that the paradoxes of situated thought cannot be overcome for philosophical reflection, and indeed, existential experience in general. The book is organised around the key elements of any situation as Merleau-Ponty describes them: time; the body; world; thing; and others. They all admit of a third-person perspective. They all also apparently irremediably have a first-person perspective and transcendentally condition our access to objects. And yet on most construals of naturalism – e.g. for the ontological and scientific naturalist – we are told that there is no ‘here’ and ‘now’ in nature. My book argues for a hybrid account of phenomenology and naturalism that is able to simultaneously respect both of these views, something akin to the manifest image and the scientific image for Wilfrid Sellars, without resorting to strategies of methodological separatism/incompatibilism, which seek to preserve a proper and autonomous space for phenomenological and empirical science, such that the twain does not meet.

A battle over the politics (and philosophy) of time is a major part of what is at stake in the di... more A battle over the politics (and philosophy) of time is a major part of what is at stake in the differences between three competing currents of contemporary philosophy: analytic philosophy, post-structuralist philosophy, and phenomenological philosophy. Avowed or tacit philosophies of time define representatives of each of these groups and also guard against their potential interlocutors. However, by bringing the temporal differences between these philosophical trajectories to the fore, and showing both their methodological presuppositions and their ethico-political implications, this book begins a long overdue dialogue on their respective strengths and weaknesses. It argues that there are systemic temporal problems (chronopathologies) that afflict each, but especially the post-structuralist tradition (focusing on Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida and their prophetic future politics) and the analytic tradition (focusing on John Rawls and analytic methodology in general, particularly the tendency to oscillate between forms of atemporality and intuition-oriented “presentism”). What is required is a “middle-way” that does not treat the living-present and the pragmatic temporality associated with bodily coping as an epiphenomenon to be explained away as either a transcendental illusion (and as a reactive force that is ethically problematic), or as a subjective/psychological experience that is not ultimately real.

Analytic Versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy

Throughout much of the 20th Century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy... more Throughout much of the 20th Century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy has been one of disinterest, caution or hostility. Recent debates in philosophy have highlighted some of the similarities between the two approaches and even envisaged a post-continental and post-analytic philosophy. Opening with a history of key encounters between philosophers of opposing camps since the late 19th Century - from Frege and Husserl to Derrida and Searle - the book goes on to explore in detail the main methodological differences between the two approaches. This covers a very wide range of topics, from issues of style and clarity of exposition to formal methods arising from logic and probability theory. The final section presents a balanced critique of the two schools’ approaches to key issues such as Time, Truth, Subjectivity, Mind and Body, Language and Meaning, and Ethics. Analytic Versus Continental is the first sustained analysis of both approaches to philosophy, examining the limits and possibilities of each. It provides a clear overview of a much-disputed history and, in highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both traditions, also offers future directions for both continental and analytic philosophy.

Understanding Existentialism

This book examines the core thinkers of existential phenomenology: Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Pon... more This book examines the core thinkers of existential phenomenology: Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir.

Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity

While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with tha... more While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with that of Jacques Derrida, there has been no sustained book-length treatment of these two French philosophers. Additionally, many of the essays presuppose an oppositional relationship between them, and between phenomenology and deconstruction more generally. Jack Reynolds systematically explores their relationship by analyzing each philosopher in terms of two important and related issues—embodiment and alterity. Focusing on areas with which they are not commonly associated (e.g., Derrida on the body and Merleau-Ponty on alterity) makes clear that their work cannot be adequately characterized in a strictly oppositional way. Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity proposes the possibility of a Merleau-Ponty-inspired philosophy that does not so avowedly seek to extricate itself from phenomenology, but that also cannot easily be dismissed as simply another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence. Reynolds argues that there are salient ethico-political reasons for choosing an alternative that accords greater attention to our embodied situation.

100 years of European Philosophy Since the Great War: Crisis and Reconfigurations

Examines the influence of the Great War upon core aspects of European thought in the subsequent c... more Examines the influence of the Great War upon core aspects of European thought in the subsequent century

This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the ... more This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the natural sciences. The contributors attempt to subvert and complicate the divide that has historically tended to characterize the relationship between the two fields. Phenomenology has traditionally been understood as methodologically distinct from scientific practice, and thus removed from any claim that philosophy is strictly continuous with science. There is some substance to this thinking, which has dominated consideration of the relationship between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century. However, there are also emerging trends within both phenomenology and empirical science that complicate this too stark opposition, and call for more systematic consideration of the inter-relation between the two fields. These essays explore such issues, either by directly examining meta-philosophical and methodological matters, or by looking at particular topics that seem to require the resources of each, including imagination, cognition, temporality, affect, imagery, language, and perception.

Contributors include:
Amanda Taylor Aiken
Shaun Gallagher
Aaron Harrison
Andrew Inkpin
Joel Krueger
Chris McCarroll
David Morris
Jack Reynolds
Richard Sebold
Marilyn Stendera
Michela Summa
John Sutton
Michael Wheeler

Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism

Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism, Jan 1, 2011

Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides

This is an important and original collection of essays examining the relationship between Analyti... more This is an important and original collection of essays examining the relationship between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Analytic and Continental philosophy have become increasingly specialised and differentiated fields of endeavour. This important collection of essays details some of the more significant methodological and philosophical differences that have separated the two traditions, as well as examining the manner in which received understandings of the divide are being challenged by certain thinkers whose work might best be described as post-analytic and meta-continental. Together these essays offer a well-defined sense of the field, of its once dominant distinctions and of some of the most productive new areas generating influential ideas and controversy. In an attempt to get to the bottom of precisely what it is that separates the analytic and continental traditions, the essays in this volume compare and contrast them on certain issues, including truth, time and subjectivity. The book engages with a range of key thinkers from phenomenology, post-structuralism, analytic philosophy and post-analytic philosophy, examines the strengths and weaknesses of each tradition, and ultimately encourages enhanced understanding, dialogue and even rapprochement between these sometimes antagonistic adversaries. "Continuum Studies in Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in all the major areas of research and study. The wholly original arguments, perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it an important and stimulating resource for students and academics from a range of disciplines across the humanities and social sciences.

Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts

Global Arts / Local Knowledge

The phenomenology of psychedelic temporality: current knowledge, open questions, and clinical applications

Philosophical Psychology, 2024

Current evidence suggests that the efficacy of psychedelic therapy depends, in part, on the chara... more Current evidence suggests that the efficacy of psychedelic therapy depends, in part, on the character of psychedelic experiences themselves. One pronounced aspect of psychedelic experiences is alterations to the experience of time, including reports of timelessness or transcending time. However, how we should interpret such reports remains unclear, and this lack of clarity has philosophical and clinical implications. For instance, “true” timelessness may be considered antithetical to having any experience at all, and descriptions of experiences involving “timelessness” are known to be diverse and of varying clinical significance. In this article, we utilize a phenomenological approach to the study of temporality to highlight ambiguities in current constructs used to assess psychedelic experiences. In doing so, we advance some preliminary phenomenological accounts of psychedelic therapy’s mechanisms of action, such as psychedelic temporality acting as a kind of counterpoint for depressive temporality. We conclude by outlining how a dedicated phenomenological research program can provide a nuanced map of psychedelic temporality, guiding future research in a manner that addresses both philosophical and clinical ambiguities.

Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 2024

In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence... more In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus' arguments about the "frame problem" for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus' work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective.

Grace De Laguna, Joel Katzav, and the conservatism of analytic philosophy

Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2023

In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the cha... more In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the charge of conservatism against the analytic tradition. We differentiate that conservatism into three kinds: starting place; path dependency; and modesty. We also think again about gender in philosophy, consider the positive account of speculative philosophy presented by de Laguna and Katzav in comparison to some other naturalist trajectories, and conclude with a brief Australian addendum that reflects on a similar period in our own country which was also associated with the professional institutionalisation of analytic philosophy.

Critical Horizons, 2023

Despite rarely explicitly thematizing the problem of dirty hands, this essay argues that Merleau-... more Despite rarely explicitly thematizing the problem of dirty hands, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty’s political work can nonetheless make some important contributions to the issue, both descriptively and normatively. Although his political writings have been neglected in recent times, his interpretations of Marxism and Machiavelli enabled him to develop an account of political phronesis and virtù that sought to retain the strengths of their respective positions without succumbing to their problems. In the process, he provides grounds for generalizing the problem of “dirty hands” beyond Michael Walzer’s influential understanding that pertains primarily to “emergencies” and singular time-slice actions, and addresses concerns about the coherence of the very idea that there is justified action that one ought to do which remains wrong. Merleau-Ponty does this by emphasizing the diachronic relationship between theoretical principles and concrete political action over a period of time, thus imbuing the problem of dirty hands with a historicity that is not sufficiently recognized in the more static and action-focused discussions.

Synthese, 2020

The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the pr... more The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment—e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and ‘4e’ cognition—interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with emerging findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to rethink the relationship between embodiment and genetics, and we argue that the balance of current epigenetic research favours the extension of an enactivist approach to mind and life, rather than the extended functionalist view of embodied cognition associated with Andy Clark and Mike Wheeler, which is more substrate neutral.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2020

Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome (TS), we still lack substantial insig... more Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome (TS), we still lack substantial insight into first-personal aspects of "what it is like" to live with this condition. This is despite the fact that developments in phenomenological psychiatry have demonstrated the scientific and clinical importance of understanding subjective experience in a range of other neuropsychiatric conditions. We argue that it is time for Tourette Syndrome research to tap into the sophisticated frameworks developed in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology (qualitative research into the formal structures or the "how" of lived experience) for describing experience in a way that integrates discrete symptoms into an overarching experiential framework concerning the self, the body, and its modes of experience. Following a historical introduction that contextualises the pertinence of phenomenology to psychopathology, we distinguish this approach from the existing, psychologically oriented studies on TS that are also qualitative. We then outline gaps and opportunities for future research, including the sorts of questions that might be utilised in phenomenological interviews and why they are of potential benefit to research programs in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. In conclusion we address some of the broader implications for phenomenology of the body and philosophy of action.

Philosophy in Review, Dec 31, 2013

Philosophers disposed to thinking of phenomenology as a quaint historical antiquity would be well... more Philosophers disposed to thinking of phenomenology as a quaint historical antiquity would be well-advised to read the Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi. With a small caveat to follow, the book certainly realises Zahavi's expressed aim of providing a "representative sample of what is currently happening in phenomenology, and make it clear to philosophers from other traditions that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is quite alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought" (4). Of course, it is always possible to quibble regarding the "representative sample" claim for any such volume, and I think it is fair to say that this book actually has particular strengths that simultaneously preclude it being a wholly representative sample of the best of the field. One reason for this is that it is deliberately not a historically focused book, eschewing scholarly chapters on famous phenomenological names, as well as prolonged or detailed exposition for its own sake (3). Moreover, many of the essays also have what might be described as a problem-centred approach. This has its own benefits for those of us working within the field, and it also makes possible some quite detailed and compelling engagements with analytic philosophy.

Merleau-Ponty: key concepts

Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they m... more Where documents are made available* through records in La Trobe University Research Online they may be regarded as" open access" documents; interested readers may read, download or print them, but they remain protected by copyright, and many are subject to publishers' policies regarding use, reproduction or communication. Please check individual records for details of other permissible use. If you believe that any material has been made available without permission of the copyright owner please contact us with the details.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Phenomenology has been described as a “non-argumentocentric” way of doing philosophy, reflecting ... more Phenomenology has been described as a “non-argumentocentric” way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone, regardless of whether this is intended as a descriptive claim about the work of the “usual suspects” or a normative claim about how phenomenology ought to be properly practiced. If phenomenology is always at least partly in the business of arguments, then it is worth giving further attention to the role and form of phenomenological argumentation, how it interacts with its more strictly descriptive component, and the status of phenomenological claims regarding conditions for various kinds of experience. I contend that different versions of phenomenological reasoning encroach upon argument forms that are commonly thought to be antithetical to phenomenology, notably abductive reasoning, understood in terms of its role in both hypothesis generation and i...

Phenomenology, Abduction and Argument: Avoiding an Ostrich Epistemology, 2022

Phenomenology has been described as a "non-argumentocentric" way of doing philosophy, reflecting ... more Phenomenology has been described as a "non-argumentocentric" way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone, regardless of whether this is intended as a descriptive claim about the work of the "usual suspects" or a normative claim about how phenomenology ought to be properly practiced. If phenomenology is always at least partly in the business of arguments, then it is worth giving further attention to the role and form of phenomenological argumentation, how it interacts with its more strictly descriptive component, and the status of phenomenological claims regarding conditions for various kinds of experience. I contend that different versions of phenomenological reasoning encroach upon argument forms that are commonly thought to be antithetical to phenomenology, notably abductive reasoning, understood in terms of its role in both hypothesis generation and in terms of justification. This paper identifies two main steps to making this case. The first step takes seriously the consequences of the intrinsically dialectical aspect of phenomenology in intersection with other modes of philosophy, the natural attitude, and non-philosophy. The second step focuses on transcendental reflection and arguments about the conditions/structures they contain. Together, these two steps aim to rescue phenomenology from the objection that it has an "ostrich epistemology" with regard to the ostensible purity of description, the intuition of essences, or the "conditions" ascertained through transcendental reflection.

Synthese

The article Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied co... more The article Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism, written by Maurizio Meloni and Jack Reynolds, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 18 June 2020 without open access. With the author(s)’ decision to opt for Open Choice the copyright of the article changed on 6 November 2020 to ©The Author(s) 2020 and the article is forthwith distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution.

Phenomenology in Australia and New Zealand

Book review : The event of the thing : Derrida's post-deconstructive realism by Michael Marder

Introduction: Chronopathologies: The Politics of Time Part I. Analytic Philosophy, Atemporality, ... more Introduction: Chronopathologies: The Politics of Time Part I. Analytic Philosophy, Atemporality, and Presentism: Some Encounters Across the Chunnel Chapter 1: Analytic and Continental Philosophy: A Contretemps? Chapter 2: Common Sense and Philosophical Methodology: Some Metaphilosophical Reflections on Analytic Philosophy via Deleuze Chapter 3: Negotiating the Non-negotiable: Rawls, Derrida, and the Intertwining of Political Calculation and Ultra-politics Part II. Poststructuralism, Time Out of Joint, and Future Politics Chapter 4: The Politics of Futurity in Derrida and Deleuze Chapter 5: Wounds and Scars: Deleuze on the Time and the Ethic of the Event Chapter 6: Deleuze's Perverse-structure: Beyond the Other-structure and the Struggle for Recognition Chapter 7: Derrida, Friendship, and the Transcendental Priority of the "Untimely" Part III. Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Pragmatic Temporality: An Anachronistic Dialogue Chapter 8: Time Out of Joint: Between Phenomenol...

Existentialism and politics

Encyclopedia of Political Thought, 2014

Condemned to freedom: Sartre's phenomenological ontology

Understanding Existentialism, 2009

According to several commentators, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) has been read more widely in his ow... more According to several commentators, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) has been read more widely in his own lifetime than any other philosopher in the history of philosophy, and around 100,000 people paid tribute to him at his funeral in Paris. He is also arguably the only self-proclaimed existentialist, at least of the major historical figures associated with the tradition, even if it is true that his initial acceptance of the label consisted largely in a begrudging assent to the media proliferation of the term with which Marcel had first described him and his partner, de Beauvoir. That said, Sartre is rightly considered to be the canonical existentialist, both in terms of public reception (he regularly graced the pages of Vogue in the US in the 1950s and was synonymous with French intellectual life), and academically, where his opus Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1943) still stands as the iconic and defining work of the tradition. Being and Nothingness was partly inspired by Sartre's encounter with Heidegger's Being and Time while he was a prisoner of war. Sartre's main influences in this work are Heidegger, Husserl and Hegel, but it is difficult to determine to what extent each of them influenced him, largely because Sartre's interpretations of them are always creative and do a certain violence to their texts (this is perhaps why Heidegger's response to Sartre in “Letter on Humanism” is so scathing).

Symposium, 2008

Deleuze suggests that his work grounds a new conception 0/ the Otherthe Other as expression 0/a p... more Deleuze suggests that his work grounds a new conception 0/ the Otherthe Other as expression 0/a possible world, as a structure that precedes any subsequent dialectical mediation, including the master-slave dialectic 0/ social relations. 1 will argue, however, that the ethico-political injunction that Deleuze derives /rom his analysis 0/ the 'other-structure' confronts a different problem. It commits Deleuze to either tacitly prescribing a romantic morality 0/ dijJerence that valorizes expressive encounters without 'relations 0/ explication' and any kind 0/ preunderstanding (embodied or otherwise), or his continual jlirtations with a mystical 'going beyond' the other-structure must be more than mere jlirtations. Arguably one ofthe most ill-understood sections ofDeleuze's oeuvre, both because it is rarely addressed and because of a general lack of agreement regarding how it fits in with his broader body of work, revolves around his enigmatic comments regarding what he calls the "other-structure," particularly in Difference and Repetition 2 and in his essay "Michel Toumier and the World Without Others," an appendix to Logic o/Sense. 3 He also briefly addresses the issue in Proust and Signs 4 and What is Philosophy?5, and in all of these books he points towards a new conception of the Other, namely, the Other as expression of a possible world, as a structure that precedes any subsequent dialectieal mediation and which hence avoids the theory of the master-slave dialectic of social relations as it has been construed since Hegel. This is perhaps not overly surprising, since as with post-structuralism in general, Deleuze's work resists the myriad different philosophical positions that privilege contradiction, opposition, and nega-tivity6, themes that are endemie to the master-slave dialectic on both Hegel and Sartre's understanding. It is not that Deleuze simply seeks to refute this version of the dialectic (the term 'dialectic' is not a dirty word for Deleuze as some have assumed 7), or even to abandon their insistenee upon arealm of soeial conflict that is non-subsumable and, therefore, constitutive for politics. Rather, it is their transcendental insistence on understanding this confliet aecording to opposition and negation that he wants to problematize, enabling hirn to retain certain of the strengths of the Hegelo-Marxist tradition. It continues to foreground questions to do with power, oppression, and domination, and also points toward the limits of any pre

Handbook of Liberal Naturalism, 2022

This chapter reads Merleau-Ponty's work in regard to liberal naturalism, giving particular attent... more This chapter reads Merleau-Ponty's work in regard to liberal naturalism, giving particular attention to embodiment and perception. It argues that Merleau-Ponty can be plausibly considered to advocate a form of liberal naturalism, and that it can help liberal naturalism fill its claims in and avoid some traps (i.e. ontological constructivism and methodological/epistemic separatism concerning philosophy and science).

This chapter examines the history of phenomenology in Australia and New Zealand, regarding: (1) o... more This chapter examines the history of phenomenology in Australia and New Zealand, regarding: (1) original phenomenological investigations and/or discoveries, (2) the interpretation, exegesis and translation of classical phenomenological texts (3) the use of classical phenomenology for the purpose of contributing to contemporary philosophical and interdisciplinary debates or (4) teaching of phenomenology in Australasian universities and the spreading of phenomenological ideas to the wider Australasian public.

Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Method, 2017

Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim... more Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between theory and practice, and the mode of philosophical presentation conducive to best making those points. We will do this by considering some of the central methodological objections that have been posed around the role of the first-person perspective and “lived experience” in the contemporary literature, before providing some neo-existentialist rejoinders. We will suggest that the dilemma that contemporary philosophy poses to existentialism, vis-à-vis methodology, is that it is: a) committed to lived experience as some sort of given that might be accessed either introspectively or retrospectively (with empirical science posing prima facie obstacles to the veridicality of each); and/or b) it advocates transformative experiences, and the power of philosophy in connection with such experiences, to radically revise our doxastic and inter-connected web of beliefs. In short, the charge is conservatism on the one hand, radicalism on the other. Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn, utilizing ideas from Kierkegaard (as the source for many existentialist themes, methodological concerns, and formal practices) and from the German and French twentieth century versions of existentialism.

Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History, 2017

In this paper, we examine the historical relationship between phenomenology and the emerging anal... more In this paper, we examine the historical relationship between phenomenology and the emerging analytic tradition. We pay particular attention to the reception of Husserl’s work by Russell, Moore, and others, and to some convergences between phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy, noted by Wittgenstein, Austin, and Ryle. Focusing on Russell and Ryle, we argue that the historical details suggest an alternative parsing of the ways to the “parting of the ways” narrative made famous by Dummett but also committed to by many others, in which we start from a common source or origin only to have two increasingly divergent inheritances of philosophy that have next to nothing in common, like the Rhine and the Danube. We will show that the period thought to be prior to the “gulf” does not evince the sort of philosophical unity and commonality of purpose sometimes ascribed to it, and that the period of socio-political institution of the ‘divide’ post World War Two, is both historically and philosophically much more complicated than it might be thought, with the ostensible rivers being rather more intertwined than is often supposed.

Crisis and Reconfigurations: 100 years of European Thought since World War 1 , ed. Matthew Sharpe et al, New York: Springer, 2017

In this chapter, I revisit the question of the philosophical significance of the Great War upon t... more In this chapter, I revisit the question of the philosophical significance of the Great War upon the trajectory of philosophy in the twentieth century. While accounts of this are very rare in philosophy, and this is itself symptomatic, those that are given are also strangely implausible, usually either asserting that there is little or no philosophical significance (because most of the major developments had already begun prior to the war), or maintaining that nothing was ever the same in philosophy (as elsewhere), with the creation of the so-called analytic-continental ‘divide’ being but one notable consequence. I attempt to steer a middle-way between these positions, both having a grain of truth but over-playing their respective hands.
Notwithstanding that analytic philosophy and phenomenology both precede the Great War (and its prospect), and that the critique of idealism was already very strong in Anglophone countries, I argue that the war was a significant factor in the ‘divide’ between analytic and continental philosophy. My claim is not simply that this is because of the widespread rhetoric, caricature, and stereotype stemming from the war concerning Germany (and German Idealism), but that it also involves some significant methodological and meta-philosophical transformations in the incipient analytic and continental trajectories that bear a close relationship to experiences of the war by some of the key philosophers (albeit also to internal philosophical pressures). I will thus contend that the first world war is closely connected with a “parting of the ways” in such self-understandings, between “philosophy and history/politics” on the one hand, and “philosophy or history/politics” on the other, even if both of these normative self-understandings are often betrayed in practice. I will mainly focus upon phenomenology and some trajectories in early analytic philosophy to argue this case.

understanding merleau-ponty, understanding modernism

Despite the enduring significance of Merleau-Ponty and the voluminous writings about his work, th... more Despite the enduring significance of Merleau-Ponty and the voluminous writings about his work, the book that was intended to be his magnum opus, The Visible and the Invisible, remains an unfinished project and one that has not had the sustained attention it merits. This may seem like a strange claim, given that many of its key concepts (chiasm, flesh, reversibility, etc.) have often been addressed. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the strengths and weaknesses of this incipient ontology are not themselves particularly well-known or discussed, especially in English. In this chapter we examine this "indirect ontology," before considering some of the criticisms made by his contemporaries and ‘successors’: Lacan, Irigaray, Levinas, Derrida and Deleuze.

Phenomenology and Science, 2016

Deleuze and Pragmatism, Oct 2014

In this chapter I juxtapose some of the central methodological and meta-philosophical commitments... more In this chapter I juxtapose some of the central methodological and meta-philosophical commitments of three contemporary neo-pragmatists - Rescher, Pilstrom and Margolis - with those of Deleuze. I pay particular attention to their respective conceptions of the centrality (or otherwise) of transcendental reasoning, methodological naturalism, and common sense, to their respective philosophical projects, and pose some obstacles for any "transcendental pragmatics" worthy of the name.

Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics, eds. K. Hermberg and P. Gyllenhammer, London: Continuum 2013, 2013

In this paper, I argue that the negative injunctions against certain ways of conceiving of the et... more In this paper, I argue that the negative injunctions against certain ways of conceiving of the ethico-political that we can draw explicitly from the methodological strictures of phenomenology are also consistent with some of the core more positive dimensions of contemporary virtue ethics (especially at the more anti-theoretical end of the virtue ethical spectrum), and that central aspects of virtue ethics are consistent with most of the explicit reflections on ethical matters proffered by canonical phenomenologists.

Time out of joint

Performance and Temporalisation: Time Happens, Jan 28, 2015

In the late 1980s, the American economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that “a battle is brewing over th... more In the late 1980s, the American economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that “a battle is brewing over the politics of time” because he felt that the pivotal issue of the twenty first century would be the question of time and who controlled it. I argue in this chapter that a battle over the politics of time (and the metaphysics of time) is also a major part of what is at stake in the differences between analytic and continental philosophy. Very different philosophies of time, and associated methodological techniques, serve to define representatives of each of these groups and also to guard against their potential interlocutors. To begin to illustrate this, I offer a patchy history of philosophy of time in the early twentieth century, the period in which the idea of a ‘divide’ between two ways of doing philosophy began to be entrenched.

Sartre's Legacy

Sartre: Key Concepts, 2013

Existentialism, Philosophy of

Encyclopedia of Political Thought, edited by Michael Gibbons, 2014

This chapter examines the connections between French existentialism and politics. Fellow travelle... more This chapter examines the connections between French existentialism and politics. Fellow travellers like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir saw themselves as engaging with two theoretical trajectories that for them dominated the mid-twentieth century intellectual milieu, one of which was ostensibly apolitical (phenomenology), the other of which involved a politicised understanding of philosophy (Marxism). Part of the motivation behind renewing phenomenology as existential phenomenology, as opposed to classical Husserlian phenomenology, was to allow them both to comprehend what was taking place during World War Two and, related to this, to allow them to try to do justice to the Marxian insight that the point is not only to understand the world but also to change it. While there are some serious risks associated with any politicising of philosophy, this chapter highlights some of the central contributions of French existentialist politics, beginning with Sartre’s Being and Nothingness and the manner in which it at least appears to consign politics to an inessential realm, before considering the subsequent illuminations on historical and political matters proffered by his contemporaries, de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty. We conclude via consideration of Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason, which perhaps was the culmination of existential Marxism, notwithstanding the subsequent contributions made by both Sartre and de Beauvoir. Central themes to be explored include the role of dialectical thinking in political theory, the failings that existentialists diagnosed at the heart of orthodox liberal and Marxist positions, and the specific contributions that they made in regard to issues to do with responsibility and dirty hands.

Existentialism and Post-structuralism: Some Unfashionable Observations

Continuum Companion to Existentialism, 2011

Continuum Companion to Existentialism, 2011

Chapter 3, Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides, ed. J. Reynolds, J. Chase, J. Williams and E. Mares, 2010

Analytic and continental philosophers typically differ on the worth of transcendental reasoning. ... more Analytic and continental philosophers typically differ on the worth of transcendental reasoning. Analytic concern with transcendental reasoning was evident from the beginning of the movement, and although the analytic literature saw a brief mini-industry on the subject following Peter Strawson’s prominent use of the method, discussion of their acceptability has always been more common than their actual use, and the trend of the discussion has run against the argument form. By contrast, in the continental traditions (from Kant to the present), it seems to us that transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous – although what the transcendental involves has been significantly and separately reconfigured by phenomenology and the genealogical turn, as well as by a more constructivist understanding of philosophy emphasising the transformative potential of the method in concept creation. In this paper, we trace these divergent attitudes vis-à-vis transcendental reasoning, with the goal of identifying some of the background differences in each tradition that (internally) justify the divergence. We begin with the analytic attitude to transcendental reasoning, which we argue is due in part to the explicit objections to transcendental reasoning absorbed by the analytic community, but also due in part to the methodological role of empiricism, the analytic understanding of transcendental argument as a form, and to a wider analytic attitude to ‘necessity-mongering’ claims. We then look at continental appropriations of such arguments, making use of Mark Sacks’ notion of a situated thought to outline transcendental reasoning involving embodiment and time, and considering the extent to which analytic criticisms apply to such usages.

Existentialism

Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, 2011

Postanalytic Philosophy?

Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides, 2010

Merleau-Ponty: Life and Works

Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, 2008

An invitation to philosophy

Reynolds and Roffe, Understanding Derrida, Jan 1, 2004

Review of Mark Kaldron, Sympathy in Perception

Notre Dame Phil Review

Book launch talk for A. J. Bartlett and J. Clemens, Badou: Key Concepts

Review of Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, ed. Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty

Jacques Derrida, Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2 Reviewed by

Philosophy in Review, 2005

Jacques Derrida , Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2 Reviewed by.

Herman Rapaport, Later Derrida: Reading the Recent Work Reviewed by

Philosophy in Review, 2004

Herman Rapaport , Later Derrida: Reading the Recent Work Reviewed by.

John Llewelyn, Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas Reviewed by

Philosophy in Review, 2003

John Llewelyn , Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas Reviewed by.

A. Vrahimis, Encounters Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy

Parrhesia Journal, 2014

Philosophy in Review, 2013

D. Zahavi, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, Oxford: OUP 2012.

Neal DeRoo, Futurity in Phenomenology

Notre Dame Journal of Phil review

J. Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography

Australian Book Review

M. Marder, The Event of the Thing: Derrida's Postdeconstructive Realism

Notre Dame Journal of Phil Review

M. Dummett, The Nature and Future of Philosophy

Metapsychology Online

S. Earnshaw, Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed

Metapsychology Online

P. Patton and J. Protevi, Between Deleuze and Derrida

Philosophy in Review

Taylor Carman and Mark Hansen, Eds, Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty

Notre Dame Journal of Phil review

J. Derrida, Eyes of the University

Philosophy in review

J. Taminiaux, Metamorphoses of the Phenomenological Reduction

Philosophy in Review

H. Rapaport, Later Derrida

Philosophy in Review

J. Derrida, Without Alibi

Philosophy in Review

J. Derrida, Rogues

Philosophy in Review

Transcendental phenomenology, naturalism, and “mutual constraint”: keeping the material a priori and inference to the best explanation

My talk at Parma, Italy, Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism conference Conference organise... more My talk at Parma, Italy, Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism conference

Conference organiser: Andrea Staiti