Peer Schouten | Danish Institute For International Studies (original) (raw)

Books by Peer Schouten

Cambridge University Press, 2022

There are so many roadblocks in Central Africa that it is hard to find a road that does not have ... more There are so many roadblocks in Central Africa that it is hard to find a road that does not have one. Based on research in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), Peer Schouten maps more than a thousand of these roadblocks to show how communities, rebels, and state security forces forge resistance and power out of control over these narrow points of passage. Schouten reveals the connections between these roadblocks in Central Africa and global supply chains, tracking the flow of multinational corporations and UN agencies alike through them, to show how they encapsulate a form of power, which thrives under conditions of supply chain capitalism. In doing so, he develops a new lens through which to understand what drives state formation and conflict in the region, offering a radical alternative to explanations that foreground control over minerals, territory, or population as key drivers of Central Africa's violent history.

Palgrave, Apr 2016

This edited volume brings back key thinkers whose work is foundational for the discipline of Inte... more This edited volume brings back key thinkers whose work is foundational for the discipline of International Relations. International Relations is as much a conversation with the living as with the dead, and The Return of the Theorists presents forty dialogues with key thinkers that shaped the field, conducted by renowned contemporary IR scholars.

This PhD dissertation explores how private security companies co-constitute political order in th... more This PhD dissertation explores how private security companies co-constitute political order in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as a case through which broader questions regarding the relationship between security governance and political order can be investigated. The thesis explores the spatial distribution of private security companies in Congo, and investigates their predominant entanglement with internationalized governance processes.
Furthermore, it explores how this contemporary instance of the relationship between security governance and political order resonates with and reproduces longer-standing patterns of internationalized political ordering in Congo.
This thesis raises questions around how it may be possible to theorize the relationship between security governance and political order to capture the historical ways in which that relationship has been articulated in Congolese history. Specifically, it asks whether broadening our conception of political order to encompass both security governance and the infrastructural arrangements underpinning modern political order might bring into view durable patterns of political ordering that otherwise remain hidden—patterns of extraversion, where key domestic ordering processes in Congo are reproduced as the properties of international power relations.

Articles by Peer Schouten

Geoforum, 2021

This article uses the concept of the ‘infrastructural frontier’ to trace the linkages between ext... more This article uses the concept of the ‘infrastructural frontier’ to trace the linkages between externally financed road building projects and the constitution of eastern DR Congo as a liminal political space at the material edge of the state. This frontier space has two core features: first, the patchy quality of its road infrastructure, which is perpetually rebuilt only to disintegrate again. Second, the transient nature of configurations of authority and control, leading to ‘circulation struggles’ along roads that are never fully functional. These features contribute to the collapse of a clear-cut dichotomy between the presence and the absence of transport infrastructure, but also between spaces of control and spaces of resistance. The constitution of eastern Congo as an infrastructural frontier, we argue, is importantly related to its ‘subversive soils’, whose clayish, sticky substance accelerates road degradation and compounds power projection. The resulting patchiness of both durable road infrastructure and central state control generates a ‘frontier effect’: it invites perpetual external donor interventions to build roads, but these projects never fundamentally upend the infrastructural and political state of affairs. In fact, as we demonstrate, these projects have become crucial to its very constitution. These observations point to the dual temporality of eastern Congo’s ‘perpetual’ infrastructural frontier, where the short-term volatility of circulation struggles is both a product of and reproduces its frontier-ness over the longue durée. Our contribution thus demonstrates the intricate relations between the temporal, material and political qualities of frontier spaces.

Geopolitics, 2020

This paper explores the history and ongoing transformation of the South Sudanese Sudd marshlands ... more This paper explores the history and ongoing transformation of the South Sudanese Sudd marshlands as a buffer zone in a variety of subsequent projects of domination and their sub-version. Its argument will be that the contemporary geopolitics of the Sudd cannot be understood properly without unwinding the historical layers of contestation and conflict around these projects of control and their reversal, projects which have sought to shape and have been shaped crucially by the area's specific ecology. For more than a century, different external ventures-colonial, nationalist, secessionist-encountered in the southern Sudanese marshlands a formidable buffer to the realization of their various projects of control. Ambitions of making the Nile water flow, establishing effective state authority , or building lines of communication, get stuck in the Sudd's difficult terrain. Building on the political ecology and wider social theory on terrain, resistance and warfare, we conceptualize the Sudd as a lively political ecology-one characterized by constant struggles and accommodations between the centripe-tal logics of state-making and the centrifugal propensities of vernacular political culture.

Environment and Planning D: Society & Space, 2019

A frequent sight along many roads, roadblocks form a banal yet persistent element across the marg... more A frequent sight along many roads, roadblocks form a banal yet persistent element across the margins of contemporary global logistical landscapes. How, this article asks, can we come to terms with roadblocks as a logistical form of power? Based on an ongoing mapping of roadblocks in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, it sketches a political geography of “roadblock politics”: a spatial pattern of control concentrated around trade routes, where the capacity to disrupt logistical aspirations is translated into other forms of power, financial and political. While today’s roadblocks are tied up with the ongoing conflict in both countries, the article shows, roadblock politics has a much deeper history. Before colonization, African rulers manufactured powerful polities out of control over points of passage along long-distance trade routes crisscrossing the continent. The article traces how since precolonial times control over long-distance trade routes was turned into a source of political power, how these routes were forcefully appropriated through colonial occupation, how after the crumbling of the colonial order new connections were engineered between political power and the circulation of goods in Central Africa, and how control over these flows ultimately became a key stake in ongoing civil wars in the region.

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2019

We can today speak of an established field of critical logistics. Collectively, it made great str... more We can today speak of an established field of critical logistics. Collectively, it made great strides in debunking the neoliberal myth that circulation is essentially born free but everywhere in chains. Instead, we are now at the point where we can recognize that economic circulation is always politically constituted: paraphrasing Polanyi (1944), it takes active work to disembed “free” circulation from the pre-existing ties that would otherwise slow it down. On dropping the assumption—corollary to the notion of the invisible hand—that circulation is a natural state, critical studies of logistics force us to render visible the many hands meddling in the world to make things move. And whereas supply chains outwardly might conjure an image of all-powerful smooth conveyance, recent work along these lines (see Chua et al., 2018) has emphasized how, to paraphrase Gregoire Chamayou (2015: 86–87), this logistical order is highly powerful over long distances but extremely vulnerable up close.

If Cowen, borrowing from Lenin, rightly posited that “logistics space is produced through the intensification of both capital circulation and organized violence” (2014: 11), in setting the agenda, critical studies of logistics have tended to focus on those loci where both reached their maximum intensity—the heart, so to speak, of the contemporary logistical order. But many patterns of “routinised ‘action at a distance’” (Amin, 2002: 386) across the globe elude this particular emphasis on intensity. Building on the insights from the logistical turn, this special issue of Environment and Planning D: Society and Space shifts the focus towards the politics of circulation in the margins of supply chain capitalism. It asks: what is the politics of logistics where Amazon doesn’t deliver to the doorstep? To explore this question, the special issue aims to foster an anthropologically informed approach to the politics of circulation. This entails an explicit move to look beyond logistics as a calculative project steered from centers of power towards the universal aspiration to put things into circulation unhindered. This analytical and methodological broadening also entails an empirical shift of focus. Empirically, the eight contributions in this collection explore the politics of circulation in the margins across four continents, ranging from Burmese mountain ranges to Central African savannahs and from failing infrastructure schemes in the Colombian Amazon to marginal West African seaports. Methodologically, the contributions share a commitment to an ethnographic inclination, gearing towards what Gregson (2017) called “logistics at work.” The authors follow unlikely logistics operators as they struggle to make things circulate, attentive to the kinds of social and political relations that these projects of circulation, big and small, engender.

International Affairs, 2018

Do roads literally lead to peace? While seemingly a strange question to ask, today's peacebuilder... more Do roads literally lead to peace? While seemingly a strange question to ask, today's peacebuilders certainly seem to think so. After decades of focus on questions of governance, today, instead, infrastructure primes in state- and peacebuilding missions in many fragile and conflict-affected societies. Peacebuilding efforts in places ranging from Somalia to Afghanistan to the Congo are, to a considerable extent, interventions in the built environment. While infrastructure has always been around in post-conflict reconstruction, today, infrastructure is mobilized during ongoing conflict, invested with aspirations of improving security and stability. To be sure, infrastructure played a big role in the formation of strong western states. But can we take this experience to try and forge political orders of concrete and steel? At a first glance, a theory of change that reorders societies by deploying the hidden powers of the built environment seems compelling, and measurable and concrete infrastructure outputs, additionally, fit perfectly within today's more pragmatic approaches to peace. However, based on examples from across the contemporary global peacebuilding landscape, we show that infrastructure neither amounts to a uniform force, nor is it clear what its impact on peace exactly is. What is certain is that infrastructure is profoundly entwined with contemporary peacebuilding, and that we therefore need to develop novel theoretical angles to come to terms with the ubiquitous politics of infrastructure.

Security Dialogue

Critical approaches to security have come to define themselves against mainstream security studie... more Critical approaches to security have come to define themselves against mainstream security studies by not a priori assuming what security is, but rather taking it as an ‘essentially contested concept’. Yet, as evidenced by the way in which recent ‘turns’ in the field have played out in the debate around airport security, ontological assumptions about security tend to restrict the scope of empirical analysis, with airport security being studied as, for instance, either discourse or practice. This article aims to propose an alternative methodological approach to security by studying security as controversy. Studying security as controversy means refraining from making a priori assumptions about the ontology of (in)security, instead considering it as itself at stake in – and hence the outcome of – security governance efforts. The article elaborates on this approach by drawing on core insights from actor-network theory, a conceptual and methodological toolkit that allows, as I show, a focus on how security actors perform security by enrolling, assembling and translating heterogeneous elements into stable assemblages that can be presented as definitive security solutions or threats. The article illustrates this approach through a look at the case of airport security at Amsterdam Airport in the aftermath of the 2009 Christmas terrorist attempt.

Corporations from the East India Company to United Fruit did shady business in conflict zones for... more Corporations from the East India Company to United Fruit did
shady business in conflict zones for decades, inviting the wrath
of diplomats and international watchdogs who accused them
of war-profiteering. By the end of the 20th century, however,
the rapidly growing international peace-building community—
including ngos, the United Nations, development consortiums,
think tanks, and some developed-world governments—started
taking a different tack. These days, an emphasis on economic
opening and corporate social responsibility means that many
of the world’s most powerful organizations are actively encouraging corporations into conflict markets, hoping this will lead to peace. But businesses like Heineken's Bralima subsidiary have found that this often means supporting the very rebel groups that their business activities are supposed to defang.

Millennium, May 2013

Congo’s state failure is usually analysed in terms of a ‘broken social contract’, reflecting the ... more Congo’s state failure is usually analysed in terms of a ‘broken social contract’, reflecting the degree to which mainstream understandings of state failure are conditioned by classical social contract theory. This article takes a different route to understanding Congo’s predicament by building on insights from actor-network theory (ANT). ANT’s insistence on society as a socio-material entanglement, it shows, translates into increasing attention to the role of material infrastructures in constituting governmental power. Conversely, this approach also allows the highlighting of the importance of the absence of the material underpinnings of rule in drawing up more nuanced accounts of state failure.

Journal of Regional Security, 2019

From September 2016 to September 2017, the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) and the... more From September 2016 to September 2017, the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) and the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) conducted a mapping of roadblocks in the Central African Republic. This data collection campaign also features more than 200 interviews with various actors and was combined with data from other reports on roadblocks to form a comprehensive study on the political economy of roadblocks in the Central African Republic.

Conflict, Security & Development, 2019

Large-scale infrastructure in conflict-affected states is often seen as a crucial means to pursue... more Large-scale infrastructure in conflict-affected states is often seen as a crucial means to pursue economic growth, poverty reduction, and increasingly, peace-building. Legitimated by an emergent ‘Business for Peace’ agenda, a variety of private actors now also engages in such infrastructure projects. The Virunga Alliance is such an initiative which aims to tackle the interlinked problems of poverty, conservation and conflict in the east of DR Congo through commercialised hydro-power. To take stock of the politics unfolding around such infrastructure efforts, this article analyses the Virunga Alliance as a form of ‘technopolitics’. This entails tracing how current is generated, distributed and consumed, and how these processes generate new sites of power and control. In describing how Virunga offers a centralised, more concentrated supply of electricity as an alternative to the decentralised charcoal circuit, we show how electrification contributes to the expansion of a form of capitalism that prioritises big businessmen over small farmers, facilitates rent-seeking by political elites and amplifies social inequalities in Congo.

Conflict, Security & Development, 2019

What role does business play in peace-building and conflict reduction? This special issue tackles... more What role does business play in peace-building and conflict reduction? This special issue tackles this complex question, exploring varied business efforts to bring peace through six rigorous qualitative cases in Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Somaliland, Brazil, Guatemala and El Salvador. Three main findings cut across this issue. First, local context is paramount to success; there is no one universal formula that a regulator, business or peace practitioner aiming to advance a business agenda for peace can employ for operational success. Second, rather than compartmentalising ‘peace’ into projects that often carry ‘win-lose’ consequences for local communities, business-peace projects must first understand who they are empowering so that they do not unwittingly make the conflict worse. Third, investment and access are deeply intertwined in fragile and conflict-affected areas, and business-peace projects that simply try to improve business access typically exacerbate inequalities favouring elite actors. We close with a discussion on how to take the business and peace-building agenda forward with scholarship and policy, stressing that business-peace projects must be assessed at the societal and not project level if their impact is to be truly beneficial for a political economy of peaceful development.

Journal of International Relations and Development, 2018

This article explores the implications of ‘business for peace’ (B4P), a new global governance par... more This article explores the implications of ‘business for peace’ (B4P), a new global governance paradigm that aims to put international businesses at the frontline of peace, stability and development efforts in fragile and conflictaffected states. This article argues that B4P entails a shift in the balance between public and private authority across what we coin the ‘business–peace nexus’ and which comprises corporate peacebuilding activities across different spatial scales and institutional settings. We explore B4P’s agency across two distinct nodes in this nexus—in global peacebuilding and development architectures, and in local peacebuilding settings in the Democratic Republic of Congo—to articulate the B4P paradigm’s multiple and contradictory effects on the balance between public and private authority in contemporary peacebuilding. On the one hand, B4P tips institutional scales towards the public by embedding corporations within public accountability structures. On the other hand, by legitimising businesses as peace actors, the B4P framework risks institutionalising asymmetrical encounters between firms and people affected by their operations. We deploy the term ‘asymmetrical governance’ to explain how the amalgamation of global and national, public and private into the operational presence of corporations skews the balance of power in their encounters with local populations.

Long thought to be a rarefied calling for diplomats or dedicated activists, global peacebuilders ... more Long thought to be a rarefied calling for diplomats or dedicated activists, global peacebuilders are being pushed to accept a new player into their ranks: international business. Attempting to shed their post-Cold War reputations as conflict profiteers, transnational firms today from Shell and Starbucks to Chevron and Heineken are undertaking peacebuilding ventures within some of the most fragile, impoverished, and conflict-affected regions of the world. Governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations and the World Bank, and even some international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have all started to bring businesses aboard in public-private partnerships that try to stimulate peaceful development through poverty reduction, socio-economic growth, and inclusive negotiation. To make sense of it all, we surveyed a broad swath of recent ventures where firms have acted effectively as peacebuilders as well as places where they have simply made conflict and violence worse. Synthesizing many of today’s implicit assumptions, we present five contemporary business actions that arguably advance peace: (1) growing markets and economically integrating regions to facilitate a peace dividend; (2) encouraging local development to grow local peace capacities; (3) importing international norms to improve democratic accountability; (4) changing the drivers or root causes of conflict; and (5) undertaking direct diplomatic efforts with conflict actors. We show that while some see ingenious initiatives brimming with possibilities, others see this as ‘peacewashing’ at best and corporate exploitation of the world’s most vulnerable at worst. We take a measured stance, finding that firms can become effective peacebuilders, but must tread carefully through societal minefields - and their own divergent interests - to get there.

While the illicit economy is generally conceived of as either a pre-existing outside reality or t... more While the illicit economy is generally conceived of as either a pre-existing outside reality or the product of governmental discourse, this article proposes to shift attention away from “the illicit economy“ towards the practices that constitute it. Building on actor-network theory, it studies the practices through which the illicit economy is produced in zones of qualification, that is, intensely governed and vital economic spaces. Highlighting the case of Johannesburg's City Improvement Districts, it shows how the illicit economy emerges as a tangible “outside“ through practices aimed at constituting and regulating an “inside.“ Through in-depth analysis of both social and material practices, this article contributes to a symmetrical theoretical understanding of the way in which the illicit economy is constructed by practice.

Reports by Peer Schouten

LSE CPR working paper, 2021

Over thirty years of conflict in eastern Congo have been marked by a deepening of the role of vio... more Over thirty years of conflict in eastern Congo have been marked by a deepening of the role of violence in politics as well as a progressive fragmentation of the landscape of armed groups. Deepening insecurity in eastern Congo coincides with competition over political power on the national level between the political networks around Felix Tshisekedi and Joseph Kabila. This report explores the relations between political dynamics on the national level and in the east, analyzing the historical evolution and properties of the Congo’s political economy of conflict and testing a political marketplace lens—an approach that foregrounds how the conduct of elites mirrors that of firms competing in a marketplace.

Cambridge University Press, 2022

Palgrave, Apr 2016

Geoforum, 2021

Geopolitics, 2020

Environment and Planning D: Society & Space, 2019

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2019

International Affairs, 2018

Security Dialogue

Millennium, May 2013

Journal of Regional Security, 2019

Conflict, Security & Development, 2019

Journal of International Relations and Development, 2018

LSE CPR working paper, 2021

IPIS/Concordis, 2021

Results of Consultation with transboundary herders, semi-settled herders and settled communities ... more Results of Consultation with transboundary herders, semi-settled herders and settled communities in Ouham Pendé and Western Ouham

DIIS Working Paper Series #15, 2019

A new DIIS study presents an overview of the role of transit taxes levied at checkpoints in finan... more A new DIIS study presents an overview of the role of transit taxes levied at checkpoints in financing ongoing conflicts around the world. Compiling evidence from six different contexts, this DIIS Working Paper finds that in each of the conflicts, checkpoints form a key source of revenue for parties to the conflict. Whether in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Syria, the Central African Republic or Iraq, taxing passage is a consistent feature of how conflict actors sustain themselves.

Understanding how conflict is financed is important, because many external interventions try to stem conflict by cutting off sources of funding to parties in a conflict. In the past, research on conflict financing has disproportionately focused on so-called ‘conflict minerals’. This has led to new regulations and interventions targeting mining.

‘The purpose of compiling the available evidence is to call attention to other sources of conflict financing which are just as important’, Peer Schouten, author of the study, explains. ‘And the preliminary evidence certainly suggests that the “global checkpoint economy” is at least as pervasive as conflict minerals.’ Checkpoints and transit taxes are particularly important for armed actors that don’t control mineral-rich areas and have no outside support.

UNOPS/DIIS, 2020

This report makes a case for increased knowledge and awareness of the role of infrastructure in F... more This report makes a case for increased knowledge and awareness of the role of infrastructure in FCAS. It advocates a shift away from the traditional view of infrastructure as individual, isolated physical assets towards a holistic understanding of infrastructure as complex systems that interact with different aspects of fragility. To illustrate this crucial point, the paper assesses how infrastructure systems interact with the five dimensions of fragility as defined by the OECD. Given that infrastructure systems and the services they provide play different roles as fragile contexts change, this paper identifies the potential role of infrastructure across different stages of the conflict life cycle, highlighting the different contexts in which infrastructure can support or hinder peacebuilding efforts.

IPIS/DIIS, 2019

In a new report and webmap, IPIS presents its updated data on armed conflict and armed interferen... more In a new report and webmap, IPIS presents its updated data on armed conflict and armed interference in eastern DRC’s artisanal mining sector. Building on extensive data, gathered over the last ten years, IPIS assesses the impact of responsible sourcing initiatives in DRC, designed to address armed interference in mineral supply chains. The report illustrates that responsible sourcing efforts have indeed improved the personal security of groups of artisanal miners in several provinces. However, these are relatively fragile gains and the underlying problems remain unchanged.

IPIS also establishes that most of the armed conflicts appear to be unrelated to mining activities. Armed interference in artisanal mining often rather concerns illegal ‘protection rackets’, while armed confrontations largely take place elsewhere and for other stakes. Nevertheless, these protection rackets do contribute to the overall insecurity in eastern DRC and further stigmatizes the region to be an impossible area to conduct ethically responsible business.

IPIS’ data on roadblocks illustrates that artisanal mining is only one of the many sources of financing for conflict actors in eastern DRC. Furthermore, the research on roadblocks demonstrates that armed actors do not need to have direct control over mining sites to benefit from the artisanal mining sector. IPIS notes a consistent pattern whereby the army consistently erects roadblocks some distance away from the mines.

Central African Republic: A Conflict Mapping. IPIS' interactive webmap and the report “Central Af... more Central African Republic: A Conflict Mapping. IPIS' interactive webmap and the report “Central African Republic: A Conflict Mapping” provides the reader with an overview of the actors, dynamics and the drivers of conflict in the Central African Republic

What are the conditions under which businesses can move beyond ‘doing no harm’ in the fragile an... more What are the conditions under which businesses can move beyond ‘doing no harm’ in the fragile and conflict-affected societies where they work to deliver more tangible positive peace dividends? Designed for businesses, practitioners, scholars and others who are interested and engaged in corporate impact in such areas, this report provides an overview of the main lessons from a four-year study of corporate peacebuilding initiatives across a range of contexts. Its main findings are formulated as seven key questions which can help evaluate risks and improve impact.

This report explores the political economy of the road in the provinces of North and South Kivu. ... more This report explores the political economy of the road in the provinces of North and South Kivu. Its main finding is that control over traffic is a key stake in the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The road is furthermore one of the main sources of illicit financing of various state and non-state armed actors, which translates into the omnipresence of roadblocks along them.

Because of this, roads without roadblocks are rare. Our research has identified 798 roadblocks: 312 in South Kivu and 486 in North Kivu. Of these, 174 or 22% have a presence of armed groups; 55 or 7% are manned by unarmed non-state actors (such as volunteers or self-demobilized elements), and 569 or 71% have a presence of government actors (comprising administrative entities, army, police, etc.) or actors tolerated by the state (such as cooperatives). In many cases, roadblocks are operated simultaneously by different actors (e.g. a cooperative and an armed non-state group, or an unarmed non-state actor accompanied by an armed soldier).

Congolese roads are heavily militarized: at 597 or 75% of all roadblocks, at least one armed actor is present. The Congolese army (FARDC) is the main operator of the roadblocks. Its presence was observed at 379 or 47% of all roadblocks. At 168 or 44% of the roadblocks where the army is present, they engage in the taxation of natural resources (such as minerals, charcoal, timber and agricultural products). The army is followed by the chieftaincy/services (local governance entities), present at 147 or 19% of the barriers. Finally, the third place is shared by the National Intelligence Agency (ANR) and the Traffic Police (PCR), being present respectively at 10% and 12% of the roadblocks in the two provinces.

The report divides the roadblocks into three categories: “strategic”, “administrative” and “economic”. The category of strategic barriers comprises military deployments, placed in response to an enemy presence. We identified 45 of these. In the administrative category fall those roadblocks that lie at the boundary between two decentralized administrative entities (province, territory, groupement). Our study has identified 37. Most roadblocks, however, are exclusively motivated by economic motives. In the “economic” category, we group all those roadblocks whose presence is justified exclusively by the imposition of taxes on a person or good crossing of the roadblock. We counted 513 barriers at which the right to pass was taxed, 239 barriers where natural resources were targeted, and 161 barriers placed at the entry and/or exit of a market. A single roadblock might be classed in several categories, for example a military roadblock (strategic) which is simultaneously used to tax passers-by (economic).

The line between legitimate revenue generation and extortion at roadblocks is often crossed. Taxation at roadblocks might be regarded as legitimate, when largely unpaid military or rebel elements posted at roadblocks make informal agreements with the local population. In exchange for the taxes, which sustain their operational presence, the armed actors provide some form of protection in return. But at most of the roadblocks, levels of taxation far exceed the operational and logistical needs of their operators. Most roadblocks should therefore be understood as one among the many forms of income generation through taxation in the DRC, complementing the direct exploitation of minerals, the monopolization of trade, and the taxation of households. Operating roadblocks is lucrative, widespread, and therefore contributes to the continuation of militarization, insecurity and structural underdevelopment in the provinces of North and South Kivu.

This roadblock mapping can serve as an empirical basis for the fight against illegal taxation and conflict financing. The report, more specifically, provides an overview of a hitherto unknown yet fundamental aspect of the political economy of con ict in eastern DRC, thus complementing existing knowledge on the role of natural resources. The mapping in this report can be used to gain insight into the geographic distribution of armed actors and state services, to gain insight into the scope of extortion, as well as its main perpetrators. Although it is hard to single out one actor, the panoply of road barriers presents a structural violation of human rights and weighs heavily of the subsistence economy in the eastern DRC.

This report explores the political economy of trade routes in the Central African Republic (CAR).... more This report explores the political economy of trade routes in the Central African Republic (CAR). Its main finding is that control over transit is a much coveted stake in the CAR’s ongoing con ict, with road space constituting a significant source of illicit wealth accumulation among different state and non-state actors. This translates into the omnipresence of roadblocks.

This report identifies a total of 284 roadblocks. Of these, 117 (or 41%) are operated by government forces, 149 (or 52 percent) by ex-Seleka groups, and 40 (or 14%) by anti-balaka groups. In some cases, two different armed actors share control over a single roadblock. In general, however, roadblocks operated by governmental structures (ranging from different administrative entities, to the police and the military) are largely concentrated in the south-western part of the country. Roadblocks operated by different armed groups concentrate around trade routes crossing the rest of the country.

Ex-Seleka groups control more roadblocks than government forces overall, but the gendarmerie is the largest individual operator of roadblocks, with a presence at 92 or 32% of all mapped roadblocks in the CAR. The gendarmerie is followed by the FPRC, present at 61 or 21% of roadblocks. Third place is shared by the UPC, the MPC and anti-balaka groups, each controlling around 40 or 14% of barriers.

This report identifies three main economic circuits on which roadblocks concentrate: the cattle circuit has 62 barriers (22% of the total) where ex-Seleka groups impose taxes; the Sudanese circuit is also dominated by former Seleka factions and has 64 barriers (23%); and finally, the ‘legal’ circuit has 26 barriers (9%) controlled by state services. The remainder of the CAR’s roadblocks are scattered across its wider road network.

The involvement of ex-Seleka groups in these economic circuits, however, goes beyond taxation at roadblocks. Customs or ‘free passage’ taxes are levied on traders passing through areas under their control, and in some cases obligatory, paid, escorts are imposed. Case studies outlined in this report detail these mechanisms of extortion. We estimate that ex-Seleka armed groups generate around EUR 6 million per year by imposing taxes on the main economic circuits in the area under their control. Of this, EUR 3.59 million per year derives from their interference with the cattle circuit, and 2.38 EUR million from the Sudanese circuit.

INFRASTRUCTURE constitutes a large portion of contemporary donor spending on fragile and conflict... more INFRASTRUCTURE constitutes a large portion of contemporary donor spending on fragile and conflict-affected states. But we know little about its impact. As part of a collaboration between DIIS and UNOPS, this report provides an overview of the evidence on the interactions between infrastructure, conflict and fragility. Through cases of experiences from contexts such as Congo, Afghanistan and South Sudan, it forwards six challenges that condition the positive impact that infrastructure might have in fragile and conflict-affected states.

CCDA Project Report, Sep 2013

"Since the end of the Cold War, transnational corporations increasingly operate in volatile envir... more "Since the end of the Cold War, transnational corporations increasingly operate in volatile environments. This has led to widespread concern with human rights abuses stemming from the impact that commercial activities have on security governance in unstable areas. While attention has hitherto mainly been directed at the activities of extractive industries in volatile environments, corporate presence in volatile environments is not restricted to mineral resource extraction. Transnational consumer goods and services corporations often also operate in similar contexts.
This report has two interrelated goals. First, it aims at shedding light on the risks and challenges that arise when transnational corporations engage security actors in volatile environments. It does so—second—by developing an analytical framework for understanding the resulting dynamics, by examining the impact of transnational corporations on security governance in terms of their interaction with commercial conflict- dependent actors (CCDA’s). CCDA’s are defined as actors that have based their actions or adjusted them to an armed conflict in such a way as to benefit financially from it.
Dealing with conflict actors and influencing local conflicts is not the typical core business of transnational corporations. Yet corporate willingness to operate in volatile environments means transnational corporations are inevitably confronted with CCDA’s. As engaging with CCDA’s entails a serious corporate risk, this study should be seen as a case study that helps corporations identify and avoid CCDA’s.
In order to provide a nuanced understand of the dynamics of transnational corporate engagement with CCDA’s in volatile environments, this reports presents an in-depth case study of Heineken’s subsidiary Bralima in the Eastern Congo. Based on extensive fieldwork, it discusses Bralima’s interaction with three different types of commercial conflict-dependent actors: first, Bralima’s complicity with rebel groups during 2006; second, Bralima’ s use of private security companies; and third, Bralima’ s engagement with Congolese state security forces—both the police and army. It discusses in detail how each of these actors qualify as commercial conflict-dependent actors within the context of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to subsequently give a systematic overview of how Bralima engages them.
Rather than aberrations, the report shows how these engagements form an intricate part of Bralima’s structures of corporate governance, that are to a large extent co-determined by the Heineken Group. The report concludes with a summary and recommendations to the Heineken Group regarding the impact they have on security governance through their subsidiary’s engagement with CCDA’s. As this case study forms an example of the more general tendency for transnational corporations to engage commercial conflict-dependent actors, this report is of relevance both to academics and NGO’s concerned with corporate security governance and to transnational corporations operating in volatile environments."

Public authority is an essentially contested concept in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). N... more Public authority is an essentially contested concept in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Not only is the ‘state of the state’ subject to profound disagreement in academic debates, but public authority on the ground is also the focal point of heated contestation. While some argue that the DRC does not exist as a state from the perspective of normative understandings of statehood (Herbst & Mills 2013), others argue that the state as an idea tenaciously persists as a frame of reference for how the Congolese attribute responsibility in questions of public authority (Englebert 2002). Yet others contest frames of state failure by pointing out that public authority coalesces in well-oiled structures of predatory accumulation (Kuditshini 2008; Olsson & Fors 2004; Rackley 2006).

This paper aims to put the debate about public authority into perspective by arguing that public authority is not an ‘either’- ‘or’ question. Rather, manifestations of public authority differ from one site to another, unfolding in overlapping and shifting spatial patterns along geographies of economic resources and infrastructures of circulation; what, following Gabrielle Hecht (2011), the author calls entangled geographies of public authority. The paper explores how these geographies are composed of practices associated with statehood that are deployed for, and essentially infused with, what are best understood as private logics of accumulation in the DRC. Rather than an exhaustive study of how public authority is negotiated in everyday encounters, it unpacks the entangled geography of public authority in Ituri by focusing on the organization and distribution of security and justice practices in the region along pathways carved out by gold extraction and circulation.

Report by IPIS for the ICGLR.

Whereas artisanal mining has always been a key economic activity in the region, the Nia-Nia area ... more Whereas artisanal mining has always been a key economic activity in the region, the Nia-Nia area in the Ituri terri- tory of the oriental province of the DRC has only recently become a site of importance to the international gold mi- ning community. As industrial mining in the DRC is often accompanied by socio-economic and political friction, this report, which is based on in-depth on-site fieldwork, explores the mining activities carried out by international mining companies and situates them in the socio-political context of the region to assess conflict potentiality and key markers for development.
In a first section, it situates the Nia-Nia area within the broader political, socio-economic and ethnic context of Ituri, to indicate that coming to grips with dynamics in Nia-Nia largely requires a unique approach as they are characte- rized by tendencies that differ from other places in Ituri.
In a second section, it lays out ongoing mining activities. It finds that of the approximately 30 mining concessions given out for the area by the Congolese authorities, several are currently being explored by three mining compa- nies: Loncor Resources, Kilo Goldmines, and Corner Stones Ressources (sic.). This report describes the ongoing acti- vities for each of these corporations and sums up the principal ways in which each international mining company interacts with the surrounding community, in each case paying specific attention to security dynamics related to its presence.
In a third section, it relates the mining companies’ community engagements and security dynamics to broader po- litical, socio-economic, and especially ethnic dynamics, to assess the conflict potentiality of the presence of each of the international mining operations. It finds that, and describes how, both community development efforts and se- curity implications of international gold mining activity in Nia-Nia on all accounts intertwine with ongoing ethnic disputes, especially in the perception of local communities. The report pays special attention in this section to the way in which mining corporations become instrumentalized in amplifying tensions between the Ndaka and Budu tribes of the adjacent Mambasa and Wamba territories.
In the concluding section, the report explores some possible policy implications. First and foremost, it argues that the absence of mobile phone communication infrastructure allows for the current situation in which tribal actors politicize and instrumentalize international mining corporations for their own political, economic, and social in- terests, leading to amplified tensions and increased conflict potentiality. By extension, mining corporations and civil society actors should push for Congolese mobile phone networks to expand their market into the Nia-Nia area. Se- condly, the report argues that information is dually important: one the one hand, mining corporations should in- form themselves about the socio-political and ethnic dynamics of the area when formulating their community engagement policy, and on the other hand, they should invest more in informing different civil society stakehol- ders.

L’exploitation des minerais en RDC se déroule actuellement toujours dans un climat d’insécurite... more L’exploitation des minerais en RDC se déroule actuellement toujours dans un climat d’insécurité, de nancement de groupes rebelles, de violation des droits humains, de taxation illégale et de contrebande, privant ainsi l’état de rentrées désespérément nécessaires. La plupart des initiatives visant à comprendre et à combattre ce problème ont largement négligé de prendre en compte le commerce de l’or, étant donné l’absence d’une base de référence en matière de production aurifère et de commerce de l’or suite à une méconnaissance générale du sujet. Pourtant, la part de l’or dans le nancement des groupes armés et l’évasion scale est beaucoup plus importante que celle des 3T (étain, tantale et tungstène). La présente étude s’e orce de remédier à cette méconnaissance et vise à informer et aider la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL) pour la mise en place d’une politique de gestion du secteur de l’or. En se concentrant sur la Province Orientale, principale région aurifère du pays, la présente étude a pour objectif de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension du secteur de l’or dans l’ensemble de la RDC.
Il y a de nombreuses explications au manque d’informations détaillées et précises sur les volumes d’or produits et négociés dans l’est de la RDC. Les problèmes institutionnels et les spéci cités de l’or, à savoir son ratio petit volume/grande valeur et la stabilité de son prix, en font un candidat idéal aux opérations de contrebande.
La nature opaque et informelle du secteur minier en Province Orientale n’est pas pour autant synonyme de chaos total. Le secteur, ses mécanismes de production et ses schémas de négoce sont relativement structurés. L’approvisionnement de la chaîne de l’or en Province Orientale est assuré par plus de 150.000 artisans-mineurs qui extraient l’or au moyen d’outils rudimentaires et fournissent les négociants qui font la navette entre les sites de production et les villes marchandes. Dans les grandes villes marchandes situées près de la frontière, des comptoirs achètent l’or en provenance de toute la province, puis l’exportent généralement de façon frauduleuse vers les pays voisins de la RDC.
Les di érences de taxation des exportations d’or sont un des facteurs importants qui permettent de comprendre le niveau élevé de fraude. Les comptoirs o ciels à Bunia et Kisangani se plaignent en e et de ne pas pouvoir lutter à armes égales avec les acheteurs de Kampala, où les exportations d’or sont soumises à une taxe d’à peine 0,5%, alors que cette taxe est de 3,25% en RDC.

Outre les acteurs impliqués activement dans le commerce de l’or (mineurs, négociants et exportateurs), il y a également en RDC d’autres parties prenantes qui pro tent des ressources naturelles du pays sans être directement impliquées dans leur commerce. Certains fonctionnaires et groupes armés sont eux aussi réputés tirer des pro ts considérables du commerce de l’or, par la perception de taxes illégales dans et autour des mines, ainsi que sur les routes menant aux centres de commerce.
L’or produit par les sites miniers de la Province Orientale emprunte plusieurs routes commerciales qui traversent le nord-est de la RDC, avant de franchir la frontière vers les pays voisins. Le présent rapport s’intéresse plus en détail à cinq villes marchandes impliquées dans la chaîne de l’or en Province Orientale. Il passe en revue les acteurs en présence, comme les comptoirs et les négociants, et tente d’évaluer le volume d’or transitant par chacune de ces villes. Le tableau 3, dans la deuxième annexe, fournit un aperçu/ résumé intéressant des routes commerciales actuelles et des volumes d’or traités par ville marchande. Au total, il apparaît que la Province Orientale exporte environ 16,5 tonnes d’or par an, ce qui est en net contraste avec les 130 kg d’or o ciellement exportés par la province en 2010. Les exportations o cielles sont répertoriées dans les tableaux 1 et 2 de la deuxième annexe.
Le rapport aborde ensuite plus en détail la production aurifère dans chacun des quatre districts de la Province. Les principaux centres miniers, routes commerciales et centres de commerce locaux sont répertoriés par territoire. Le rapport propose en outre une estimation du nombre d’artisans-mineurs en activité et les niveaux de production aurifère par territoire. Cette information est condensée de façon pratique dans le tableau 5 de la deuxième annexe. Une fois de plus, ces données mettent en lumière des nuances assez déconcertantes par rapport aux chi res de production o ciels gurant dans le tableau 4.
L’étude montre que le niveau élevé de fraude au sein de la chaîne de l’or en Province Orientale fait perdre au gouvernement congolais d’importantes rentrées scales. Se basant sur une analyse détaillée du système de taxation des exploitations minières artisanales et sur une estimation des volumes d’or réellement exportés par la province, le rapport conclut que le manque à gagner scal de la RDC sur le secteur de l’or en Province Orientale s’élèverait à au moins $25 millions par an.
Les initiatives prises par la CIRGL pour combattre ce problème d’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles sont très bien accueillies. L’Initiative Régionale contre l’exploitation illégale des Ressources Naturelles (IRRN) contient quelques outils de valeur pour s’attaquer à certains points clés de la chaîne de l’or. La certi cation du commerce de l’or est un instrument essentiel pour remédier à divers problèmes liés au secteur de l’or au Congo. Il faudrait cependant revoir l’étroitesse de vue dont la certi cation fait l’objet, car celle-ci devrait plutôt être considérée comme un des six outils majeurs et interdépendants dans ce contexte. La formalisation, par exemple, est elle aussi un élément essentiel pour une lutte e cace contre la chape d’opacité qui recouvre le secteur aurifère.

Ce rapport explore l’économie politique de la circulation routière dans les provinces de Nord e... more Ce rapport explore l’économie politique de la circulation routière dans les provinces de Nord et Sud Kivu. Les constats principaux sont d’abord que le contrôle de la circulation routière constitue un enjeu primordial dans les con its en République Démocratique du Congo. Deuxièmement, l’espace routier figure parmi les principales sources de financement illicite des différents acteurs étatiques et non étatiques, ce qui se traduit par l’omniprésence des barrages sur celles-ci.

De ce fait, les routes sans barrières sont rares. Nos recherches ont permis l’identification de 798 barrières routières, dont 312 au Sud Kivu et 486 au Nord Kivu. Parmi celles-ci, 174 ou 22 % connaissent une présence des groupes armés, 55 ou 7 % d’acteurs non-étatiques non-armés (comme les volontaires ou auto-démobilisés), et 569 ou 71 % uniquement des acteurs gouvernementales ou acteurs tolérés par l’état (comme des coopératives). Les barrières contrôlées simultanément par des représentants de différents services (une coopérative et un groupe non-étatique armé par exemple, ou un acteur non-étatique non-armé accompagné d’un militaire armé), ont été répertoriées dans ces catégories.

Les routes congolaises sont fortement militarisées : sur 597 ou 75% des barrières, un acteur armé est présent. L’armée nationale (FARDC) est le principal exploitant des barrières routières. Sa présence a été observée à 379 reprises, (soit 47%). Sur 168 de ces barrières tenues par des militaires (soit 44 %), ceux-ci taxent ressources naturelles (les minerais, le charbon, les planches, ainsi que les produits agricoles). L’armée est suivie par les services de chefferies/secteurs (des entités de gouvernance locale), présents sur 147 soit 19% des barrières. En n, la troisième fréquence est partagée par l’Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR) et la Police de Circulation Routière (PCR), les deux étant présentes respectivement sur 10% et 12% des barrières dans les deux provinces.

Le rapport divise les barrières en 3 catégories : les barrières « stratégiques », « administratives », et finalement « économiques ». Dans la catégorie des barrières stratégiques, il s’agit des postes de déploiement ou les limites externes d’une zone d’influence d’un acteur armé, placés en réponse à la présence proche d’un ennemi. Nous en avons identifié 45. Dans la catégorie administrative, nous avons considéré les barrières qui se situent aux limites entre deux entités administratives décentralisées (province, territoire, groupement). Notre étude en a répertorié 37. Mais l’emplacement des barrières trouvées s’explique dans une large mesure par des raisons économiques. En n, dans la catégorie « économique », nous reprenons l›ensemble des barrières dont la présence se justifie uniquement par l’imposition d’un bien ou d’un passage. Nous avons compté 513 barrières qui taxaient le droit de passage, 239 les ressources naturelles, et 161 placés sur l’entrée et/ou la sortie d’un marché. Dans la pratique, une même barrière peut se retrouver dans plusieurs catégories, en étant par exemple tenue par exemple par des militaires à des avant-postes (stratégique) et taxant les passants (économique).

La ligne de démarcation entre la génération légitime de recettes et l’extorsion par les acteurs contrôlant la barrière est floue. Légitime car les militaires ni rebelles ne sont pas régulièrement payés, donc il arrive qu’à un niveau local, les éléments postés aux barrières passent des accords tacites, informels, avec la population pour qu’elle subvienne à leurs besoins primaires en échange de leur protection. Mais la taxation sur la plupart des barrières trouvées va au-delà des besoins opérationnels et logistiques de leurs opérateurs. En tant que tel, ces barrières figurent parmi les multiples formes de génération de recettes par l’imposition en RDC, complétant ainsi l’exploitation directe de minerais, la monopolisation du commerce, et la taxation des ménages. La prolifération de barrières est lucrative, ce qui contribue à la continuation de la militarisation, de l’insécurité et du sous-développement structurel des provinces du Nord et Sud Kivu.

La cartographie des barrières routières pourrait servir comme base empirique pour la lutte contre la taxation illégale et le financement du conflit. Spécifiquement, le rapport fournit à l’utilisateur un aperçu d’un aspect fondamental de l’économie politique du con it dans l’Est de la RDC, complétant ainsi les connaissances autour du rôle des ressources naturelles. La cartographie dans ce rapport peut servir pour apprécier la distribution géographique des acteurs armés et services étatiques, d’avoir un aperçu de la portée de l’extorsion, ainsi que ses principaux auteurs. Il est difficile de pointer du doigt un seul acteur, mais la panoplie des barrières routières dans l’ensemble constitue une violation structurelle des droits de l’homme, un saignement de l’économie de survie à l’Est du Congo.

Ce rapport explore l’économie politique de la circulation routière en République centrafricain... more Ce rapport explore l’économie politique de la circulation routière en République centrafricaine. Les constats principaux sont d’abord que le contrôle de la circulation routière constitue un enjeu clé du con it en Centrafrique. Deuxièmement, l’espace routier figure parmi les sources principales de financement illicite des différents acteurs étatiques et non étatiques dont la conséquence est une forte militarisation des routes, ce qui se traduit par l’omniprésence des barrages sur celles-ci.

Ce rapport identifie un total de 284 barrières routières. Parmi celles-ci, 117 (ou 41 %) sont exploitées par des forces gouvernementales, 149 (ou 52 %) par les groupes ex-Seleka, et 40 (ou 14 %) par les Anti-Balaka. Dans certains cas, deux acteurs armés différents se partagent le contrôle d’un même barrage routier. En général, les structures gouvernementales (de différentes entités administratives, la police, ou l’armée) exploitent les barrages qui se concentrent en grande partie dans la zone sud-ouest du pays. Les différents groupes armés, par contre, ont pris le contrôle des grands axes dans le centre et nord-ouest du pays.

Même si l’ensemble des groupes ex-Seleka contrôle plus de barrières que les forces gouvernementales, la gendarmerie reste le principal exploitant individuel, avec une présence sur 92, soit 32% des barrières en Centrafrique. La gendarmerie est suivie par le FPRC, présent sur 61, soit 21% des barrières. Enfin, la présence de l’UPC, MPC et Anti-Balaka, a été observée sur une quarantaine, soit 14% de barrières.

Ce rapport identifie trois circuits économiques sur lesquelles les barrières illégales se concentrent : le circuit du bétail où les groupes ex-Seleka imposent des taxes, qui compte 62 barrières (soit 22%) ; le circuit soudanais, également aux mains des ex-Seleka et de taille comparable au précédent, 64 barrières (soit 23%) ; et en fin, le circuit légal qui comprend 26 barrières (9%) détenues par les services étatiques. Le reste des barrières est éparpillé sur l’ensemble du réseau routier.

Toutefois, l’implication des groupes ex-Seleka dans ces circuits économiques va au-delà de l’érection de barrières routières. Ils se livrent également à l’imposition de taxes de libre circulation sur les acteurs économiques qui transitent par les zones sous leur emprise, et imposent des escortes obligatoires et payantes. Nos études de cas présentent les mécanismes de rackets mis en place. Nous estimons que les groupes armés ex-Seleka gagnent environ 6 millions EUR par an de leur imposition sur les principaux circuits économiques dans leur zone de contrôle, dont 3,59 millions EUR par an sur le circuit du bétail, et 2,38 millions EUR sur le circuit soudanais.

A cartography of (in)security in the gold mining sector in Mambasa (Ituri, DRC), detailing the co... more A cartography of (in)security in the gold mining sector in Mambasa (Ituri, DRC), detailing the complex entanglements of security actors and different modes of extraction, and how they relate to recent security incidents.

Chronic unsafety reigns in the west part of the Mambasa district in Ituri province, DRC. Between militias and semi autonomous troops of the Congolese army the civil population depends on artisanal mining of gold as a major source of income. The mining activities are hemmed in between the national reserve 'Réserve de Faune Okapi', where mining is prohibited and the concession of Canadian gold mining company Kilo Goldmines. This results in ruthless exploitation and severe violations of humans rights. PAX advocates demilitarisation of the zone and proper governance by the Congolese state. Regulating small scale mining activities of inhabitants and establishing local security committees in cooperation with religious and women's organisations will lead to radical improvement.

L’objectif de l’étude est de mieux connaitre les risques sécuritaires dans le contexte de l’opéra... more L’objectif de l’étude est de mieux connaitre les risques sécuritaires dans le contexte de l’opération de KibaliGold. En tant que première mine industrielle aurifère dans la Province Orientale, KibaliGold est entrée en phase d’exploitation à partir de septembre 2013. Une relocalisation de 14 villages, constitués de 4216 foyers et de 16.277 personnes, a été nécessaire pour mettre sur pied l’exploitation. Pendant la période de l’exploitation, donc après la phase de délocalisation, plusieurs incidents sécuritaires ont eu lieu. Au cours de nos recherches, nous avons inventorié les incidents survenus à l’occasion de manifestations et d’autres moyens d’expression de la population et des incidents concernant les évacuations des chantiers miniers. Ce rapport en donne une liste et analyse chaque incident.

Roadblocks are a ubiquitous phenomenon in Eastern Congo. In an effort to map the scope of this ph... more Roadblocks are a ubiquitous phenomenon in Eastern Congo. In an effort to map the scope of this phenomenon as well as its significance in the political economy of conflict, IPIS has embarked on a collaboration with the Danish Institute for International Studies.

The point of departure is that control over the circulation of people and valuable goods, including minerals, constitutes an important stake in Congo’s conflicts, and that the road figures among the sources of illicit revenue generation for different state and non-state actors. This phenomenon translates into the ubiquity of roadblocks.

As the first fruit of this collaboration, this report provides information about the presence of and actors operating roadblocks in the territories of Walikale and Masisi, both in the province of North Kivu. Based on an analysis of in total 134 mapped roadblocks, the report discusses the relative importance of roadblocks for the political economy of conflict in these two territories.

The Global Politics of Science and Technology - Vol. 2, 2014

This chapter explores an analytical gap emerging at the intersection of political science and sci... more This chapter explores an analytical gap emerging at the intersection of political science and science and technology studies when their gaze is turned towards postcolonial Africa. Where political science has been bad at dealing with the importance of technological infrastructures for the constitution of governmental power, science and technology studies have hitherto been less attentive to situations in which such ‘infrastructures of rule’ are absent. This chapter aims at tentatively exploring this gap by pointing to the relevance of technological infrastructures in postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa. It does so both through a cursory overview of literatures that might help articulate this problematique and by discussing the role of absences in technological infrastructures—such as roads, statistical tools, and government offices—in the historical unfolding of state formation of the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo. The example of the chukudu—an improvised wooden transport utility that allows Congolese to go about despite decrepit infrastructures— is used to unpack the significance for infrastructural absences for social processes. Generalizing beyond the example of the chukudu, this chapter offers novel insights in the importance of technological asymmetries in global power-relations in postcolonial contexts.

Private Security in Africa: From the Global Assemblage to the Everyday, Jun 15, 2017

This chapter explores the politics of everyday private security provision in the Democratic Repub... more This chapter explores the politics of everyday private security provision in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It provides an overview of the private security sector in the DRC, to then provide a discussion of the rise of the sector, and subsequently situate it within the broader politics of everyday security provision by picking out and articulating some of the threads that make up the intricate fabric of Congo’s security multiverse. It puts forward the premise that private security provision is a specific instantiation of a broader web of productive entanglements between state and society in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this web of associations, the very notions of public and private become subverted and tangled in a complex choreography of security actors at the centre of Congo’s specific patterns of order-making and accumulation. In order to advance this premise, the exploration of private security provision in the DRC must be premised on, and articulated within, the broader everyday politics of security provision in the country. While for semantic reasons alone private security provision might be considered in opposition to public security, as we will see, this a priori is partially substituted for its opposite in the everyday politics of security provision in the Congo.

Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International Relations (edited by Michele Acuto, Simon Curtis)

While the term ‘security assemblages’ lends substantial analytical purchase to mappings of contem... more While the term ‘security assemblages’ lends substantial analytical purchase to mappings of contemporary security governance arrangements, this contribution suggests its purchase could be radically expanded by building on insights by John Dewey and elaborated upon by actor-network theory (ANT). Where most studies use the term ‘security assemblage’ negatively – to show how contemporary security governance doesn’t fit the state-centric institutional and territorial mold of traditional IR theorizing – I argue that the work of pragmatists such as John Dewey can enrich the analytical purchase of the term ‘security assemblage’. By being agnostic as to the ontological nature of governance arrangements, I want to suggest that Dewey and ANT widen the scope of what security assemblages are.

T. Dietz, K. Havnevik, M. Kaag & T. Oestigaard (Eds., 2011), African engagements - Africa Negotiating an Emerging Multipolar World (pp. 56-83). Leiden: Brill.

This chapter investigates the political topography arising around private security companies in S... more This chapter investigates the political topography arising around private security companies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The geographic spread of private security companies reveals a postcolonial landscape that is made up—like its colonial predecessor—of two distinct types of spaces, each requiring a distinct regime of government. On the one hand, there is l’Afrique utile, consisting of a number of intensely regulated and highly secured enclaves. This chapter shows how these enclaves represent the shared interest of African regimes (who depend on taxation of these enclaves for their revenue base) and—often international—formal businesses. These islands of ‘useful Africa’ are increasingly guarded and regulated by private security companies with the goal of separating them off from the grey spaces on the map, l’Afrique inutile, the informal, criminalised, ‘other’ side of Africa. Illustrated with examples from the DRC and South Africa, private security companies are argued to constitute pivotal agencies policing the boundary between these two Africas, progressively disconnecting the high-yield sphere of activities of the ‘formal economy’ from contending modes of economic exchange and disfranchising a large part of these countries’ respective populations.

How does the anthropocene matter for how we understand energy security and climate change? This c... more How does the anthropocene matter for how we understand energy security and climate change? This chapter shows how that actor-network theory can sharply articulate both as concerns in IR.

In Bachmann, Jan, Bell, Colleen, & Holmqvist, Caroline (Eds.). (2014). War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention. (pp. 183-203). (London: Routledge).

The nature of humanitarian intervention is subject to substantial debate within International Rel... more The nature of humanitarian intervention is subject to substantial debate within International Relations. As evidenced by studies on humanitarian intervention in Congo, dominant approaches conceive of intervention as a top-down dynamic revolving around discursive politics of framing. Based on an alternative approach to agency in International Relations, this chapter provides a different account of humanitarian intervention in Congo framing it as ‘ontological politics’. Drawing on the work of Annemarie Mol, ontological politics refers to how objects are made and unmade in heterogeneous practices. Doing so displaces the focus from discursive politics towards a broader set of practices that matter in constituting Congo as an object of intervention, and humanitarian actors as subjectivities ontologically distinct from the object of intervention. Studying these practices in the humanitarian hub of Goma renders visible the entanglements of fences, private security guards, statistics, maps and discursive framings as acts of ‘ontological politics’ that enact a Congo ripe for intervention.

In C. Aradau, J. Huysmans, A. Neal & N. Voelkner (Eds.), Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks for Analysis (pp. 23-56). (London: Routledge)., 2014

L'Afrique des Grands Lacs - Annuaire 2012-2013, Nov 2013

The conflict that haunted Ituri until approximately 2005 revolved in no small part around control... more The conflict that haunted Ituri until approximately 2005 revolved in no small part around control over Ituri’s vast mineral resources, in particular gold. As such, Ituri’s gold formed a prime example of what is widely called ‘conflict minerals’, constituting a source of funding for rebel activities. Now that the conflict ended nearly a decade ago, this article attempts to assess the role gold plays in Ituri’s (under)development. In particular, it aims to provide a broad overview of the political economy of artisanal gold mining, that is, the variegated ways in which the artisanal gold mining sector is governed. It does so based on the wealth of empirical data generated by a large quantitative and qualitative research project coordinated by the authors and conducted in late 2011 by IKV Pax Christi and Haki na Amani.
The article proposes a distinction between three modes of governance (or apparatuses) that structure artisanal mining activities, each more or less confined to specific zones. As such, this article sketches a topography of the overlapping and shifting arrangements that structure how and where profits are accrued during the gold extraction processes.
The first type of zone we identify is where gold is governed by a relatively stable politico- economic apparatus composed of low-ranking state representatives and traditional authorities. Second is the militarized mode of governance, concentrated in zones where both rebels and Congolese armed forces are heavily involved in structuring artisanal gold mining. The third type of zone corresponds to industrial mining concessions, where governance of artisanal mining is best characterized as ambiguous—for it is unclear what rights artisanal miners have here, yet still artisanal mining is here subject to intense but constantly shifting governance by state agents and mining companies. Thus, while all of Ituri’s gold is currently exported illegally, this does not preclude the ubiquitous involvement of state actors in the organization of the gold extraction and trade. Based on this typology, the article presents a detailed overview of the dynamics in each zone.
The discussion aims to show how both the conflict potentiality of gold mining and the contribution that artisanal gold mining makes to development in Ituri vary in function of which mode of governance prevails at any given mining site.

In 2014 deed IPIS een uitgebreid ‘conflict mapping’ onderzoek om inzicht te krijgen in de veiligh... more In 2014 deed IPIS een uitgebreid ‘conflict mapping’ onderzoek om inzicht te krijgen in de veiligheidssituatie in de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek (CAR). Dit leidde tot de publicatie van een publiek toegankelijke webkaart over belangrijke conflictdynamieken. IPIS bracht de gewapende groepen, mensenrechtenschendingen, natuurlijke rijkdommen, vluchtelingenstromen en migratieroutes van veehouders in kaart.

De voornaamste conclusies van dit rapport en nieuwe gegevens die IPIS verzamelde in 2016 leidden tot de publicatie van dit Nederlandstalig rapport dat op 20 december werd toegelicht tijdens een panelgesprek met IPIS-onderzoekster Fiona Southward en CAR-expert Peer Schouten van het Danish Institute for International Studies. Peer Schouten gaat in op de problematiek van de wegversperringen of roadblocks en hun impact op het dagelijks leven, de lokale veiligheid en de economie.

DIIS Working Paper Series 'Roadblocks & Revenues' #6 , 2024

This working paper examines the dynamics of checkpoint authority in Somalia, focusing on how kins... more This working paper examines the dynamics of checkpoint authority in Somalia, focusing on how kinship, mobility and checkpoint practices intersect to shape political and social orders. The paper challenges the notion, gaining traction in the literature on taxation and conflict, that checkpoint governance is either an expression of state-like power or indicative of the state’s absence. Instead, it argues that checkpoints in Somalia—or isbaaro as they are locally called—are deeply embedded in the social fabric of clan society, where the practice of abanship—the brokerage of passage through clan territory—plays a crucial role. This brokerage not only facilitates trade but also reinforces clan identity and social differentiation.

Drawing on participatory cartography and semi-structured interviews with over 80 Somali road users, we contend that checkpoints serve as sites of social navigation and identity formation, reflecting broader historical and contemporary struggles over mobility and trade. We propose that ‘clan capital’, or standing within clan society, is key to brokering passage along checkpoints, but genealogical differences also become accentuated at checkpoints, and clan formations reinforced and reshaped in struggles over checkpoint rents. We understand this dynamic through the principle of schismogenesis—or the process of social division and differentiation—whereby fiscal disagreements are a central driver for kinship groups to differentiate themselves from one another, resulting in new political forms and identities. We conclude that checkpoints are sites where we can observe some of the more complex and fluctuating political dynamics of the Somali territories that have long confounded analysts, international practitioners and policymakers. While we focus empirically on the case of Somalia, we expect our analysis to resonate in other similar settings where capital concentrates in the trade sector and state authority is weak.

DIIS Working Paper Series 'Roadblocks & Revenues', 2024

From Afghanistan and Yemen and from Mali to Somalia, research shows, roadblocks are central to dy... more From Afghanistan and Yemen and from Mali to Somalia, research shows, roadblocks are central to dynamics of armed conflict, funding insurgents, driving violence and shaping the forms of order espoused by various types of armed actors, state and non-state alike. Despite increasing evidence, roadblocks and the forms of circulation they interact with have not yet received the theoretical attention they deserve, and are often overlooked in debates over what drives conflict and how we should understand order in areas of contested statehood. Our premise is that a focus on checkpoints has the potential to enrich engrained approaches to conflict and order-making because roadblocks represent a window into dynamics of authority and power that only partially follow the script of ‘stateness’ as it is usually understood: as revolving around claims to territory and the population or resources within it.

This paper, which introduces the working paper series Roadblocks and revenues, argues that checkpoints constitute a distinct claim to authority with their own logic and effects on conflict dynamics and political order-making. We coin the idea of the ‘politics of passage’, which refers to the mutually constitutive struggles over movement and authority that play out at roadblocks in fragile and conflict-affected settings. We propose that attending to the politics of passage means exploring how both authority and passage—and through them trade and revenues, as well as mobility and order—are contingent on the sometimes routinised, sometimes unpredictable processes of negotiation that take place at checkpoint encounters. We provide a definition of roadblocks, explore the historicity of circulation struggles in relation to state formation, and outline a new research agenda on roadblocks, advancing debates on state-building, war economies, informal taxation, global value chains and rebel governance, offering reflections from existing research and avenues for future work.

For over a decade it’s been widely recognised that rebel financing in the Democratic Republic of ... more For over a decade it’s been widely recognised that rebel financing in the Democratic Republic of Congo is firmly linked to mining. First discovered by the Belgians in 1904, the Congolese soil harbours a huge amount of precious minerals. Subsequent industrial exploitation of copper and gold became the backbone of first Belgian colonialism and later Mobutu Sese Seko’s kleptocracy.

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space

The Return of the Theorists, 2016

TT: Dear Professor Dewey. Thank you so much for your willingness to participate in this Talk. The... more TT: Dear Professor Dewey. Thank you so much for your willingness to participate in this Talk. Theory Talks is an open-access journal, which contributes to International Relations debates by publishing interviews with cutting-edge theorists. It is not often that Theory Talks is able to overcome space-time limitations and conduct a Talk with a departed theorist.

Timothy Mitchell moves across disciplinary borders to study entanglements of technology, governan... more Timothy Mitchell moves across disciplinary borders to study entanglements of technology, governance, and fossil energy. Tracing the global through tiny details and mundane processes at the local level, Mitchell suggests replacing technological determinism with infra-theory to understand the limits of government, the role of technical experts, and the change of political systems.

Conjuntura Internacional, 2013

Reassembling International Theory, 2013

Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 2013

1. Introduction 2. Engaging Hybrid Security Governance 3. Transnationalised Business Spaces in a ... more 1. Introduction 2. Engaging Hybrid Security Governance 3. Transnationalised Business Spaces in a Postcolonial World 4. Practicing Hybrid Security: Multinational Companies and Hybrid Security Practices, post-1995 5. Understanding Hybrid Security Practices: Transnational Meaning Systems, post-1995 6. Companies, Security Governance and Change: Practicing Transnational Meaning Systems, 1890s-1920s 7. Conclusion

Global Governance, Regionalism & the role of the EU. Challenges & Debates shaping IR theory in the early 21st Century’, 8th Garnet PhD School, 8-12 June, Brussels: Institute for European Studies (Université Libre de Bruxelles), 2009

This paper attempts to give a snapshot overview of the field of IR Theory based on a series of th... more This paper attempts to give a snapshot overview of the field of IR Theory based on a series of thirty interviews with influential IR theorists conducted for Theory Talks. In doing so, this paper provides a unique survey of what those at the forefront of theoretical innovation perceive to be the central debates in IR Theory and core challenges confronting IR as a practice. It first presents two related challenges that are perceived to be central in IR theory because of their recurrence throughout these interviews: the relation between state and ...

Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change–The Asia-Pacific Experience, 2011

This chapter sets out to revisit energy security and climate security in light of the Anthropocen... more This chapter sets out to revisit energy security and climate security in light of the Anthropocene. We draw on the notion of the Anthropocene in order to ask what it means for conceptions of security that the environment has become an effect of human agency. The passage quoted above, which is a statement of the British Government in the 2007 United Nation Security Council debate on climate change and security, provides an ideal starting point for our considerations. The dilemma that stems from the costly down-sides of the ...

Non-Traditional Security Studies, 2012

Theory Talks, 2009

Theory Talks is an interactive forum for discussion of debates in International Relations with an... more Theory Talks is an interactive forum for discussion of debates in International Relations with an emphasis of the underlying theoretical issues. By frequently inviting cutting-edge specialists in the field to elucidate their work and to explain current developments both in IR theory and real-world politics, Theory Talks aims to offer both scholars and students a comprehensive view of the field and its most important protagonists.

The new 'Business For Peace' (B4P) paradigm urges multinational corporations (MNCs) to enter conf... more The new 'Business For Peace' (B4P) paradigm urges multinational corporations (MNCs) to enter conflict zones and fragile post-conflict environments as an alternative to traditional development aid. While B4P's positive impact through economic opening and Corporate Social Responsibility is assumed, corporate presence can instead exacerbate conflict dynamics in certain settings. As B4P is becoming a standardized component throughout all multilateral development aid activities per the United Nations Global Compact B4P platform and the UN's 'Delivering As One' mandate, we argue that bringing B4P into the forefront of research on business, development, and conflict is essential. In this article, we unpack the relationships between business, conflict and liberal peace politics that led to the B4P framework. We then show how five major debates influence B4P today: if MNCs should be peacebuilders; if so, what should they do; how do we define and model ‘peace’ activities; how businesses navigate conflict economies; and how businesses engage with informal economies. We then show how these discussions guide the international community’s multi-billion dollar development agenda and influence how businesses see their new role as peacebuilders and peacemakers. We conclude with suggestions for forward research on this rapidly emerging topic.

Aftenposten Innsikt, Dec 2, 2013