Qt OAuth2 Overview | Qt Network Authorization (original) (raw)

OAuth2

RFC 6749 OAuth 2.0 defines an authorization framework which enables resource authorization without exposing sensitive user credentials such as passwords.

The OAuth2 framework defines several client types (public and confidential) as well as flows (implicit, authorization code, and several others). For typical Qt applications the client type should be considered as public native application. The public implies that the application isn't trusted to hold secrets, such as passwords, embedded within the shipped binary.

RFC 8252 OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps further defines the best practices for such applications. Among other things, it defines the Authorization Code Flow as the recommended flow, and therefore QtNetworkAuth provides a concrete implementation of this flow.

Since Qt 6.9, QtNetworkAuth also provides support for RFC 8628 OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant. This device flow is intended for connected devices that have limited input capabilities, or where using a user-agent or browser is not practical. Examples of such devices include televisions, media consoles, machine HMIs, and IoT devices.

The following table highlights the main aspects of the two concrete OAuth2 flows supported by QtNetworkAuth module:

Aspect Authorization Code Flow Device Authorization Flow
Network Connection Yes Yes
User Interaction Browser / user-agent on the same device Browser / user-agent on a different device
Redirect Handling Required Yes No
Input Capability On Device Rich input capabilities Limited or no input capability
Targets Desktop and Mobile Apps TVs, Consoles, HMIs, IoT Devices

OAuth2 requires using a user-agent which is typically a browser. For further information, see Qt OAuth2 Browser Support.

Qt OAuth2 Classes

QtNetworkAuth provides both concrete and abstract OAuth2 classes. The abstract classes are intended for implementing custom flows, while the concrete classes provide a concrete implementation.

QtNetworkAuth has two abstract classes for implementing OAuth2 flows:

The authorization code flow is the recommended OAuth2 flow for native applications like Qt applications.

The following code snippet provides an example setup:

QOAuth2AuthorizationCodeFlow m_oauth; QOAuthUriSchemeReplyHandler m_handler;

m_oauth.setAuthorizationUrl(QUrl(authorizationUrl)); m_oauth.setTokenUrl(QUrl(accessTokenUrl)); m_oauth.setClientIdentifier(clientIdentifier); m_oauth.setRequestedScopeTokens({scope});

connect(&m_oauth, &QAbstractOAuth::authorizeWithBrowser, this, &QDesktopServices::openUrl); connect(&m_oauth, &QAbstractOAuth::granted, this, this { // Here we use QNetworkRequestFactory to store the access token m_api.setBearerToken(m_oauth.token().toLatin1()); m_handler.close(); });

m_handler.setRedirectUrl(QUrl{"com.example.myqtapp://oauth2redirect"_L1}); m_oauth.setReplyHandler(&m_handler);

// Initiate the authorization if (m_handler.listen()) { m_oauth.grant(); }

Stages

The Authorization Code Flow has two main stages: resource authorization (including any necessary user authentication) followed up by an access token request. These are optionally followed by access token usage and access token refreshing. The following figure illustrates these stages:

Details and Customization

OAuth2 flows are dynamic and following the details can be tricky at first. The figure below illustrates the main details of a successful authorization code flow.

For clarity the figure omits some less used signals, but altogether illustrates the details and main customization points. The customization points are the various signals/slots the application can catch (and call), as well as the callbacks which are settable with QAbstractOAuth::setModifyParametersFunction() and QAbstractOAuth2::setNetworkRequestModifier().

Choosing A Reply Handler

The decision on which reply hander to use, or to implement, is dependent on the redirect_uri used. The redirect_uri is where the browser is redirected upon concluding the authorization stage.

In the context of native applications, RFC 8252 outlines three main types of URI schemes: loopback, https, and private-use.

The choice depends on several factors such as:

RFC 8252 recommends using the https scheme for security and usability advantages over the other methods.

Device Authorization Flow

The Device Authorization Flow is intended for connected devices that are limited in terms of input capabilities, or where user-agent/browser usage is not practical.

The following code snippet provides an example setup:

m_deviceFlow.setAuthorizationUrl(QUrl(authorizationUrl)); m_deviceFlow.setTokenUrl(QUrl(accessTokenUrl)); m_deviceFlow.setRequestedScopeTokens({scope}); m_deviceFlow.setClientIdentifier(clientIdentifier); // The need for a client secret depends on the authorization server m_deviceFlow.setClientIdentifierSharedKey(clientSecret);

connect(&m_deviceFlow, &QOAuth2DeviceAuthorizationFlow::authorizeWithUserCode, this, [](const QUrl &verificationUrl, const QString &userCode, const QUrl &completeVerificationUrl) { if (completeVerificationUrl.isValid()) { // If the authorization server provided a complete URL // that already contains the necessary data as part of the URL parameters, // you can choose to use that qDebug() << "Complete verification uri:" << completeVerificationUrl; } else { // Authorization server provided only verification URL; use that qDebug() << "Verification uri and usercode:" << verificationUrl << userCode; } } );

connect(&m_deviceFlow, &QAbstractOAuth::granted, this, this{ // Here we use QNetworkRequestFactory to store the access token m_api.setBearerToken(m_deviceFlow.token().toLatin1()); }); m_deviceFlow.grant();

Stages

Device Authorization Flow has three main stages: initializing the authorization, polling for tokens, and completing the authorization. These are optionally followed by token usage and token refreshing. The following figure illustrates these stages:

Details and Customization

The following figure illustrates the flow in more detail. The figure illustrates also the main customization points, which may sometimes be needed (for instance proprietary parameters, or additional authentication credentials).

Refreshing Tokens

A full OAuth2 flow requires user interaction, which can be intrusive to the user experience. To minimize these interactions, tokens can be silently refreshed from user's perspective.

Refreshing tokens requires that the authorization server provide a refresh token during authorization. Providing a refresh token is up to the authorization server: some servers provide it always, some never, and some provide it if a specific scope was present in the authorization request.

The following figure illustrates the token refresh in more detail:

As shown in the figure above, the usual customization points are also available when refreshing tokens.

To refresh the tokens after an application startup, the application needs to persist the refresh token securely, and set it with QAbstractOAuth2::setRefreshToken(). QAbstractOAuth2::refreshTokens() can then be called to request new tokens.

Since Qt 6.9, applications can also use refresh convenience functionality to automatically refresh the tokens - see QAbstractOAuth2::accessTokenAboutToExpire(), QAbstractOAuth2::autoRefresh, and QAbstractOAuth2::refreshLeadTime.

The expiration time for a refresh token is generally not indicated by the authorization server (apart from the server's documentation). Their validity can range from days to months, or longer. Furthermore, as with other tokens, they can be revoked by the user and thus invalidated at any time. Therefore, it is important to properly detect a failed refresh attempt with QAbstractOAuth::requestFailed() or QAbstractOAuth2::serverReportedErrorOccurred().

Qt OpenID Connect Support

OpenID Connect (OIDC) is a simple identity layer on top of OAuth2 protocol. Where authorization provides means to authorize users to perform actions, OIDC enables establishing a trusted identity of a user.

Qt's support for OIDC is at the moment limited to getting ID tokens. An ID token is a JSON Web Token (JWT) that contains claims about the authentication event.

Notably the support for ID token validation or ID token decryption is currently not implemented.

Assuming the application is able to validate the received tokens, the token can be used to establish the identity of the user reliably (to the degree the OIDC provider itself is trusted).

ID tokens are sensitive information and should be kept as a secret. ID tokens are not intended for sending out in API calls - the access token is intended for that purpose. Note that some vendors may use the same JWT format for access tokens, but that is not to be confused with actual ID tokens which incidentally use the same format. With ID tokens the client receiving the token is responsible for verifying the token, whereas with access tokens it's the resource server accepting the token that is responsible for verification.

Getting an ID Token

Getting an ID token is very similar to getting an access token. First we need to set the appropriate scope. Authorization Server vendor may support additional scope specifiers such as profile and email, but all OIDC requests must include openid scope:

m_oauth.setRequestedScopeTokens({"openid"});

For OIDC it is strongly recommended to use nonce parameter. This is done by ensuring that appropriate NonceMode is set.

// This is for illustrative purposes, 'Automatic' is the default mode m_oauth.setNonceMode(QAbstractOAuth2::NonceMode::Automatic);

As last step we can listen for either QAbstractOAuth2::granted signal or the QAbstractOAuth2::idTokenChanged directly:

connect(&m_oauth, &QAbstractOAuth2::idTokenChanged, this, [this](const QString &token) { Q_UNUSED(token); // Handle token });

Validating an ID Token

Validating the received ID Token is a crucial part of the flow, and, when fully implemented, a somewhat complicated task.

At its outline validation consists of these steps

Qt currently doesn't provide support for ID token validation, but there are several C++ library options available, such as jwt-cpp.

ID Token Verification Example

This section illustrates a simple verification with the help of jwt-cpp library. As prerequisites, the development environment needs to have OpenSSL libraries, and jwt-cpp include folder under the application project's source directory.

In application project's CMakeLists.txt we first check that the prerequisities are met:

find_package(OpenSSL 1.0.0 QUIET) set(JWT_CPP_INCLUDE_DIR "${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include") if(OPENSSL_FOUND AND EXISTS "${JWT_CPP_INCLUDE_DIR}/jwt-cpp/jwt.h")

Then we add necessary includes and libraries:

target_include_directories(networkauth_oauth_snippets PRIVATE "${JWT_CPP_INCLUDE_DIR}")
target_link_libraries(networkauth_oauth_snippets PRIVATE OpenSSL::SSL OpenSSL::Crypto)
target_compile_definitions(networkauth_oauth_snippets PRIVATE JWT_CPP_AVAILABLE)

In the application source files, include the verification library:

#ifdef JWT_CPP_AVAILABLE #include "jwt-cpp/jwt.h" #endif

Once the application receives an ID token, it's time to verify it. First we find a matching key from JSON Web Key Sets (JWKS, see OpenID Connect Discovery).

try { const auto jwt = jwt::decode(m_oauth.idToken().toStdString()); const auto jwks = jwt::parse_jwks(m_jwks->toJson(QJsonDocument::Compact).toStdString()); const auto jwk = jwks.get_jwk(jwt.get_key_id());

And then we do the actual verification:

// Here we use modulus and exponent to derive the key const auto n = jwk.get_jwk_claim("n").as_string(); // modulus const auto e = jwk.get_jwk_claim("e").as_string(); // exponent if (n.empty() || e.empty()) { qWarning() << "Modulus or exponent empty"; return false; } if (jwt.get_algorithm() != "RS256") { // This example only supports RS256 qWarning() << "Unsupported algorithm:" << jwt.get_algorithm(); return false; } if (jwk.get_jwk_claim("kty").as_string() != "RSA") { qWarning() << "Unsupported key type:" << jwk.get_jwk_claim("kty").as_string(); return false; } if (jwk.has_jwk_claim("use") && jwk.get_jwk_claim("use").as_string() != "sig") { qWarning() << "Key not for signature" << jwk.get_jwk_claim("use").as_string(); return false; } // Simple minimal verification (omits special cases and eg. 'sub' verification). // jwt-cpp does check also 'exp', 'iat', and 'nbf' if they are present. const auto keyPEM = jwt::helper::create_public_key_from_rsa_components(n, e); auto verifier = jwt::verify() .allow_algorithm(jwt::algorithm::rs256(keyPEM)) .with_claim("nonce", jwt::claim(m_oauth.nonce().toStdString())) .with_issuer(m_oidcConfig->value("issuer"_L1).toString().toStdString()) .with_audience(std::string(clientIdentifier.data())) .leeway(60UL); verifier.verify(jwt); qDebug() << "ID Token verified successfully"; return true; } catch(const std::exception &e) { // Handle error. Alternatively pass error parameter to jwt-cpp calls qWarning() << "ID Token verification failed" << e.what(); return false; }

It is recommended to check up-to-date documentation and examples of the library being used, and also to familiarize with ID token verification.

Reading ID Token Values

The ID token is in JSON Web Token (JWT) format and consists of a header, payload, and signature parts, separated by dots {'.'}.

Reading the values of the ID token is straightforward. As an example, assuming a struct:

And a function:

std::optional parseIDToken(const QString &token) const;

The token can be extracted:

In more rare cases the token may be encrypted with JSON Web Encryption (JWE), which internally contains a JWT token. In this case the token must be decrypted first.

OpenID Connect Discovery

OpenID Connect Discovery defines means to discover needed OpenID provider details, in order to interact with it. This includes things such as authorization_endpoint and token_endpoint URLs.

While these provider details can be statically configured in the application, discovering the details at runtime may provide more flexibility and robustness in interacting with various providers.

Getting the discovery document is a simple HTTP GET request. The document is typically located in https://<the-domain eg. example.com>/.well-known/openid_configuration

m_network->get(request, this, this &reply) { if (reply.isSuccess()) { if (auto doc = reply.readJson(); doc && doc->isObject()) m_oidcConfig = doc->object(); // Store the configuration } });

Notably, for token validation, the jwks_uri field provides a link for accessing the current (public) security credentials. Using that removes the need to hardcode such credentials in the application directly. This also helps with key rotation; the vendors may change the used keys from time to time, and therefore ensuring an up-to-date key is important.

Getting the keys is similarly a simple HTTP GET request:

m_network->get(request, this, this &reply) { if (reply.isSuccess()) { if (auto doc = reply.readJson(); doc && doc->isObject()) m_jwks = doc; // Use the keys later to verify tokens } });

The key set typically contains several keys. The correct key is indicated in the JWT header (care must be taken to match the keys properly, just checking the key id (kid) field is not adequate).

OpenID UserInfo Endpoint

An alternative way to access user information is to use OpenID UserInfo Endpoint, if the OIDC provider supports it. The URL for the userinfo is in userinfo_endpoint field of the OpenID Connect Discovery document.

The userinfo endpoint does not use the ID token, but is accessed with the access token. Accessing the userinfo is similar to accessing any other resource with an access token.

Assuming the access token is received and set for example by:

Then accessing the userinfo is a HTTP GET request:

m_network->get(userInfoApi.createRequest(), this, this &reply) { if (reply.isSuccess()) { if (auto doc = reply.readJson(); doc && doc->isObject()) qDebug() << doc->object(); // Use the userinfo } });

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