An Intelligent Intruder Model for Security Protocol Analysis (original) (raw)

Abstract

An intelligent intruder model is proposed in this paper. Except for the algebraic abilities to process messages like the Dolev-Yao intruder, it can decide when to generate what terms and whether or not to launch a new session, which principal to choose, and what roles the principal will play based on some strand-added rules. By this heuristic method, we can get a finite state space without the explicit configuration needed by most model checking tools.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Shanghai Jiaotong University, 200030, Shanghai, China
    Dongxi Liu, Xiaoyong Li & Yingcai Bai

Authors

  1. Dongxi Liu
  2. Xiaoyong Li
  3. Yingcai Bai

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Engineering Research Center for Information Security Technology (ERCIST), Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 8718, 100080, Beijing, China
    Sihan Qing
  2. NTT Labs, 1-1 Hikarinooka, 239-0847, Yokosuka-shi, Japan
    Tatsuaki Okamoto
  3. Oracle Corporation, 500 Oracle Parkway, 94065, Redwood Shores, CA, USA
    Jianying Zhou

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Liu, D., Li, X., Bai, Y. (2001). An Intelligent Intruder Model for Security Protocol Analysis. In: Qing, S., Okamoto, T., Zhou, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7\_2

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