A marginalistic value for monotonic set games (original) (raw)

Abstract

In this paper we characterize a value, called a marginalistic value, for monotonic set games, which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games. For this characterization we use a modification of the strong monotonicity axiom of Young, but the proof is rather different from his.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500, AE Enschede, The Netherlands
    Harry Aarts & Kees Hoede
  2. Faculty of Economics, Tokyo University, Oka 2-11-10 Asaka-shi, 351, Saitama, Japan
    Yukihiko Funaki

Authors

  1. Harry Aarts
  2. Kees Hoede
  3. Yukihiko Funaki

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Aarts, H., Hoede, K. & Funaki, Y. A marginalistic value for monotonic set games.Int J Game Theory 26, 97–111 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262515

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