Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games (original) (raw)

Abstract

We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic Markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary ε-equilibria (ε > 0) do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
   Janos Flesch, Frank Thuijsman & Koos Vrieze

Authors

1. Janos Flesch
2. Frank Thuijsman
3. Koos Vrieze

Additional information

We wish to thank anonymous referees for their valuable remarks and suggestions concerning the organization of this paper.

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Flesch, J., Thuijsman, F. & Vrieze, K. Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games.Int J Game Theory 26, 303–314 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01263273

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• Received: 15 September 1995
• Revised: 15 February 1996
• Issue date: October 1997
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01263273

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