Weighted nucleoli (original) (raw)
Abstract.
Cooperative games in characteristic function form (TU games) are considered. We allow for variable populations or carriers. Weighted nucleoli are defined via weighted excesses for coalitions. A solution satisfies the Null Player Out (NPO) property, if elimination of a null player does not affect the payoffs of the other players. For any single-valued and efficient solution, the NPO property implies the null player property. We show that a weighted nucleolus has the null player property if and only if the weights of multi-player coalitions are weakly decreasing with respect to coalition inclusion. Weighted nucleoli possessing the NPO-property can be characterized by means of a multiplicative formula for the weights of the multi-player coalitions and a restrictive condition on the weights of one-player coalitions.
Access this article
Subscribe and save
- Starting from 10 chapters or articles per month
- Access and download chapters and articles from more than 300k books and 2,500 journals
- Cancel anytime View plans
Buy Now
Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.
Instant access to the full article PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
- Department of Mathematics, Faculty of General Sciences, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands (e-mail: jean.derks@math.unimaas.nl), , , , , , NL
Jean Derks - Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0316, USA (e-mail: haller@vt.edu), , , , , , US
Hans Haller
Authors
- Jean Derks
- Hans Haller
Additional information
Received: March 1997/Final version: November 1998
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Derks, J., Haller, H. Weighted nucleoli.Game Theory 28, 173–187 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050011
- Issue date: May 1999
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050011