Parties with Policy Preferences and Uncertainty Over Voter Behavior (original) (raw)

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An Erratum to this article was published on 20 May 2006

Abstract

The equilibrium redistributive policy proposals of two parties with policy preferences are studied. Each party’s ideal policy coincides with that of citizens having a particular income level, and the party’s utility function reflects its attitude to the trade-off between the choice of preferred policy and the likelihood of victory. When parties face uncertainty about citizens’ abstention from voting, divergent equilibrium proposals are derived which are more moderate than their contrasting ideal policies. Political equilibria under different prior beliefs on abstention are then compared. It is shown that a lower likelihood of abstention in a particular income group induces both parties to make proposals catering to that group, in equilibrium.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Faculty of Business Administration, Hosei University, 2-17-1 Fujimi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 102-8160, Japan
   Kimiko Terai

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Correspondence toKimiko Terai.

Additional information

An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0167-2

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Terai, K. Parties with Policy Preferences and Uncertainty Over Voter Behavior.Soc Choice Welfare 27, 155–172 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0120-4

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• Received: 27 July 2004
• Accepted: 02 February 2005
• Published: 28 March 2006
• Issue date: August 2006
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0120-4

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