Coalition Formation and Stability (original) (raw)

Abstract

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals’ preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. GEPYD and Department of Economics, University of Alicante, 03071, Alicante, Spain
   José Alcalde
2. Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
   Antonio Romero-Medina

Authors

1. José Alcalde
2. Antonio Romero-Medina

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Correspondence toJosé Alcalde.

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Alcalde, J., Romero-Medina, A. Coalition Formation and Stability.Soc Choice Welfare 27, 365–375 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1

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• Received: 24 September 2004
• Accepted: 03 November 2005
• Published: 24 May 2006
• Issue date: October 2006
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1

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