A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections (original) (raw)

Abstract

I develop a two period model of elections in which voters’ first period actions affect candidates’ estimates of voter preferences and thus affect second period electoral and policy outcomes. I find an equilibrium in which centrist voters abstain in the first election, despite facing zero costs of voting and having a strict preference between the alternatives before them. The reason centrists abstain is to signal their preferences to future candidates and thereby promote future policy moderation.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Stanford Graduate School of Business, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA, 94305-5015, USA
   Kenneth W. Shotts

Corresponding author

Correspondence toKenneth W. Shotts.

Additional information

For helpful discussions and comments I thank David Austen-Smith, Tim Feddersen, Roger Myerson, Tom Palfrey, Ronny Razin, two anonymous reviewers, and seminar participants at Kellogg, NYU, and the 2000 World Congress of the Game Theory Society.

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Shotts, K.W. A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections.Soc Choice Welfare 27, 251–261 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0129-8

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• Received: 26 December 2000
• Accepted: 29 August 2005
• Published: 30 June 2006
• Issue date: October 2006
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0129-8

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