Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets (original) (raw)

Abstract

We investigate games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets as proposed by Konishi and Ünver (Soc Choice Welfare, in press). While Konishi and Ünver (Soc Choice Welfare, in press) show that there may not exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in general, there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in such a game. We show that every hospital weakly prefers a Nash equilibrium to any “larger” capacity profiles, whether the equilibrium is in pure or mixed strategies. In particular, a Nash equilibrium is weakly preferred by hospitals to the outcome that results from truthful reporting.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Economics, Harvard University, 1875 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA
   Fuhito Kojima

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Correspondence toFuhito Kojima.

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Kojima, F. Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets.Soc Choice Welfare 27, 25–28 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6

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• Received: 30 September 2005
• Accepted: 22 November 2005
• Published: 29 April 2006
• Issue date: August 2006
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6

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