Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (original) (raw)

Abstract

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women weakly successfully manipulates or employs truncation strategies, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that these results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
   Itai Ashlagi
2. Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC), Campus UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain
   Flip Klijn

Authors

1. Itai Ashlagi
2. Flip Klijn

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Correspondence toFlip Klijn.

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Ashlagi, I., Klijn, F. Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests.Soc Choice Welf 39, 23–33 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0549-y

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• Received: 16 June 2010
• Accepted: 23 March 2011
• Published: 10 April 2011
• Issue date: June 2012
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0549-y

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