A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi’s (‘impartial’) observer (original) (raw)

Abstract

We provide an axiomatization of an additively separable social welfare function in the context of Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi’s setting to make the lotteries over the identities the observer may assume independent of the social alternative.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Economics, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
   Simon Grant
2. School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
   Simon Grant
3. Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
   Atsushi Kajii
4. Department of Economics, School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
   Ben Polak
5. University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
   Zvi Safra
6. The College of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
   Zvi Safra

Authors

1. Simon Grant
2. Atsushi Kajii
3. Ben Polak
4. Zvi Safra

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Correspondence toSimon Grant.

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Grant, S., Kajii, A., Polak, B. et al. A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi’s (‘impartial’) observer.Soc Choice Welf 39, 833–846 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0563-0

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• Received: 03 June 2010
• Accepted: 24 June 2011
• Published: 16 July 2011
• Issue date: October 2012
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0563-0

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