Vladimir Putin’s Aspiration to Restore the Lost Russian Empire | European Review | Cambridge Core (original) (raw)

Abstract

In this article, I argue that the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, by his political actions in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Central Asian countries, and his current actions in Ukraine, strives to re-establish the nineteenth-century Russian Empire, ignoring the principle of international law that protects the sovereignty of each nation-state over its territory. In order to achieve his goals Putin uses ‘soft force’ and social fermentation in Russian-speaking ‘near abroad’ nation-states of the former Soviet Union. He also uses a policy of weakening the economy of the target countries and uses the Russian chauvinism and irredentism as the basis of his policy.

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