Resource competition and social conflict in experimental populations of yeast (original) (raw)

Nature volume 441, pages 498–501 (2006) Cite this article

Abstract

Understanding the conditions that promote the maintenance of cooperation is a classic problem in evolutionary biology1,2,3,4,5. The essence of this dilemma is captured by the ‘tragedy of the commons’6: how can a group of individuals that exploit resources in a cooperative manner resist invasion by ‘cheaters’ who selfishly use common resources to maximize their individual reproduction at the expense of the group7,8? Here, we investigate this conflict through experimental competitions between isogenic cheater and cooperator strains of yeast with alternative pathways of glucose metabolism9, and by using mathematical models of microbial biochemistry10. We show that both coexistence and competitive exclusion are possible outcomes of this conflict, depending on the spatial and temporal structure of the environment. Both of these outcomes are driven by trade-offs between the rate and efficiency of conversion of resources into offspring that are mediated by metabolic intermediates.

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Acknowledgements

This project was funded by grants from NERC to the Center for Population Biology. I. Gudelj was supported by a NERC-EMS Fellowship. The authors would like to thank C. Godfray for comments and C. Brandon for technical assistance. Author Contributions R.C.M. carried out experimental work and wrote the manuscript. I.G. carried out mathematical modelling.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. NERC Center for Population Biology, Imperial College London, Silwood Park Campus, Ascot, Berkshire, SL5 7PY, UK
    R. Craig MacLean
  2. Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Bath, Claverton Down, BA2 7AY, Bath, UK
    Ivana Gudelj

Authors

  1. R. Craig MacLean
  2. Ivana Gudelj

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Correspondence toR. Craig MacLean.

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Reprints and permissions information is available at npg.nature.com/reprintsandpermissions. The authors declare no competing financial interests.

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Supplementary Notes nature04672-s1.pdf This file contains Supplementary Figure 1, Supplementary Table 1, Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Equation 1. (PDF 145 kb)

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MacLean, R., Gudelj, I. Resource competition and social conflict in experimental populations of yeast.Nature 441, 498–501 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04624

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Editorial Summary

Your cheating art

The evolution and maintenance of cooperative behaviour take some explaining. Cooperative groups can be undermined by ‘cheaters’ who selfishly exploit common resources, and a large body of theory predicts that cheats will usually displace cooperators. But a possible explanation of why cheats don't always prosper emerges from competition experiments between strains of yeast that act as cooperators and cheaters, competing for glucose and utilizing it either efficiently or ‘selfishly’. The results show that both strategies can coexist, because both are associated with costs and benefits. There is a cost to cheating; in this instance the production of fewer offspring than the opposition. A graphic — really — demonstration that natural selection can favour cooperation comes in a study by Ohtsuki et al. of the evolutionary dynamics of structured ‘virtual’ populations formed of points on a graph. Cooperation is favoured if the benefit of the altruistic act divided by the cost exceeds the average number of neighbours. So cooperation can evolve as a consequence of this ‘social viscosity’ even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.