Gain-of-function experiments: time for a real debate (original) (raw)

Nature Reviews Microbiology volume 13, pages 58–64 (2015)Cite this article

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Abstract

According to the WHO, dual use research of concern (DURC) is “life sciences research that is intended for benefit, but which might easily be misapplied to do harm”. Recent studies, particularly those on influenza viruses, have led to renewed attention on DURC, as there is an ongoing debate over whether the benefits of gain-of-function (GOF) experiments that result in an increase in the transmission and/or pathogenicity of potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs) are outweighed by concerns over biosecurity and biosafety. In this Viewpoint article, proponents and opponents of GOF experiments discuss the benefits and risks associated with these studies, as well as the implications of the current debate for the scientific community and the general public, and suggest how the current discussion should move forward.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Boston University School of Medicine and the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL), Boston, 02118, Massachusetts, USA
    W. Paul Duprex
  2. Department of Viroscience of Erasmus MC Rotterdam, Rotterdam, 3015 GE, The Netherlands
    Ron A. M. Fouchier
  3. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 48109, Michigan, USA
    Michael J. Imperiale
  4. Department of Epidemiology and Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, 02115, Massachusetts, USA
    Marc Lipsitch
  5. Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, California 94305, USA,
    David A. Relman
  6. the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, Palo Alto, California 94304, USA.,
    David A. Relman

Authors

  1. W. Paul Duprex
  2. Ron A. M. Fouchier
  3. Michael J. Imperiale
  4. Marc Lipsitch
  5. David A. Relman

Corresponding authors

Correspondence toW. Paul Duprex, Ron A. M. Fouchier, Michael J. Imperiale, Marc Lipsitch or David A. Relman.

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Competing interests

W.P.D., M.J.I. and D.A.R. declare no competing interests. R.A.M.F. receives research support for gain-of-function research from the US National Institutes of Health (NIH), the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and the European Union. M.L. receives research funding for pneumococcal vaccine modelling projects from PATH Vaccine Solutions and Pfizer.

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Duprex, W., Fouchier, R., Imperiale, M. et al. Gain-of-function experiments: time for a real debate.Nat Rev Microbiol 13, 58–64 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1038/nrmicro3405

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