From consociational consciousness to majoritarian myth: Consociational democracy, multi-level politics and the Belgian case of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (original) (raw)

Abstract

The Belgian federal system is consociational par excellence, most notably concerning the regional-linguistic cleavage where non-majoritarian conflict resolution through elite accommodation is institutionalised. Although they hold a majority in parliament, Dutch-speaking political parties have to compromise with French-speaking parties on issues of state structure and reform. However, in the case of the split of the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, Dutch-speaking parties – after years of dealing with the issue in a typical consociational way – started to follow a majoritarian logic, first in their discourse, later also in their actions. While this threatened political stability, it did not bring a solution, because of the constitutionalised consociational logic. This raises the question of what brought these parties to act according to a logic of majoritarianism while they function in an institutional context of consociationalism. After outlining the core non-majoritarian features of consociationalism and their institutionalisation in the Belgian federal system, the article analyses the case of BHV in this light and attempts to explain the paradoxical behaviour of Dutch-speaking political parties. It notably concentrates on two core explanations: the perverse effects of the consociational logic itself and the disconnection of regional and federal election dates in Belgium. The article concludes that Belgium's specific combination of consociationalism and multi-level politics hinders the federal system's functioning.

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Notes

  1. For a definition of language regions, see infra.
  2. This logic is pursued in 1979, for the first direct elections of the European parliament. The country is divided into a Dutch and a French electoral college, who both choose their own representatives, on the basis of a fixed number of seats for the two groups. This system is also introduced for senate elections in 1995 and a similar logic underpins the election of the Brussels Capital Parliament from 1988 onwards (Deschouwer, 2006, pp. 903–904).
  3. The alarm bell cannot be applied to special majority laws (which are already taken in consensus) and budget laws and can only be used once for the same proposal. The motion has to be introduced after the report of the Parliamentary Commission has been submitted, and before the final vote in the plenary session.
  4. There is no parity obligation in the government as such, as nothing is stipulated on the language group that the secretaries of state have to belong to.
  5. Other elements introduced later in the same vein are linguistic parity in the Constitutional Court and in the Concertation Committee between the federal government, the regions and communities. Also, dispositions similar to those protecting the French-speaking minority on the national level were introduced to protect the Dutch-speaking minority on the Brussels regional level.
  6. These compensations did not consist of a change in the language border, but instead introduced ‘registration rights’ for French-speakers in some of the Flemish communes peripheral to the Brussels region. These could administratively register in one of the Brussels communes and so also cast their vote there. These rights would be introduced permanently in the six facility communes and for a period of 20 years in parts of seven other communes. Also, the French-speaking community would be attributed a number of cultural competences in the facility communes.
  7. Candidates could either present themselves on an exclusively Dutch-speaking list which could be voted for in the electoral districts of Leuven (which contained the remaining communes of the Flemish-Brabant province) and of BHV or on an exclusively French-speaking list which could be voted for only in BHV (but with the possibility of an ‘apparentment’ with lists of the electoral district Walloon-Brabant). For Dutch-speaking lists, an electoral district BHV-Leuven (coinciding with the province of Flemish-Brabant) was de facto created, for French-speaking lists, BHV was maintained.
  8. Although their combined electoral score did not surpass their separate scores of 2003.
  9. Bar a few minor exceptions, before parties were either in the majority or the opposition on both levels simultaneously.
  10. The agreement contained ingredients similar to those of the Egmontpact of 1977: electoral registration rights for inhabitants of a number of communes and competences for the French-speaking community in the facility communes (for more details see Govaert, 2007, p. 11).

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  1. Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO), Department of Political Science, Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO), Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, University of Antwerp, Sint Jacobstraat 2, Antwerp, 2000, Belgium
    Dave Sinardet

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Sinardet, D. From consociational consciousness to majoritarian myth: Consociational democracy, multi-level politics and the Belgian case of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde.Acta Polit 45, 346–369 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2010.4

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