The architecture of representation (original) (raw)

Abstract

In this article I outline, apply, and defend a theory of natural representation. The main consequences of this theory are: (i) representational status is a matter of how physical entities are used, and specifically is not a matter of causation, nomic relations with the intentional object, or information; (ii) there are genuine (brain‐) internal representations; (iii) such representations are really representations, and not just farcical pseudo‐representations, such as attractors, principal components, state‐space partitions, or what‐have‐you; and (iv) the theory allows us to sharply distinguish those complex behaviors which are genuinely cognitive from those which are merely complex and adaptive.

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