The Pomp of Superfluous Causes: The Interpretation of Evolutionary Theory | Philosophy of Science | Cambridge Core (original) (raw)

Abstract

There are two competing interpretations of the modern synthesis theory of evolution: the dynamical (also know as ‘traditional’) and the statistical. The dynamical interpretation maintains that explanations offered under the auspices of the modern synthesis theory articulate the causes of evolution. It interprets selection and drift as causes of population change. The statistical interpretation holds that modern synthesis explanations merely cite the statistical structure of populations. This paper offers a defense of statisticalism. It argues that a change in trait frequencies in a population can be attributed only to selection or drift against the background of a particular statistical description of the population. The traditionalist supposition that selection and drift are description-independent causes of population change leads the dynamical interpretation into a dilemma: it must face a contradiction or accept the loss of explanatory power.

References

Abrams, Marshall (2007), “How Do Natural Selection and Random Drift Interact?”, Philosophy of Science (forthcoming).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Ariew, André, and Lewontin, Richard C. (2004), “The Confusions of Fitness”, The Confusions of Fitness 55:347–363.Google Scholar

Beatty, John (1984), “Chance and Natural Selection”, Chance and Natural Selection 51:183–211.Google Scholar

Bouchard, Frederic, and Rosenberg, Alexander (2004), “Fitness, Probability and the Principles of Natural Selection”, Fitness, Probability and the Principles of Natural Selection 55:693–712.Google Scholar

Brandon, Robert (2006), “The Principle of Drift: Biology’s First Law”, The Principle of Drift: Biology’s First Law 103:319–336.Google Scholar

Brandon, Robert, and Ramsey, Grant (2007), “What’s Wrong with the Emergentist Statistical Interpretation of Natural Selection and Random Drift”, in Ruse, Michael and Hull, David L. (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Gillespie, James (1977), “Natural Selection for Variances in Offspring Number—a New Evolutionary Principle”, Natural Selection for Variances in Offspring Number—a New Evolutionary Principle 111:1010–1014.Google Scholar

Grene, Marjorie (1961), “Statistics and Selection”, Statistics and Selection 12:25–42.Google Scholar

Hodge, M. J. S. (1987), “Natural Selection as a Causal, Empirical, and Probabilistic Theory”, in Krüger, L. (ed.), The Probabilistic Revolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 233–270.Google Scholar

Lange, M. (2001), Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics: Locality, Fields and Mass. London: Routledge.Google Scholar

Matthen, Mohan, and Ariew, André (2002), “Two Ways of Thinking about Fitness and Natural Selection”, Two Ways of Thinking about Fitness and Natural Selection 119:55–83.Google Scholar

Matthen, Mohan, and Ariew, André (2005), “How to Understand Causal Relations in Natural Selection: Reply to Rosenberg and Bouchard”, How to Understand Causal Relations in Natural Selection: Reply to Rosenberg and Bouchard 20:355–364.Google Scholar

Millstein, Roberta (2002), “Are Random Drift and Natural Selection Conceptually Distinct?”, Are Random Drift and Natural Selection Conceptually Distinct? 17:33–53.Google Scholar

Millstein, Roberta (2006), “Natural Selection as a Population-Level Causal Process”, Natural Selection as a Population-Level Causal Process 57:627–653.Google Scholar

Newton, I. ([1729] 1963), Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: The System of the World. Translated by Motte, A.; revised by Cajori, F.. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar

Reisman, Kenneth, and Forber, Patrick (2005), “Manipulation and the Causes of Evolution”, Manipulation and the Causes of Evolution 72:1113–1123.Google Scholar

Rosenberg, Alexander (2006), Darwinian Reductionism, or How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rosenberg, Alexander, and Bouchard, Frederic (2005), “Matthen and Ariew’s Obituary for Fitness: Reports of Its Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated”, Matthen and Ariew’s Obituary for Fitness: Reports of Its Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated 20:343–353.Google Scholar

Shapiro, Lawrence A., and Sober, Elliott (2007), “Epiphenomenalism—Some Do’s and Don’ts”, in Wolters, G. and Machamer, P. (eds), Studies in Causality: Historical and Contemporary. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar

Sober, Elliott (1984), The Nature of Selection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Sober, Elliott (2001), “Two Faces of Fitness”, in Singh, R., Paul, D., Krimbas, C., and Beatty, J. (eds.), Thinking about Evolution: Historical, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 309–321.Google Scholar

Stephens, Christopher (2004), “Selection, Drift and the ‘Forces’ of Evolution”, Selection, Drift and the ‘Forces’ of Evolution 71:550–570.Google Scholar

Walsh, Denis M. (2003), “Fit and Diversity: Explaining Adaptive Evolution”, Fit and Diversity: Explaining Adaptive Evolution 70:280–301.Google Scholar

Walsh, Denis M. (2004), “Bookkeeping or Metaphysics? The Units of Selection Debate”, Bookkeeping or Metaphysics? The Units of Selection Debate 138:337–361.Google Scholar

Walsh, Denis, Lewens, Tim, and Ariew, André (2002), “The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Drift”, The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Drift 69:452–473.Google Scholar

Waters, C. Kenneth (1991), “Tempered Realism about the Force of Selection”, Tempered Realism about the Force of Selection 58:553–573.Google Scholar

Woodward, J. (2003), Making Things Happen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Wright, S. ([1931] 1986), “The Statistical Theory of Evolution”, The Statistical Theory of Evolution 22:201–208. Reprinted in William Provine (ed.), Evolution: Selected Papers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 89–96.Google Scholar

Zar, Jerrold (1974), Biostatistical Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar