Optimization of ProVerif Programs for AKE Protocols (original) (raw)

Abstract

Cryptographic protocols are used to establish secure connection between agents who communicate strictly in accordance with the rules specified by the protocol. To make sure that a newly designed cryptographic protocol is cryptographically strong, various software tools are usually employed. However, an adequate specification of a cryptographic protocol is generally represented as a set of requirements for sequences of transmitted messages, including their format. The fulfillment of all these requirements leads to the fact that the formal specification of a real-world cryptographic protocol becomes cumbersome and, therefore, difficult to analyze by formal methods. ProVerif is one of the intensively developed tools for formal verification of cryptographic protocols. However, ProVerif often fails to analyze large protocols, i.e., it can neither prove the security of the protocol nor refute it. In these cases, either the problem is approximated or equivalent transformations of a program model in the ProVerif language are carried out to simplify the ProVerif model. In this paper, we propose a technique to simplify ProVerif specifications for AKE protocols that use the ElGamal encryption scheme. In particular, we define equivalent transformations that make it possible to construct a ProVerif specification that facilitates the analysis for the ProVerif tool. Experimental results for the Needham–Schroeder and Yahalom cryptoprotocols show that this approach is promising for automatic verification of real-world protocols.

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Funding

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, grant no. 075-15-2020-788.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ivannikov Institute for System Programming, Russian Academy of Sciences, ul. Solzhenitsyna 25, 109004, Moscow, Russia
    E. M. Vinarskii & A. V. Demakov
  2. National Research University Higher School of Economics, Pokrovskii bul’v. 11, 109028, Moscow, Russia
    E. M. Vinarskii

Authors

  1. E. M. Vinarskii
  2. A. V. Demakov

Corresponding authors

Correspondence toE. M. Vinarskii or A. V. Demakov.

Additional information

Translated by Yu. Kornienko

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Vinarskii, E.M., Demakov, A.V. Optimization of ProVerif Programs for AKE Protocols.Program Comput Soft 48, 781–787 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0361768822080035

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