A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems (original) (raw)

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Published: 01 February 1978 Publication History

Abstract

An encryption method is presented with the novel property that publicly revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the corresponding decryption key. This has two important consequences: (1) Couriers or other secure means are not needed to transmit keys, since a message can be enciphered using an encryption key publicly revealed by the intented recipient. Only he can decipher the message, since only he knows the corresponding decryption key. (2) A message can be “signed” using a privately held decryption key. Anyone can verify this signature using the corresponding publicly revealed encryption key. Signatures cannot be forged, and a signer cannot later deny the validity of his signature. This has obvious applications in “electronic mail” and “electronic funds transfer” systems. A message is encrypted by representing it as a number M, raising M to a publicly specified power e, and then taking the remainder when the result is divided by the publicly specified product, n, of two large secret primer numbers p and q. Decryption is similar; only a different, secret, power d is used, where e * d ≡ 1(mod (p - 1) * (q - 1)). The security of the system rests in part on the difficulty of factoring the published divisor, n.

References

[1]

Diffie, W., and Hellman, M. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory IT-22, 6 (Nov. 1976), 644-654.

[2]

Diffie, W., and Hellman, M. Exhaustive cryptanalysis of the NBS data encryption standard. Computer 10 (June 1977), 74-84.

[3]

Knuth, D. E. The Art of Computer Programming, Vol 2: Seminumerical Algorithms. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1969.

[4]

Levine, J., and Brawley, J.V. Some cryptographic applications of permutation polynomials. Cryptologia 1 (Jan. 1977), 76-92.

[5]

Merkle, R. Secure communications over an insecure channel. Submitted to Comm. ACM.

[6]

Miller, G.L. Riemann's hypothesis and tests for primality. Proc. Seventh Annual ACM Symp. on the Theory of Comptng. Albuquerque, New Mex., May 1975, pp. 234-239; extended vers. available as Res. Rep. CS-75-27, Dept. of Comptr. Sci., U. of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ont., Canada, Oct. 1975.

[7]

Niven, I., and Zuckerman, H.S. An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers. Wiley, New York, 1972.

[8]

Pohlig, S.C., and Hellman, M.E. An improved algorithm for computing logarithms over GF(p) and its cryptographic significance. To appear in IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 1978.

[9]

Pollard, J.M. Theorems on factorization and primality testing. Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. 76 (1974), 521-528.

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Potter, R.J., Electronic mail. Science 195, 4283 (March 1977), 1160-1164.

[11]

Rabin, M.O., Probabilistic algorithms. In Algorithms and Complexity, J. F. Traub, Ed., Academic Press, New York, 1976, pp. 21-40.

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Solovay, R., and Strassen, V. A Fast Monte-Carlo test for primality. SIAM J. Comptng. 6 (March 1977), 84-85.

[13]

Federal Register, Vol. 40, No. 52, March 17, 1975.

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Federal Register, Vol. 40, No. 149, August 1, 1975.

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Published In

cover image Communications of the ACM

Communications of the ACM Volume 21, Issue 2

Feb. 1978

74 pages

Copyright © 1978 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 February 1978

Published in CACM Volume 21, Issue 2

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Author Tags

  1. authentication
  2. cryptography
  3. digital signatures
  4. electronic funds transfer
  5. electronic mail
  6. factorization
  7. message-passing
  8. prime number
  9. privacy
  10. public-key cryptosystems
  11. security

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R. L. Rivest

MIT Lab. for Computer Science and Department of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA

A. Shamir

MIT Lab. for Computer Science and Department of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA

L. Adleman

MIT Lab. for Computer Science and Department of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA