Reflections on Sam Harris' "Free Will" (original) (raw)

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Abstract

Abstract: In his book Free Will Sam Harris tries to persuade us to abandon the morally pernicious idea of free will. The following contribution articulates and defends a more sophisticated model of free will that is not only consistent with neuroscience and introspection but also grounds a variety of responsibility that justifies both praise and blame, reward and punishment. This begins with the long lasting parting of opinion between compatibilists (who argue that free will can live comfortably with determinism) and incompatibilists (who deny this). While Harris dismisses compatibilism as a form of theology, this article aims at showing that Harris has underestimated and misinterpreted compatibilism and at defending a more sophisticated version of compatibilism that is imprevious to Harris’ criticism.

Keywords: Sam Harris; Free Will; Compatibilism; Incompatibilism; Neuroscience

Riflessioni su "Free Will" di Sam Harris

Riassunto: Nel suo libro Free Will Sam Harris cerca di persuaderci ad abbandonare l’idea, a suo avviso moralmente perniciosa, del libero arbitrio. Il contributo seguente articola e difende un modello di libero arbitrio che non solo è coerente con le neuroscienze e con l’introspezione, ma che dà anche fondamento a varie responsabilità giustificando encomi e biasimo, premi e punizioni. Questo prende le mosse dalla discussione della disputa di lunga data fra compatibilisti (secondo i quali il libero arbitrio può convivere pacificamente con il determinismo) e incompatibilisti (che negano questa posizione). Mentre Harris respinge il compatibilismo alla stregua di una forma di teologia, questo articolo ambisce a mostrare come Harris abbia sottostimato e mal interpretato il compatibilismo e come invece sia possibile enucleare una forma di compatibilismo più sofisticata, insensibile alle sue critiche.

Parole chiave: Sam Harris; Libero arbitrio; Compatibilismo; Incompatibilismo; Neuroscienza

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References

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