Katherine Brading | Duke University (original) (raw)
Papers by Katherine Brading
By means of an example, special relativity and presentism, I argue for the importance of reading ... more By means of an example, special relativity and presentism, I argue for the importance of reading history of physics as a contribution to philosophy, and for the fruitfulness of this approach to doing integrated history and philosophy of science. Within philosophy of physics, presentism is widely regarded as un-tenable in the light of special relativity. I argue that reading Newton's Principia as a contribution to philosophy reveals a law-constitutive approach to the unity of what there is, from which an alternative approach to presentism within physics emerges. This view respects the methodological and epistemo-logical commitments of philosophy of physics in " taking special relativity seriously " , but proposes an alternative approach to the status of spacetime (as epistemic) and to the ground of what is real (law-constitution). While this approach to presentism does not preserve all of the contemporary presentist desiderata, it offers the possibility that the spatiotemporal extent of an existing thing is less than its entire history as represented in the block universe. I argue that the approach warrants further philosophical investigation.
Page 1. 1 All alone in the Universe: Individuals in Descartes and Newton Katherine A. Brading, Wo... more Page 1. 1 All alone in the Universe: Individuals in Descartes and Newton Katherine A. Brading, Wolfson College, Oxford OX2 6UD, UK Dana Jalobeanu, West University Vasile Goldis, Arad, Romania. June 2002 Abstract In ...
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2017
Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from... more Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from John Worrall’s “Structural Realism” in which he defends a position (since characterized “epistemic structural realism”) whose historical roots he attributes to Poincaré. In the renewed debate inspired by Worrall, it is thus not uncommon to find Poincaré’s name associated with various structuralist positions. However, Poincaré’s structuralism is deeply entwined with neo-Kantianism and the roles of convention and objectivity within science. In this article we explore the nature of these dependencies. What emerges is not only a clearer picture of Poincaré’s position regarding structuralism but also two arguments for versions of epistemic structuralism different in kind from that of Worrall.
*Structural Realism: Structure, Object, Causality* (The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol. 77), edited by Elaine Landry and Dean Rickles, 2012
We examine the argument for ontic structural realism that begins from an alleged “metaphysical un... more We examine the argument for ontic structural realism that begins from an alleged “metaphysical underdetermination” afflicting contemporary fundamental physics. Current discussions have focussed on challenging this underdetermination claim. Our purpose here is to examine what follows even if the premise concerning underdetermination is conceded. We consider the additional premises needed to arrive at an endorsement of ontic structural realism, and show that each can and should be rejected. Moreover, the ontic structural realist program faces an analogous metaphysical underdetermination issue of its own. We conclude that the argument fails, independently of whether the alleged metaphysical underdetermination is conceded.
Projects by Katherine Brading
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2021
By means of an example, special relativity and presentism, I argue for the importance of reading ... more By means of an example, special relativity and presentism, I argue for the importance of reading history of physics as a contribution to philosophy, and for the fruitfulness of this approach to doing integrated history and philosophy of science. Within philosophy of physics, presentism is widely regarded as un-tenable in the light of special relativity. I argue that reading Newton's Principia as a contribution to philosophy reveals a law-constitutive approach to the unity of what there is, from which an alternative approach to presentism within physics emerges. This view respects the methodological and epistemo-logical commitments of philosophy of physics in " taking special relativity seriously " , but proposes an alternative approach to the status of spacetime (as epistemic) and to the ground of what is real (law-constitution). While this approach to presentism does not preserve all of the contemporary presentist desiderata, it offers the possibility that the spatiotemporal extent of an existing thing is less than its entire history as represented in the block universe. I argue that the approach warrants further philosophical investigation.
Page 1. 1 All alone in the Universe: Individuals in Descartes and Newton Katherine A. Brading, Wo... more Page 1. 1 All alone in the Universe: Individuals in Descartes and Newton Katherine A. Brading, Wolfson College, Oxford OX2 6UD, UK Dana Jalobeanu, West University Vasile Goldis, Arad, Romania. June 2002 Abstract In ...
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2017
Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from... more Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from John Worrall’s “Structural Realism” in which he defends a position (since characterized “epistemic structural realism”) whose historical roots he attributes to Poincaré. In the renewed debate inspired by Worrall, it is thus not uncommon to find Poincaré’s name associated with various structuralist positions. However, Poincaré’s structuralism is deeply entwined with neo-Kantianism and the roles of convention and objectivity within science. In this article we explore the nature of these dependencies. What emerges is not only a clearer picture of Poincaré’s position regarding structuralism but also two arguments for versions of epistemic structuralism different in kind from that of Worrall.
*Structural Realism: Structure, Object, Causality* (The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol. 77), edited by Elaine Landry and Dean Rickles, 2012
We examine the argument for ontic structural realism that begins from an alleged “metaphysical un... more We examine the argument for ontic structural realism that begins from an alleged “metaphysical underdetermination” afflicting contemporary fundamental physics. Current discussions have focussed on challenging this underdetermination claim. Our purpose here is to examine what follows even if the premise concerning underdetermination is conceded. We consider the additional premises needed to arrive at an endorsement of ontic structural realism, and show that each can and should be rejected. Moreover, the ontic structural realist program faces an analogous metaphysical underdetermination issue of its own. We conclude that the argument fails, independently of whether the alleged metaphysical underdetermination is conceded.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2021