Woojin Han | Duksung - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Woojin Han

Philosophical Psychology, 2023

Orange heart shapes are commonly perceived as slightly reddish, which is an example of the memory... more Orange heart shapes are commonly perceived as slightly reddish, which is an example of the memory color effect (MCE). Given that the MCE is a modulation of visual memories of typical colors of familiar objects, it can be considered to be a top-down effect. Whether cognitive penetration can explain MCEs has been actively debated since Macpherson argued that the belief that hearts are red alters orange perception. This paper aims to provide a credible explanation of the MCE that is consistent with scientific studies. I first prove that Macpherson’s theory is not properly supported by the psychological evidence that she provides. I also show that her model contradicts a report on the neural correlate of the MCE. Next, I examine color constancy, which enables the perception of colors as constant under various illuminations, as a possible noncognitive principle for the MCE. The relationship between them, however, is not well established. Using statistical analyses of scenes around us, Purves suggests that perception is determined by the most frequent percepts. I argue that Purves’ view better explains the noncognitive aspects of visual memory and is consistent with the finding of the neural correlate of the MCE.

Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association, 2020

Theory theory assumes that we read other minds through theories of mind from the 3rd person point... more Theory theory assumes that we read other minds through theories of mind from the 3rd person point of view, while simulation theory supposes that empathy is equivalent to putting oneself in someone’s situation from the 1st person point of view. As an alternative, interaction theory is other-oriented by taking the 2nd person point of view and pays attention to the perceptual and embodied aspect of daily interactions. Debates over social cognition have centered on which theory better explains specific dimensions of mindreading, empathy, or interaction. Although interaction theory is meaningful in that it focuses on the reciprocity of interactions, empathy is not monopolized by one theory or point of view but instead has multi-levels. We interact with others on various levels, each of which corresponds to related theories and points of view. Based on reciprocity, a key feature of empathy, this study distills a comprehensive set of elements of empathy from theories and points of view for each level.

Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association, 2019

The inverse (optics) problem means that a perceiver cannot discriminate what correctly correspond... more The inverse (optics) problem means that a perceiver cannot discriminate what correctly corresponds to her perception among multiple distal stimuli. Taking it seriously, Purves proposed an empirical approach that perceptual content is determined not by external objects but by the frequency of accumulated internal perceptions. Wojtach presents empirical externalism which combines Purves’ empirical approach and a teleological theory of representation. According to him, there is no misrepresentation, and a perceiver creates an internal representation which corresponds to the most frequent distal stimulus. However, theorists of representation would not endorse an explanation which denies misrepresentation. This study aims to supply indirect externalism as an alternative to empirical externalism. Indirect externalism is different from empirical externalism in that it does not assume representation that causally connects particular perceptual content to the most frequent distal stimulus. Instead, indirect externalism, which appropriately reflects empirical approach, argues that an individual perception is directly determined by accumulated internal perceptions, while the environment that has been frequently met by a perceiver indirectly affects perceptual content by contributing to the history of internal perceptions.

Journal of The Society of philosophical studies, 2018

Alphagrid is a futuristic smartgrid which preventively responds to uncertainties in the new envir... more Alphagrid is a futuristic smartgrid which preventively responds to uncertainties in the new environment of energy industry. Smartgrid, depending on ICT, aims to improve efficiency via automation of power systems. Although smartgrid utilizes two-way communication technologies such as smart devices, it has a limited understanding of people as prosumers. Alphagrid is an advanced smartgrid, in that it considers uncertainties that can be caused by human factors. Cutting-edge technologies such as deep learning, big data, electric vehicles, renewable energies, internet of things, smart sensors, smart devices, and block-chain will develop microgrids which are small, localized energy systems. Eventually, P2P energy trading markets, where people buy and sell energies stored by conservation and solar generation, will emerge. People are likely to be rational in pursuing their best interests, whereas they are irrationally biased and emotional. Thus, people sometimes show their irrationality to energy policies which are influenced by social and political factors. This can result in vast amount of social costs. Moreover, decentralized P2P energy trading markets can be exposed to human uncertainties which already drove financial markets to catastrophes. Therefore, alphagrid should consider social, political, and human factors as well as technologies.

This dissertation aims to provide a posteriori answers to the mystery of consciousness, which can... more This dissertation aims to provide a posteriori answers to the mystery of consciousness, which can be articulated in the form of the zombie argument, which denies physicalism if there is a possible world in which a physical/functional duplicate of me that lacks qualia exists.

Korean Journal of Philosophy of Science 과학철학, 2020

Many conceptualists argue that only if perceivers have concepts, their perceptual experiences hav... more Many conceptualists argue that only if perceivers have concepts, their
perceptual experiences have content. According to nonconceptualism,
however, there is perceptual content without any involvement of concepts. Nonconceptualists have been interested in the Müller-Lyer
illusion, a phenomenon in which one of two lines with the identical
length looks longer than the other despite our knowledge of the
illusion, since it implies the belief-independence of perceptions.
Conceptualists contend that a concept such as ‘longer line’ is
necessary for seeing one line longer. Or they can explain, by
appealing to a top-down theory, that there is some influence of
judgments. This study highlights the Müller-Lyer illusion especially in
animals. Not only primates but birds and fish also have been reported
to experience the illusion. I argue that conceptualists’ responses to the
Müller-Lyer illusion in humans and their explanations of animals’
perception in general entail serious problems if they are applied to
the Müller-Lyer illusion in animals.

Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association (CHULHAK-RONCHONG), 2020

Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association (CHULHAK-RONCHONG), 2019

Journal of the Society of Philosophical Studies 철학연구, 2018

Alphagrid is a futuristic smartgrid which preventively responds to uncertainties in the new ... more Alphagrid is a futuristic smartgrid which preventively responds to uncertainties in the new environment of energy industry. Smartgrid, depending on ICT, aims to improve efficiency via automation of power systems. Although smartgrid utilizes two-way communication technologies such as smart devices, it has a limited understanding of people as prosumers. Alphagrid is an advanced smartgrid, in that it considers uncertainties that can be caused by human factors. Cutting-edge technologies such as deep learning, big data, electric vehicles, renewable energies, internet of things, smart sensors, smart devices, and block-chain will develop microgrids which are small, localized energy systems. Eventually, P2P energy trading markets, where people buy and sell energies stored by conservation and solar generation, will emerge. People are likely to be rational in pursuing their best interests, whereas they are irrationally biased and emotional. Thus, people sometimes show their irrationality to energy policies which are influenced by social and political factors. This can result in vast amount of social costs. Moreover, decentralized P2P energy trading markets can be exposed to human uncertainties which already drove financial markets to catastrophes. Therefore, alphagrid should consider social, political, and human factors as well as technologies.

Korean Journal of Philosophy of Science 과학철학, 2017

In "The Mind-Body Problem", Tohyong Paik (2014) examines varied theories surrounding the notoriou... more In "The Mind-Body Problem", Tohyong Paik (2014) examines varied theories surrounding the notorious mind-body problem, including property dualism, eliminativism, and reductionism. He then criticizes all of them. He argues that the mind-body problem is unsolvable since we are still under the shadow of Descartes and take mental properties to be universals. Paik’s alternative is nominalism or four-dimensional particularism. However, he neglects a posteriori physicalism which has been the most prominent response to Chalmers’s zombie argument. It assumes that ontological reduction is the best theory that we have at hand and tries to explain away the mind-body problem which is found only in the epistemic level. I argue that we do not need to seriously consider nominalism or particularism when a posteriori physicalism is tenable.

KOREAN JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE , 2017

Molyneux raised a famous problem. If a born-blind person opens her eyes, can she visually recogni... more Molyneux raised a famous problem. If a born-blind person opens her eyes, can she visually recognize a sphere and a square that she has known by touch? Locke, an empiricist, said that she cannot recognize which is which since her visual experiences are totally new. Recently, a real experiment about Molyneux’s problem was conducted. Born-blind children who just opened their eyes could not visually recognize shapes. However, a new experiment produced a contrary result. Born-blind children who just underwent eye surgeries experienced the Müller-Lyer illusion, a phenomenon in which a subject sees two lines of the identical length as different according to the direction of arrowheads at the tips of the lines. Top-down theories focus on the influence of past experiences and so well conform to empiricism. However, the result of the Müller-Lyer illusion experiment seems to deny top-down theories and empiricism. Whereas one of the two experiments strengthens empiricism, the other weakens. I argue that empiricists cannot solve this puzzle.

The Catholic Philosophy, 2016

“Seeing is believing” means that we see something first, and later higher-level cognitive activit... more “Seeing is believing” means that we see something first, and later higher-level cognitive activities such as believing or knowing are applicable to seeing. However, “we see as much as we know” implies that seeing and knowing are inseperable. Dennett uses a painting which contains tiny people when we see from a distance. But just paint bulbs or touches are recognized when we see it very closely. He argues that we see these paint bulbs, suggesting real people, as people by filling-in which is a sort of judgment. Judgment, which is a conceptual process, in perception implies that perceptual content is conceptual. On the other hand, Dretske claims that perceptual experiences, inaccessible by cognitive activities, are found. The change blindness shows that we are not aware of a salient difference between two very similar pictures. This involves that nonconceptual content, detachable from judgment or inference, exists. By examining not only these examples but also further empirical cases such as blindsight, Sperling’s experiments, and crowding, I argue Dretske’s view is more plausible than Dennett’s.

Philosophical counseling has established its identity that distinguishes itself from psychologica... more Philosophical counseling has established its identity that distinguishes itself from psychological counseling. Non-directiveness, reciprocity, and critical thinking have been mentioned as inherent properties of philosophical counseling. Recently, an interesting metaphysical problem about philosophical and psychological counseling was raised. Psychological counseling, which supposes mental causation as its metaphysical assumption, is vulnerable to Kim’s exclusion argument. However, Logic-Based Therapy, a sort of philosophical therapy, can dodge the exclusion argument, since it does not appeal to mental causation but employs deductive reasoning which goes back to Aristotle’s practical reasoning. Nevertheless, logical necessity found in deductive reasoning is insufficient to provide a legitimate metaphysical ground for philosophical counseling. Practical reasoning guaranteeing agent’s rationality should be able to evaluate appropriateness of reasons for actions beyond just logical necessity in deductive reasoning. It can also utilize varied traditions of philosophy. Agent’s practical reasoning has its metaphysical strength in that it is not vulnerable to the exclusion argument, since it does not necessarily suppose mental causation. Agent’s practical reasoning presents justification not only for diverse practices of philosophical counseling but also for kinds of psychological counseling which have borrowed qualitative elements from philosophy.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2014

Braddon-Mitchell (2003), Hawthorne (2002), and Stalnaker (2002) provide a physicalistic argument ... more Braddon-Mitchell (2003), Hawthorne (2002), and Stalnaker (2002) provide a physicalistic argument that depends on the following two conditionals. If we experience dualistic pain, zombies are possible. On the other hand, if the actual world is physicalistic, zombies are impossible. Based on these conditionals, it is derived that zombies are conceivable but this does not entail their possibility. This line of argument for physicalism is referred to as the Conditional Analysis Strategy (CAS). I claim that the CAS does not help physicalists defuse the zombie argument. To show this, I first suggest that there are three possible interpretations of the strategy: the CAS explains the zombie intuition by virtue of the conceivability of zombies; the CAS conditionally disproves the entailment-link from conceivability to possibility; the CAS unconditionally denies the entailment-link. I argue that none of the three understandings brings good news to physicalism.

McTaggart asserts that time is unreal by denying the two theories of time. A-Theory holds that te... more McTaggart asserts that time is unreal by denying the two theories of time. A-Theory holds that tense such as present, past or future is real and present events can be past events in the future. B-Theory maintains that tense is unreal, and only relations between events such as ‘before,’ ‘after’ or ‘simultaneous’ exist. I claim that McTaggart’s argument to deny time is inconsistent. He first drives B-theory to a contradiction by introducing ‘change’ which is a key notion of A-Theory, and then criticizes A-Theory. In his argument to show that A-Theory entails a contradiction, he utilizes tenseless terms belonging to B-Theory, which he already denied. However, this is inconsistent. When we reconstruct his argument into a dilemma, the problem of inconsistency is still found. Furthermore, the whole sequence of his argument is revealed to be invalid.

The Multiple Realizability Thesis, stating that one mental state can have at least two physical r... more The Multiple Realizability Thesis, stating that one mental state can have at least two physical realizers, was considered as supporting anti-reductionism about mental states in general. But recently, Multiple Realizability has become a main issue regarding physicalism about consciousness, in relation to the explanatory gap that there is no explanation about a correlation between a neural and a conscious state. I aim to formulate Cognitive Neurofunctionalism as a reductive theory about consciousness which is compatible with Multiple Realizability. Cognitive Neurofunctionalism appeals to cutting-edge cognitive neuroscience to maintain reduction; at the same time, it makes reduction compatible with Multiple Realizability by virtue of a functional interpretation of a neural state. This means that Cognitive Neurofunctionalism is a better physicalistic theory than type-identity theory or reduction in defying the explanatory gap.

This paper argues that David Chalmers’s Two Dimensional (2D) semantics and modal monism are not p... more This paper argues that David Chalmers’s Two Dimensional (2D) semantics and modal monism are not properly applicable to natural kinds, and we need independent semantics and modal concepts for them. Chalmers’s 2D semantics is serious about considering possible worlds as actual, and so highlights primary intensions which are grounded on rational reasoning. Modal monism is a thesis that logical necessity, tightly associated with primary intensions, is identical with metaphysical necessity. Chalmers insists that modal dualism, which holds the independence of metaphysical necessity, is wrong and logical necessity embraces facts about natural kinds. However, 2D semantics and modal monism entail an absurd metaphysical result that considering possible worlds as actual could affect metaphysics of our natural kinds. Hence, Chalmers’s 2D semantics and modal monism should be turned down.

Journal of The Society of Philosophical Studies 철학연구, 2010

The ordinary view about kinds of supervenience is that nomological supervenience is a sub-kind of... more The ordinary view about kinds of supervenience is that nomological supervenience is a sub-kind of metaphysical supervenience. This conforms to the ordinary understanding of modal notions that the set of metaphysical possible worlds includes the set of nomological possible worlds. This is in turn based on a metaphysical view that the nature of things (or properties) is prior to laws of nature, which are dependent on the interactions between things (or properties). However, Jessica Wilson argues that the nature of things (or properties) is rather individuated by laws of nature, and thus metaphysical supervenience collapses into nomological supervenience. While supporting the ordinary view, I prove that Wilson's thesis is too strong by presenting counter-examples about things (or properties) which endure changes in laws.

This paper investigates the natrue of God’s time by virtue of two theories of time originated fro... more This paper investigates the natrue of God’s time by virtue of two theories of time originated from J. E. M. McTaggart. A-theory considers tense as actual, and portraits God as a temporal being who is everlasting from the infinite past to the present to the infinite future. A-theory has its strength in explaining God’s sustaining and acting on His creatures. On the other hand, B-theory, which holds that there is no tense and only relations between events exist, is better in depicting God as a complete being who pre-owns all the events. A contradiction arises from the two theories of time that respectively illuminate God’s two different aspects: God seems to be an atemporal being but, at the same time, he seems to be a temporal being. A solution is to accept God’s atemporality, which conforms to His completeness and B-theory, and then to coherently explain his presence and temporal action. I resolve the contradiction by appealing to the notion of weak supervenience, which maintains that our temporal events depend on the events pre-owned by God only in the actual world.

The Journal of the Korean Soceity for Philosophy, 2009

N. Block criticizes that functionalists ignore the conceptual distinction between Access-Consciou... more N. Block criticizes that functionalists ignore the conceptual distinction between Access-Consciousness, which reflects the functional aspect of consciousness, and Phenomenal Consciousness, which reflects its phenomenal aspect. To support the distinction, he raises examples such as blindsighters, who react to what appeared in the visual field of which they cannot have any phenomenal experience, and G. Sperling’s test about the existence of iconic memories. This paper aims to argue that defining phenomenal consciousness by nonconceptual content has theoretical advantages and explains Block’s examples better than his definition. Nonconceptual content is found in informational states before cognitive, conceptual, or rational judgment. I define phenomenal consciousness as an informational state with nonconceptual content before our rational inferences, verbal reports, or behaviors. My definition agrees with the explanation of the mental by informational process, and keeps the conceptual autonomy of phenomenal consciousness. My suggestion can solve the problems that are entailed by Block’s or functionalists’ notion of consciousness. It also helps effectively defuse the zombie argument that, if a duplicate of me only without qualia is conceivable, it is possible.