Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives (original) (raw)
Abstract
This paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1990. The empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time. We find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior, nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns. The most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid, suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district.
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Authors and Affiliations
- The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 19104-6372, Philadelphia, PA
John R. Lott Jr. - Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, 78712, Austin, TX
Stephen G. Bronars
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- John R. Lott Jr.
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We would like to thank Linda Cohen and Gertrud Fremling and the participants in sessions at the 1992 Public Choice and Western Economic Association meetings for their helpful discussions on the topics in this paper. Lott is the Carl D. Covitz Assistant Professor at the Wharton School and Bronars is an Associate Professor at the University of Texas.
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Lott, J.R., Bronars, S.G. Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives.Public Choice 76, 125–149 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049346
- Accepted: 23 July 1992
- Issue Date: June 1993
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049346