Reciprocity in international relations | International Organization | Cambridge Core (original) (raw)

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World politics is commonly referred to as anarchic, meaning that it lacks a common government. Yet a Hobbesian “war of all against all” does not usually ensue: even sovereign governments that recognize no common authority may engage in limited cooperation. The anarchic structure of world politics does mean, however, that the achievement of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement. On the contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help.

References

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  18. My distinction between specific and diffuse reciprocity was suggested by Peter Blau's distinction between social and economic exchange. Social exchange involves somewhat indefinite, sequential exchanges within the context of a general pattern of obligation. In economic exchange, however, the benefits to be exchanged are precisely specified and no trust is required. The distinction between specific and diffuse reciprocity also bears some similarity to Marshall Sahlins's distinction between “balanced” and “generalized” reciprocity. Sahlins, however, views generalized exchange as “putatively altruistic.” See Blau, , Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 8, 93–97Google Scholar, and Sahlins, , Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), p. 194.Google Scholar

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  21. Gouldner, , “Norm of Reciprocity,” p. 171Google Scholar. In the case of what I have called diffuse reciprocity, cooperation is contingent not on the behavior of particular individuals but on the continued successful functioning of the group.

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  23. Bloch, Marc, Feudal Society (1940; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968)Google Scholar. This quotation is from selections from Feudal Society in Schmidt, Steffen W. et al. , Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 205Google Scholar. On patron-client relations see two other articles in the Schmidt volume: Powell, John Duncan, “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,”Google Scholar and Scott, James C., “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.”Google Scholar Imbalances in favor of the patron may be accounted for by the resources, sometimes including force, at the patron's disposal: that is, the patron's bargaining power may be greater than that of the client. Sometimes, however, the observable material flow of goods favors the client, which poses a potential paradox for exchange theory: why should a patron enter into an exchange relationship in which surrendered resources are greater in value than those received? Social exchange theory answers that the political deference of the client toward the patron balances the exchange. This deference may be used to extract resources indirectly, from the client and from other similarly placed people in the society, through the operation of the political system. Thus the eventual material rewards to the patron may be quite considerable. See Homans, George C., Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1961)Google Scholar, and Blau, , Exchange and Power in Social Life.Google Scholar

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  26. Blackhurst, Richard, “Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations under Flexible Exchange Rates,” in Martin, John P. and Smith, Alasdair, eds., Trade and Payments Adjustment under Flexible Exchange Rates (London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre, 1979), quotation on p. 215Google Scholar, discussion of reciprocal concessions on p. 225. On the latter see also Finlayson and Zacher, , “GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers,” p. 286Google Scholar. A related article that helped stimulate my thinking on this subject is Roessler, Frieder, “The Rationale for Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations under Floating Currencies,” Kyklos 31, 2 (1978), pp. 258–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

  27. If C represents a cooperative move and D an uncooperative “defection,” the order of preferences for player A is as follows, listing A's move first: DC > CC > DD > CD. For a detailed account see Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, or the special issue of World Politics 38 (10 1985).Google Scholar

  28. Taylor, Michael, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976)Google Scholar. As Axelrod points out, it has long been argued in the game-theoretic literature that in Prisoner's Dilemma with a finite number of plays, a rational player will defect continually: “On the next-to-last move neither player will have an incentive to cooperate since they can both anticipate a defection by the other player on the very last move. Such a line of reasoning implies that the game will unravel all the way back to mutual defection on the first move of any sequence of plays that is of known finite length” (Evolution of Cooperation, p. 10). However, this finding is highly sensitive to the assumption of perfect information embedded in it. In finite Prisoner's Dilemma even a small amount of uncertainty involving asymmetrical information can make it rational to follow a strategy of reciprocity, which yields higher payoffs than the “rational” strategy of defection under perfect information. A certain amount of ignorance is indeed bliss! See Kreps, D. and Wilson, R., “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), pp. 245–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and other articles in the same issue.

  29. On Prisoner's Dilemma see Oskamp, Stuart, “Effects of Programmed Strategies on Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Mixed-Motive Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 15 (06 1971), pp. 225–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Warner Wilson, “Reciprocation and Other Techniques for Inducing Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Ibid., pp. 167–95; and Alker, Hayward R. Jr., and Hurwitz, Roger, Resolving Prisoner's Dilemma (Teaching Module) (Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1981).Google Scholar

  30. For some experimental evidence about the effects of reciprocity in a bargaining game that is quite different from Prisoner's Dilemma, see Esser, James K. and Komorita, S. S., “Reciprocity and Concession Making in Bargaining,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31, 5 (1975), pp. 864–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Komorita, S. S. and Esser, James K., “Frequency of Reciprocated Concessions in Bargaining,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32, 4 (1975), pp. 699–705CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O., “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38 (10 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

  31. Axelrod, , Evolution of Cooperation, p. 138Google Scholar. Reciprocity may be regarded as morally wrong even when it could be expected to lead to an agreement rather than to a feud. For instance, many ethical doctrines would consider it wrong for the United States to have seized innocent Shiite Moslem hostages in retaliation for the Shiite hijacking of a TWA airliner in June 1985. When adversaries hold themselves to very different ethical standards, one side may be unwilling to behave as the other does, making reciprocity unattainable.

  32. Evans, John W., The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the GATT? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 31–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On problems of biased equivalence in implementing “aggressive reciprocity,” see Wonnacott, , “Aggressive U.S. Reciprocity,” especially pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

  33. Breslauer, George, “Why Detente Failed: An Interpretation,” in George, , ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry, pp. 319–10Google Scholar. The quotations appear on pp. 321, 327, 334, and 335, respectively. Without focusing on reciprocity per se, Stanley Hoffmann also emphasizes the overambitiousness of America's détente policy–its lack of “modesty” –as a key reason for its failure. See Hoffmann, , “Detente,” in Nye, , ed., The Making of America's Soviet Policy, p. 259.Google Scholar

  34. This constitutes what Axelrod and I in “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy” call the “sanctioning problem.”

  35. See Keohane, , After Hegemony, chap. 3Google Scholar; Russett, Bruce M., “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?” International Organization 39 (Spring 1985), pp. 207–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the special issue of World Politics 38 (October 1985) on cooperation under anarchy. In the last see especially the contributions by Kenneth Oye, who developed the concept of privatization, and Charles Lipson's “Bankers’ Dilemmas,” which discusses the breakdown of large groups.

  36. Schuyler, , Fall of the Old Colonial System, p. 119.Google Scholar

  37. Stein, Arthur A., “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, p. 130Google Scholar. See also Stein, , “The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), p. 130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

  38. Quoted in Imlah, Albert, Economic Elements in the Pax Brittanica (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), pp. 14–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The director-general of the GATT expressed the same sentiment 135 years later. He argued that the search for reciprocity “now threatens to set back the process [of trade liberalization].” In his view, “it makes no economic sense for [a country involved in world trade] to react to barriers in its export markets by imposing on itself the additional burden of inefficiency and price distortion.” Yet what does not make economic sense may be prudent politically: “It may pay to postpone one's liberalization if other countries can thus be induced to bring forward their own.” See Dunkel, , “GATT: Its Evolution and Role,” p. 7.Google Scholar

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  43. Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations (1776; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 1:518Google Scholar. This passage appears in bk. 4, chap. 3, pt. 2.

  44. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Erb, Joanna Shelton, Subsidies in International Trade (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1984), pp. 120–23.Google Scholar

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  47. Nevertheless, what I have elsewhere called “empathetic interdependence” should not be excluded a priori as irrelevant to world politics. See Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 123ff.Google Scholar

  48. Lindblom, Charles E., The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free, 1965), p. 63.Google Scholar

  49. Blau defines norms as involving not merely standards of behavior but moral codes that supersede self-interest. He therefore refuses to associate reciprocity with norms, on the grounds that this would make reciprocity inconsistent with self-interest. Like Blau, I think that a valuable conception of reciprocity must be consistent with self-interested practice; but since obligations may be undertaken by egoists, it seems clearest to define norms as standards of behavior to some of which even egoists could conform. See Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 57.Google Scholar

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  51. The quotations are, respectively, from Blau, , Exchange and Power in Social Life, p. 92Google Scholar; Gouldner, , “Norm of Reciprocity,” p. 175Google Scholar; and Blau, , Exchange and Power, p. 94Google Scholar. In some cases, of course, reciprocity may reflect solidaristic social norms. Edward Schlieffen, for instance, accounts for reciprocity among the Kaluli, a New Guinea tribe with about 1,200 members, by pointing out that for this tribe reciprocity embodies a “socially shared sense of proportion, an ideology and a set of assumptions and expectations which form the basis upon which Kaluli approach and deal with many kinds of situations, both inside and outside the context of exchange.” See Schlieffen, , “Reciprocity and the Construction of Reality,” Man 15 (09 1980), pp. 502–17.Google Scholar

  52. Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–57 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).Google Scholar

  53. Ernst Haas, personal communication.

  54. This, of course, is similar to the situation faced by major trading partners of the United States before 1923, as described above, insofar as they had made commercial agreements with the United States.

  55. These three dimensions of situations, which affect cooperation, are discussed by Oye, Kenneth and others in the special issue of World Politics 38 (10 1985)Google Scholar. Keohane, , After HegemonyGoogle Scholar, discusses how regimes facilitate cooperation.