Kieran J Oberman | University of Edinburgh (original) (raw)

Papers by Kieran J Oberman

Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article presents what might be cal... more Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article presents what might be called an “emergency justification” for emigration restrictions, one that defends the curtailment of a right as a means to prevent a severe cost. The justification presented in this article contrasts with the positions taken by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake in their highly engaging book Debating Brain Drain. While both authors mention the possibility of an emergency justification, neither pays it sufficient attention. As a result, both list various conditions for justifying emigration restrictions that prove superfluous. This article thus criticizes Brock and Blake for their treatment of emigration restrictions. But it also criticizes them for failing to condemn the more pressing danger: unjustified immigration restrictions.

On what basis should Scottish voters make their decision to leave the United Kingdom or the stay?... more On what basis should Scottish voters make their decision to leave the United Kingdom or the stay? Kieran Oberman urges them to consider what is best for everyone affected by the referendum, wherever they live, arguing that right-wing internationalists have good cause to vote yes, while their counterparts on the left have good cause to vote no.

Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2020

The Political Philosophy of Refuge

The Philosophical Review

This article addresses a previously overlooked problem in the ethics of defensive killing. Everyo... more This article addresses a previously overlooked problem in the ethics of defensive killing. Everyone agrees that defensive killing can only be justified when it is necessary. But necessary for what? That seemingly simple question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to answer. Imagine Attacker is trying to kill Victim, and the only way one could save Victim is by killing Attacker. It would seem that, in such a case, killing is necessary. But now suppose there is some other innocent person, suffering some entirely distinct threat, whose life one could save instead. Is killing still necessary? The seemingly obvious answer is “yes.” Killing is necessary since it is the only means to achieve the goal that stands to justify killing. The problem with this answer is that it presupposes a certain description of that goal as something like “saving Victim’s life” or “saving Victim’s life from Attacker.” Other descriptions are plausible, such as “saving a life.” On that latter description, ki...

European Political Science, 2018

David Miller’s book, Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration covers an im... more David Miller’s book, Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration covers an impressive range of topics. In these comments, I wish to address just one of them: the rights of economic migrants. The conventional view holds that economic migrants are importantly distinct from refugees. While refugees are entitled to claim asylum, economic migrants can justifiably be returned. Miller defends this conventional view. His defence makes use of what we might call the ‘Potentiality Response’: the claim that what distinguishes economic migrants from refugees is that the former can be assisted in their country of origin. In these comments, I argue that the Potentiality Response fails. When it comes to the rights of economic migrants, it is reality, not potentiality that matters.

Philosophical Studies, 2019

Because the poorest people tend to die from easily preventable diseases, addressing poverty is ... more Because the poorest people tend to die from easily preventable diseases, addressing poverty is a relatively cheap way to save lives. War, by contrast, is extremely expensive. This article argues that, since states that wage war could alleviate poverty instead, poverty can render war unjust. Two just war theory conditions prove relevant: proportionality and last resort. Proportionality requires that war does not yield excessive costs in relation to the benefits. Standardly, just war theorists count only the direct costs: the death and destruction wrought by war. This article argues that it can sometimes be appropriate to add the opportunity costs of a failure to alleviate poverty. Last resort is the condition that there must be no better alternative means of achieving the same just end for which the war is waged. This article argues that there are some cases in which alleviating poverty may constitute a better alternative. These are cases in which the most fitting description of the just end for war is sufficiently general that poverty alleviation offers a means to pursue it. The idea that poverty can sometimes render war unjust has, to date, been largely overlooked. It is, nevertheless, an idea with profound implications since, once taken seriously, war becomes much harder to justify. Wars that, in every other respect, seem just may prove disproportionate or unnecessary given the alternative of alleviating poverty

Law, Ethics and Philosophy, 2016

Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article presents what might be cal... more Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article presents what might be called an " emergency justification " for emigration restrictions, one that defends the curtailment of a right as a means to prevent a severe cost. The justification presented in this article contrasts with the positions taken by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake in their highly engaging book Debating Brain Drain. While both authors mention the possibility of an emergency justification, neither pays it sufficient attention. As a result, both list various conditions for justifying emigration restrictions that prove superfluous. This article thus criticizes Brock and Blake for their treatment of emigration restrictions. But it also criticizes them for failing to condemn the more pressing danger: unjustified immigration restrictions.

Ration Juris, 2017

A number of philosophers argue that the earth's resources belong to everyone equally. Suppose thi... more A number of philosophers argue that the earth's resources belong to everyone equally. Suppose this is true. Does this entail that people have a right to migrate across borders? This article considers two models of egalitarian ownership and assesses their implications for immigration policy. The first is Equal Division, under which each person is granted an equal share of the value of the earth's natural resources. The second is Common Ownership, under which every person has the right to use the earth's natural resources, but not the right to exclude others from them. While these models and their associated ideas have a long history within Western political thought, this article will examine them as they are presented by two sets of contemporary philosophers: Hillel Steiner, who defends Equal Division, and Michael Blake and Mathias Risse, who defend Common Ownership. In the case of each model, the article does three things. First, it considers the implications of the model for immigration policy. Second, it defends the model against objections from those defending immigration restrictions. Third, it contends that the model does not go far enough in its opposition to immigration restrictions. More specifically, the article argues that both Equal Division and Common Ownership, as presented by their proponents, fail to respect the claims of people whose interest in the land is not primarily economic. If the earth belongs to everyone equally, then people should not be prevented from pursuing important migratory goals such as family reunification, career development and education. The article concludes with a proposal for combining Equal Division with Common Ownership. Under this combined model, people would be free to migrate across international borders.

Journal of Political Philosophy, 2016

While liberal democratic states continue to jealously guard their power to restrict immigration, ... more While liberal democratic states continue to jealously guard their power to restrict immigration, they have come to recognise a norm of granting citizenship to legally resident immigrants after a period of residency, usually five to ten years. The borders can be closed, but citizenship must remain open for those who have already arrived. Philosophers too tend to separate questions of immigration from questions of naturalisation. Those defending immigration restrictions acknowledge a duty to naturalise. Even Joseph Carens, the most prominent advocate of open borders, treats the two questions as distinct. He makes his argument for naturalization while assuming, for the sake of argument, that immigration restrictions are permissible.
This article critiques that consensus view. It argues that if it really were the case that states had moral discretion to restrict immigration, then states would also be entitled to permanently exclude voluntary migrants from citizenship. Voluntary migrants are those who are not forced to migrate. Unlike refugees or desperately poor economic migrants, they could lead a reasonably decent life back home. Since they migrate voluntarily, their choice to do so could be taken to signal consent to the terms of their admission were there no right to immigrate. It is only because the idea of a right to immigrate is plausible that we have reason to object to permanent alienage even in the case of voluntary migrants.

Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, eds. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)

This chapter argues that people have a human right to immigrate to other states. People have esse... more This chapter argues that people have a human right to immigrate to other states. People have essential interests in being able to make important personal decisions and engage in politics without state restrictions on the options available to them. It is these interests that other human rights, such as the human rights to internal freedom of movement, expression and association, protect. The human right to immigrate is not absolute. Like other human freedom rights , it can be restricted in certain extreme circumstances. Outside these circumstances, however, immigration restrictions are unjust. Having presented the argument for a human right to immigrate, the chapter responds to objections from distributive justice, culture and scarcity.

American Political Science Review

What are the ethical implications of global poverty for immigration policy? This article finds su... more What are the ethical implications of global poverty for immigration policy? This article finds substantial evidence that migration is effective at reducing poverty. There is every indication that a fairly open immigration policy, coupled with selective use of immigration restrictions in cases of deleterious brain drain, offers an effective tool to counter global poverty. Empirically there is nothing wrong with using immigration policy to address poverty. The reason we have to reject such an approach is not empirical but normative. People have human rights to stay in their home country and to migrate elsewhere. Counter poverty measures that require people to move or to stay are likely to violate these rights. Everyone should be free to migrate but no one should be forced to migrate. Using immigration policy to address global poverty, in place of alternatives, fails on both these counts.

Ethics, 2013

This article considers one seemingly compelling justification for immigration restrictions: that ... more This article considers one seemingly compelling justification for immigration restrictions: that they help restrict the brain drain of skilled workers from poor states. For some poor states, brain drain is a severe problem, sapping their ability to provide basic services. Yet this article finds that justifying immigration restrictions on brain drain grounds is far from straightforward. For restrictions to be justified, a series of demanding conditions must be fulfilled. Brain drain does provide a successful argument for some immigration restrictions, but it is an argument that fails to justify restrictions beyond a small minority of cases.

Political Studies, Jan 1, 2011

This article questions the use of immigration as a tool to counter global poverty. It argues that... more This article questions the use of immigration as a tool to counter global poverty. It argues that poor people have ahuman right to stay in their home state, which entitles them to receive development assistance without the necessityof migrating abroad. The article thus rejects a popular view in the philosophical literature on immigration which holdsthat rich states are free to choose between assisting poor people in their home states and admitting them as immigrantswhen fulfilling duties to assist the global poor. Since the human right to stay is entailed by values that featureprominently in the philosophical debate on immigration, the article further contends that participants in that debatehave particular reason to reject the popular‘choice view’and endorse the alternative position presented in the article

Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2015

If a state is morally permitted to wage a war, is it morally required to do so? A common view wi... more If a state is morally permitted to wage a war, is it morally required to do so? A common view within just war theory is that while there are some wars that states are required to wage and, of course, many wars a state is prohibited from waging, there is also a middle category: wars that a state is permitted but not required to wage. These are what we may call “optional wars”. This article argues that that common view is wrong. There are in fact no optional wars. States are either required to wage war or prohibited from doing so. The article assesses the two most promising arguments for the idea of the optional war. The first relates to wars of humanitarian intervention. It holds that if a war of humanitarian intervention would be particularly costly for an intervening state, then that state may not be obliged to wage it. The second relates to wars of national self-defence. It holds that states have the right to defend themselves but that that right is one that can be waived: states are permitted to yield to the aggressors that aggress against them. The article refutes both arguments. Pace the first argument, states should not wage wars when the costs of doing so are overly burdensome to their citizens. Pace the second argument, states owe it to both their citizens and other states to resist aggressors whenever they are morally permitted to do so.

Res Publica

In his most recent book, National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller presents an acc... more In his most recent book, National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller presents an account of human rights grounded on the idea of basic human needs. Miller argues that his account can overcome what he regards as a central problem for human rights theory: the need to provide a ‘non-sectarian’ justification for human rights, one that does not rely on reasons that people from non-liberal societies should find objectionable. The list of human rights that Miller’s account generates is, however, minimal when compared to those found in human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. This article argues that contrary to what Miller claims, his account is ‘sectarian’, since it relies on reasons that some non-liberals should find objectionable given their divergent values. It goes on to question whether ‘sectarianism’, as Miller defines it, is, in any case, a problem for human rights theory. The article concludes that Miller provides us with no reason to abandon commitment to a more extensive list of human rights.

Most people think that the actual distribution of property poorly reflects moral entitlement. Wer... more Most people think that the actual distribution of property poorly reflects moral entitlement. Were wealth to be justly distributed, some people would have more than they currently possess; others, less. Theft is one means by which a more just distribution could be pursued. Those who currently have less than their due could take from those that have more. Yet most people also think that theft is wrong, even when it redistributes wealth in the direction of justice. This article investigates why. It examines three arguments against redistributive theft: that (1) has bad consequences, (2) is illegal, (3) disrupts legitimate expectations or (4) is undemocratic. The article finds none of the arguments wholly convincing. Of the four, the first is the most successful. Redistributive theft is wrong if it entails such large costs that the costs outweigh or negate the redistributive benefits. Perhaps many instances of redistributive theft are wrong for this reason. But as long as there are some instances in which the benefits of redistributive theft outweigh the costs we need to ask a further question: what is wrong with redistributive theft that is effective and proportionate in advancing distributive justice? The other three arguments are potential responses to that further question. But as this article shows, none provides a satisfactory answer. The article thus concludes with the same puzzle. While everyone seems agreed that the actual distribution of property does not represent genuine entitlement, everyone also seems agreed that, outside of emergency cases, theft is always wrong. It remains unclear why this is so.

Available at SSRN 1900895, Jan 1, 2011

If justice requires that certain goods, such as education, health and emergency services, be prov... more If justice requires that certain goods, such as education, health and emergency services, be provided, how should the resources needed to provide these goods be collected: by taxation or donation? This is a crucial question. In many countries, including the US and the UK, donation plays an important role in funding basic services. We need to know whether this practice is to be welcomed and extended or whether governments should replace donor funding with taxation. This article seeks to answer this question on the basis of two values. The first, ‘justice amongst contributors’, is the value of justly distributing the costs of providing a good amongst those obligated to contribute to its provision. The second, ‘non-domination for recipients’, is the value of ensuring that recipients are secured against arbitrary interference in the receipt of the goods they are owed. It may seem that donation ensures justice amongst contributors since it allows each contributor to contribute exactly the amount that they wish to contribute. Any contributor who feels that they contribute too much is free to contribute less. However, this article demonstrates that voluntariness is insufficient to ensure justice amongst contributors. A contributor who contributes more than their fair share, out of concern that recipients receive the goods they are owed, suffers distributive injustice. The article goes on to argue that taxation does a better job than donation in realising both justice amongst contributors and non-domination for recipients.

Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article presents what might be cal... more Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article presents what might be called an “emergency justification” for emigration restrictions, one that defends the curtailment of a right as a means to prevent a severe cost. The justification presented in this article contrasts with the positions taken by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake in their highly engaging book Debating Brain Drain. While both authors mention the possibility of an emergency justification, neither pays it sufficient attention. As a result, both list various conditions for justifying emigration restrictions that prove superfluous. This article thus criticizes Brock and Blake for their treatment of emigration restrictions. But it also criticizes them for failing to condemn the more pressing danger: unjustified immigration restrictions.

On what basis should Scottish voters make their decision to leave the United Kingdom or the stay?... more On what basis should Scottish voters make their decision to leave the United Kingdom or the stay? Kieran Oberman urges them to consider what is best for everyone affected by the referendum, wherever they live, arguing that right-wing internationalists have good cause to vote yes, while their counterparts on the left have good cause to vote no.

Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2020

The Political Philosophy of Refuge

The Philosophical Review

This article addresses a previously overlooked problem in the ethics of defensive killing. Everyo... more This article addresses a previously overlooked problem in the ethics of defensive killing. Everyone agrees that defensive killing can only be justified when it is necessary. But necessary for what? That seemingly simple question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to answer. Imagine Attacker is trying to kill Victim, and the only way one could save Victim is by killing Attacker. It would seem that, in such a case, killing is necessary. But now suppose there is some other innocent person, suffering some entirely distinct threat, whose life one could save instead. Is killing still necessary? The seemingly obvious answer is “yes.” Killing is necessary since it is the only means to achieve the goal that stands to justify killing. The problem with this answer is that it presupposes a certain description of that goal as something like “saving Victim’s life” or “saving Victim’s life from Attacker.” Other descriptions are plausible, such as “saving a life.” On that latter description, ki...

European Political Science, 2018

David Miller’s book, Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration covers an im... more David Miller’s book, Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration covers an impressive range of topics. In these comments, I wish to address just one of them: the rights of economic migrants. The conventional view holds that economic migrants are importantly distinct from refugees. While refugees are entitled to claim asylum, economic migrants can justifiably be returned. Miller defends this conventional view. His defence makes use of what we might call the ‘Potentiality Response’: the claim that what distinguishes economic migrants from refugees is that the former can be assisted in their country of origin. In these comments, I argue that the Potentiality Response fails. When it comes to the rights of economic migrants, it is reality, not potentiality that matters.

Philosophical Studies, 2019

Because the poorest people tend to die from easily preventable diseases, addressing poverty is ... more Because the poorest people tend to die from easily preventable diseases, addressing poverty is a relatively cheap way to save lives. War, by contrast, is extremely expensive. This article argues that, since states that wage war could alleviate poverty instead, poverty can render war unjust. Two just war theory conditions prove relevant: proportionality and last resort. Proportionality requires that war does not yield excessive costs in relation to the benefits. Standardly, just war theorists count only the direct costs: the death and destruction wrought by war. This article argues that it can sometimes be appropriate to add the opportunity costs of a failure to alleviate poverty. Last resort is the condition that there must be no better alternative means of achieving the same just end for which the war is waged. This article argues that there are some cases in which alleviating poverty may constitute a better alternative. These are cases in which the most fitting description of the just end for war is sufficiently general that poverty alleviation offers a means to pursue it. The idea that poverty can sometimes render war unjust has, to date, been largely overlooked. It is, nevertheless, an idea with profound implications since, once taken seriously, war becomes much harder to justify. Wars that, in every other respect, seem just may prove disproportionate or unnecessary given the alternative of alleviating poverty

Law, Ethics and Philosophy, 2016

Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article presents what might be cal... more Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article presents what might be called an " emergency justification " for emigration restrictions, one that defends the curtailment of a right as a means to prevent a severe cost. The justification presented in this article contrasts with the positions taken by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake in their highly engaging book Debating Brain Drain. While both authors mention the possibility of an emergency justification, neither pays it sufficient attention. As a result, both list various conditions for justifying emigration restrictions that prove superfluous. This article thus criticizes Brock and Blake for their treatment of emigration restrictions. But it also criticizes them for failing to condemn the more pressing danger: unjustified immigration restrictions.

Ration Juris, 2017

A number of philosophers argue that the earth's resources belong to everyone equally. Suppose thi... more A number of philosophers argue that the earth's resources belong to everyone equally. Suppose this is true. Does this entail that people have a right to migrate across borders? This article considers two models of egalitarian ownership and assesses their implications for immigration policy. The first is Equal Division, under which each person is granted an equal share of the value of the earth's natural resources. The second is Common Ownership, under which every person has the right to use the earth's natural resources, but not the right to exclude others from them. While these models and their associated ideas have a long history within Western political thought, this article will examine them as they are presented by two sets of contemporary philosophers: Hillel Steiner, who defends Equal Division, and Michael Blake and Mathias Risse, who defend Common Ownership. In the case of each model, the article does three things. First, it considers the implications of the model for immigration policy. Second, it defends the model against objections from those defending immigration restrictions. Third, it contends that the model does not go far enough in its opposition to immigration restrictions. More specifically, the article argues that both Equal Division and Common Ownership, as presented by their proponents, fail to respect the claims of people whose interest in the land is not primarily economic. If the earth belongs to everyone equally, then people should not be prevented from pursuing important migratory goals such as family reunification, career development and education. The article concludes with a proposal for combining Equal Division with Common Ownership. Under this combined model, people would be free to migrate across international borders.

Journal of Political Philosophy, 2016

While liberal democratic states continue to jealously guard their power to restrict immigration, ... more While liberal democratic states continue to jealously guard their power to restrict immigration, they have come to recognise a norm of granting citizenship to legally resident immigrants after a period of residency, usually five to ten years. The borders can be closed, but citizenship must remain open for those who have already arrived. Philosophers too tend to separate questions of immigration from questions of naturalisation. Those defending immigration restrictions acknowledge a duty to naturalise. Even Joseph Carens, the most prominent advocate of open borders, treats the two questions as distinct. He makes his argument for naturalization while assuming, for the sake of argument, that immigration restrictions are permissible.
This article critiques that consensus view. It argues that if it really were the case that states had moral discretion to restrict immigration, then states would also be entitled to permanently exclude voluntary migrants from citizenship. Voluntary migrants are those who are not forced to migrate. Unlike refugees or desperately poor economic migrants, they could lead a reasonably decent life back home. Since they migrate voluntarily, their choice to do so could be taken to signal consent to the terms of their admission were there no right to immigrate. It is only because the idea of a right to immigrate is plausible that we have reason to object to permanent alienage even in the case of voluntary migrants.

Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, eds. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)

This chapter argues that people have a human right to immigrate to other states. People have esse... more This chapter argues that people have a human right to immigrate to other states. People have essential interests in being able to make important personal decisions and engage in politics without state restrictions on the options available to them. It is these interests that other human rights, such as the human rights to internal freedom of movement, expression and association, protect. The human right to immigrate is not absolute. Like other human freedom rights , it can be restricted in certain extreme circumstances. Outside these circumstances, however, immigration restrictions are unjust. Having presented the argument for a human right to immigrate, the chapter responds to objections from distributive justice, culture and scarcity.

American Political Science Review

What are the ethical implications of global poverty for immigration policy? This article finds su... more What are the ethical implications of global poverty for immigration policy? This article finds substantial evidence that migration is effective at reducing poverty. There is every indication that a fairly open immigration policy, coupled with selective use of immigration restrictions in cases of deleterious brain drain, offers an effective tool to counter global poverty. Empirically there is nothing wrong with using immigration policy to address poverty. The reason we have to reject such an approach is not empirical but normative. People have human rights to stay in their home country and to migrate elsewhere. Counter poverty measures that require people to move or to stay are likely to violate these rights. Everyone should be free to migrate but no one should be forced to migrate. Using immigration policy to address global poverty, in place of alternatives, fails on both these counts.

Ethics, 2013

This article considers one seemingly compelling justification for immigration restrictions: that ... more This article considers one seemingly compelling justification for immigration restrictions: that they help restrict the brain drain of skilled workers from poor states. For some poor states, brain drain is a severe problem, sapping their ability to provide basic services. Yet this article finds that justifying immigration restrictions on brain drain grounds is far from straightforward. For restrictions to be justified, a series of demanding conditions must be fulfilled. Brain drain does provide a successful argument for some immigration restrictions, but it is an argument that fails to justify restrictions beyond a small minority of cases.

Political Studies, Jan 1, 2011

This article questions the use of immigration as a tool to counter global poverty. It argues that... more This article questions the use of immigration as a tool to counter global poverty. It argues that poor people have ahuman right to stay in their home state, which entitles them to receive development assistance without the necessityof migrating abroad. The article thus rejects a popular view in the philosophical literature on immigration which holdsthat rich states are free to choose between assisting poor people in their home states and admitting them as immigrantswhen fulfilling duties to assist the global poor. Since the human right to stay is entailed by values that featureprominently in the philosophical debate on immigration, the article further contends that participants in that debatehave particular reason to reject the popular‘choice view’and endorse the alternative position presented in the article

Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2015

If a state is morally permitted to wage a war, is it morally required to do so? A common view wi... more If a state is morally permitted to wage a war, is it morally required to do so? A common view within just war theory is that while there are some wars that states are required to wage and, of course, many wars a state is prohibited from waging, there is also a middle category: wars that a state is permitted but not required to wage. These are what we may call “optional wars”. This article argues that that common view is wrong. There are in fact no optional wars. States are either required to wage war or prohibited from doing so. The article assesses the two most promising arguments for the idea of the optional war. The first relates to wars of humanitarian intervention. It holds that if a war of humanitarian intervention would be particularly costly for an intervening state, then that state may not be obliged to wage it. The second relates to wars of national self-defence. It holds that states have the right to defend themselves but that that right is one that can be waived: states are permitted to yield to the aggressors that aggress against them. The article refutes both arguments. Pace the first argument, states should not wage wars when the costs of doing so are overly burdensome to their citizens. Pace the second argument, states owe it to both their citizens and other states to resist aggressors whenever they are morally permitted to do so.

Res Publica

In his most recent book, National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller presents an acc... more In his most recent book, National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller presents an account of human rights grounded on the idea of basic human needs. Miller argues that his account can overcome what he regards as a central problem for human rights theory: the need to provide a ‘non-sectarian’ justification for human rights, one that does not rely on reasons that people from non-liberal societies should find objectionable. The list of human rights that Miller’s account generates is, however, minimal when compared to those found in human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. This article argues that contrary to what Miller claims, his account is ‘sectarian’, since it relies on reasons that some non-liberals should find objectionable given their divergent values. It goes on to question whether ‘sectarianism’, as Miller defines it, is, in any case, a problem for human rights theory. The article concludes that Miller provides us with no reason to abandon commitment to a more extensive list of human rights.

Most people think that the actual distribution of property poorly reflects moral entitlement. Wer... more Most people think that the actual distribution of property poorly reflects moral entitlement. Were wealth to be justly distributed, some people would have more than they currently possess; others, less. Theft is one means by which a more just distribution could be pursued. Those who currently have less than their due could take from those that have more. Yet most people also think that theft is wrong, even when it redistributes wealth in the direction of justice. This article investigates why. It examines three arguments against redistributive theft: that (1) has bad consequences, (2) is illegal, (3) disrupts legitimate expectations or (4) is undemocratic. The article finds none of the arguments wholly convincing. Of the four, the first is the most successful. Redistributive theft is wrong if it entails such large costs that the costs outweigh or negate the redistributive benefits. Perhaps many instances of redistributive theft are wrong for this reason. But as long as there are some instances in which the benefits of redistributive theft outweigh the costs we need to ask a further question: what is wrong with redistributive theft that is effective and proportionate in advancing distributive justice? The other three arguments are potential responses to that further question. But as this article shows, none provides a satisfactory answer. The article thus concludes with the same puzzle. While everyone seems agreed that the actual distribution of property does not represent genuine entitlement, everyone also seems agreed that, outside of emergency cases, theft is always wrong. It remains unclear why this is so.

Available at SSRN 1900895, Jan 1, 2011

If justice requires that certain goods, such as education, health and emergency services, be prov... more If justice requires that certain goods, such as education, health and emergency services, be provided, how should the resources needed to provide these goods be collected: by taxation or donation? This is a crucial question. In many countries, including the US and the UK, donation plays an important role in funding basic services. We need to know whether this practice is to be welcomed and extended or whether governments should replace donor funding with taxation. This article seeks to answer this question on the basis of two values. The first, ‘justice amongst contributors’, is the value of justly distributing the costs of providing a good amongst those obligated to contribute to its provision. The second, ‘non-domination for recipients’, is the value of ensuring that recipients are secured against arbitrary interference in the receipt of the goods they are owed. It may seem that donation ensures justice amongst contributors since it allows each contributor to contribute exactly the amount that they wish to contribute. Any contributor who feels that they contribute too much is free to contribute less. However, this article demonstrates that voluntariness is insufficient to ensure justice amongst contributors. A contributor who contributes more than their fair share, out of concern that recipients receive the goods they are owed, suffers distributive injustice. The article goes on to argue that taxation does a better job than donation in realising both justice amongst contributors and non-domination for recipients.