Mahrad Almotahari | University of Edinburgh (original) (raw)
Papers by Mahrad Almotahari
The Monist, 2024
A new take on Avicenna's argument
Noûs
Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude conte... more Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other 'higher-level' explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under-appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them.
Mind & Language
What is the relationship between the claim that generics articulate psychologically primitive gen... more What is the relationship between the claim that generics articulate psychologically primitive generalizations and the claim that they exhibit a unique form of context sensitivity? This paper maintains that the two claims are compatible. It develops and defends an overlooked form of contextualism grounded in the idiosyncrasies of System 1 thought.
Analysis, 2022
We present a puzzle about deontic modals. An adequate resolution requires abandoning the standard... more We present a puzzle about deontic modals. An adequate resolution requires abandoning the standard theory. What to replace it with isn’t clear. We consider two possibilities.
Islamic Philosophy of Religion: Analytic Perspectives, 2022
An application of some recent work on the science of generic thought
MIND, 2020
We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege... more We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege's Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.
A new puzzle about material constitution is presented and its implications are discussed. The mor... more A new puzzle about material constitution is presented and its implications are discussed. The moral of the story is that familiar intuitions supporting a neo-Aristotelian view of the material world are contradictory. To accommodate these intuitions is to embrace inconsistency. Therefore, neo-Aristotelianism is worse off for its intuitive appeal. Furthermore, the puzzle is used to argue for an account of ordinary modal thought and language that's reconstructive, or ameliorative.
Deflationism is the view that certain metaphysical debates are defective, leaving it open whether... more Deflationism is the view that certain metaphysical debates are defective, leaving it open whether the defect is best explained in semantic, conceptual, or epistemic terms. Local semantic deflationism is the thesis that familiar metaphysical debates, which appear to be about the existence and identity of material objects, are merely verbal. It's a form of local deflationism because it restricts itself to one particular area of metaphysics. It's a form of semantic deflationism because the defect it purports to identify in these debates is explained in terms of the broadly semantic notion of a merely verbal disputation. Three questions about this thesis are asked and answered here. Does a commitment to the principle of interpretive charity support it? No. Does it avoid the problems that plagued Carnap? No. Does it support a linguistic turn with respect to questions about the nature of material things? No. The central take-home message is that local semantic deflationism is unstable: advocates of the view must (on pain of inconsistency) admit that debates about material coincidence and identity are substantive.
Philosophical Studies
and Judith Jarvis Thomson ( , 2008 have argued that nothing is just plain good, because 'good' is... more and Judith Jarvis Thomson ( , 2008 have argued that nothing is just plain good, because 'good' is, logically, an attributive adjective. The upshot, according to Geach and Thomson, is that consequentialism is unacceptable, since its very formulation requires a predicative (non-attributive) use of 'good'. Reactions to the argument have, for the most part, been uniform. although the logical tests that Geach and Thomson invoke clearly illustrate that 'good', as commonly used, is an attributive, they don't show that 'good' lacks an intelligible predicative interpretation. Second, even if the English word 'good' fails to express the property of goodness, we can just stipulate that 'good*' expresses goodness and thus formulate consequentialism accordingly. The second objection is one way of voicing skepticism about the method of drawing substantive philosophical conclusions from considerations about ordinary language. In this essay, we present an argument, inspired by Geach and Thomson, which isn't susceptible to the same objections but which supports the same conclusion. The significance of our argument for ethics is obvious; it challenges the intelligibility of standard consequentialism, and even certain forms of non-consequentialism. One might be inclined to think that a more sophisticated consequentialism, which relies on 'good {possible world/state of affairs/outcome}' instead of just 'good', evades the criticism. But we explain why the criticism can't be so easily evaded.
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
Peter Geach (1956) and Judith Jarvis Thomson (1997, 2008) have argued that nothing is just plain ... more Peter Geach (1956) and Judith Jarvis Thomson (1997, 2008) have argued that nothing is just plain good, because ‘good’ is, logically, an attributive adjective. The upshot, according to Geach and Thomson, is that consequentialism is unacceptable, since its very formulation requires a predicative (non-attributive) use of ‘good’. Reactions to the argument have, for the most part, been uniform. Authors have converged on two challenging objections (W. D. Ross 1930; Charles Pidgen 1990; Richard Arneson 2010; Michael Smith 2010; Nicholas Sturgeon 2010; Richard Kraut 2011). First, although the logical tests that Geach and Thomson invoke clearly illustrate that ‘good’, as commonly used, is an attributive, they don’t show that ‘good’ lacks an intelligible predicative interpretation. Second, even if the English word ‘good’ fails to express the property of goodness, we can just stipulate that ‘good*’ expresses goodness and thus formulate consequentialism accordingly. The second objection is one way of voicing skepticism about the method of drawing substantive philosophical conclusions from considerations about ordinary language. In this essay, we present an argument, inspired by Geach and Thomson, which isn’t susceptible to the same objections but which supports the same conclusion. The significance of our argument for ethics is obvious; it challenges the intelligibility of standard consequentialism, and even certain forms of non-consequentialism. One might be inclined to think that a more sophisticated consequentialism, which relies on ‘good {possible world/state of affairs/outcome}’ instead of just ‘good’, evades the criticism. But we explain why the criticism can’t be so easily evaded.
Forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly
I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a ma... more I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a material thing—a Romanesque statue, for example, or an open door—can be distinguished from its constituent matter—a piece of alloy, say, or a hunk of plastic—without recourse to modal or temporal considerations. The statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque. The door is open; the hunk of plastic is not open. I argue that these considerations, when combined with a proper understanding of how the use of ‘not’ is functioning, entail that the statue is the piece of alloy, and that the door is the hunk of plastic. Far from challenging the doctrine that a material thing is its matter, Fine’s observations confirm the view. My larger aim is methodological. I will show that natural language semantics can guide inquiry in certain areas of metaphysics by helping us to advance lingering debates.
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
In a series of articles, Kit Fine presents some highly compelling objections to monism, the doctr... more In a series of articles, Kit Fine presents some highly compelling objections to monism, the doctrine that spatially coincident objects are identical. His objections rely on Leibniz's Law and linguistic environments that appear to be immune to the standard charge of non-transparency and substitution failure. In this paper, I respond to Fine's objections on behalf of the monist. Following Benjamin Schnieder, I observe that arguments from Leibniz's Law are valid only if they involve descriptive, rather than metalinguistic, negation. Then I show that the monist is justified in treating the negation in Fine's objections as metalinguistic in nature. Along the way I make a few methodological remarks about the interaction between the study of natural language and metaphysics. I also present evidence that some of the linguistic environments which Fine relies on are, contrary to appearances, non-transparent.
Notes and Discussions by Mahrad Almotahari
Analysis, 2022
Some generic sentences seem to be true despite the fact that almost all the members of the releva... more Some generic sentences seem to be true despite the fact that almost all the members of the relevant kind are exceptions. It's controversial whether generics of this type express relatively weak generalizations or relatively strong ones. If the latter, then we're systematically mistaken about their truth, but they make no trouble for our semantic theorizing. In this brief note, I present several arguments for the former: sentences of the relevant type are weak generics.
Formal relationism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that folk psychological states should ... more Formal relationism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that folk psychological states should be individuated, at least partially, in terms of the purely formal inference-licensing relations between underlying mental representations. It’s supposed to provide a Russellian alternative to a Fregean theory of propositional attitudes. I argue that there’s an inconsistency between the motivation for formal relationism and the use to which it’s put in defense of Russellian propositions. Furthermore, I argue that formal relationism is committed to epiphenomenalism about singular mental content.
Thomas Hofweber says yes, Damien Rochford and I say no.
We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic... more We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic opacity is not a serious problem for Robert Stalnaker's theory of content and conversation. We conclude with critical remarks about John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor's alternative theory.
Reviews by Mahrad Almotahari
The Monist, 2024
A new take on Avicenna's argument
Noûs
Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude conte... more Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other 'higher-level' explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under-appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them.
Mind & Language
What is the relationship between the claim that generics articulate psychologically primitive gen... more What is the relationship between the claim that generics articulate psychologically primitive generalizations and the claim that they exhibit a unique form of context sensitivity? This paper maintains that the two claims are compatible. It develops and defends an overlooked form of contextualism grounded in the idiosyncrasies of System 1 thought.
Analysis, 2022
We present a puzzle about deontic modals. An adequate resolution requires abandoning the standard... more We present a puzzle about deontic modals. An adequate resolution requires abandoning the standard theory. What to replace it with isn’t clear. We consider two possibilities.
Islamic Philosophy of Religion: Analytic Perspectives, 2022
An application of some recent work on the science of generic thought
MIND, 2020
We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege... more We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege's Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.
A new puzzle about material constitution is presented and its implications are discussed. The mor... more A new puzzle about material constitution is presented and its implications are discussed. The moral of the story is that familiar intuitions supporting a neo-Aristotelian view of the material world are contradictory. To accommodate these intuitions is to embrace inconsistency. Therefore, neo-Aristotelianism is worse off for its intuitive appeal. Furthermore, the puzzle is used to argue for an account of ordinary modal thought and language that's reconstructive, or ameliorative.
Deflationism is the view that certain metaphysical debates are defective, leaving it open whether... more Deflationism is the view that certain metaphysical debates are defective, leaving it open whether the defect is best explained in semantic, conceptual, or epistemic terms. Local semantic deflationism is the thesis that familiar metaphysical debates, which appear to be about the existence and identity of material objects, are merely verbal. It's a form of local deflationism because it restricts itself to one particular area of metaphysics. It's a form of semantic deflationism because the defect it purports to identify in these debates is explained in terms of the broadly semantic notion of a merely verbal disputation. Three questions about this thesis are asked and answered here. Does a commitment to the principle of interpretive charity support it? No. Does it avoid the problems that plagued Carnap? No. Does it support a linguistic turn with respect to questions about the nature of material things? No. The central take-home message is that local semantic deflationism is unstable: advocates of the view must (on pain of inconsistency) admit that debates about material coincidence and identity are substantive.
Philosophical Studies
and Judith Jarvis Thomson ( , 2008 have argued that nothing is just plain good, because 'good' is... more and Judith Jarvis Thomson ( , 2008 have argued that nothing is just plain good, because 'good' is, logically, an attributive adjective. The upshot, according to Geach and Thomson, is that consequentialism is unacceptable, since its very formulation requires a predicative (non-attributive) use of 'good'. Reactions to the argument have, for the most part, been uniform. although the logical tests that Geach and Thomson invoke clearly illustrate that 'good', as commonly used, is an attributive, they don't show that 'good' lacks an intelligible predicative interpretation. Second, even if the English word 'good' fails to express the property of goodness, we can just stipulate that 'good*' expresses goodness and thus formulate consequentialism accordingly. The second objection is one way of voicing skepticism about the method of drawing substantive philosophical conclusions from considerations about ordinary language. In this essay, we present an argument, inspired by Geach and Thomson, which isn't susceptible to the same objections but which supports the same conclusion. The significance of our argument for ethics is obvious; it challenges the intelligibility of standard consequentialism, and even certain forms of non-consequentialism. One might be inclined to think that a more sophisticated consequentialism, which relies on 'good {possible world/state of affairs/outcome}' instead of just 'good', evades the criticism. But we explain why the criticism can't be so easily evaded.
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
Peter Geach (1956) and Judith Jarvis Thomson (1997, 2008) have argued that nothing is just plain ... more Peter Geach (1956) and Judith Jarvis Thomson (1997, 2008) have argued that nothing is just plain good, because ‘good’ is, logically, an attributive adjective. The upshot, according to Geach and Thomson, is that consequentialism is unacceptable, since its very formulation requires a predicative (non-attributive) use of ‘good’. Reactions to the argument have, for the most part, been uniform. Authors have converged on two challenging objections (W. D. Ross 1930; Charles Pidgen 1990; Richard Arneson 2010; Michael Smith 2010; Nicholas Sturgeon 2010; Richard Kraut 2011). First, although the logical tests that Geach and Thomson invoke clearly illustrate that ‘good’, as commonly used, is an attributive, they don’t show that ‘good’ lacks an intelligible predicative interpretation. Second, even if the English word ‘good’ fails to express the property of goodness, we can just stipulate that ‘good*’ expresses goodness and thus formulate consequentialism accordingly. The second objection is one way of voicing skepticism about the method of drawing substantive philosophical conclusions from considerations about ordinary language. In this essay, we present an argument, inspired by Geach and Thomson, which isn’t susceptible to the same objections but which supports the same conclusion. The significance of our argument for ethics is obvious; it challenges the intelligibility of standard consequentialism, and even certain forms of non-consequentialism. One might be inclined to think that a more sophisticated consequentialism, which relies on ‘good {possible world/state of affairs/outcome}’ instead of just ‘good’, evades the criticism. But we explain why the criticism can’t be so easily evaded.
Forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly
I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a ma... more I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a material thing—a Romanesque statue, for example, or an open door—can be distinguished from its constituent matter—a piece of alloy, say, or a hunk of plastic—without recourse to modal or temporal considerations. The statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque. The door is open; the hunk of plastic is not open. I argue that these considerations, when combined with a proper understanding of how the use of ‘not’ is functioning, entail that the statue is the piece of alloy, and that the door is the hunk of plastic. Far from challenging the doctrine that a material thing is its matter, Fine’s observations confirm the view. My larger aim is methodological. I will show that natural language semantics can guide inquiry in certain areas of metaphysics by helping us to advance lingering debates.
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
In a series of articles, Kit Fine presents some highly compelling objections to monism, the doctr... more In a series of articles, Kit Fine presents some highly compelling objections to monism, the doctrine that spatially coincident objects are identical. His objections rely on Leibniz's Law and linguistic environments that appear to be immune to the standard charge of non-transparency and substitution failure. In this paper, I respond to Fine's objections on behalf of the monist. Following Benjamin Schnieder, I observe that arguments from Leibniz's Law are valid only if they involve descriptive, rather than metalinguistic, negation. Then I show that the monist is justified in treating the negation in Fine's objections as metalinguistic in nature. Along the way I make a few methodological remarks about the interaction between the study of natural language and metaphysics. I also present evidence that some of the linguistic environments which Fine relies on are, contrary to appearances, non-transparent.
Analysis, 2022
Some generic sentences seem to be true despite the fact that almost all the members of the releva... more Some generic sentences seem to be true despite the fact that almost all the members of the relevant kind are exceptions. It's controversial whether generics of this type express relatively weak generalizations or relatively strong ones. If the latter, then we're systematically mistaken about their truth, but they make no trouble for our semantic theorizing. In this brief note, I present several arguments for the former: sentences of the relevant type are weak generics.
Formal relationism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that folk psychological states should ... more Formal relationism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that folk psychological states should be individuated, at least partially, in terms of the purely formal inference-licensing relations between underlying mental representations. It’s supposed to provide a Russellian alternative to a Fregean theory of propositional attitudes. I argue that there’s an inconsistency between the motivation for formal relationism and the use to which it’s put in defense of Russellian propositions. Furthermore, I argue that formal relationism is committed to epiphenomenalism about singular mental content.
Thomas Hofweber says yes, Damien Rochford and I say no.
We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic... more We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic opacity is not a serious problem for Robert Stalnaker's theory of content and conversation. We conclude with critical remarks about John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor's alternative theory.
When evaluating the actions of Hamas, it is essential to separate some importantly distinct issue... more When evaluating the actions of Hamas, it is essential to separate some importantly distinct issues. We argue that even though Palestinians in Gaza have very serious grievances, there are major practical and moral objections to Hamas using violence to address those grievances, including an absence of the sort political legitimacy needed to fight in the name of Gazans. There are yet further objections to the particular violent methods that Hamas uses. These reflections also show that Gazans have no reasonable means to protect themselves at this point, and as such there are very strong duties on other parties, including Israel and the U.S., to help address their grievances.