Laszlo E. Szabo | Eötvös Loránd University Budapest (original) (raw)
Papers by Laszlo E. Szabo
Foundations of Science
I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that ther... more I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that there is anything conceptual in logic and mathematics. The elements of a formal system, even if they are tagged by suggestive names, are merely meaningless parts of a physically existing machinery, which have nothing to do with concepts, because they have nothing to do with the actual things. The only situation in which they can become meaning-carriers is when they are involved in a physical theory. But in this role they refer to elements of the physical reality, i.e. they represent a physical concept. “Mathematical concepts” are just idols, that philosophy can completely deny and physics can completely ignore.
Magyar Tudomány, 2020
Amellett fogok érvelni, hogy egy koherens fizikalista ontológiára épülő, általam fiziko-formalist... more Amellett fogok érvelni, hogy egy koherens fizikalista ontológiára épülő, általam fiziko-formalista matematikafilozófiának nevezett megközelítés tükrében, a "végtelen" semmivel nem nagyobb probléma, mint a "kettő".
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2018
According to the standard realistic interpretation of classical electrodynamics, the electromagne... more According to the standard realistic interpretation of classical electrodynamics, the electromagnetic field is conceived as a real physical entity existing in space and time. The problem we address in this paper is how to understand this spatiotemporal existence, that is, how to describe the persistence of a field-like physical entity like electromagnetic field. First, we provide a formal description of the notion of persistence: we derive an "equation of persistence" constituting a necessary condition that the spatiotemporal distributions of the fundamental attributes of a persisting physical entity must satisfy. We then prove a theorem according to which the vast majority of the solutions of Maxwell's equations, describing possible spatiotemporal distributions of the fundamental attributes of the electromagnetic field, violate the equation of persistence. Finally, we discuss the consequences of this result for the ontology of the electromagnetic field.
Foundations of Physics, 2019
On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amende... more On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian-Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a "thing-in-itself"; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is flawed.
Making it Formally Explicit, 2017
A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system (L, S), where L is a formal ... more A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system (L, S), where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course incompatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics.
Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle claims that if there is correlation between two events ... more Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle claims that if there is correlation between two events and none of them is directly causally influenced by the other, then there must exist a third event that can, as a common cause, account for the correlation. The EPR-Bell paradox consists ...
According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support object... more According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while — as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Grünbaum — ”the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians ’ ’could have done otherwise ’ does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.” In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is ’allowed’ to describe not only the measurement outcomes, but also ...
In classical mechanics, Galilean covariance and the principle of relativity are completely equiva... more In classical mechanics, Galilean covariance and the principle of relativity are completely equivalent and hold for all possible dynamical processes. In contrast, in relativistic physics the situation is much more complex. It will be shown that Lorentz covariance and the principle of relativity are not completely equivalent. The reason is that the principle of relativity actually only holds for the equilibrium quantities that characterize the equilibrium state of dissipative systems. In the light of this fact it will be argued that Lorentz covariance should not be regarded as a fundamental symmetry of the laws of physics.
In the real spin-correlation experiments the detection/emission inefficiency is usually ascribed ... more In the real spin-correlation experiments the detection/emission inefficiency is usually ascribed to independent random detection errors, and treated by the "enhancement hypothesis". In Fine's "prism model" the detection inefficiency is an effect not only of the random errors in the analyzer + detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-settled (hidden) property of the particles.
It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, spe... more It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about spacetime and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects.
Two problems will be considered: the question of hidden parameters and the problem of Kolmogorovi... more Two problems will be considered: the question of hidden parameters and the problem of Kolmogorovity of quantum probabilities. Both of them will be analyzed from the point of view of two distinct understandings of quantum mechanical probabilities. Our analysis will be focused, as a particular example, on the Aspect-type EPR experiment. It will be shown that the quantum mechanical probabilities appearing in this experiment can be consistently understood as conditional probabilities without any paradoxical consequences. Therefore, nothing implies in the Aspect experiment that quantum theory is incompatible with a deterministic universe.
arXiv: History and Philosophy of Physics, 2014
As a first principle, it is the basic assumption of the standard relativistic formulation of clas... more As a first principle, it is the basic assumption of the standard relativistic formulation of classical electrodynamics (ED) that the physical laws describing the electromagnetic phenomena satisfy the relativity principle (RP). According to the standard view, this assumption is absolutely unproblematic, and its correctness is well confirmed, at least in a hypothetico-deductive sense, by means of the empirical confirmation of the consequences derived from it. In this paper, we will challenge this customary view as being somewhat simplistic. The RP is actually used in exceptional cases satisfying some special conditions. As we will see, however, it is quite problematic how the RP must be understood in the general case of a coupled particles + electromagnetic field system.
Arxiv preprint quant-ph/0002030, 2000
The aim of this paper is to make an introduction to the Einstein-Fine interpretation of quantum m... more The aim of this paper is to make an introduction to the Einstein-Fine interpretation of quantum mechanics and to show how it can solve the EPR-Bell problem. Analyzing the EPR experiment we will find a principal logical loophole in the real spin correlation experiments. The ...
It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theor... more It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theories but without any relevance to our real world.
arXiv: Quantum Physics, 1995
According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support object... more According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while --- as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Gr\"unbaum --- "{\sl the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Gr\"unbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.}" In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is 'allowed' to d...
It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theor... more It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theories but without any relevance to our real world.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed th... more In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called ``Reality Criterion'' imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxi...
Foundations of Science
I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that ther... more I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that there is anything conceptual in logic and mathematics. The elements of a formal system, even if they are tagged by suggestive names, are merely meaningless parts of a physically existing machinery, which have nothing to do with concepts, because they have nothing to do with the actual things. The only situation in which they can become meaning-carriers is when they are involved in a physical theory. But in this role they refer to elements of the physical reality, i.e. they represent a physical concept. “Mathematical concepts” are just idols, that philosophy can completely deny and physics can completely ignore.
Magyar Tudomány, 2020
Amellett fogok érvelni, hogy egy koherens fizikalista ontológiára épülő, általam fiziko-formalist... more Amellett fogok érvelni, hogy egy koherens fizikalista ontológiára épülő, általam fiziko-formalista matematikafilozófiának nevezett megközelítés tükrében, a "végtelen" semmivel nem nagyobb probléma, mint a "kettő".
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2018
According to the standard realistic interpretation of classical electrodynamics, the electromagne... more According to the standard realistic interpretation of classical electrodynamics, the electromagnetic field is conceived as a real physical entity existing in space and time. The problem we address in this paper is how to understand this spatiotemporal existence, that is, how to describe the persistence of a field-like physical entity like electromagnetic field. First, we provide a formal description of the notion of persistence: we derive an "equation of persistence" constituting a necessary condition that the spatiotemporal distributions of the fundamental attributes of a persisting physical entity must satisfy. We then prove a theorem according to which the vast majority of the solutions of Maxwell's equations, describing possible spatiotemporal distributions of the fundamental attributes of the electromagnetic field, violate the equation of persistence. Finally, we discuss the consequences of this result for the ontology of the electromagnetic field.
Foundations of Physics, 2019
On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amende... more On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian-Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a "thing-in-itself"; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is flawed.
Making it Formally Explicit, 2017
A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system (L, S), where L is a formal ... more A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system (L, S), where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course incompatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics.
Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle claims that if there is correlation between two events ... more Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle claims that if there is correlation between two events and none of them is directly causally influenced by the other, then there must exist a third event that can, as a common cause, account for the correlation. The EPR-Bell paradox consists ...
According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support object... more According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while — as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Grünbaum — ”the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians ’ ’could have done otherwise ’ does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.” In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is ’allowed’ to describe not only the measurement outcomes, but also ...
In classical mechanics, Galilean covariance and the principle of relativity are completely equiva... more In classical mechanics, Galilean covariance and the principle of relativity are completely equivalent and hold for all possible dynamical processes. In contrast, in relativistic physics the situation is much more complex. It will be shown that Lorentz covariance and the principle of relativity are not completely equivalent. The reason is that the principle of relativity actually only holds for the equilibrium quantities that characterize the equilibrium state of dissipative systems. In the light of this fact it will be argued that Lorentz covariance should not be regarded as a fundamental symmetry of the laws of physics.
In the real spin-correlation experiments the detection/emission inefficiency is usually ascribed ... more In the real spin-correlation experiments the detection/emission inefficiency is usually ascribed to independent random detection errors, and treated by the "enhancement hypothesis". In Fine's "prism model" the detection inefficiency is an effect not only of the random errors in the analyzer + detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-settled (hidden) property of the particles.
It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, spe... more It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about spacetime and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects.
Two problems will be considered: the question of hidden parameters and the problem of Kolmogorovi... more Two problems will be considered: the question of hidden parameters and the problem of Kolmogorovity of quantum probabilities. Both of them will be analyzed from the point of view of two distinct understandings of quantum mechanical probabilities. Our analysis will be focused, as a particular example, on the Aspect-type EPR experiment. It will be shown that the quantum mechanical probabilities appearing in this experiment can be consistently understood as conditional probabilities without any paradoxical consequences. Therefore, nothing implies in the Aspect experiment that quantum theory is incompatible with a deterministic universe.
arXiv: History and Philosophy of Physics, 2014
As a first principle, it is the basic assumption of the standard relativistic formulation of clas... more As a first principle, it is the basic assumption of the standard relativistic formulation of classical electrodynamics (ED) that the physical laws describing the electromagnetic phenomena satisfy the relativity principle (RP). According to the standard view, this assumption is absolutely unproblematic, and its correctness is well confirmed, at least in a hypothetico-deductive sense, by means of the empirical confirmation of the consequences derived from it. In this paper, we will challenge this customary view as being somewhat simplistic. The RP is actually used in exceptional cases satisfying some special conditions. As we will see, however, it is quite problematic how the RP must be understood in the general case of a coupled particles + electromagnetic field system.
Arxiv preprint quant-ph/0002030, 2000
The aim of this paper is to make an introduction to the Einstein-Fine interpretation of quantum m... more The aim of this paper is to make an introduction to the Einstein-Fine interpretation of quantum mechanics and to show how it can solve the EPR-Bell problem. Analyzing the EPR experiment we will find a principal logical loophole in the real spin correlation experiments. The ...
It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theor... more It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theories but without any relevance to our real world.
arXiv: Quantum Physics, 1995
According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support object... more According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while --- as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Gr\"unbaum --- "{\sl the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Gr\"unbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.}" In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is 'allowed' to d...
It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theor... more It is argued that quantum logic and quantum probability theory are fascinating mathematical theories but without any relevance to our real world.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed th... more In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called ``Reality Criterion'' imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxi...