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Conference Presentations by Joseph Benavides
Democratization in Georg Lukács' Political Theory An important yet infrequently addressed aspect... more Democratization in Georg Lukács' Political Theory
An important yet infrequently addressed aspect of Georg Lukács' political philosophy that merits serious attention is his call for a thoroughgoing democratization of society, most explicitly in his later writings (but by no means exclusively there).
In many of the key texts in which Lukács develops his line on democratization (History and Class Consciousness, Lenin, the Blum Theses, and the very important 1968 manuscript Demokratisierung Heute und Morgen, translated as The Process of Democratization) he directly addresses a key question that many Marxists are reluctant to engage: what happens after the revolution? And what have you to offer by way of a concrete political program? The answer is surprising, given that it comes from a militant communist party member, but it amounts to an endorsement of socialist democracy, as opposed to a dictatorship of proletarians or party bureaucrats.
In my paper, I explore what exactly this means, and how his conception of socialist democracy is a valuable legacy for the present day. I argue that Lukács provides a very important course correction to Marxism with his claim. By supporting 'democratization,' he provides a clear repudiation of Stalin's totalitarianism, and also takes Marxism to task on a theoretical level. It is inadequate to the concrete ambitions of communist party politics to retain a historico-political eschatology as a core commitment, particularly in regard to overcoming the form of the state and classless society. "When Marx speaks here [in the Critique of the Gotha Program] about the nature of communist society ('From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs') he describes the revolutionary transformation brought about by communism as the fact that 'Labor is no longer a means to life, but itself becomes the first need of life.' That is a transcendence of the purely economic." (The Process of Democratization, 141) Providing a robust exposition of this and other of Lukács' remarks will involve a closer look at what he means by socialism, and what the difference between bourgeois and socialist democracy is. Those distinctions, in turn, allow one to understand how he is able to conclude that a socialist democracy is a vastly enlarged sphere of political activity, whose aim is the cultivation of human species being and of the individuals that comprise it. The position is opposed not only to a 'classical' Marxist picture of the state that 'withers away,' but to contemporary states whose democratic form is out of sync with the popular political content that is supposedly invested in them.
"( ... ) The entire project, however, can be cemented on a sounder base than ‘separation from ... more "( ... )
The entire project, however, can be cemented on a sounder base than ‘separation from painting’. Indeed, it must be, if what is pursued is to remain coherent; no inquiry can satisfy itself by enumerating what its object is not. To formulate a core to the noun photography, to run it through a centrifuge, is to bring the question of photography under the lens of ontological inquiry. A rumination on Cézanne has both the luxury and the burden of taking place in front of the historical edifice of Painting, of a phenomenon that has become enshrined in the museum and understood as a vehicle for art. Cézanne is a figure who at once turns such a history back upon itself, and who in doing so renews the future of painting without volatilizing its core. Indeed, that Cézanne had the vision to look into painting and understand its potential to emerge in his unique expressivity is an implacable testament to the resilient core of the enterprise of painting. Cézanne did not break out of painting; he returned to its essential power, and in doing so, brought the matter of that core to the forefront of his work. Hence Merleau-Ponty’s interest in him, and in what painting is all about. To do such an operation on photography is different. It is a medium that has never quite found itself, never grounded itself in anything other than updating its technological apparatus, in expanding its role as a medium. It is at once a document of evidence, an art medium, a personal totem of the past, a scientific tool, a method of surveillance. Rather than settling around a common set of properties, the tendency of photography seems to be a spreading outward, an acquisition of new powers, an expansion of its writ. Photography as it is classically understood is even in a state of dissolution, with the recent emergence of digital modes of acquisition prevailing almost entirely over the use of various films. Putting an ontological wrench on this kind of a problem will require a starting from scratch, which will mean starting at the image, not at the exclusively photographic mode of image. The image then, in the conversation about image-making that we are equipping ourselves to begin, is something that must, in turn, be tracked.
( ... )"
""THRASYMACHUS AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS The Thrasymachean definition of justice encountered in t... more ""THRASYMACHUS AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
The Thrasymachean definition of justice encountered in the first book of Plato’s Republic is one that deserves serious attention and thorough rehabilitation. “The just,” Thrasymachus says, “is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.” This definition is one that the paper proposed here will treat not as the crude outburst of an adolescent brute, or as wholesale endorsement of a nihilist legal positivism, but as the radical opposite to such common readings. To what purpose is this attempted? Far from being an anachronistic exercise, a defense of the Thrasymachean position will not only flesh out a coherent and compelling theory, but will also show how the register of Thrasymachean thought is itself what we practice today as political philosophy, in contradistinction to Socrates’ metaphysical/ethical analytic of the state.
In the historical context of the Athenian polis, Thrasymachus must also be understood as a representative of the flourishing Sophist class, a social contingent too often scapegoated as opportunist and petty when contrasted with the supposedly free-minded Socrates. Re-reading Thrasymachus must incorporate his social standing into his uniquely animated philosophical voice, and it will be argued that Thrasymachus is arguing not on the behalf of the state (an assertion made quite explicitly by Allan Bloom, who was neither the inventor nor the apex of this thought), but on behalf of the Sophist class. In order to convincingly rehabilitate his position, this aspect of the argument is indispensable. This is true in terms of historiographical competence, but its significance for this argument emerges from the clarity it will provide in showing what Thrasymachus has at stake. Socrates and Thrasymachus do not clash only because of intellectual disagreement, but because they are socioeconomic antipodes to one another. The Sophist project is one of building and installing a critically reflective social class that is skilled enough to work on problems for hire, and to provide a social space in which thought can be pursued on its own without the contingent pressures of thinkers needing ‘another job.’ Socrates, the Sophist-for-free, volatilizes and threatens this enterprise, which is why Thrasymachus comes to him with an aim to publicly destroy him. From Thrasymachus’ perspective, Socrates is a culturally regressive force (which in 5th century Athens was not a regress into some inferior social configuration, but a regress into nature itself).
Thrasymachus is a figure whose radicalism is not wholly appreciated if we evaluate his political philosophy out of context. Without such a context, the physicality of his dramatic presentation and the intensity of his disdain for Socrates leaves one with little reason to take him seriously, which is why I suspect that the Thrasymachean presentation of justice is so often misunderstood, if not completely dismissed as a morality play at the beginning of Republic that teaches us the dangers of rash, stubborn interlocutors.""
Papers by Joseph Benavides
that people not be a herd, manipulated and standardized by the choice of consumer goods and consu... more that people not be a herd, manipulated and standardized by the choice of consumer goods and consumer television culture, whether this culture is offered to him by three giant competing capitalist networks or a single giant noncompetitive socialist network. It is important, in short, that the superficial variety of one system, or the repulsive grayness of the other, not hide the same emptiness of life devoid of meaning." (DP, 15) Václav Havel, 1991 Bloch: Hope and History 2
Drafts by Joseph Benavides
[...] The Differenzschrift might be read as an announcement of there being a difference between t... more [...] The Differenzschrift might be read as an announcement of there being a difference between the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling. That such a difference would have to be announced suggests that a difference between the two was as-yet unrecognized, which is a claim that can be supported on two fronts. On the one hand, there is correspondence between Fichte and Schelling from before and after Hegel’s publication in which the two struggle to reconcile their differences, or, in less optimistic moments, bemoan the fact that the one has only just recently understood that their thought differs on some specific matter. So, the first support for the claim is that Fichte and Schelling were themselves not thoroughly aware at any given time what the differences between them were. [...]
Democratization in Georg Lukács' Political Theory An important yet infrequently addressed aspect... more Democratization in Georg Lukács' Political Theory
An important yet infrequently addressed aspect of Georg Lukács' political philosophy that merits serious attention is his call for a thoroughgoing democratization of society, most explicitly in his later writings (but by no means exclusively there).
In many of the key texts in which Lukács develops his line on democratization (History and Class Consciousness, Lenin, the Blum Theses, and the very important 1968 manuscript Demokratisierung Heute und Morgen, translated as The Process of Democratization) he directly addresses a key question that many Marxists are reluctant to engage: what happens after the revolution? And what have you to offer by way of a concrete political program? The answer is surprising, given that it comes from a militant communist party member, but it amounts to an endorsement of socialist democracy, as opposed to a dictatorship of proletarians or party bureaucrats.
In my paper, I explore what exactly this means, and how his conception of socialist democracy is a valuable legacy for the present day. I argue that Lukács provides a very important course correction to Marxism with his claim. By supporting 'democratization,' he provides a clear repudiation of Stalin's totalitarianism, and also takes Marxism to task on a theoretical level. It is inadequate to the concrete ambitions of communist party politics to retain a historico-political eschatology as a core commitment, particularly in regard to overcoming the form of the state and classless society. "When Marx speaks here [in the Critique of the Gotha Program] about the nature of communist society ('From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs') he describes the revolutionary transformation brought about by communism as the fact that 'Labor is no longer a means to life, but itself becomes the first need of life.' That is a transcendence of the purely economic." (The Process of Democratization, 141) Providing a robust exposition of this and other of Lukács' remarks will involve a closer look at what he means by socialism, and what the difference between bourgeois and socialist democracy is. Those distinctions, in turn, allow one to understand how he is able to conclude that a socialist democracy is a vastly enlarged sphere of political activity, whose aim is the cultivation of human species being and of the individuals that comprise it. The position is opposed not only to a 'classical' Marxist picture of the state that 'withers away,' but to contemporary states whose democratic form is out of sync with the popular political content that is supposedly invested in them.
"( ... ) The entire project, however, can be cemented on a sounder base than ‘separation from ... more "( ... )
The entire project, however, can be cemented on a sounder base than ‘separation from painting’. Indeed, it must be, if what is pursued is to remain coherent; no inquiry can satisfy itself by enumerating what its object is not. To formulate a core to the noun photography, to run it through a centrifuge, is to bring the question of photography under the lens of ontological inquiry. A rumination on Cézanne has both the luxury and the burden of taking place in front of the historical edifice of Painting, of a phenomenon that has become enshrined in the museum and understood as a vehicle for art. Cézanne is a figure who at once turns such a history back upon itself, and who in doing so renews the future of painting without volatilizing its core. Indeed, that Cézanne had the vision to look into painting and understand its potential to emerge in his unique expressivity is an implacable testament to the resilient core of the enterprise of painting. Cézanne did not break out of painting; he returned to its essential power, and in doing so, brought the matter of that core to the forefront of his work. Hence Merleau-Ponty’s interest in him, and in what painting is all about. To do such an operation on photography is different. It is a medium that has never quite found itself, never grounded itself in anything other than updating its technological apparatus, in expanding its role as a medium. It is at once a document of evidence, an art medium, a personal totem of the past, a scientific tool, a method of surveillance. Rather than settling around a common set of properties, the tendency of photography seems to be a spreading outward, an acquisition of new powers, an expansion of its writ. Photography as it is classically understood is even in a state of dissolution, with the recent emergence of digital modes of acquisition prevailing almost entirely over the use of various films. Putting an ontological wrench on this kind of a problem will require a starting from scratch, which will mean starting at the image, not at the exclusively photographic mode of image. The image then, in the conversation about image-making that we are equipping ourselves to begin, is something that must, in turn, be tracked.
( ... )"
""THRASYMACHUS AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS The Thrasymachean definition of justice encountered in t... more ""THRASYMACHUS AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
The Thrasymachean definition of justice encountered in the first book of Plato’s Republic is one that deserves serious attention and thorough rehabilitation. “The just,” Thrasymachus says, “is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.” This definition is one that the paper proposed here will treat not as the crude outburst of an adolescent brute, or as wholesale endorsement of a nihilist legal positivism, but as the radical opposite to such common readings. To what purpose is this attempted? Far from being an anachronistic exercise, a defense of the Thrasymachean position will not only flesh out a coherent and compelling theory, but will also show how the register of Thrasymachean thought is itself what we practice today as political philosophy, in contradistinction to Socrates’ metaphysical/ethical analytic of the state.
In the historical context of the Athenian polis, Thrasymachus must also be understood as a representative of the flourishing Sophist class, a social contingent too often scapegoated as opportunist and petty when contrasted with the supposedly free-minded Socrates. Re-reading Thrasymachus must incorporate his social standing into his uniquely animated philosophical voice, and it will be argued that Thrasymachus is arguing not on the behalf of the state (an assertion made quite explicitly by Allan Bloom, who was neither the inventor nor the apex of this thought), but on behalf of the Sophist class. In order to convincingly rehabilitate his position, this aspect of the argument is indispensable. This is true in terms of historiographical competence, but its significance for this argument emerges from the clarity it will provide in showing what Thrasymachus has at stake. Socrates and Thrasymachus do not clash only because of intellectual disagreement, but because they are socioeconomic antipodes to one another. The Sophist project is one of building and installing a critically reflective social class that is skilled enough to work on problems for hire, and to provide a social space in which thought can be pursued on its own without the contingent pressures of thinkers needing ‘another job.’ Socrates, the Sophist-for-free, volatilizes and threatens this enterprise, which is why Thrasymachus comes to him with an aim to publicly destroy him. From Thrasymachus’ perspective, Socrates is a culturally regressive force (which in 5th century Athens was not a regress into some inferior social configuration, but a regress into nature itself).
Thrasymachus is a figure whose radicalism is not wholly appreciated if we evaluate his political philosophy out of context. Without such a context, the physicality of his dramatic presentation and the intensity of his disdain for Socrates leaves one with little reason to take him seriously, which is why I suspect that the Thrasymachean presentation of justice is so often misunderstood, if not completely dismissed as a morality play at the beginning of Republic that teaches us the dangers of rash, stubborn interlocutors.""
that people not be a herd, manipulated and standardized by the choice of consumer goods and consu... more that people not be a herd, manipulated and standardized by the choice of consumer goods and consumer television culture, whether this culture is offered to him by three giant competing capitalist networks or a single giant noncompetitive socialist network. It is important, in short, that the superficial variety of one system, or the repulsive grayness of the other, not hide the same emptiness of life devoid of meaning." (DP, 15) Václav Havel, 1991 Bloch: Hope and History 2
[...] The Differenzschrift might be read as an announcement of there being a difference between t... more [...] The Differenzschrift might be read as an announcement of there being a difference between the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling. That such a difference would have to be announced suggests that a difference between the two was as-yet unrecognized, which is a claim that can be supported on two fronts. On the one hand, there is correspondence between Fichte and Schelling from before and after Hegel’s publication in which the two struggle to reconcile their differences, or, in less optimistic moments, bemoan the fact that the one has only just recently understood that their thought differs on some specific matter. So, the first support for the claim is that Fichte and Schelling were themselves not thoroughly aware at any given time what the differences between them were. [...]