CRYSTALS -- Dilithium: Digital Signatures from Module Lattices (original) (raw)

Paper 2017/633

CRYSTALS -- Dilithium: Digital Signatures from Module Lattices

Leo Ducas, Tancrede Lepoint, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Peter Schwabe, Gregor Seiler, and Damien Stehle

Abstract

This paper presents Dilithium, a lattice-based signature scheme that is part of the CRYSTALS (Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices) package that will be submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum standards. The scheme is designed to be simple to securely implement against side-channel attacks and to have comparable efficiency to the currently best lattice-based signature schemes. Our implementation results show that Dilithium is competitive with lattice schemes of the same security level and outperforms digital signature schemes based on other post-quantum assumptions.

Note: Changes: - Improved cycle counts (over the CHES 2018 publication) of the scheme - Removed the Gaussian version of the Dilithium scheme - The presented scheme now closely matches the submission to the NIST standardization process

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/633, author = {Leo Ducas and Tancrede Lepoint and Vadim Lyubashevsky and Peter Schwabe and Gregor Seiler and Damien Stehle}, title = {{CRYSTALS} -- Dilithium: Digital Signatures from Module Lattices}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/633}, year = {2017}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/633} }