Angela Sutan | Burgundy School of Business Dijon (original) (raw)
Papers by Angela Sutan
Strategic Change, 2015
Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) res... more Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) research. On the one hand, several studies have been conducted to understand the fi nancial decisions of MF clients related to the construction of trustworthiness and social collateral (which replaces fi nancial collateral in MF loans). On the other hand, the natural counterpart of trustworthiness (i.e., risk taking) has been another main point of focus when evaluating MF clients ' behavior. Yet, most of these studies remain observational, use standard surveys about behavior, or make use of fi nancial information only -as found in many qualitative impact assessments and econometric studies. Th erefore, the usual biases when reporting stated behavior, in particular about items that are diffi cult to rationalize (such as trustworthiness and risk taking), are diffi cult to capture. Only recently have experimental games become popular in MF to gain deeper insights into MF clients and reduce these biases.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
b) Corresponding author. ESSEC Business School and THEMA 105, av. Bernard Hirsch,
Strategic Change
Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) res... more Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) research. On the one hand, several studies have been conducted to understand the fi nancial decisions of MF clients related to the construction of trustworthiness and social collateral (which replaces fi nancial collateral in MF loans). On the other hand, the natural counterpart of trustworthiness (i.e., risk taking) has been another main point of focus when evaluating MF clients ' behavior. Yet, most of these studies remain observational, use standard surveys about behavior, or make use of fi nancial information only -as found in many qualitative impact assessments and econometric studies. Th erefore, the usual biases when reporting stated behavior, in particular about items that are diffi cult to rationalize (such as trustworthiness and risk taking), are diffi cult to capture. Only recently have experimental games become popular in MF to gain deeper insights into MF clients and reduce these biases.
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2015
ABSTRACT Using a canonical trust game, we investigate whether the inequality of endowment between... more ABSTRACT Using a canonical trust game, we investigate whether the inequality of endowment between trustor and trustee and the acquired versus permanent financial state affect trust and trustworthiness. We found that trust and trustworthiness are reference-dependent and that individuals with permanent financial state receive more trust and are more trustworthy than others. In our experiment, unequal endowments do not significantly affect trust, but trustworthiness increases significantly when the trustor is poorer.
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2015
ABSTRACT Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we invest... more ABSTRACT Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly p... more We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome depending both on effort and ability. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in
Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) res... more Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) research. On the one hand, several studies have been conducted to understand the fi nancial decisions of MF clients related to the construction of trustworthiness and social collateral (which replaces fi nancial collateral in MF loans). On the other hand, the natural counterpart of trustworthiness (i.e., risk taking) has been another main point of focus when evaluating MF clients ' behavior. Yet, most of these studies remain observational, use standard surveys about behavior, or make use of fi nancial information only -as found in many qualitative impact assessments and econometric studies. Th erefore, the usual biases when reporting stated behavior, in particular about items that are diffi cult to rationalize (such as trustworthiness and risk taking), are diffi cult to capture. Only recently have experimental games become popular in MF to gain deeper insights into MF clients and reduce these biases.
Nutrition Clinique et Métabolisme, 2014
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT In this paper we try to neutralize the strategic behaviour commonly observed in experime... more ABSTRACT In this paper we try to neutralize the strategic behaviour commonly observed in experimental cobweb markets (Sutan and Willinger, 2002, 2003) in order to restore the coherence of the production decisions and price forecasts. This is done by introducing into the experimental design a circularity operator by which each subject has to make a guess about the price determined by the production decisions of all other agents in the market (except himself). With this procedure we eliminate market power, by generating a situation of local asymmetrical interaction : each agent i acts as a price-taker on his own market while the n-1 remaining players are price-makers. However, from a global point of view, all the subjects are inter-connected, and therefore are perfectly symmetric. Each subject assumes fundamentally two roles : he acts as a price-taker on his own product market since his production decision does not affect his own price, but he acts as a price-maker on the other players' markets, since his production decision affects other players' selling price. Such circular links between agents can be vicious, because if a single agent adopts a risky behaviour, he drives all markets in which he is involved in the same direction. However, we make the assumption that circularity could eliminate the non-coherent behaviours and transform the producers into real price-takers (it becomes virtuous). This assumption is tested experimentally. We show that: i) prices are stationary around the rational expectations equilibrium; ii) subjects do not exhibit strategic behaviour even in the first part of the experiment; iii) the subjects' forecasts come very close to the equilibrium; iv) price series on various markets are correlated; v) over time, the participants take into account the prices and their individual production when they form their forecasts, which testifies of their ability of sophistication and comprehension of the interactions of the economy.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT Envy is evident when an agent undertakes a costly effort to reduce the gap between his s... more ABSTRACT Envy is evident when an agent undertakes a costly effort to reduce the gap between his situation and the envied others' situation. This attempt can take two paths. An agent characterized by competitive or white envy is willing to incur a cost in order to keep up with the Joneses' situation. An agent characterized by destructive or black envy is willing to incur a cost in order to push the others downwards. Using experiments and survey data, we show (1) that people exhibit competitive and destructive forms of envy and (2) that the dominant form of envy varies across domains. A major implication is that underdevelopment may be partly due to destructive envy.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT We here introduce a beauty contest game with negative feedback and interior equilibrium ... more ABSTRACT We here introduce a beauty contest game with negative feedback and interior equilibrium in a multi-period experiment. This game is isomorphic to classical BCG but fit economic situations such as crop production or professional investment better. The game is still being analysed from the eductive point of view and with respect to the attempt to establish a typology of players according to their depths of reasoning. Our main contribution to the understanding of this game is the formalization of the process by which the information is processed. Using the Shannon entropy criterion, we evaluated information and made a link between the Sperber analysis of reflective and intuitive beliefs and numerical psychological research (Dehaene, 1993). Information that players take into account in their choices is denoted useful information. As this depends on the exploitation of the strategy interval, it will be higher in BCG- than in BCG+ in the first iterations, because strategies are numbers that are naturally scanned several times. As argued by Sperber (1997), there is a point in the reasoning process starting from which reflective beliefs become intuitive. In order to determine the exact location of the specific point from which players in the BCG- can jump to the REE, we assume that sophisticated reasoning is costly. Therefore, an agent stops calculating at step k which is obtained by the intersection between his marginal cost function and his marginal benefit (information) function. However, there are individuals who are not able to reach that point, because their cognitive constraint is saturated beforehand. There are also individuals for whom the cognitive constraint is saturated for a value higher that k, but who stop at step k because, given the structure of the population, they can win the game at a smaller cost. Therefore, a guess in this game corresponds to the solution of the system comprising these two constraints. For our experiments, we found a depth of reasoning smaller than 3, which can, however, be optimal. Results show that the k-step thinking with k
La Faculté n'entend donner aucune approbation ou improbation aux opinions émises dans les thèses.... more La Faculté n'entend donner aucune approbation ou improbation aux opinions émises dans les thèses. Ces opinions doivent être considérées comme propres à leurs auteurs. Je tiens, en premier lieu, à adresser mes remerciements les plus sincères à mon directeur de thèse, Monsieur le Professeur Marc WILLINGER. Il m'a fait bénéficier de ses compétences, m'a fait découvrir l'économie expérimentale et m'a fait partager sa passion pour la recherche. Il m'a incitée à monter des projets et des collaborations ; à me poser des questions et à être dynamique. Par ses conseils, il m'a apporté un grand soutien scientifique et moral. J'ai beaucoup apprécié l'environnement de travail agréable qu'il a su me créer pour ces quatre années de thèse. Je tiens également à remercier M. Bruno BIAIS, M. Roger GUESNERIE, M. Patrick ROGER et M. Jan TUINSTRA pour l'honneur qu'ils me font de participer à mon jury de thèse. Plusieurs personnes sont à l'origine de ce projet, m'ont aidée à mieux le définir ou m'ont permis d'avancer dans ma réflexion. Ainsi, je remercie M. Roger GUESNERIE, dont les travaux sur le raisonnement éductif ont constitué ma source d'inspiration pour la mise en place des projets d'économie expérimentale. Je lui remercie également de m'avoir mise en contact avec M. Thorsten HENS, de l'Université de Zurich, et avec M. Cars HOMMES et M. Jan TUINSTRA (et toute l'équipe du CeNDEF), de l'Université d'Amsterdam, avec lesquels j'ai eu des discussions très intéressantes sur mon sujet de thèse. Les conseils de M. Colin CAMERER, de Dijon, m'ont été particulièrement utiles pour la construction de cette thèse. Sans être techniquement liés à mon sujet de recherche, plusieurs personnes ont cependant contribué à me donner l'envie du métier de chercheur. J'aimerais donc remercier Murat YILDIZOGLU, Dominique LACOUE-LABARTHE, Henri BOURGUINAT, ainsi que mes autres professeurs de l'Université de Bordeaux, et Stéphanie CHORT, doctorante, pour leur enthousiasme constant envers mes projets. Je pense à toutes les personnes qui ont partagé ma vie de doctorante au BETA à Strasbourg et au LAMETA à Montpellier. Je suis reconnaissante à Kene BOUNMY, qui a développé le programme informatique nécessaire à la réalisation des expériences de la deuxième partie de ma thèse ; à Sandrine SPAETER, qui a toujours su me motiver dans mes travaux de doctorante et de jeune maman ; à Anne ROZAN et Théophile AZOMAHOU ; à mes collègues doctorants (Mathieu BREZOVSKI, Cédric DITZLER), dont le soutien et l'optimisme ont fait de mon séjour à Strasbourg une période très agréable. Je n'oublie pas Danièle GENEVE et Christine DEMANGE, pour leur douceur, et tous les autres membres du BETA et du LARGE pour tous les instants passés ensemble. J'ai retrouvé à Montpellier des gens enthousiastes et qui m'ont accueillie avec amitié. Je pense à tous les membres du site de Richter et tout particulièrement à Sébastien ROUSSEL, Jean-Fernand NGUEMA et Thierry VIGNOLO. Pierre-Jean COTTALORDA et Mélanie HEUGUES ont été des collègues extraordinaires. Ma gratitude la plus profonde s'adresse à tous mes amis du monde "réel"(Isabelle RENAVANT, Nicoleta FETITA, Emmanuel DIAS, Daniela BONDOC, Nectara POPA, Delia GAVRUS, Andrei MALINOVSCHI, Diana BRATU, Mihaela BONESCU), qui m'ont sans cesse soutenue dans cette aventure dans la recherche, à toute ma famille et en particulier à ma soeur Dana. Je tiens aussi à remercier Sophie REBOUD et tous les chercheurs du CEREN de Dijon pour l'accueil chaleureux au sein de leur équipe. Quelques personnes qui m'ont accompagnée dans cette aventure reçoivent mes remerciements les plus profonds. Je pense à mon vieil ami du Magistère, Brice CORGNET, doctorant à l'Université Carlos III de Madrid, avec lequel j'ai eu le plaisir de travailler sur un projet et qui a relu attentivement une partie de cette thèse. Maria Noel PI ALPERIN et Gaston GIORDANA, doctorants à Montpellier, ont eu une grande contribution logistique dans mes travaux et m'ont témoigné d'une grande amitié. François COCHARD, maître de conférences à l'Université de Toulouse, m'a apporté des conseils scientifiques de grande qualité dans le domaine de l'économie expérimentale et sur ce travail, et un grand soutien amical, tout au long de ma thèse. Avec Christophe GODLEWSKI, Thierry BURGER-HELMCHEN et Rachel LEVY, futurs ex-doctorants du BETA et du LARGE, nous avons connu en même temps le stress et les inquiétudes de fin de thèse, et nous avons partagé des moments de grande amitié. Aurelia VASILE, doctorante à Dijon, a toujours été là pour m'encourager. Enfin, je ne saurai jamais assez remercier Virgil OPTASANU, mon époux, pour son immense soutien scientifique, logistique et moral, et ma fille Mara, pour son amour.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of uninformative communications on asse... more The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of uninformative communications on asset prices. An experimental approach allows us to control for the release of a priori uninformative messages. We introduce the release of messages in standard experimental asset markets with bubbles using a strategy method experiment. We conjecture that messages that are a priori uninformative can
Revue économique, 2010
We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly p... more We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome depending both on effort and ability. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in
Strategic Change, 2015
Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) res... more Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) research. On the one hand, several studies have been conducted to understand the fi nancial decisions of MF clients related to the construction of trustworthiness and social collateral (which replaces fi nancial collateral in MF loans). On the other hand, the natural counterpart of trustworthiness (i.e., risk taking) has been another main point of focus when evaluating MF clients ' behavior. Yet, most of these studies remain observational, use standard surveys about behavior, or make use of fi nancial information only -as found in many qualitative impact assessments and econometric studies. Th erefore, the usual biases when reporting stated behavior, in particular about items that are diffi cult to rationalize (such as trustworthiness and risk taking), are diffi cult to capture. Only recently have experimental games become popular in MF to gain deeper insights into MF clients and reduce these biases.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
b) Corresponding author. ESSEC Business School and THEMA 105, av. Bernard Hirsch,
Strategic Change
Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) res... more Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) research. On the one hand, several studies have been conducted to understand the fi nancial decisions of MF clients related to the construction of trustworthiness and social collateral (which replaces fi nancial collateral in MF loans). On the other hand, the natural counterpart of trustworthiness (i.e., risk taking) has been another main point of focus when evaluating MF clients ' behavior. Yet, most of these studies remain observational, use standard surveys about behavior, or make use of fi nancial information only -as found in many qualitative impact assessments and econometric studies. Th erefore, the usual biases when reporting stated behavior, in particular about items that are diffi cult to rationalize (such as trustworthiness and risk taking), are diffi cult to capture. Only recently have experimental games become popular in MF to gain deeper insights into MF clients and reduce these biases.
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2015
ABSTRACT Using a canonical trust game, we investigate whether the inequality of endowment between... more ABSTRACT Using a canonical trust game, we investigate whether the inequality of endowment between trustor and trustee and the acquired versus permanent financial state affect trust and trustworthiness. We found that trust and trustworthiness are reference-dependent and that individuals with permanent financial state receive more trust and are more trustworthy than others. In our experiment, unequal endowments do not significantly affect trust, but trustworthiness increases significantly when the trustor is poorer.
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2015
ABSTRACT Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we invest... more ABSTRACT Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly p... more We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome depending both on effort and ability. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in
Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) res... more Understanding the behavior of the poor has long been an important focus of microfi nance (MF) research. On the one hand, several studies have been conducted to understand the fi nancial decisions of MF clients related to the construction of trustworthiness and social collateral (which replaces fi nancial collateral in MF loans). On the other hand, the natural counterpart of trustworthiness (i.e., risk taking) has been another main point of focus when evaluating MF clients ' behavior. Yet, most of these studies remain observational, use standard surveys about behavior, or make use of fi nancial information only -as found in many qualitative impact assessments and econometric studies. Th erefore, the usual biases when reporting stated behavior, in particular about items that are diffi cult to rationalize (such as trustworthiness and risk taking), are diffi cult to capture. Only recently have experimental games become popular in MF to gain deeper insights into MF clients and reduce these biases.
Nutrition Clinique et Métabolisme, 2014
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT In this paper we try to neutralize the strategic behaviour commonly observed in experime... more ABSTRACT In this paper we try to neutralize the strategic behaviour commonly observed in experimental cobweb markets (Sutan and Willinger, 2002, 2003) in order to restore the coherence of the production decisions and price forecasts. This is done by introducing into the experimental design a circularity operator by which each subject has to make a guess about the price determined by the production decisions of all other agents in the market (except himself). With this procedure we eliminate market power, by generating a situation of local asymmetrical interaction : each agent i acts as a price-taker on his own market while the n-1 remaining players are price-makers. However, from a global point of view, all the subjects are inter-connected, and therefore are perfectly symmetric. Each subject assumes fundamentally two roles : he acts as a price-taker on his own product market since his production decision does not affect his own price, but he acts as a price-maker on the other players' markets, since his production decision affects other players' selling price. Such circular links between agents can be vicious, because if a single agent adopts a risky behaviour, he drives all markets in which he is involved in the same direction. However, we make the assumption that circularity could eliminate the non-coherent behaviours and transform the producers into real price-takers (it becomes virtuous). This assumption is tested experimentally. We show that: i) prices are stationary around the rational expectations equilibrium; ii) subjects do not exhibit strategic behaviour even in the first part of the experiment; iii) the subjects' forecasts come very close to the equilibrium; iv) price series on various markets are correlated; v) over time, the participants take into account the prices and their individual production when they form their forecasts, which testifies of their ability of sophistication and comprehension of the interactions of the economy.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT Envy is evident when an agent undertakes a costly effort to reduce the gap between his s... more ABSTRACT Envy is evident when an agent undertakes a costly effort to reduce the gap between his situation and the envied others' situation. This attempt can take two paths. An agent characterized by competitive or white envy is willing to incur a cost in order to keep up with the Joneses' situation. An agent characterized by destructive or black envy is willing to incur a cost in order to push the others downwards. Using experiments and survey data, we show (1) that people exhibit competitive and destructive forms of envy and (2) that the dominant form of envy varies across domains. A major implication is that underdevelopment may be partly due to destructive envy.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT We here introduce a beauty contest game with negative feedback and interior equilibrium ... more ABSTRACT We here introduce a beauty contest game with negative feedback and interior equilibrium in a multi-period experiment. This game is isomorphic to classical BCG but fit economic situations such as crop production or professional investment better. The game is still being analysed from the eductive point of view and with respect to the attempt to establish a typology of players according to their depths of reasoning. Our main contribution to the understanding of this game is the formalization of the process by which the information is processed. Using the Shannon entropy criterion, we evaluated information and made a link between the Sperber analysis of reflective and intuitive beliefs and numerical psychological research (Dehaene, 1993). Information that players take into account in their choices is denoted useful information. As this depends on the exploitation of the strategy interval, it will be higher in BCG- than in BCG+ in the first iterations, because strategies are numbers that are naturally scanned several times. As argued by Sperber (1997), there is a point in the reasoning process starting from which reflective beliefs become intuitive. In order to determine the exact location of the specific point from which players in the BCG- can jump to the REE, we assume that sophisticated reasoning is costly. Therefore, an agent stops calculating at step k which is obtained by the intersection between his marginal cost function and his marginal benefit (information) function. However, there are individuals who are not able to reach that point, because their cognitive constraint is saturated beforehand. There are also individuals for whom the cognitive constraint is saturated for a value higher that k, but who stop at step k because, given the structure of the population, they can win the game at a smaller cost. Therefore, a guess in this game corresponds to the solution of the system comprising these two constraints. For our experiments, we found a depth of reasoning smaller than 3, which can, however, be optimal. Results show that the k-step thinking with k
La Faculté n'entend donner aucune approbation ou improbation aux opinions émises dans les thèses.... more La Faculté n'entend donner aucune approbation ou improbation aux opinions émises dans les thèses. Ces opinions doivent être considérées comme propres à leurs auteurs. Je tiens, en premier lieu, à adresser mes remerciements les plus sincères à mon directeur de thèse, Monsieur le Professeur Marc WILLINGER. Il m'a fait bénéficier de ses compétences, m'a fait découvrir l'économie expérimentale et m'a fait partager sa passion pour la recherche. Il m'a incitée à monter des projets et des collaborations ; à me poser des questions et à être dynamique. Par ses conseils, il m'a apporté un grand soutien scientifique et moral. J'ai beaucoup apprécié l'environnement de travail agréable qu'il a su me créer pour ces quatre années de thèse. Je tiens également à remercier M. Bruno BIAIS, M. Roger GUESNERIE, M. Patrick ROGER et M. Jan TUINSTRA pour l'honneur qu'ils me font de participer à mon jury de thèse. Plusieurs personnes sont à l'origine de ce projet, m'ont aidée à mieux le définir ou m'ont permis d'avancer dans ma réflexion. Ainsi, je remercie M. Roger GUESNERIE, dont les travaux sur le raisonnement éductif ont constitué ma source d'inspiration pour la mise en place des projets d'économie expérimentale. Je lui remercie également de m'avoir mise en contact avec M. Thorsten HENS, de l'Université de Zurich, et avec M. Cars HOMMES et M. Jan TUINSTRA (et toute l'équipe du CeNDEF), de l'Université d'Amsterdam, avec lesquels j'ai eu des discussions très intéressantes sur mon sujet de thèse. Les conseils de M. Colin CAMERER, de Dijon, m'ont été particulièrement utiles pour la construction de cette thèse. Sans être techniquement liés à mon sujet de recherche, plusieurs personnes ont cependant contribué à me donner l'envie du métier de chercheur. J'aimerais donc remercier Murat YILDIZOGLU, Dominique LACOUE-LABARTHE, Henri BOURGUINAT, ainsi que mes autres professeurs de l'Université de Bordeaux, et Stéphanie CHORT, doctorante, pour leur enthousiasme constant envers mes projets. Je pense à toutes les personnes qui ont partagé ma vie de doctorante au BETA à Strasbourg et au LAMETA à Montpellier. Je suis reconnaissante à Kene BOUNMY, qui a développé le programme informatique nécessaire à la réalisation des expériences de la deuxième partie de ma thèse ; à Sandrine SPAETER, qui a toujours su me motiver dans mes travaux de doctorante et de jeune maman ; à Anne ROZAN et Théophile AZOMAHOU ; à mes collègues doctorants (Mathieu BREZOVSKI, Cédric DITZLER), dont le soutien et l'optimisme ont fait de mon séjour à Strasbourg une période très agréable. Je n'oublie pas Danièle GENEVE et Christine DEMANGE, pour leur douceur, et tous les autres membres du BETA et du LARGE pour tous les instants passés ensemble. J'ai retrouvé à Montpellier des gens enthousiastes et qui m'ont accueillie avec amitié. Je pense à tous les membres du site de Richter et tout particulièrement à Sébastien ROUSSEL, Jean-Fernand NGUEMA et Thierry VIGNOLO. Pierre-Jean COTTALORDA et Mélanie HEUGUES ont été des collègues extraordinaires. Ma gratitude la plus profonde s'adresse à tous mes amis du monde "réel"(Isabelle RENAVANT, Nicoleta FETITA, Emmanuel DIAS, Daniela BONDOC, Nectara POPA, Delia GAVRUS, Andrei MALINOVSCHI, Diana BRATU, Mihaela BONESCU), qui m'ont sans cesse soutenue dans cette aventure dans la recherche, à toute ma famille et en particulier à ma soeur Dana. Je tiens aussi à remercier Sophie REBOUD et tous les chercheurs du CEREN de Dijon pour l'accueil chaleureux au sein de leur équipe. Quelques personnes qui m'ont accompagnée dans cette aventure reçoivent mes remerciements les plus profonds. Je pense à mon vieil ami du Magistère, Brice CORGNET, doctorant à l'Université Carlos III de Madrid, avec lequel j'ai eu le plaisir de travailler sur un projet et qui a relu attentivement une partie de cette thèse. Maria Noel PI ALPERIN et Gaston GIORDANA, doctorants à Montpellier, ont eu une grande contribution logistique dans mes travaux et m'ont témoigné d'une grande amitié. François COCHARD, maître de conférences à l'Université de Toulouse, m'a apporté des conseils scientifiques de grande qualité dans le domaine de l'économie expérimentale et sur ce travail, et un grand soutien amical, tout au long de ma thèse. Avec Christophe GODLEWSKI, Thierry BURGER-HELMCHEN et Rachel LEVY, futurs ex-doctorants du BETA et du LARGE, nous avons connu en même temps le stress et les inquiétudes de fin de thèse, et nous avons partagé des moments de grande amitié. Aurelia VASILE, doctorante à Dijon, a toujours été là pour m'encourager. Enfin, je ne saurai jamais assez remercier Virgil OPTASANU, mon époux, pour son immense soutien scientifique, logistique et moral, et ma fille Mara, pour son amour.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of uninformative communications on asse... more The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of uninformative communications on asset prices. An experimental approach allows us to control for the release of a priori uninformative messages. We introduce the release of messages in standard experimental asset markets with bubbles using a strategy method experiment. We conjecture that messages that are a priori uninformative can
Revue économique, 2010
We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly p... more We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome depending both on effort and ability. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in