Boris Rigod | European University Institute (original) (raw)
Papers by Boris Rigod
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
This chapter deals with the rules on trade in goods in the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement. It is o... more This chapter deals with the rules on trade in goods in the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement. It is organized, as follows. First, the rules on market access, that is, the EU-Korea FTA provisions related to import measures applicable at the border, will be delineated and analyzed. Subsequently, aspects of one of the most innovative parts of the agreement will be examined in detail: the section containing rules on domestic regulation, in particular, on technical regulations and standards.
This paper shows two sides of the EU–Korea FTA. On the one hand, it is a very traditional trade agreement, largely based on existing WTO provisions. This is particularly the case in those parts of the agreement concerning border measures. On the other hand, in particular, concerning the sector-specific rules on technical barriers to trade, the agreement is quite innovative and breaks new grounds, with respect to the regulation of domestic instruments.
Moreover, the Agreement is, to a large extent, a ‘living instrument’. Many of the remaining lacunae in the field of domestic regulation must be dealt with in the future, through cooperation and consultations within the different committees and working groups. This is the Agreement’s approach to tackle its endogenous incompleteness, which is inherent in any trade agreement. From this angle, the EU–Korea FTA may not only be understood as a static body of rules, but also as a framework for collaboration that helps to find prompt and appropriate responses to changes in real-world conditions, thus facilitating trade relations between the parties in the long run.
Among the WTO Agreements, the SPS Agreement provides for the strictest rules on domestic regulato... more Among the WTO Agreements, the SPS Agreement provides for the strictest rules on domestic regulatory measures. Governments adopting measures to protect human, animal, and plant life and health have to comply with a plethora of obligations, exceeding the disciplines contained in the GATT and the TBT. Except for cases where scientific evidence is not available, they have to base regulatory measures on a scientific risk assessment, be it their own or one conducted by a third party. Given, on the one hand, the sensitivity of health and environmental concerns and, on the other, the constraints the treaty imposes on governments' ability to address them, the SPS Agreement has been widely criticized for undermining democratic self-government and also for introducing elements of 'postdiscrimination' into the world trade order. This article delves into the question whether the criticism is justified. To that end, it examines the purpose of the SPS Agreement on the basis of economic theory and the negotiating history. It shows that much of the criticism is exaggerated and that the SPS Agreement serves, as does every other WTO Agreement (except for the TRIPs), a single purpose: the preservation of market access commitments. This insight has wider implications, as it suggests that the 'correct' application of the SPS should in fact lead neither to an (improper) impediment to democracy nor to a 'postdiscriminatory' trade regime.
This article links recent developments in EU trade politics with the relevant rules governing the... more This article links recent developments in EU trade politics with the relevant rules governing the formulation of the common commercial policy. Its aim is to explain the domestic law regulating the EU's current external trade relations. Since 2006 EU trade policy has undergone a major shift from a policy of strict multilateralism towards selective bilateralism. To that end, the EU has launched a "new generation" of free trade agreements (FTAs), which are today its principle means for opening foreign markets. Despite the fact that already many bilateral trade treaties are in place between the EU and third countries, these new agreements mark a change in EU trade policy in that, for the first time, purely commercial goals are pursued on a bilateral basis. This shift in policy is accompanied by a major treaty amendment: the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which has a great impact on EU external action in general and on trade policy in particular. One of the Treaty's main features is to link the Union's trade policy with its other foreign policies. In the context of the common commercial policy, this leads to some contradictions between the language of the law and actual EU trade policies. This paper identifies the relevant factors in the move towards bilateralism and provides an in depth analysis of EU trade policies in the face of these changes.
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
The Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
This chapter deals with the rules on trade in goods in the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement. It is o... more This chapter deals with the rules on trade in goods in the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement. It is organized, as follows. First, the rules on market access, that is, the EU-Korea FTA provisions related to import measures applicable at the border, will be delineated and analyzed. Subsequently, aspects of one of the most innovative parts of the agreement will be examined in detail: the section containing rules on domestic regulation, in particular, on technical regulations and standards.
This paper shows two sides of the EU–Korea FTA. On the one hand, it is a very traditional trade agreement, largely based on existing WTO provisions. This is particularly the case in those parts of the agreement concerning border measures. On the other hand, in particular, concerning the sector-specific rules on technical barriers to trade, the agreement is quite innovative and breaks new grounds, with respect to the regulation of domestic instruments.
Moreover, the Agreement is, to a large extent, a ‘living instrument’. Many of the remaining lacunae in the field of domestic regulation must be dealt with in the future, through cooperation and consultations within the different committees and working groups. This is the Agreement’s approach to tackle its endogenous incompleteness, which is inherent in any trade agreement. From this angle, the EU–Korea FTA may not only be understood as a static body of rules, but also as a framework for collaboration that helps to find prompt and appropriate responses to changes in real-world conditions, thus facilitating trade relations between the parties in the long run.
Among the WTO Agreements, the SPS Agreement provides for the strictest rules on domestic regulato... more Among the WTO Agreements, the SPS Agreement provides for the strictest rules on domestic regulatory measures. Governments adopting measures to protect human, animal, and plant life and health have to comply with a plethora of obligations, exceeding the disciplines contained in the GATT and the TBT. Except for cases where scientific evidence is not available, they have to base regulatory measures on a scientific risk assessment, be it their own or one conducted by a third party. Given, on the one hand, the sensitivity of health and environmental concerns and, on the other, the constraints the treaty imposes on governments' ability to address them, the SPS Agreement has been widely criticized for undermining democratic self-government and also for introducing elements of 'postdiscrimination' into the world trade order. This article delves into the question whether the criticism is justified. To that end, it examines the purpose of the SPS Agreement on the basis of economic theory and the negotiating history. It shows that much of the criticism is exaggerated and that the SPS Agreement serves, as does every other WTO Agreement (except for the TRIPs), a single purpose: the preservation of market access commitments. This insight has wider implications, as it suggests that the 'correct' application of the SPS should in fact lead neither to an (improper) impediment to democracy nor to a 'postdiscriminatory' trade regime.
This article links recent developments in EU trade politics with the relevant rules governing the... more This article links recent developments in EU trade politics with the relevant rules governing the formulation of the common commercial policy. Its aim is to explain the domestic law regulating the EU's current external trade relations. Since 2006 EU trade policy has undergone a major shift from a policy of strict multilateralism towards selective bilateralism. To that end, the EU has launched a "new generation" of free trade agreements (FTAs), which are today its principle means for opening foreign markets. Despite the fact that already many bilateral trade treaties are in place between the EU and third countries, these new agreements mark a change in EU trade policy in that, for the first time, purely commercial goals are pursued on a bilateral basis. This shift in policy is accompanied by a major treaty amendment: the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which has a great impact on EU external action in general and on trade policy in particular. One of the Treaty's main features is to link the Union's trade policy with its other foreign policies. In the context of the common commercial policy, this leads to some contradictions between the language of the law and actual EU trade policies. This paper identifies the relevant factors in the move towards bilateralism and provides an in depth analysis of EU trade policies in the face of these changes.