Giovani Sartor | European University Institute (original) (raw)
Papers by Giovani Sartor
There are occasions in which an agent lengthens its own action through the implementation of a fo... more There are occasions in which an agent lengthens its own action through the implementation of a foreign activity for its own interests. We focus on the occasional dependence relation between a principal agent and a helper agent. In particular, we are interested in the helper’s harmful performance that has its origin in extra contractual situations e.g. factual and/or occasional situations based on trust or courtesy which may lead to the emergence of an obligation to compensate third parties.
We address some forms of temporal reasoning within normative MAS, focusing on the combination of ... more We address some forms of temporal reasoning within normative MAS, focusing on the combination of temporal logics with multi-modal multi-agent logics. We suggest perspectives on how these combinations can be used for modelling aspects of time within lawful provisions, obligations, and legal principles. The main contributions are the new variant of deontic tense logic using hybrid logic, and the combination of time and obligations.
Computational Models of Argument, 2008
Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law, 2001
In this paper we put forward a formal description of theories which can be used to record underst... more In this paper we put forward a formal description of theories which can be used to record understanding of, and explain decisions in, case law domains. We believe that reasoning with cases involves all of theory construction, use and evaluation, and that awareness of the theory which provides a context for case based arguments is essential to understanding such arguments. Moreover, our account of these theories includes a systematic link between factors and values, which we believe is necessary to explain why some arguments prove to be more persuasive than others. We begin by formalising the various elements that the theories contain, and then provide a set of theory constructors which allow theories to built up from the background of decided cases. We show how such theories can be used to explain decisions on particular cases. We discuss how theories can be compared and evaluated. We then show how the argument moves of HYPO and CATO can be understood in terms of our framework. We conclude with a brief discussion of an implementation of the framework, and a summary of the major features of our approach.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for ... more This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for such purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Law Department of the EUI if the paper is to be published elsewhere, and should also assume responsibility for any consequent obligation(s).
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law, 2005
We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal logic arising from the combinatio... more We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal logic arising from the combination of temporalised agency and temporalised normative positions. We argue about the defeasible nature of these notions and then we show how to represent and reason with them in the setting of Defeasible Logic.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and... more This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.
International Journal of Business Process Integration and Management, 2009
This paper provides a formal analysis of good faith in terms of a notion of satisfaction of given... more This paper provides a formal analysis of good faith in terms of a notion of satisfaction of given correctness rules. We consider the distinction between objective and subjective good faith, focusing on observable behaviour, the former, and on beliefs, the latter. The form given to the correctness rules will allow us to impose both positive and negative requirements to be fulfilled. This analysis is then incorporated into an extension of defeasible logic, in order to provide a computational framework to deal with the various versions of good faith previously discussed. Finally, we outline some formal connections between good faith and trust.
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2009
I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an... more I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an ontology (a conceptual architecture). Firstly, I shall introduce the inferential approach, consider its implications, and distinguish the mere possession of an inferentially defined concept from the belief in the concept’s applicability, which also involves the acceptance of the concept’s constitutive inferences. For
Artificial Intelligence, 2003
Reasoning with cases has been a primary focus of those working in AI and law who have attempted t... more Reasoning with cases has been a primary focus of those working in AI and law who have attempted to model legal reasoning. In this paper we put forward a formal model of reasoning with cases which captures many of the insights from that previous work. We begin by stating our view of reasoning with cases as a process of constructing, evaluating and applying a theory. Central to our model is a view of the relationship between cases, rules based on cases, and the social values which justify those rules. Having given our view of these relationships, we present our formal model of them, and explain how theories can be constructed, compared and evaluated. We then show how previous work can be described in terms of our model, and discuss extensions to the basic model to accommodate particular features of previous work. We conclude by identifying some directions for future work. A naive model of reasoning with cases, set up as a straw man in Frank, 1949, can be expressed as an equation, R x F = D, intended to express that a decision, D, can be deduced by the application of a set of rules, R, to the facts of a particular case, F. Although the simplicity of this picture has its attractions, it is problematic in every respect. The facts of a case are not givens: cases need to be interpreted, and different lawyers will interpret them in different ways. The rules, intended to be derived from precedent cases, are also not in plain view; a case may interpreted in a variety of ways, and as Levi,1949, stresses, the interpretation of a precedent may change in the light of subsequent cases (see also Twining and Miers, 1991, p311 ff). Moreover, the rules that cases give rise to are inherently defeasible: when we come to apply them we will typically find conflicting rules pointing to differing decisions, so we need a means of resolving such conflicts. Thus none of describing the facts of the case, extracting rules from precedents and applying these rules is straightforward. To model reasoning with cases in a satisfactory way, we must account for all of the description of cases, the extraction of rules and the resolution of conflicts. A better way of seeing reasoning with cases is to see it as a process of constructing and using a theory. As McCarty put it:
Disclaimer/Klachtenregeling Meent u dat de digitale beschikbaarstelling van bepaald materiaal inb... more Disclaimer/Klachtenregeling Meent u dat de digitale beschikbaarstelling van bepaald materiaal inbreuk maakt op enig recht dat u toekomt of uw (privacy)belangen schaadt, dan kunt u dit onderbouwd aan de Universiteitsbibliotheek laten weten. Bij een gegronde klacht zal de Universiteitsbibliotheek het materiaal ontoegankelijk maken en/of van de website verwijderen, dan wel samen met u bekijken hoe op een andere manier aan uw klacht tegemoet kan worden gekomen. Stuurt u hiervoor een e-mail naar: dare@uva.nl, of een brief naar: Bibliotheek van de Universiteit ...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for ... more This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for such purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Law Department of the EUI if the paper is to be published elsewhere, and should also assume responsibility for any consequent obligation(s).
This paper proposes a framework based on Defeasible Logic (DL) to reason about normative modifica... more This paper proposes a framework based on Defeasible Logic (DL) to reason about normative modifications. We show how to express them in DL and how the logic deals with conflicts between temporalised normative modifications. Some comments will be given with regard to the phenomenon of retroactivity.
Abstract: The legal nature of digital agents is considered, and it is argued that it is possible ... more Abstract: The legal nature of digital agents is considered, and it is argued that it is possible to attribute to such artificial entities intentional (mental) states that are legally relevant. Consequently we may recognise their legal capacity to act as representative of their users, ...
Ratio Juris, 2008
I will argue that the concept of (valid) law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual de... more I will argue that the concept of (valid) law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual description. Its conceptual function is that of relating certain (alternative sets of) properties a norm may possess to the conclusion that the norm is legally binding, namely, that it deserves to be endorsed and applied in legal reasoning. Legal validity has to be distinguished from other, more demanding, normative ideas, such as moral bindingness or legal optimality.
Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 1997
Approaches to Legal …, 2011
Page 1. Chapter 1 Introduction: Theory and Methodology in Legal Ontology Engineering: Experiences... more Page 1. Chapter 1 Introduction: Theory and Methodology in Legal Ontology Engineering: Experiences and Future Directions Pompeu Casanovas, Giovanni Sartor, Maria Angela Biasiotti, and Meritxell Fernández-Barrera 1.1 Legal Ontologies Come of Age ...
There are occasions in which an agent lengthens its own action through the implementation of a fo... more There are occasions in which an agent lengthens its own action through the implementation of a foreign activity for its own interests. We focus on the occasional dependence relation between a principal agent and a helper agent. In particular, we are interested in the helper’s harmful performance that has its origin in extra contractual situations e.g. factual and/or occasional situations based on trust or courtesy which may lead to the emergence of an obligation to compensate third parties.
We address some forms of temporal reasoning within normative MAS, focusing on the combination of ... more We address some forms of temporal reasoning within normative MAS, focusing on the combination of temporal logics with multi-modal multi-agent logics. We suggest perspectives on how these combinations can be used for modelling aspects of time within lawful provisions, obligations, and legal principles. The main contributions are the new variant of deontic tense logic using hybrid logic, and the combination of time and obligations.
Computational Models of Argument, 2008
Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law, 2001
In this paper we put forward a formal description of theories which can be used to record underst... more In this paper we put forward a formal description of theories which can be used to record understanding of, and explain decisions in, case law domains. We believe that reasoning with cases involves all of theory construction, use and evaluation, and that awareness of the theory which provides a context for case based arguments is essential to understanding such arguments. Moreover, our account of these theories includes a systematic link between factors and values, which we believe is necessary to explain why some arguments prove to be more persuasive than others. We begin by formalising the various elements that the theories contain, and then provide a set of theory constructors which allow theories to built up from the background of decided cases. We show how such theories can be used to explain decisions on particular cases. We discuss how theories can be compared and evaluated. We then show how the argument moves of HYPO and CATO can be understood in terms of our framework. We conclude with a brief discussion of an implementation of the framework, and a summary of the major features of our approach.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for ... more This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for such purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Law Department of the EUI if the paper is to be published elsewhere, and should also assume responsibility for any consequent obligation(s).
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law, 2005
We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal logic arising from the combinatio... more We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal logic arising from the combination of temporalised agency and temporalised normative positions. We argue about the defeasible nature of these notions and then we show how to represent and reason with them in the setting of Defeasible Logic.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and... more This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.
International Journal of Business Process Integration and Management, 2009
This paper provides a formal analysis of good faith in terms of a notion of satisfaction of given... more This paper provides a formal analysis of good faith in terms of a notion of satisfaction of given correctness rules. We consider the distinction between objective and subjective good faith, focusing on observable behaviour, the former, and on beliefs, the latter. The form given to the correctness rules will allow us to impose both positive and negative requirements to be fulfilled. This analysis is then incorporated into an extension of defeasible logic, in order to provide a computational framework to deal with the various versions of good faith previously discussed. Finally, we outline some formal connections between good faith and trust.
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2009
I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an... more I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an ontology (a conceptual architecture). Firstly, I shall introduce the inferential approach, consider its implications, and distinguish the mere possession of an inferentially defined concept from the belief in the concept’s applicability, which also involves the acceptance of the concept’s constitutive inferences. For
Artificial Intelligence, 2003
Reasoning with cases has been a primary focus of those working in AI and law who have attempted t... more Reasoning with cases has been a primary focus of those working in AI and law who have attempted to model legal reasoning. In this paper we put forward a formal model of reasoning with cases which captures many of the insights from that previous work. We begin by stating our view of reasoning with cases as a process of constructing, evaluating and applying a theory. Central to our model is a view of the relationship between cases, rules based on cases, and the social values which justify those rules. Having given our view of these relationships, we present our formal model of them, and explain how theories can be constructed, compared and evaluated. We then show how previous work can be described in terms of our model, and discuss extensions to the basic model to accommodate particular features of previous work. We conclude by identifying some directions for future work. A naive model of reasoning with cases, set up as a straw man in Frank, 1949, can be expressed as an equation, R x F = D, intended to express that a decision, D, can be deduced by the application of a set of rules, R, to the facts of a particular case, F. Although the simplicity of this picture has its attractions, it is problematic in every respect. The facts of a case are not givens: cases need to be interpreted, and different lawyers will interpret them in different ways. The rules, intended to be derived from precedent cases, are also not in plain view; a case may interpreted in a variety of ways, and as Levi,1949, stresses, the interpretation of a precedent may change in the light of subsequent cases (see also Twining and Miers, 1991, p311 ff). Moreover, the rules that cases give rise to are inherently defeasible: when we come to apply them we will typically find conflicting rules pointing to differing decisions, so we need a means of resolving such conflicts. Thus none of describing the facts of the case, extracting rules from precedents and applying these rules is straightforward. To model reasoning with cases in a satisfactory way, we must account for all of the description of cases, the extraction of rules and the resolution of conflicts. A better way of seeing reasoning with cases is to see it as a process of constructing and using a theory. As McCarty put it:
Disclaimer/Klachtenregeling Meent u dat de digitale beschikbaarstelling van bepaald materiaal inb... more Disclaimer/Klachtenregeling Meent u dat de digitale beschikbaarstelling van bepaald materiaal inbreuk maakt op enig recht dat u toekomt of uw (privacy)belangen schaadt, dan kunt u dit onderbouwd aan de Universiteitsbibliotheek laten weten. Bij een gegronde klacht zal de Universiteitsbibliotheek het materiaal ontoegankelijk maken en/of van de website verwijderen, dan wel samen met u bekijken hoe op een andere manier aan uw klacht tegemoet kan worden gekomen. Stuurt u hiervoor een e-mail naar: dare@uva.nl, of een brief naar: Bibliotheek van de Universiteit ...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for ... more This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for such purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Law Department of the EUI if the paper is to be published elsewhere, and should also assume responsibility for any consequent obligation(s).
This paper proposes a framework based on Defeasible Logic (DL) to reason about normative modifica... more This paper proposes a framework based on Defeasible Logic (DL) to reason about normative modifications. We show how to express them in DL and how the logic deals with conflicts between temporalised normative modifications. Some comments will be given with regard to the phenomenon of retroactivity.
Abstract: The legal nature of digital agents is considered, and it is argued that it is possible ... more Abstract: The legal nature of digital agents is considered, and it is argued that it is possible to attribute to such artificial entities intentional (mental) states that are legally relevant. Consequently we may recognise their legal capacity to act as representative of their users, ...
Ratio Juris, 2008
I will argue that the concept of (valid) law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual de... more I will argue that the concept of (valid) law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual description. Its conceptual function is that of relating certain (alternative sets of) properties a norm may possess to the conclusion that the norm is legally binding, namely, that it deserves to be endorsed and applied in legal reasoning. Legal validity has to be distinguished from other, more demanding, normative ideas, such as moral bindingness or legal optimality.
Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 1997
Approaches to Legal …, 2011
Page 1. Chapter 1 Introduction: Theory and Methodology in Legal Ontology Engineering: Experiences... more Page 1. Chapter 1 Introduction: Theory and Methodology in Legal Ontology Engineering: Experiences and Future Directions Pompeu Casanovas, Giovanni Sartor, Maria Angela Biasiotti, and Meritxell Fernández-Barrera 1.1 Legal Ontologies Come of Age ...