Jasper C van den Herik | Erasmus University Rotterdam (original) (raw)
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Papers by Jasper C van den Herik
Philosophical Studies, 2021
Situated normativity is the ability of skilled individuals to distinguish better from worse, adeq... more Situated normativity is the ability of skilled individuals to distinguish better from worse, adequate from inadequate, appropriate from inappropriate, or correct from incorrect in the context of a particular situation. Situated normativity consists in a situated appreciation expressed in normative behaviour, and can be experienced as a bodily affective tension that motivates a skilled individual to act on particular possibilities for action offered by a concrete situation. The concept of situated normativity has so far primarily been discussed in the context of skilled unreflective action. In this paper, we aim to explore and sketch the role of the concept of situated normativity in characterising more reflective forms of norma-tivity. The goal of the paper is twofold: first, by showing more reflective forms of normativity to be continuous with unreflective situated normativity, we bring these reflective forms into the reach of embodied accounts of cognition; and second, by extending the concept of situated normativity, new light is thrown on questions regarding reflective forms of cognition. We show that sociomaterial aspects of situations are crucial for understanding more reflective forms of normativity. We also shed light on the important question of how explicit rules can compel people to behave in particular ways.
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Synthese, 2020
The Radical Enactive/embodied view of Cognition, or REC, claims that all cognition is a matter of... more The Radical Enactive/embodied view of Cognition, or REC, claims that all cognition is a matter of skilled performance. Yet REC also makes a distinction between basic and content-involving cognition, arguing that the development of basic to content-involving cognition involves a kink. It might seem that this distinction leads to problematic gaps in REC’s story. We address two such alleged gaps in this paper. First, we identify and reply to the concern that REC leads to an “interface problem”, according to which REC has to account for the interaction of two minds co-present in the same cognitive activity. We emphasise how REC’s view of content-involving cognition in terms of activities that require particular sociocultural practices can resolve these interface concerns. The second potential problematic gap is that REC creates an unjustified difference in kind between animal and human cognition. In response, we clarify and further explicate REC’s notion of content, and argue that this notion allows REC to justifiably mark the distinction between basic and content-involving cognition as a difference in kind. We conclude by pointing out in what sense basic and content-involving cognitive activities are “same, yet different”. They are the same because they are all forms of skilled performance, yet different as some forms of skilled performance are genuinely different from other forms.
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This paper proposes an ecological-enactive account of utterances of concrete words – words used t... more This paper proposes an ecological-enactive account of utterances of concrete words – words used to indicate observable situations, events, objects, or characteristics. Building on the education of attention model of learning, utterances of concrete words are defined as attentional actions: a repeatable form of behaviour performed by a person to indicate (i.e. point out) a particular aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. Based on recent empirical evidence on categorical colour perception, attentional actions are proposed to constrain the ongoing phenotypic reorganisation of persons into task-specific devices. The paper ends by situating the proposed account in a wider theoretical perspective on language. This paper serves two purposes: first, it undermines the scope objection against the ecological-enactive approach, and second, it provides a novel explanation for recent empirical evidence with respect to the role of language in categorical colour perception.
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Redactioneel Onze focusauteur Fred Keijzer schrijft: ‘Achter de klaarblijkelijke vanzelfsprekendh... more Redactioneel
Onze focusauteur Fred Keijzer schrijft: ‘Achter de klaarblijkelijke vanzelfsprekendheid dat
dieren, en daarmee mensen, de beschikking hebben over complexe zintuigen, hersenen en
effectoren, en daarmee als actor kunnen functioneren in onze alledaagse wereld, schuilt een
hele wereld die juist niet vanzelfsprekend is.’
Wat voor wereld kan Keijzer bedoelen? We weten toch inmiddels wel dat ons brein
een door natuurlijke selectie en leerprocessen gevormd en geprogrammeerd
informatieverwerkend systeem is dat ons in staat stelt tot adaptief gedrag? En beginnen we dat
systeem niet al aardig in kaart te brengen, al valt er ongetwijfeld nog veel te ontdekken? Wat
kan hier, na zo’n halve eeuw cognitiewetenschap en de recentere zegetocht van de
neurowetenschappen, nog aan ‘niet vanzelfsprekends’ achter schuilen?
Maar we zouden weleens op een verkeerde straathoek naar de verkeerde portemonnee
aan het zoeken kunnen zijn, terwijl we intussen geen flauw benul hebben van de processen die
werkelijk aan de basis van onze mentale vermogens liggen. Binnen de cognitieve
neurowetenschap wordt bijvoorbeeld aangenomen dat cognitie zich in het brein afspeelt, en
dat wat dat brein doet primair informatieverwerking is. Maar stel nu eens dat deze aannamen
niet kloppen?
Onze focusauteur betoogt hier dat we, willen we ooit echt iets over actorschap, mind
of intelligentie leren, ons denken over cognitie over een geheel andere boeg moeten gooien.
Ten eerste, zegt hij, ligt cognitie wel aan de basis van mind, maar moeten we ons bij het
bestuderen ervan niet laten leiden door onze nogal feilbare intuïties over precies die mind. Ten
tweede is cognitie volgens hem niet primair informatieverwerking door een brein – we weten
überhaupt niet zo goed wat een brein allemaal wel en niet doet –, maar eerder ‘de manier
waarop levende organismen hun interacties met de omgeving organiseren.’ Hij noemt dat
cobolisme. Dat moeten we eerst bestuderen, om te beginnen bij planten en microben, om pas
in een later stadium iets zinnigs te kunnen zeggen over de intelligentie van onze eigen soort.
Maar dan belanden we in een vreemde en grillige wereld, waar onze vertrouwde
computationele modellen van cognitie niet veel waard zijn: inderdaad een ‘hele wereld die
juist niet vanzelfsprekend is’.
Onze focusauteur gaat in discussie met maar liefst acht commentatoren. Daarbij heeft
dit nummer een primeur: voor de eerste maal publiceren we een Engelstalige tekst, iets wat
we – onder bepaalde voorwaarden – vaker willen gaan doen.
Wim de Muijnck
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Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
In this paper, I argue that the distinction between information and data lies at the root of much... more In this paper, I argue that the distinction between information and data lies at the root of much confusion that surrounds the concept of information. Although data are ‘out there’ and concrete, informational content is abstract and always co-constituted by information agents – a set which includes at least linguistically capable human beings. Information is thus not an intrinsic property of concrete data, but rather a relational property, which relies on the existence of information agents. To reach this conclusion I first argue that the semantic content of human-generated data is co-constituted by the information agent. In the second part I broaden the scope and argue that environmental information also depends on information agents. I further consider and reject both Dretske’s view of information as an objective commodity and foundational accounts of information, that take information to be the fundamental ingredient of reality.
✪ This paper was awarded the Pierre Bayle Bokaal 2014 - an award for the best student essay of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Erasmus University Rotterdam ✪
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Conference Presentations by Jasper C van den Herik
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Philosophical Studies, 2021
Situated normativity is the ability of skilled individuals to distinguish better from worse, adeq... more Situated normativity is the ability of skilled individuals to distinguish better from worse, adequate from inadequate, appropriate from inappropriate, or correct from incorrect in the context of a particular situation. Situated normativity consists in a situated appreciation expressed in normative behaviour, and can be experienced as a bodily affective tension that motivates a skilled individual to act on particular possibilities for action offered by a concrete situation. The concept of situated normativity has so far primarily been discussed in the context of skilled unreflective action. In this paper, we aim to explore and sketch the role of the concept of situated normativity in characterising more reflective forms of norma-tivity. The goal of the paper is twofold: first, by showing more reflective forms of normativity to be continuous with unreflective situated normativity, we bring these reflective forms into the reach of embodied accounts of cognition; and second, by extending the concept of situated normativity, new light is thrown on questions regarding reflective forms of cognition. We show that sociomaterial aspects of situations are crucial for understanding more reflective forms of normativity. We also shed light on the important question of how explicit rules can compel people to behave in particular ways.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Synthese, 2020
The Radical Enactive/embodied view of Cognition, or REC, claims that all cognition is a matter of... more The Radical Enactive/embodied view of Cognition, or REC, claims that all cognition is a matter of skilled performance. Yet REC also makes a distinction between basic and content-involving cognition, arguing that the development of basic to content-involving cognition involves a kink. It might seem that this distinction leads to problematic gaps in REC’s story. We address two such alleged gaps in this paper. First, we identify and reply to the concern that REC leads to an “interface problem”, according to which REC has to account for the interaction of two minds co-present in the same cognitive activity. We emphasise how REC’s view of content-involving cognition in terms of activities that require particular sociocultural practices can resolve these interface concerns. The second potential problematic gap is that REC creates an unjustified difference in kind between animal and human cognition. In response, we clarify and further explicate REC’s notion of content, and argue that this notion allows REC to justifiably mark the distinction between basic and content-involving cognition as a difference in kind. We conclude by pointing out in what sense basic and content-involving cognitive activities are “same, yet different”. They are the same because they are all forms of skilled performance, yet different as some forms of skilled performance are genuinely different from other forms.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
This paper proposes an ecological-enactive account of utterances of concrete words – words used t... more This paper proposes an ecological-enactive account of utterances of concrete words – words used to indicate observable situations, events, objects, or characteristics. Building on the education of attention model of learning, utterances of concrete words are defined as attentional actions: a repeatable form of behaviour performed by a person to indicate (i.e. point out) a particular aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. Based on recent empirical evidence on categorical colour perception, attentional actions are proposed to constrain the ongoing phenotypic reorganisation of persons into task-specific devices. The paper ends by situating the proposed account in a wider theoretical perspective on language. This paper serves two purposes: first, it undermines the scope objection against the ecological-enactive approach, and second, it provides a novel explanation for recent empirical evidence with respect to the role of language in categorical colour perception.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Redactioneel Onze focusauteur Fred Keijzer schrijft: ‘Achter de klaarblijkelijke vanzelfsprekendh... more Redactioneel
Onze focusauteur Fred Keijzer schrijft: ‘Achter de klaarblijkelijke vanzelfsprekendheid dat
dieren, en daarmee mensen, de beschikking hebben over complexe zintuigen, hersenen en
effectoren, en daarmee als actor kunnen functioneren in onze alledaagse wereld, schuilt een
hele wereld die juist niet vanzelfsprekend is.’
Wat voor wereld kan Keijzer bedoelen? We weten toch inmiddels wel dat ons brein
een door natuurlijke selectie en leerprocessen gevormd en geprogrammeerd
informatieverwerkend systeem is dat ons in staat stelt tot adaptief gedrag? En beginnen we dat
systeem niet al aardig in kaart te brengen, al valt er ongetwijfeld nog veel te ontdekken? Wat
kan hier, na zo’n halve eeuw cognitiewetenschap en de recentere zegetocht van de
neurowetenschappen, nog aan ‘niet vanzelfsprekends’ achter schuilen?
Maar we zouden weleens op een verkeerde straathoek naar de verkeerde portemonnee
aan het zoeken kunnen zijn, terwijl we intussen geen flauw benul hebben van de processen die
werkelijk aan de basis van onze mentale vermogens liggen. Binnen de cognitieve
neurowetenschap wordt bijvoorbeeld aangenomen dat cognitie zich in het brein afspeelt, en
dat wat dat brein doet primair informatieverwerking is. Maar stel nu eens dat deze aannamen
niet kloppen?
Onze focusauteur betoogt hier dat we, willen we ooit echt iets over actorschap, mind
of intelligentie leren, ons denken over cognitie over een geheel andere boeg moeten gooien.
Ten eerste, zegt hij, ligt cognitie wel aan de basis van mind, maar moeten we ons bij het
bestuderen ervan niet laten leiden door onze nogal feilbare intuïties over precies die mind. Ten
tweede is cognitie volgens hem niet primair informatieverwerking door een brein – we weten
überhaupt niet zo goed wat een brein allemaal wel en niet doet –, maar eerder ‘de manier
waarop levende organismen hun interacties met de omgeving organiseren.’ Hij noemt dat
cobolisme. Dat moeten we eerst bestuderen, om te beginnen bij planten en microben, om pas
in een later stadium iets zinnigs te kunnen zeggen over de intelligentie van onze eigen soort.
Maar dan belanden we in een vreemde en grillige wereld, waar onze vertrouwde
computationele modellen van cognitie niet veel waard zijn: inderdaad een ‘hele wereld die
juist niet vanzelfsprekend is’.
Onze focusauteur gaat in discussie met maar liefst acht commentatoren. Daarbij heeft
dit nummer een primeur: voor de eerste maal publiceren we een Engelstalige tekst, iets wat
we – onder bepaalde voorwaarden – vaker willen gaan doen.
Wim de Muijnck
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
In this paper, I argue that the distinction between information and data lies at the root of much... more In this paper, I argue that the distinction between information and data lies at the root of much confusion that surrounds the concept of information. Although data are ‘out there’ and concrete, informational content is abstract and always co-constituted by information agents – a set which includes at least linguistically capable human beings. Information is thus not an intrinsic property of concrete data, but rather a relational property, which relies on the existence of information agents. To reach this conclusion I first argue that the semantic content of human-generated data is co-constituted by the information agent. In the second part I broaden the scope and argue that environmental information also depends on information agents. I further consider and reject both Dretske’s view of information as an objective commodity and foundational accounts of information, that take information to be the fundamental ingredient of reality.
✪ This paper was awarded the Pierre Bayle Bokaal 2014 - an award for the best student essay of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Erasmus University Rotterdam ✪
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
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