Gabriele Galluzzo | University of Exeter (original) (raw)

Papers by Gabriele Galluzzo

Research paper thumbnail of Automatic puppets, Toy Carts, and Robots. Aristotle's Metaphysics of Artefacts and the Question of Automata

in T. Bur, M. Gerolemou, and I. Ruffell (eds.), Technological Animation in Classical Antiquity, Oxford University Press, Oxford

metaphysics of artefacts Aristotle draws a sharp line between natural and artificial things. In B... more metaphysics of artefacts Aristotle draws a sharp line between natural and artificial things. In Book II of the Physics and elsewhere, he claims that natural and artificial things are different on the grounds that natural things have an internal principle of motion and rest, while for artefacts such a principle is external. Φύσις is the internal principle of motion and rest for natural things, while τέχνη is the external principle of motion and rest for artefacts 1. The way the distinction between φύσις and τέχνη intersects with Aristotle's metaphysics of material objects is rather complex. In the Categories and in the Physics, Aristotle calls 'primary substances' or simply 'substances' the entities on whose existence the existence of all other things rests. (Primary) substances are, on Aristotle's characterisation, those entities that are particular instances of kinds and bearers of accidental properties 2. On this criterion, artefacts seem to qualify as substances. For particular tables, beds and carts are certainly instances of (artificial) kinds and have a number of accidental properties, and so should be included in the list of substances. In the Metaphysics, however, Aristotle becomes more and more restrictive about what counts as a substance. In several places, he states that only natural things are substances, while artefacts either are not substances at all or are substances only in a derivative sense 3. What is more, it is organic wholes and living things in particular, and not just natural things, that function as paradigmatic instances of substances. So, artefacts are demoted to the role of secondary entities when compared to natural substances in general and to living things in particular 4. Interpreters disagree on what makes natural things (and especially living things) substances and artefacts non-substances on Aristotle's mature account of substance in the Metaphysics 5. On reflection, it is not difficult to point to a number of crucial respects in which artefacts score poorly when compared to their organic

Research paper thumbnail of Is substance a πρὸς ἕν notion?

In R. Salis (ed.), La dottrina dell’analogia dell’essere nella Metafisica di Aristotele e i suoi sviluppi nel pensiero tardo-antico e medievale, Il Poligrafo, Padua, pp. 49-76., 2019

Is substance a πρὸς ἕν notion? 1. Introduction The impressively vast literature on Aristotle's th... more Is substance a πρὸς ἕν notion? 1. Introduction The impressively vast literature on Aristotle's theory of substance makes comparatively little use of the standard notions through which we are used to framing Aristotle's discussion of being. The question as to whether substance is a synonymous or homonymous notion is rarely raised in the literature, and few attempts have been made to trace Aristotle's thoughts about how substance is said 1. This is surprising because the issue is important, for various reasons. In his works, Aristotle is rather generous with the term 'substance' and in fact there are several entities that he is prepared to call substances. In the Categories, for instance, individual objects, things like Socrates and Bucephalus, as well as the species and genera individual objects belong to, are called substancesindividual objects primary substances and their species and genera secondary substances. In the Metaphysics, but also in the Physics and the De anima, matter, form and the compound of matter and form are all called substances. So, the question naturally arises as to what the relationship is between the different things that are called substances. Are they synonymously related, i.e. is there one single notion of substance according to which all things that are called substances are so called? Or are they homonymously related, i.e. they are called substances according to different notions of substance? And if they are homonymously related, is there is any significant connection among the different accounts substance is associated with? There is another, related reason why establishing in how many ways substance is said is important. In Met. Γ 1 Aristotle claims that being is a πρὸς ἕν notion. Being, in other words, is said in many ways, but the different ways being is said, the different ways of being, make reference to one single thing. Like several other interpreters, I take the πρὸς ἕν structure to be a case of systematic homonymy 2. The term 'being' is said of the different things that are called being according to different accounts; but the different accounts of 'being' are associated in such a way that they all make reference to one thing. Since substance is precisely the thing all the different accounts of 'being' refer to, substance is the primary way in which being is said, because all the other accounts of 'being' depend on substance-being. Since substance-being is the primary way of being, it becomes particularly important to establish how it is said. More particularly, one may wonder whether substance displays the same πρὸς ἕν structure as governs the relationship between the different ways of being, or is rather structured in some other way. In this paper, I wish to tackle Aristotle's theory of substance from the particular point of view of the ways in which substance is said. My hope in doing so is to bridge the gap, both in the literature and in the text, between the theory of substance and discussion of homonymy and synonymy. I take a broad compass and try to track down Aristotle's thoughts on how substance is said from the Categories to the Metaphysics. In Section 2, I start with the Categories and argue that substance is synonymous in the Categories, though the way Aristotle characterises the synonymy of substance is not entirely unproblematic. In Section 3, I move on to the discussion of substance in Met. Δ 8 to show that homonymy and not synonymy is the framework for the analysis of substance in the Metaphysics. I also argue that traditional strategies for dealing with the homonymy of substance in the Metaphysics are not entirely satisfactory. In Section 4, I suggest πρὸς ἕν homonymy as an alternative model for understanding the internal structure of substance, and in Section 5 I review the textual evidence, inside and outside the Metaphysics, for associating πρὸς ἕν homonymy with substance. My conclusion will be that Aristotle is flirting with this model, without endorsing it in a sufficiently consistent way or providing the details of the conceptual framework in which this model should be understood. In Section 6, I deal with some complications the πρὸς ἕν structure generates if endorsed as a general model for the notion of substance. 2. The synonymy of substance in the Categories Aristotle characterizes homonymy and synonymy at the very beginning of the Categories 3. Two things are homonymous with respect to a predicate 'F' when they are both F but the account of 'F' is different in the two cases. Two things are synonymous, by contrast, with respect to the same predicate 'F' when they are both F and the account of 'F' is the same in the two cases. Thus, for instance, two entities are homonymously substance if they are both substances but the account of 'substance' is different in one case and in the other. They are synonymously substance if they are both substances and the account of 'substance' is the same in the two cases. Aristotle's introduction of homonymy only prescribes that the accounts of the homonyms be different, but does not rule it out that the accounts might overlap, provided that they do not completely overlap 4. In his general classification of the different varieties of homonymy, Shield calls the homonymy in which the accounts of the homonyms overlap associated homonymy 5. Cases in which the accounts of the homonyms are associated are of particular philosophical interest to Aristotle. In the interpretation that I favour, the πρὸς ἕν structure of being is a special and particularly significant case of associated homonymy, i.e. a case in which the definition of one of the homonyms, substance, is included in that of all the others. The interesting question for us is whether the different entities that Aristotle is prepared to call substances are substances synonymously or homonymously, that is, if 'substance' goes with the same account in all its applications. Should substance turn out to be homonymous, we may then wish to explore whether or not the homonymy of substance is systematic, i.e. whether or not the different accounts of 'substance' overlap in systematic way, as is the case for instance with πρὸς ἕν homonymy. Let me start with the Categories. In the Categories, Aristotle distinguishes between primary and secondary substances. Primary substances are individual objects, like Socrates and Bucephalus, while secondary substances are the species and genera to which individual objects belong, for instance man, horse and animal 6. Primary substances are particular substances, while secondary substances, species and genera, are universal substances 7. Are primary and secondary substances called 'substance' synonymously or homonymously? Aristotle's official position in the Categories is that substance is synonymous 8. This is shown by two interesting features of the discussion of substance. The first has to do with the said-of relation. The said-of relation, which roughly corresponds to essential predication, governs the relationship among entities in the same category 9. To confine ourselves to the category of substance, individual substances are not said-of anything, while universal substances are said-of all the less universal entities in the category and of individual substances. Thus, animal is said-of man, both animal and man are said-of Socrates, while Socrates is not said-of anything. Now, the said-of relation is clearly 4

Research paper thumbnail of Are Matter and Form Parts? Aristotle's and Neo-Aristotelian Hylomorphism

in R. Chiaradonna, F. Forcignanò, and F. Trabattoni (eds.), Ancient Ontologies, Contemporary Debates, «Discipline Filosofiche: Special issue», 28(1): 65-88., 2018

The paper takes issue with Koslicki's Neo-Aristotelian Mereology (NAM) and more particularly with... more The paper takes issue with Koslicki's Neo-Aristotelian Mereology (NAM) and more particularly with her understanding of hylomorphism in mereological terms. NAM centres on two characteristic claims: (i) that Aristotle's form is a proper part of the composite substance; (ii) that there is a univocal notion of part, and a univocal notion of composition, which apply across the board and to matter and form in particular. The paper shows that both assumptions are questionable within an Aristotelian framework. More in general, it is argued that a strictly mereological approach does not do justice to the complex relationship between matter and form, and that considerations about identity are more crucial than mereology when it comes to understanding Aristotle's hylomorphism.

Research paper thumbnail of Substantiae sunt sicut numeri. Aristotle on the structure of numbers.

In M. Sialoros (ed.), Revolution and Continuity in Greek Mathematics, De Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 295-318, 2018

Aristotle's contribution to the metaphysics of numbers is often described in terms of a critical ... more Aristotle's contribution to the metaphysics of numbers is often described in terms of a critical response to the Platonist paradigm. Plato, we are told, conceives of numbers as abstract entities entirely distinct from the physical objects around us, while Aristotle takes the more mundane view that numbers are pluralities of physical objects considered in a particular way, a way relevant to mathematics. Without rejecting altogether this familiar picture, this paper aims to show that Aristotle has another major contribution to offer to the history of philosophy of mathematics. In the Metaphysics, he claims that numbers too can be analysed in terms of matter and form (hylomorphism). On the hylomorphic model, a number has both a material component (the units in the number) and a formal one (the structure that keeps the units together). The paper fully explores the motivations behind Aristotle's hylomorphic conceptions of numbers as well as its most significant implications.

Research paper thumbnail of Genus as matter in Aristotle's Metaphysics. A reconsideration

in A. Bertolacci and A. Paravicini Bagliani (eds.), La filosofia medievale fra antichità ed età moderna. Saggi in onore di Francesco Del Punta, Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 2017, 37-71., 2017

explaining, i.e. giving a philosophical account of, how genus and differentia make up a unity and... more explaining, i.e. giving a philosophical account of, how genus and differentia make up a unity and hence define one thing and not many. Introducing the genus-as-matter doctrine, i.e. regarding the genus as matter and the differentia as form, is expected to provide the philosophical explanation desired. Group B comprises two famous chapters in the central books of the Metaphysics, that is, Z 12 and H 6, which both deal with the problem of the unity of definition. To these two fundamental texts one can probably add a rather quick reference to the genus-as-matter doctrine in H 3, in the course of Aristotle's evaluation of Antisthenes' doctrine of definition. Texts in Group A are the easier to deal with. Besides, the argument could certainly be made that they are earlier or at least theoretical less developed than texts in Group B. My argument, therefore, will proceed as follows. In Section 2 I shall examine texts in Group A and show that they offer little or no support to a literal interpretation of the genus-asmatter doctrine. In Sections 3 and 4 I deal with texts in Group B by first taking up Met. Z 12 (Section 3) and then Met. H 3 and 6 (Section 4). My view is that Z 12 cannot possibly be read along the lines of the literal interpretation, whereas H 3 and 6, which are admittedly more

Research paper thumbnail of Aristotle's Metaphysics

Research paper thumbnail of Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics

Research paper thumbnail of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics

A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2013

Research paper thumbnail of Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals

Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 2004

Research paper thumbnail of Aquinas's Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics , Book Z

Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 2007

Research paper thumbnail of Scotus on the Essence and Definition of Sensible Substances

Research paper thumbnail of Summaries of the Text. Paul of Venice’s Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book VII

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Index authorum et philosophorum a Paulo Veneto nominatorum

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Substance in Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book VII

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Paul of Venice As a Reader of Averroes. The Case of Essence and Definition

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Pauli Veneti: Expositio in Duodecim Libros Metaphisice Aristotelis, Liber VII

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Bibliography

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Aquinas’s Understanding of Metaphysics Z

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Index locorum

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Index authorum

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Automatic puppets, Toy Carts, and Robots. Aristotle's Metaphysics of Artefacts and the Question of Automata

in T. Bur, M. Gerolemou, and I. Ruffell (eds.), Technological Animation in Classical Antiquity, Oxford University Press, Oxford

metaphysics of artefacts Aristotle draws a sharp line between natural and artificial things. In B... more metaphysics of artefacts Aristotle draws a sharp line between natural and artificial things. In Book II of the Physics and elsewhere, he claims that natural and artificial things are different on the grounds that natural things have an internal principle of motion and rest, while for artefacts such a principle is external. Φύσις is the internal principle of motion and rest for natural things, while τέχνη is the external principle of motion and rest for artefacts 1. The way the distinction between φύσις and τέχνη intersects with Aristotle's metaphysics of material objects is rather complex. In the Categories and in the Physics, Aristotle calls 'primary substances' or simply 'substances' the entities on whose existence the existence of all other things rests. (Primary) substances are, on Aristotle's characterisation, those entities that are particular instances of kinds and bearers of accidental properties 2. On this criterion, artefacts seem to qualify as substances. For particular tables, beds and carts are certainly instances of (artificial) kinds and have a number of accidental properties, and so should be included in the list of substances. In the Metaphysics, however, Aristotle becomes more and more restrictive about what counts as a substance. In several places, he states that only natural things are substances, while artefacts either are not substances at all or are substances only in a derivative sense 3. What is more, it is organic wholes and living things in particular, and not just natural things, that function as paradigmatic instances of substances. So, artefacts are demoted to the role of secondary entities when compared to natural substances in general and to living things in particular 4. Interpreters disagree on what makes natural things (and especially living things) substances and artefacts non-substances on Aristotle's mature account of substance in the Metaphysics 5. On reflection, it is not difficult to point to a number of crucial respects in which artefacts score poorly when compared to their organic

Research paper thumbnail of Is substance a πρὸς ἕν notion?

In R. Salis (ed.), La dottrina dell’analogia dell’essere nella Metafisica di Aristotele e i suoi sviluppi nel pensiero tardo-antico e medievale, Il Poligrafo, Padua, pp. 49-76., 2019

Is substance a πρὸς ἕν notion? 1. Introduction The impressively vast literature on Aristotle's th... more Is substance a πρὸς ἕν notion? 1. Introduction The impressively vast literature on Aristotle's theory of substance makes comparatively little use of the standard notions through which we are used to framing Aristotle's discussion of being. The question as to whether substance is a synonymous or homonymous notion is rarely raised in the literature, and few attempts have been made to trace Aristotle's thoughts about how substance is said 1. This is surprising because the issue is important, for various reasons. In his works, Aristotle is rather generous with the term 'substance' and in fact there are several entities that he is prepared to call substances. In the Categories, for instance, individual objects, things like Socrates and Bucephalus, as well as the species and genera individual objects belong to, are called substancesindividual objects primary substances and their species and genera secondary substances. In the Metaphysics, but also in the Physics and the De anima, matter, form and the compound of matter and form are all called substances. So, the question naturally arises as to what the relationship is between the different things that are called substances. Are they synonymously related, i.e. is there one single notion of substance according to which all things that are called substances are so called? Or are they homonymously related, i.e. they are called substances according to different notions of substance? And if they are homonymously related, is there is any significant connection among the different accounts substance is associated with? There is another, related reason why establishing in how many ways substance is said is important. In Met. Γ 1 Aristotle claims that being is a πρὸς ἕν notion. Being, in other words, is said in many ways, but the different ways being is said, the different ways of being, make reference to one single thing. Like several other interpreters, I take the πρὸς ἕν structure to be a case of systematic homonymy 2. The term 'being' is said of the different things that are called being according to different accounts; but the different accounts of 'being' are associated in such a way that they all make reference to one thing. Since substance is precisely the thing all the different accounts of 'being' refer to, substance is the primary way in which being is said, because all the other accounts of 'being' depend on substance-being. Since substance-being is the primary way of being, it becomes particularly important to establish how it is said. More particularly, one may wonder whether substance displays the same πρὸς ἕν structure as governs the relationship between the different ways of being, or is rather structured in some other way. In this paper, I wish to tackle Aristotle's theory of substance from the particular point of view of the ways in which substance is said. My hope in doing so is to bridge the gap, both in the literature and in the text, between the theory of substance and discussion of homonymy and synonymy. I take a broad compass and try to track down Aristotle's thoughts on how substance is said from the Categories to the Metaphysics. In Section 2, I start with the Categories and argue that substance is synonymous in the Categories, though the way Aristotle characterises the synonymy of substance is not entirely unproblematic. In Section 3, I move on to the discussion of substance in Met. Δ 8 to show that homonymy and not synonymy is the framework for the analysis of substance in the Metaphysics. I also argue that traditional strategies for dealing with the homonymy of substance in the Metaphysics are not entirely satisfactory. In Section 4, I suggest πρὸς ἕν homonymy as an alternative model for understanding the internal structure of substance, and in Section 5 I review the textual evidence, inside and outside the Metaphysics, for associating πρὸς ἕν homonymy with substance. My conclusion will be that Aristotle is flirting with this model, without endorsing it in a sufficiently consistent way or providing the details of the conceptual framework in which this model should be understood. In Section 6, I deal with some complications the πρὸς ἕν structure generates if endorsed as a general model for the notion of substance. 2. The synonymy of substance in the Categories Aristotle characterizes homonymy and synonymy at the very beginning of the Categories 3. Two things are homonymous with respect to a predicate 'F' when they are both F but the account of 'F' is different in the two cases. Two things are synonymous, by contrast, with respect to the same predicate 'F' when they are both F and the account of 'F' is the same in the two cases. Thus, for instance, two entities are homonymously substance if they are both substances but the account of 'substance' is different in one case and in the other. They are synonymously substance if they are both substances and the account of 'substance' is the same in the two cases. Aristotle's introduction of homonymy only prescribes that the accounts of the homonyms be different, but does not rule it out that the accounts might overlap, provided that they do not completely overlap 4. In his general classification of the different varieties of homonymy, Shield calls the homonymy in which the accounts of the homonyms overlap associated homonymy 5. Cases in which the accounts of the homonyms are associated are of particular philosophical interest to Aristotle. In the interpretation that I favour, the πρὸς ἕν structure of being is a special and particularly significant case of associated homonymy, i.e. a case in which the definition of one of the homonyms, substance, is included in that of all the others. The interesting question for us is whether the different entities that Aristotle is prepared to call substances are substances synonymously or homonymously, that is, if 'substance' goes with the same account in all its applications. Should substance turn out to be homonymous, we may then wish to explore whether or not the homonymy of substance is systematic, i.e. whether or not the different accounts of 'substance' overlap in systematic way, as is the case for instance with πρὸς ἕν homonymy. Let me start with the Categories. In the Categories, Aristotle distinguishes between primary and secondary substances. Primary substances are individual objects, like Socrates and Bucephalus, while secondary substances are the species and genera to which individual objects belong, for instance man, horse and animal 6. Primary substances are particular substances, while secondary substances, species and genera, are universal substances 7. Are primary and secondary substances called 'substance' synonymously or homonymously? Aristotle's official position in the Categories is that substance is synonymous 8. This is shown by two interesting features of the discussion of substance. The first has to do with the said-of relation. The said-of relation, which roughly corresponds to essential predication, governs the relationship among entities in the same category 9. To confine ourselves to the category of substance, individual substances are not said-of anything, while universal substances are said-of all the less universal entities in the category and of individual substances. Thus, animal is said-of man, both animal and man are said-of Socrates, while Socrates is not said-of anything. Now, the said-of relation is clearly 4

Research paper thumbnail of Are Matter and Form Parts? Aristotle's and Neo-Aristotelian Hylomorphism

in R. Chiaradonna, F. Forcignanò, and F. Trabattoni (eds.), Ancient Ontologies, Contemporary Debates, «Discipline Filosofiche: Special issue», 28(1): 65-88., 2018

The paper takes issue with Koslicki's Neo-Aristotelian Mereology (NAM) and more particularly with... more The paper takes issue with Koslicki's Neo-Aristotelian Mereology (NAM) and more particularly with her understanding of hylomorphism in mereological terms. NAM centres on two characteristic claims: (i) that Aristotle's form is a proper part of the composite substance; (ii) that there is a univocal notion of part, and a univocal notion of composition, which apply across the board and to matter and form in particular. The paper shows that both assumptions are questionable within an Aristotelian framework. More in general, it is argued that a strictly mereological approach does not do justice to the complex relationship between matter and form, and that considerations about identity are more crucial than mereology when it comes to understanding Aristotle's hylomorphism.

Research paper thumbnail of Substantiae sunt sicut numeri. Aristotle on the structure of numbers.

In M. Sialoros (ed.), Revolution and Continuity in Greek Mathematics, De Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 295-318, 2018

Aristotle's contribution to the metaphysics of numbers is often described in terms of a critical ... more Aristotle's contribution to the metaphysics of numbers is often described in terms of a critical response to the Platonist paradigm. Plato, we are told, conceives of numbers as abstract entities entirely distinct from the physical objects around us, while Aristotle takes the more mundane view that numbers are pluralities of physical objects considered in a particular way, a way relevant to mathematics. Without rejecting altogether this familiar picture, this paper aims to show that Aristotle has another major contribution to offer to the history of philosophy of mathematics. In the Metaphysics, he claims that numbers too can be analysed in terms of matter and form (hylomorphism). On the hylomorphic model, a number has both a material component (the units in the number) and a formal one (the structure that keeps the units together). The paper fully explores the motivations behind Aristotle's hylomorphic conceptions of numbers as well as its most significant implications.

Research paper thumbnail of Genus as matter in Aristotle's Metaphysics. A reconsideration

in A. Bertolacci and A. Paravicini Bagliani (eds.), La filosofia medievale fra antichità ed età moderna. Saggi in onore di Francesco Del Punta, Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 2017, 37-71., 2017

explaining, i.e. giving a philosophical account of, how genus and differentia make up a unity and... more explaining, i.e. giving a philosophical account of, how genus and differentia make up a unity and hence define one thing and not many. Introducing the genus-as-matter doctrine, i.e. regarding the genus as matter and the differentia as form, is expected to provide the philosophical explanation desired. Group B comprises two famous chapters in the central books of the Metaphysics, that is, Z 12 and H 6, which both deal with the problem of the unity of definition. To these two fundamental texts one can probably add a rather quick reference to the genus-as-matter doctrine in H 3, in the course of Aristotle's evaluation of Antisthenes' doctrine of definition. Texts in Group A are the easier to deal with. Besides, the argument could certainly be made that they are earlier or at least theoretical less developed than texts in Group B. My argument, therefore, will proceed as follows. In Section 2 I shall examine texts in Group A and show that they offer little or no support to a literal interpretation of the genus-asmatter doctrine. In Sections 3 and 4 I deal with texts in Group B by first taking up Met. Z 12 (Section 3) and then Met. H 3 and 6 (Section 4). My view is that Z 12 cannot possibly be read along the lines of the literal interpretation, whereas H 3 and 6, which are admittedly more

Research paper thumbnail of Aristotle's Metaphysics

Research paper thumbnail of Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics

Research paper thumbnail of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics

A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2013

Research paper thumbnail of Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals

Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 2004

Research paper thumbnail of Aquinas's Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics , Book Z

Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 2007

Research paper thumbnail of Scotus on the Essence and Definition of Sensible Substances

Research paper thumbnail of Summaries of the Text. Paul of Venice’s Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book VII

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Index authorum et philosophorum a Paulo Veneto nominatorum

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Substance in Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book VII

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Paul of Venice As a Reader of Averroes. The Case of Essence and Definition

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Pauli Veneti: Expositio in Duodecim Libros Metaphisice Aristotelis, Liber VII

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Bibliography

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Aquinas’s Understanding of Metaphysics Z

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Index locorum

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Index authorum

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 vol. set), 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Aristotle and Essentialism about Existence

As Stephen Menn (2021: 200) has recently reminded us, there was a time when philosophers used to ... more As Stephen Menn (2021: 200) has recently reminded us, there was a time when philosophers used to be split into essentialists and existentialists, with Aristotle being regarded as a champion of essentialism. For essentialists existence should be somehow analysed in terms of essence, while existentialists take existence to be primitive and irreducible. This way of looking at things, which originated in a neo-Thomist environment, found its way into the analytic philosophy tradition as well. We often read that, on Aristotle's view, for a thing to exist is for it to be essentially something or other or, equivalently, that for a thing to exist is for it to be a member of some kind or other. My view is that Aristotle is an essentialist about existence. But essentialism about existence comes in different varieties and it is important to determine which one can be attributed to him. This is what I will do in this paper. I will show that there are several things that Aristotle's particular version of essentialism does not imply. Two in particular will be at the centre of this study. For one thing, Aristotle's strategy about existence is not eliminativist. Existence claims, statements etc. are perfectly understandable on their own, and should in no way be replaced by claims and statements about essences. Essentialism about existence is a metaphysical analysis of existence and not an attempt to eliminate altogether all discourse about existence. Another thing that Aristotle's essentialism does not imply is that only essential properties entail existence. Essential properties define in some sense a thing's existence and entail its existence, but standard accidental properties entail existence, too. Those that do not are in many ways non-standard properties. Thus, the distinction between existence-entailing properties and those that do not entail existence cannot be drawn along the lines of the essential-accidental divide. This paper breaks into three parts. In Sections 2-3, I deal with Aristotle's treatment of existence sentences. In Section 2, I argue that, for Aristotle, existence and predicative sentences are distinct types of sentences, which differ syntactically and to some extent semantically. In Section 3, I show, in line with other interpreters, that Aristotle's distinction between existence and predicative sentences cannot be accounted for by the modern, Frege-Russell style distinction between different senses of the verb 'to be' (such as the predicative, identity, existential sense etc.), as there is no such distinction in Aristotle. Sections 4-5 deal with essentialism about existence. In Section 4, I argue that Aristotle does defend the essentialist claim that to exist for something is to be a member of a kind, where 'kind' should be understood in terms of both the lowest kinds and the general categories of being things belong to. I also show that the essentialist claim has the important semantic consequence that 'to exist' has different senses when applied to things of different kinds. In Section 5, I contend that Aristotle's essentialism about existence fundamentally remains a metaphysical claim and so argues against the so-called ellipsis claim, i.e. the claim that essentialism about existence implies that existence sentences should be paraphrased into instances of essential predications. In the section, l also caution against Menn (2021)'s conclusion that the failure of the ellipsis claim implies that Aristotle does not hold essentialism about existence. Sections 6-7 address the issue of existence-entailing properties. I show that it is wrong to think that Aristotle's essentialism implies that only essential properties and predicates entail existence. By contrast, his view is that, in standard cases, all accidental properties and predicates entail existence, too, and property possession is a mark of existence for Aristotle. I will make my point by looking at the issue of the existential import of declarative sentences, i.e. whether true declarative sentences require the existence of the objects they are about. My analysis will show that declarative sentences do normally have existential import for Aristotle (Section 6) and those that do not are non-standard in one way or another (Section 7). 2. EXISTENCE AND PREDICATION It may be useful to start by considering how Aristotle would convey ideas of existence in the first place and what form existence sentences would normally take for him. At the time Aristotle was writing, philosophical Greek had no verb corresponding to the English 'to exist'. It is natural for us to think that the complete use of the (Greek equivalent of the) verb 'to be' could be a good substitute for 'to exist'. Thus, on this proposal, a sentence like 'Socrates is' could normally be used to say that Socrates exists. Moreover, the sentence 'Socrates is', where 'is' is used completely and expresses existence, would normally be taken to be different from the sentence 'Socrates is sick'. In the latter, the 'is' is used incompletely or as a copula and expresses predication, the attribution of a property or character to an object. As Kahn's studies have shown 1 , however, one should be cautious here and not assume, right from the start, that Aristotle, or any other Greek philosopher before him, should take sentences of the form 'Socrates is' to have existential force or the incomplete use of 'to be' to bear an existential meaning. The distinction between the complete and the incomplete use of 'to be' is syntactic, and may not be mirrored by a semantic distinction between existential and predicative sense. The complete use of 'to be' is certainly a good candidate for expressing existence, but other options were certainly available to Aristotle, including that of having recourse to the incomplete use of 'to be'. For instance, one could certainly use such expressions as 'is something' or 'is there', where 'is' is used incompletely, to say that a certain thing exists. Against this background, the interesting 1 Cf. Kahn (1966) and (1986).