John Schiemann | Fairleigh Dickinson University (original) (raw)
Papers by John Schiemann
PubMed, 2017
Background: Pragmatic arguments for interrogational torture rest on the twin assumptions that tor... more Background: Pragmatic arguments for interrogational torture rest on the twin assumptions that torture generates reliable information and that torture can be controlled and limited. Methods: I assess the claims of torture proponents by providing the intuition behind a game theoretic model of interrogational torture. Tracing out the logic of different combinations of possible interrogators and detainee types results in eight outcomes that can be compared to three claims made by torture proponents: that information will be predictably reliable, that the frequency of torture will be minimized, including no torture of innocents, and that the severity of torture can likewise be limited and controlled. Findings: Of the eight outcomes generated by the model, only two result in full information, but an innocent is tortured in both and in one the detainee providing information is tortured after having no more information to give. Moreover, these outcomes are only possible for an extremely restricted and empirically unlikely combination of circumstances. With respect to torture frequency, detainees are tortured in seven of the eight outcomes, including innocent detainees. The incentives facing interrogators also compel them to ratchet up their brutality in an effort to compel information. Discussion: The outcomes of a model of interrogational torture based on the proponent ideal violate the three conditions individually necessary to support that ideal: (1) information from torture is unpredictable and unreliable, with no information and false information far more likely than good information; (2) torture will be used more frequently-including against innocents-than control and limits permit; (3) torture will be more brutal than controls and limits allow. Conclusion: The only thing reliably effective about interrogational torture is its ability to generate slippery slopes of frequency and brutality, violating the basic premises of the pragmatic argument for interrogational torture.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks, 2005
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks, 2005
One of the most important institutional salvation strategies in the MSZMP arsenal was a directly ... more One of the most important institutional salvation strategies in the MSZMP arsenal was a directly elected president who would not only enjoy legislative and executive powers, but also boost the ruling party’s seat share in the parliamentary elections.The MSZMP’s withdrawal of its presidency plan from parliament for the roundtable talks did not reduce its desire for a directly elected president before parliamentary elections and the presidency became one of the most contentious debates in the roundtable talks. Section 3.1 examines the MSZMP’s initial institutional strategy concerning the presidency, reconstructing its drafts and later attempts to unilaterally impose a powerful presidency that would preserve its power. Section 3.2 reconstructs the positions of individual opposition parties as well as the position of the EKA during most of the NKA, when the opposition resisted discussing the institution at all. Section 3.3 turns to the negotiations over the powers of the office once the EKA agreed to establish some form of presidency. Section 3.4 turns to the rules governing the election of the president. Section 3.5 summarizes the distribution of the presidency’s individual rules between the regime and the opposition in the pact and compares it with the MSZMP’s original plans.
The Roundtable Talks of 1989
One of the most important institutional salvation strategies in the MSZMP arsenal was a directly ... more One of the most important institutional salvation strategies in the MSZMP arsenal was a directly elected president who would not only enjoy legislative and executive powers, but also boost the ruling party’s seat share in the parliamentary elections.The MSZMP’s withdrawal of its presidency plan from parliament for the roundtable talks did not reduce its desire for a directly elected president before parliamentary elections and the presidency became one of the most contentious debates in the roundtable talks. Section 3.1 examines the MSZMP’s initial institutional strategy concerning the presidency, reconstructing its drafts and later attempts to unilaterally impose a powerful presidency that would preserve its power. Section 3.2 reconstructs the positions of individual opposition parties as well as the position of the EKA during most of the NKA, when the opposition resisted discussing the institution at all. Section 3.3 turns to the negotiations over the powers of the office once th...
Substantive pact-making in Hungary at the NKA from June through September 1989 was preceded both ... more Substantive pact-making in Hungary at the NKA from June through September 1989 was preceded both by growing splits within a MSZMP leadership divided over how to deal with an existing economic—and looming political—crisis as well as by a simultaneous explosion of independent groups challenging the party’s monopoly on power. The question is not which side, regime or opposition, initiated the pact-making process (Huntington 1991, 124–163).The more important questions ask what the dynamics were between the regime and opposition that led them to the particular bargaining table that came to be called the roundtable talks and what implications these dynamics have for pact-making and the pact chosen as its outcome.
The Politics of Pact-Making, 2005
The constitutional court was just one, albeit crucial, element in the MSZMP’s comprehensive effor... more The constitutional court was just one, albeit crucial, element in the MSZMP’s comprehensive efforts to create an interlocking system of perverse checks and balances. The system would have been perverse in that, rather than provide a mechanism to control power, the MSZMP’s system was designed to use multiple institutions to concentrate power in the ruling party, if not in one institution, and permit the regime to eliminate its more radical opponents and coopt its more moderate ones. The constitutional court was to play an important role in this strategy, as it would provide a veneer of political reform and the rule of law behind which the MSZMP could ban political parties and insulate important features of the socialist system from opposition challenges as the guardian of the “Stalinist” constitution. In the course of early 1989, however, as power slipped from the grasp of the regime to opposition parties, the MSZMP began to view the court in defensive as well as offensive terms. That is, it came to be seen by some worried leaders as an insurance mechanism, as a way for the MSZMP to hedge its bets if they did not perform as well as they hoped and expected in the free elections.1
PubMed, 2017
Background: Pragmatic arguments for interrogational torture rest on the twin assumptions that tor... more Background: Pragmatic arguments for interrogational torture rest on the twin assumptions that torture generates reliable information and that torture can be controlled and limited. Methods: I assess the claims of torture proponents by providing the intuition behind a game theoretic model of interrogational torture. Tracing out the logic of different combinations of possible interrogators and detainee types results in eight outcomes that can be compared to three claims made by torture proponents: that information will be predictably reliable, that the frequency of torture will be minimized, including no torture of innocents, and that the severity of torture can likewise be limited and controlled. Findings: Of the eight outcomes generated by the model, only two result in full information, but an innocent is tortured in both and in one the detainee providing information is tortured after having no more information to give. Moreover, these outcomes are only possible for an extremely restricted and empirically unlikely combination of circumstances. With respect to torture frequency, detainees are tortured in seven of the eight outcomes, including innocent detainees. The incentives facing interrogators also compel them to ratchet up their brutality in an effort to compel information. Discussion: The outcomes of a model of interrogational torture based on the proponent ideal violate the three conditions individually necessary to support that ideal: (1) information from torture is unpredictable and unreliable, with no information and false information far more likely than good information; (2) torture will be used more frequently-including against innocents-than control and limits permit; (3) torture will be more brutal than controls and limits allow. Conclusion: The only thing reliably effective about interrogational torture is its ability to generate slippery slopes of frequency and brutality, violating the basic premises of the pragmatic argument for interrogational torture.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks, 2005
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 1, 2015
Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks, 2005
One of the most important institutional salvation strategies in the MSZMP arsenal was a directly ... more One of the most important institutional salvation strategies in the MSZMP arsenal was a directly elected president who would not only enjoy legislative and executive powers, but also boost the ruling party’s seat share in the parliamentary elections.The MSZMP’s withdrawal of its presidency plan from parliament for the roundtable talks did not reduce its desire for a directly elected president before parliamentary elections and the presidency became one of the most contentious debates in the roundtable talks. Section 3.1 examines the MSZMP’s initial institutional strategy concerning the presidency, reconstructing its drafts and later attempts to unilaterally impose a powerful presidency that would preserve its power. Section 3.2 reconstructs the positions of individual opposition parties as well as the position of the EKA during most of the NKA, when the opposition resisted discussing the institution at all. Section 3.3 turns to the negotiations over the powers of the office once the EKA agreed to establish some form of presidency. Section 3.4 turns to the rules governing the election of the president. Section 3.5 summarizes the distribution of the presidency’s individual rules between the regime and the opposition in the pact and compares it with the MSZMP’s original plans.
The Roundtable Talks of 1989
One of the most important institutional salvation strategies in the MSZMP arsenal was a directly ... more One of the most important institutional salvation strategies in the MSZMP arsenal was a directly elected president who would not only enjoy legislative and executive powers, but also boost the ruling party’s seat share in the parliamentary elections.The MSZMP’s withdrawal of its presidency plan from parliament for the roundtable talks did not reduce its desire for a directly elected president before parliamentary elections and the presidency became one of the most contentious debates in the roundtable talks. Section 3.1 examines the MSZMP’s initial institutional strategy concerning the presidency, reconstructing its drafts and later attempts to unilaterally impose a powerful presidency that would preserve its power. Section 3.2 reconstructs the positions of individual opposition parties as well as the position of the EKA during most of the NKA, when the opposition resisted discussing the institution at all. Section 3.3 turns to the negotiations over the powers of the office once th...
Substantive pact-making in Hungary at the NKA from June through September 1989 was preceded both ... more Substantive pact-making in Hungary at the NKA from June through September 1989 was preceded both by growing splits within a MSZMP leadership divided over how to deal with an existing economic—and looming political—crisis as well as by a simultaneous explosion of independent groups challenging the party’s monopoly on power. The question is not which side, regime or opposition, initiated the pact-making process (Huntington 1991, 124–163).The more important questions ask what the dynamics were between the regime and opposition that led them to the particular bargaining table that came to be called the roundtable talks and what implications these dynamics have for pact-making and the pact chosen as its outcome.
The Politics of Pact-Making, 2005
The constitutional court was just one, albeit crucial, element in the MSZMP’s comprehensive effor... more The constitutional court was just one, albeit crucial, element in the MSZMP’s comprehensive efforts to create an interlocking system of perverse checks and balances. The system would have been perverse in that, rather than provide a mechanism to control power, the MSZMP’s system was designed to use multiple institutions to concentrate power in the ruling party, if not in one institution, and permit the regime to eliminate its more radical opponents and coopt its more moderate ones. The constitutional court was to play an important role in this strategy, as it would provide a veneer of political reform and the rule of law behind which the MSZMP could ban political parties and insulate important features of the socialist system from opposition challenges as the guardian of the “Stalinist” constitution. In the course of early 1989, however, as power slipped from the grasp of the regime to opposition parties, the MSZMP began to view the court in defensive as well as offensive terms. That is, it came to be seen by some worried leaders as an insurance mechanism, as a way for the MSZMP to hedge its bets if they did not perform as well as they hoped and expected in the free elections.1