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untrusted comment: signature from openbsd 5.5 base secret key RWRGy8gxk9N930/jzqCCFMfSCKMjKDSYrXSKPhnGlL2r21nCGEPw+wOEDXpQC6Zispe8gewI7duy5T76oRpvWFGyzsYxl6pWfAc= OpenBSD 5.5 errata 10, August 9, 2014: This patch contains backported fixes for OpenSSL issues. Refer to https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv\_20140806.txt Apply patch using: signify -Vep /etc/signify/openbsd-55-base.pub -x 010_openssl.patch.sig \ -m - | (cd /usr/src && patch -p0) Then build and install libcrypto and libssl cd /usr/src/lib/libssl/crypto make obj make make install cd /usr/src/lib/libssl/ssl make obj make make install Then restart services which depend on OpenSSL. Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_object.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_object.c,v retrieving revision 1.9 diff -u -p -r1.9 a_object.c --- lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_object.c 3 Nov 2011 02:34:32 -0000 1.9 +++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_object.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i); return(NULL); } + ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *data; - int i; - /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in - * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2 + int i, length; + + /* Sanity check OID encoding. + * Need at least one content octet. + * MSB must be clear in the last octet. + * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2 */ - for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++) + if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL || + p[len - 1] & 0x80) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING); + return NULL; + } + /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */ + length = (int)len; + for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++) { if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) { @@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT data = (unsigned char *)ret->data; ret->data = NULL; /* once detached we can change it */ - if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len)) + if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length)) { ret->length=0; if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data); - data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1); + data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length); if (data == NULL) { i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; } - memcpy(data,p,(int)len); + memcpy(data,p,length); /* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */ ret->data =data; - ret->length=(int)len; + ret->length=length; ret->sn=NULL; ret->ln=NULL; /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */ - p+=len; + p+=length; if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret; *pp=p; Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c,v retrieving revision 1.6 diff -u -p -r1.6 ec_lib.c --- lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:13 -0000 1.6 +++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { - if (group->meth->dbl == 0) + if (group->meth->invert == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c,v retrieving revision 1.5 diff -u -p -r1.5 ecp_smpl.c --- lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:13 -0000 1.5 +++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -1181,9 +1181,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_G int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *tmp0, *tmp1; - size_t pow2 = 0; - BIGNUM **heap = NULL; + BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z; + BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL; size_t i; int ret = 0; @@ -1198,124 +1197,104 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(con } BN_CTX_start(ctx); - tmp0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (tmp0 == NULL || tmp1 == NULL) goto err; - - /* Before converting the individual points, compute inverses of all Z values. - * Modular inversion is rather slow, but luckily we can do with a single - * explicit inversion, plus about 3 multiplications per input value. - */ - - pow2 = 1; - while (num > pow2) - pow2 <<= 1; - /* Now pow2 is the smallest power of 2 satifsying pow2 >= num. - * We need twice that. */ - pow2 <<= 1; - - heap = OPENSSL_malloc(pow2 * sizeof heap[0]); - if (heap == NULL) goto err; - - /* The array is used as a binary tree, exactly as in heapsort: - * - * heap[1] - * heap[2] heap[3] - * heap[4] heap[5] heap[6] heap[7] - * heap[8]heap[9] heap[10]heap[11] heap[12]heap[13] heap[14] heap[15] - * - * We put the Z's in the last line; - * then we set each other node to the product of its two child-nodes (where - * empty or 0 entries are treated as ones); - * then we invert heap[1]; - * then we invert each other node by replacing it by the product of its - * parent (after inversion) and its sibling (before inversion). - */ - heap[0] = NULL; - for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--) - heap[i] = NULL; + tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) goto err; + + prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof prod_Z[0]); + if (prod_Z == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) - heap[pow2/2 + i] = &points[i]->Z; - for (i = pow2/2 + num; i < pow2; i++) - heap[i] = NULL; - - /* set each node to the product of its children */ - for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--) - { - heap[i] = BN_new(); - if (heap[i] == NULL) goto err; - - if (heap[2*i] != NULL) + { + prod_Z[i] = BN_new(); + if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) goto err; + } + + /* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z, + * skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */ + + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z)) + { + if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { - if ((heap[2*i + 1] == NULL) || BN_is_zero(heap[2*i + 1])) - { - if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i])) goto err; - } - else - { - if (BN_is_zero(heap[2*i])) - { - if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i + 1])) goto err; - } - else - { - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, heap[i], - heap[2*i], heap[2*i + 1], ctx)) goto err; - } - } + if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0])) goto err; } } - /* invert heap[1] */ - if (!BN_is_zero(heap[1])) + for (i = 1; i < num; i++) { - if (!BN_mod_inverse(heap[1], heap[1], &group->field, ctx)) + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err; } + else + { + if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) goto err; + } + } + + /* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every + * non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ + + if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx)) + { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; } if (group->meth->field_encode != 0) { - /* in the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H) + /* In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H) * into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H); - * i.e. we have need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice */ - if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err; + * i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */ + if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err; } - /* set other heap[i]'s to their inverses */ - for (i = 2; i < pow2/2 + num; i += 2) + for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i) { - /* i is even */ - if ((heap[i + 1] != NULL) && !BN_is_zero(heap[i + 1])) - { - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp0, heap[i/2], heap[i + 1], ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, heap[i/2], heap[i], ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_copy(heap[i], tmp0)) goto err; - if (!BN_copy(heap[i + 1], tmp1)) goto err; - } - else + /* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of + * points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */ + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z)) { - if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[i/2])) goto err; + /* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product + * of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err; + /* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err; + /* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ + if (!BN_copy(&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) goto err; } } - /* we have replaced all non-zero Z's by their inverses, now fix up all the points */ + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z)) + { + /* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */ + if (!BN_copy(&points[0]->Z, tmp)) goto err; + } + + /* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */ + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { EC_POINT *p = points[i]; - + if (!BN_is_zero(&p->Z)) { /* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */ - if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp1, ctx)) goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx)) goto err; + + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp1, ctx)) goto err; - if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; @@ -1329,20 +1308,19 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(con } ret = 1; - + err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); - if (heap != NULL) + if (prod_Z != NULL) { - /* heap[pow2/2] .. heap[pow2-1] have not been allocated locally! */ - for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--) + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { - if (heap[i] != NULL) - BN_clear_free(heap[i]); + if (prod_Z[i] != NULL) + BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]); } - OPENSSL_free(heap); + OPENSSL_free(prod_Z); } return ret; } Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c,v retrieving revision 1.2.4.3 diff -u -p -r1.2.4.3 d1_both.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c 5 Jun 2014 20:16:56 -0000 1.2.4.3 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -587,29 +587,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, return 0; } +/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes + * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may + * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */ +static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) + { + unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; + if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list) + return s->max_cert_list; + return max_len; + } static int -dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) +dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; int i = -1, is_complete; unsigned char seq64be[8]; - unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len; + unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; - if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) + if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len || + msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; - /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set) - * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum. - */ - if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list) - max_len = s->max_cert_list; - else - max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; - - if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len) - goto err; + if (frag_len == 0) + return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; /* Try to find item in queue */ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); @@ -636,7 +639,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct } /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a - * retransmit and can be dropped. + * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag + * does not need to be freed. */ if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { @@ -656,7 +660,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i=-1; + if (i<=0) goto err; RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off, @@ -673,10 +679,6 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct if (item == NULL) { - memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); - item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) { @@ -684,21 +686,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct i = -1; } - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. + * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, + * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control + * would never have reached this branch. */ + OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: - if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); + if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } static int -dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) +dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) { int i=-1; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; @@ -718,7 +724,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it. */ - if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) + if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) item = NULL; /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is @@ -743,9 +749,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, } else { - if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) + if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok); + if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) + goto err; + frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0); if ( frag == NULL) goto err; @@ -757,26 +766,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i = -1; + if (i<=0) goto err; } - memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); - item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if ( item == NULL) goto err; - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. + * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, + * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either + * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set + * to NULL and it will have been processed with + * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have + * been discarded. */ + OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: - if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); + if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } @@ -1177,6 +1191,8 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0); + if (!frag) + return 0; memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c,v retrieving revision 1.5 diff -u -p -r1.5 d1_clnt.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:14 -0000 1.5 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -868,12 +868,18 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s) *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions*/ + if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } -#endif +#endif l=(p-d); d=buf; @@ -982,6 +988,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL * RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; else @@ -1172,6 +1185,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL * { DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; else @@ -1231,6 +1251,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL * int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; int field_size = 0; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + /* Did we send out the client's * ECDH share for use in premaster * computation as part of client certificate? @@ -1706,5 +1733,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } - - Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c,v retrieving revision 1.6 diff -u -p -r1.6 d1_srvr.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:14 -0000 1.6 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -597,10 +597,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; } else { - /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we - * have not asked for it :-) */ - ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) + { + ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + } s->init_num=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; } @@ -969,6 +970,11 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); + return -1; + } if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_lib.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_lib.c,v retrieving revision 1.9 diff -u -p -r1.9 s23_lib.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_lib.c 3 Nov 2011 02:34:33 -0000 1.9 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_lib.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_C long l; /* We can write SSLv2 and SSLv3 ciphers */ + /* but no ECC ciphers */ + if (c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHr || + c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHe || + c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kEECDH || + c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDH || + c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDSA) + return 0; if (p != NULL) { l=c->id; Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_srvr.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_srvr.c,v retrieving revision 1.14 diff -u -p -r1.14 s23_srvr.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_srvr.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:14 -0000 1.14 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_srvr.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have * to read more records to find out. * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this, - * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade - * attacks. */ + * so we simply reject such connections to avoid + * protocol version downgrade attacks. */ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6) { -#if 0 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto err; -#else - v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; -#endif } /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value * which will use the highest version 3 we support. * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise * this.... */ - else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) v[1]=0xff; else v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */ @@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */ v[1] = p[4]; + /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 + * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS + * record. It's format is: + * Byte Content + * 0-1 msg_length + * 2 msg_type + * 3-4 version + * 5-6 cipher_spec_length + * 7-8 session_id_length + * 9-10 challenge_length + * ... ... + */ n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1]; if (n > (1024*4)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } + if (n < 9) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2); + /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have + * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid + * packet bytes. */ if (j <= 0) return(j); ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2); Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c,v retrieving revision 1.26.8.2 diff -u -p -r1.26.8.2 s3_clnt.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c 5 Jun 2014 20:09:30 -0000 1.26.8.2 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; /* clear flags */ @@ -902,6 +903,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j); + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ @@ -953,6 +955,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) && + !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); @@ -1456,6 +1467,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) p+=i; n-=param_len; + if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + /* We must check if there is a certificate */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) @@ -2248,6 +2265,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s { RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c,v retrieving revision 1.18 diff -u -p -r1.18 s3_enc.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c 14 Feb 2013 15:11:43 -0000 1.18 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -642,10 +642,18 @@ int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_ int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p) { - int ret; + int ret, sha1len; ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_md5,sender,len,p); + if(ret == 0) + return 0; + p+=ret; - ret+=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p); + + sha1len=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p); + if(sha1len == 0) + return 0; + + ret+=sha1len; return(ret); } static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c,v retrieving revision 1.20.4.3 diff -u -p -r1.20.4.3 s3_pkt.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c 5 Jun 2014 17:05:16 -0000 1.20.4.3 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, un if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return(-1); - if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || + if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c,v retrieving revision 1.29.8.1 diff -u -p -r1.29.8.1 s3_srvr.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c 5 Jun 2014 17:05:16 -0000 1.29.8.1 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -2781,6 +2781,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } + if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 + || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c,v retrieving revision 1.24 diff -u -p -r1.24 ssl_lib.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:14 -0000 1.24 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -1397,6 +1397,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC s->psk_client_callback == NULL) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) && + !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); p+=j; } Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c,v retrieving revision 1.12.8.1 diff -u -p -r1.12.8.1 t1_lib.c --- lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c 8 Apr 2014 00:55:39 -0000 1.12.8.1 +++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000 @@ -360,15 +360,16 @@ int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsig return (int)slen; } -unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) +unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) { int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; + unsigned char *orig = buf; + unsigned char *ret = buf; /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return p; + return orig; ret+=2; @@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex return NULL; } - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; + if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); s2n(el,ret); @@ -460,8 +461,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ long lenmax; @@ -480,8 +480,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ long lenmax; @@ -655,7 +654,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; + if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); s2n(el,ret); @@ -668,24 +667,25 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex ret += el; } - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; + if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) + return orig; - s2n(extdatalen,p); + s2n(extdatalen, orig); return ret; } -unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) +unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit) { int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; + unsigned char *orig = buf; + unsigned char *ret = buf; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int next_proto_neg_seen; #endif /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return p; + return orig; ret+=2; if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ @@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex return NULL; } - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; + if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); s2n(el,ret); @@ -723,8 +723,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ long lenmax; @@ -787,7 +786,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; + if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); s2n(el,ret); @@ -855,10 +854,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex } #endif - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; + if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) + return orig; - s2n(extdatalen,p); + s2n(extdatalen, orig); return ret; } @@ -1035,8 +1034,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); @@ -1070,8 +1068,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, fprintf(stderr,"\n"); #endif } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); @@ -1427,8 +1424,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); @@ -1438,15 +1434,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) + if (!s->hit) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; + s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); #if 0 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;