Angelina Dmitrieva | State Academic University for the Humanities (original) (raw)
Papers by Angelina Dmitrieva
Представлена критика доводов Дэвида Чалмерса в пользу неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальных... more Представлена критика доводов Дэвида Чалмерса в пользу неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальныхубеждений. Целью статьи является выдвижение ряда возражений против тезиса о неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальных убеждений, главное из которых исследует лежащие в основании данного тезиса имплицитные допущения существования особой интимной связи между чистым феноменальным понятием и представляемым им феноменальным свойством, а также прямого доступа через процедуру «знакомства» к самим феноменальным убеждениям
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Вестник Томского государственного университета, Dec 1, 2016
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Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya
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Философия и культура, 2014
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The aim of this article is to criticize David Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis, which holds that ... more The aim of this article is to criticize David Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis, which holds that a direct phenomenal belief cannot be false. In order to maintain his claim, Chalmers distinguishes three types of phenomenal concepts – relational phenomenal concepts, demonstrative phenomenal concepts and pure phenomenal concepts. According to Chalmers, pure phenomenal concepts do not pick out phenomenal properties relationally or indexically as do relational phenomenal concepts and demonstrative phenomenal concepts. Instead, they pick them out directly, in terms of their intrinsic phenomenal nature. Chalmers also distinguishes two subtypes of pure phenomenal concepts – direct phenomenal concepts and standing phenomenal concepts. Direct phenomenal concepts, which underlie direct phenomenal beliefs, can be formed by a subject only in presence of an object with phenomenal properties and only if she directs her attention to them. Standing phenomenal concepts can be formed by memory. Chalmers assumes that direct phenomenal concepts can be described as phenomenal concepts, which are partly constituted by underlying phenomenal qualities. He also insists on the existence of a special intimate connection between a direct phenomenal concept and its content – the phenomenal quality. This specific intimate connection makes the phenomenal concept’s representation of its content incorrigibly accurate. Moreover he describes the introspective access to a direct phenomenal belief (at heart of which there is a direct phenomenal concept) as an immediate, non-relational connection, which he names by the Russellian term “acquaintance.” First, the article tries to show that the idea of there being a special connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties, along with the idea of acquaintance, makes Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis weak, for these two ideas remain unexplained in his current description of this thesis. Moreover, because of their mysterious meaning, they most likely cannot be explained in the future. Second the article points out that the specific immediate connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties seems inexplicable, because of the meaning of the word “concept,” which presupposes that any concept – relational or not – picks out only certain features of the object and cannot grasp all its details. Third, the article challenges the incorrigible accuracy of the representation of content in direct phenomenal concepts in the light of modern theories of consciousness, according to which phenomenal experience is illusory. Finally, the article draws attention to the fact that even if direct phenomenal beliefs are indeed incorrigible, it remains unclear how they can enrich philosophical and psychological studies of consciousness as long as their content is so private. The first objection is, I think, the most serious one.
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В статье представлена критика доводов Дэвида Чалмерса в пользу неопровержимости интроспекции фено... more В статье представлена критика доводов Дэвида Чалмерса в пользу неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальных убеждений. Целью статьи является выдвижение ряда возражений против тезиса о неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальных убеждений, главное из которых исследует лежащие в основании данного тезиса имплицитные допущения существования особой интимной связи между чистым феноменальным понятием и представляемым им феноменальным свойством, а также прямого доступа через процедуру «знакомства» к самим феноменальным убеждениям.
Ключевые слова: достоверность интроспекции, интроспекция, феноменальное понятие, феноменальное убеждение, эпистемология интроспекции.
The aim of this article is to criticize David Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis, which holds that a direct phenomenal belief cannot be false. In order to maintain his claim, Chalmers distinguishes three types of phenomenal concepts – relational phenomenal concepts, demonstrative phenomenal concepts and pure phenomenal concepts. According to Chalmers, pure phenomenal concepts do not pick out phenomenal properties relationally or indexically as do relational phenomenal concepts and demonstrative phenomenal concepts. Instead, they pick them out directly, in terms of their intrinsic phenomenal nature. Chalmers also distinguishes two subtypes of pure phenomenal concepts – direct phenomenal concepts and standing phenomenal concepts. Direct phenomenal concepts, which underlie direct phenomenal beliefs, can be formed by a subject only in presence of an object with phenomenal properties and only if she directs her attention to them. Standing phenomenal concepts can be formed by memory. Chalmers assumes that direct phenomenal concepts can be described as phenomenal concepts, which are partly constituted by underlying phenomenal qualities. He also insists on the existence of a special intimate connection between a direct phenomenal concept and its content – the phenomenal quality. This specific intimate connection makes the phenomenal concept’s representation of its content incorrigibly accurate. Moreover he describes the introspective access to a direct phenomenal belief (at heart of which there is a direct phenomenal concept) as an immediate, non-relational connection, which he names by the Russellian term “acquaintance.” First, the article tries to show that the idea of there being a special connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties, along with the idea of acquaintance, makes Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis weak, for these two ideas remain unexplained in his current description of this thesis. Moreover, because of their mysterious meaning, they most likely cannot be explained in the future. Second the article points out that the specific immediate connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties seems inexplicable, because of the meaning of the word “concept,” which presupposes that any concept – relational or not – picks out only certain features of the object and cannot grasp all its details. Third, the article challenges the incorrigible accuracy of the representation of content in direct phenomenal concepts in the light of modern theories of consciousness, according to which phenomenal experience is illusory. Finally the article draws attention to the fact that even if direct phenomenal beliefs are indeed incorrigible, it remains unclear how they can enrich philosophical and psychological studies of consciousness as long as their content is so private. The first objection is, I think, the most serious one.
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Статья анализирует содержание и следствия плюралистических моделей интроспекции Джесси Принца, Эр... more Статья анализирует содержание и следствия плюралистических моделей интроспекции Джесси Принца, Эрика Швитсгебеля и Джесси Батлера. В статье предпринята попытка в свете этих моделей решить вопрос о том, может ли термин «интроспекция» считаться научным, соотнести плюралистические модели интроспекции с теорией перцептивного сознания, а также обсудить вопрос о достоверности видов интроспекции.
The article analyses content and consequences of the Pluralist Models of Introspection of Jesse Prinz, Eric Schwitzgebel and Jesse Butler. It makes an attempt to decide if the term “introspection” can be used as scientific term in the light of the Pluralist Models of Introspection, to relate the Pluralist Models of Introspection with the theory of perceptual consciousness and discuss the problem of reliability of the species of introspection.
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В статье анализируются четыре философских аргумента против перцептивной модели ин-троспекции: ана... more В статье анализируются четыре философских аргумента против перцептивной модели ин-троспекции: аналитико-лингвистическая критика Гилберта Райла, феноменологический аргу-мент Уильяма Лайонса, аргумент Дениэла Деннета, согласно которому перцептивная модель интроспекции ведет к дурной бесконечности, и аргумент Джона Сёрля о недопустимости бук-вального понимания метафоры «внутреннее око». Подробно рассмотрено, какие именно аспек-ты перцептивной модели интроспекции эти аргументы стремятся подвергнуть критике.
This article lays out a brief analysis of four philosophical arguments against the Perceptual Model of Introspection: the analytical-linguistic criticism of Gilbert Ryle, the phenomenological argument of William Lyons, the infinite regression argument of Daniel Dennett and the argument of John Searle about the impermissibility of taking literally metaphors around the notion of inner vision. It details in turn precisely which aspects of the Perceptual Model of Introspection each type of argument subjects to criticism.
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Статья посвящена вопросу о месте интроспекции в гносеологических исследованиях Нового времени. Пр... more Статья посвящена вопросу о месте интроспекции в гносеологических исследованиях Нового времени. Предпринята попытка описать как характерные, так и функциональные особенности этой способности, выделяемые репрезентативными философами этого времени, и дать общий образ ее понимания, сложившийся в их текстах. Автор обращается к философским концепциям Рене Декарта, Джона Локка и Дэвида Юма с целью продемонстрировать, что вопрос об интроспекции был поставлен в эпоху Нового времени, задолго до работ Вильгельма Вундта и Эдварда Титченера, хотя последние и ввели этот термин в активный научный словарь. Именно такой подход позволяет обнаружить теоретические и общеметодологические, а не экспериментальные и частные проблемы интроспекции, которые коренятся еще в ранних работах по этой теме как раз потому, что в этих работах интроспекция приобретает статус особого привилегированного метода познания. Представляется, что это делает настоящий анализ значимым преимущественно в философском, а не психологическом контексте.
This paper attempts to situate introspection in the epistemological investigations of early modern philosophy. It explores the characteristic and functional features that philosophers of this period ascribed to introspection and provides a general outline of the understanding of this ability laid out in their writings. Examining key philosophical concepts of Rene Descartes, John Locke, and David Hume, this article demonstrates that the question of introspection was posed in the early modern period, long before the investigations of Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Titchener, although they first introduced the term itself into scholarly discourse. The author's approach allows us to uncover the theoretical and general methodological aspects of the problem of introspection rather than its experimental and private aspects. This is because in the works in question introspection assumes a privileged status as a method of knowledge. Thus the analysis presented here is significant today primarily in the context of philosophy rather than psychology.
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Thesis Chapters by Angelina Dmitrieva
This essay is largely based on Chapter Two of my Candidate of Science dissertation «Возможностиин... more This essay is largely based on Chapter Two of my Candidate of Science dissertation «Возможностиинтроспекции в аналитической философии сознания» (“The Possibility of Introspection in the Philosophy of Consciousness”), written and defended in Russian.
This essay lays out an analysis of three philosophical arguments against the perceptual model of introspection: the analytical-linguistic criticism of Gilbert Ryle, the phenomenological argument of William Lyons and the infinite-regress argument of Daniel Dennett. It details in turn precisely which aspects of the perceptual account of introspection each type of argument subjects to criticism. This essay also presents two reductive approaches to introspection—Ryle’s reduction of introspection to retrospection of past behavior and Lyons’s reduction of introspection to a replay of previous perceptions—and evaluates their contribution to modern discussions of introspection.
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Объектом исследования является проблематика интроспекции в философии сознания. С целью выяснить э... more Объектом исследования является проблематика интроспекции в философии сознания. С целью выяснить эпистемологические возможности интроспекции применялся метод теоретической реконструкции, а также сравнительный и исторический. Новизна работы состоит в том, что она предлагает фундаментальное теоретическое переосмысление проблематики интроспекции в условиях невозможности принятия как позиции, наделяющей ее абсолютной достоверностью, так и точки зрения, полностью отрицающей ее исследовательские возможности. Практическая значимость исследования состоит в том, что его результаты могут быть применены в преподавании курсов гносеологии, философии психологии, проблем современной философии сознания.
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Представлена критика доводов Дэвида Чалмерса в пользу неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальных... more Представлена критика доводов Дэвида Чалмерса в пользу неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальныхубеждений. Целью статьи является выдвижение ряда возражений против тезиса о неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальных убеждений, главное из которых исследует лежащие в основании данного тезиса имплицитные допущения существования особой интимной связи между чистым феноменальным понятием и представляемым им феноменальным свойством, а также прямого доступа через процедуру «знакомства» к самим феноменальным убеждениям
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Вестник Томского государственного университета, Dec 1, 2016
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Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya
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Философия и культура, 2014
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The aim of this article is to criticize David Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis, which holds that ... more The aim of this article is to criticize David Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis, which holds that a direct phenomenal belief cannot be false. In order to maintain his claim, Chalmers distinguishes three types of phenomenal concepts – relational phenomenal concepts, demonstrative phenomenal concepts and pure phenomenal concepts. According to Chalmers, pure phenomenal concepts do not pick out phenomenal properties relationally or indexically as do relational phenomenal concepts and demonstrative phenomenal concepts. Instead, they pick them out directly, in terms of their intrinsic phenomenal nature. Chalmers also distinguishes two subtypes of pure phenomenal concepts – direct phenomenal concepts and standing phenomenal concepts. Direct phenomenal concepts, which underlie direct phenomenal beliefs, can be formed by a subject only in presence of an object with phenomenal properties and only if she directs her attention to them. Standing phenomenal concepts can be formed by memory. Chalmers assumes that direct phenomenal concepts can be described as phenomenal concepts, which are partly constituted by underlying phenomenal qualities. He also insists on the existence of a special intimate connection between a direct phenomenal concept and its content – the phenomenal quality. This specific intimate connection makes the phenomenal concept’s representation of its content incorrigibly accurate. Moreover he describes the introspective access to a direct phenomenal belief (at heart of which there is a direct phenomenal concept) as an immediate, non-relational connection, which he names by the Russellian term “acquaintance.” First, the article tries to show that the idea of there being a special connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties, along with the idea of acquaintance, makes Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis weak, for these two ideas remain unexplained in his current description of this thesis. Moreover, because of their mysterious meaning, they most likely cannot be explained in the future. Second the article points out that the specific immediate connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties seems inexplicable, because of the meaning of the word “concept,” which presupposes that any concept – relational or not – picks out only certain features of the object and cannot grasp all its details. Third, the article challenges the incorrigible accuracy of the representation of content in direct phenomenal concepts in the light of modern theories of consciousness, according to which phenomenal experience is illusory. Finally, the article draws attention to the fact that even if direct phenomenal beliefs are indeed incorrigible, it remains unclear how they can enrich philosophical and psychological studies of consciousness as long as their content is so private. The first objection is, I think, the most serious one.
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В статье представлена критика доводов Дэвида Чалмерса в пользу неопровержимости интроспекции фено... more В статье представлена критика доводов Дэвида Чалмерса в пользу неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальных убеждений. Целью статьи является выдвижение ряда возражений против тезиса о неопровержимости интроспекции феноменальных убеждений, главное из которых исследует лежащие в основании данного тезиса имплицитные допущения существования особой интимной связи между чистым феноменальным понятием и представляемым им феноменальным свойством, а также прямого доступа через процедуру «знакомства» к самим феноменальным убеждениям.
Ключевые слова: достоверность интроспекции, интроспекция, феноменальное понятие, феноменальное убеждение, эпистемология интроспекции.
The aim of this article is to criticize David Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis, which holds that a direct phenomenal belief cannot be false. In order to maintain his claim, Chalmers distinguishes three types of phenomenal concepts – relational phenomenal concepts, demonstrative phenomenal concepts and pure phenomenal concepts. According to Chalmers, pure phenomenal concepts do not pick out phenomenal properties relationally or indexically as do relational phenomenal concepts and demonstrative phenomenal concepts. Instead, they pick them out directly, in terms of their intrinsic phenomenal nature. Chalmers also distinguishes two subtypes of pure phenomenal concepts – direct phenomenal concepts and standing phenomenal concepts. Direct phenomenal concepts, which underlie direct phenomenal beliefs, can be formed by a subject only in presence of an object with phenomenal properties and only if she directs her attention to them. Standing phenomenal concepts can be formed by memory. Chalmers assumes that direct phenomenal concepts can be described as phenomenal concepts, which are partly constituted by underlying phenomenal qualities. He also insists on the existence of a special intimate connection between a direct phenomenal concept and its content – the phenomenal quality. This specific intimate connection makes the phenomenal concept’s representation of its content incorrigibly accurate. Moreover he describes the introspective access to a direct phenomenal belief (at heart of which there is a direct phenomenal concept) as an immediate, non-relational connection, which he names by the Russellian term “acquaintance.” First, the article tries to show that the idea of there being a special connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties, along with the idea of acquaintance, makes Chalmers’ incorrigibility thesis weak, for these two ideas remain unexplained in his current description of this thesis. Moreover, because of their mysterious meaning, they most likely cannot be explained in the future. Second the article points out that the specific immediate connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties seems inexplicable, because of the meaning of the word “concept,” which presupposes that any concept – relational or not – picks out only certain features of the object and cannot grasp all its details. Third, the article challenges the incorrigible accuracy of the representation of content in direct phenomenal concepts in the light of modern theories of consciousness, according to which phenomenal experience is illusory. Finally the article draws attention to the fact that even if direct phenomenal beliefs are indeed incorrigible, it remains unclear how they can enrich philosophical and psychological studies of consciousness as long as their content is so private. The first objection is, I think, the most serious one.
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Статья анализирует содержание и следствия плюралистических моделей интроспекции Джесси Принца, Эр... more Статья анализирует содержание и следствия плюралистических моделей интроспекции Джесси Принца, Эрика Швитсгебеля и Джесси Батлера. В статье предпринята попытка в свете этих моделей решить вопрос о том, может ли термин «интроспекция» считаться научным, соотнести плюралистические модели интроспекции с теорией перцептивного сознания, а также обсудить вопрос о достоверности видов интроспекции.
The article analyses content and consequences of the Pluralist Models of Introspection of Jesse Prinz, Eric Schwitzgebel and Jesse Butler. It makes an attempt to decide if the term “introspection” can be used as scientific term in the light of the Pluralist Models of Introspection, to relate the Pluralist Models of Introspection with the theory of perceptual consciousness and discuss the problem of reliability of the species of introspection.
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В статье анализируются четыре философских аргумента против перцептивной модели ин-троспекции: ана... more В статье анализируются четыре философских аргумента против перцептивной модели ин-троспекции: аналитико-лингвистическая критика Гилберта Райла, феноменологический аргу-мент Уильяма Лайонса, аргумент Дениэла Деннета, согласно которому перцептивная модель интроспекции ведет к дурной бесконечности, и аргумент Джона Сёрля о недопустимости бук-вального понимания метафоры «внутреннее око». Подробно рассмотрено, какие именно аспек-ты перцептивной модели интроспекции эти аргументы стремятся подвергнуть критике.
This article lays out a brief analysis of four philosophical arguments against the Perceptual Model of Introspection: the analytical-linguistic criticism of Gilbert Ryle, the phenomenological argument of William Lyons, the infinite regression argument of Daniel Dennett and the argument of John Searle about the impermissibility of taking literally metaphors around the notion of inner vision. It details in turn precisely which aspects of the Perceptual Model of Introspection each type of argument subjects to criticism.
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Статья посвящена вопросу о месте интроспекции в гносеологических исследованиях Нового времени. Пр... more Статья посвящена вопросу о месте интроспекции в гносеологических исследованиях Нового времени. Предпринята попытка описать как характерные, так и функциональные особенности этой способности, выделяемые репрезентативными философами этого времени, и дать общий образ ее понимания, сложившийся в их текстах. Автор обращается к философским концепциям Рене Декарта, Джона Локка и Дэвида Юма с целью продемонстрировать, что вопрос об интроспекции был поставлен в эпоху Нового времени, задолго до работ Вильгельма Вундта и Эдварда Титченера, хотя последние и ввели этот термин в активный научный словарь. Именно такой подход позволяет обнаружить теоретические и общеметодологические, а не экспериментальные и частные проблемы интроспекции, которые коренятся еще в ранних работах по этой теме как раз потому, что в этих работах интроспекция приобретает статус особого привилегированного метода познания. Представляется, что это делает настоящий анализ значимым преимущественно в философском, а не психологическом контексте.
This paper attempts to situate introspection in the epistemological investigations of early modern philosophy. It explores the characteristic and functional features that philosophers of this period ascribed to introspection and provides a general outline of the understanding of this ability laid out in their writings. Examining key philosophical concepts of Rene Descartes, John Locke, and David Hume, this article demonstrates that the question of introspection was posed in the early modern period, long before the investigations of Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Titchener, although they first introduced the term itself into scholarly discourse. The author's approach allows us to uncover the theoretical and general methodological aspects of the problem of introspection rather than its experimental and private aspects. This is because in the works in question introspection assumes a privileged status as a method of knowledge. Thus the analysis presented here is significant today primarily in the context of philosophy rather than psychology.
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This essay is largely based on Chapter Two of my Candidate of Science dissertation «Возможностиин... more This essay is largely based on Chapter Two of my Candidate of Science dissertation «Возможностиинтроспекции в аналитической философии сознания» (“The Possibility of Introspection in the Philosophy of Consciousness”), written and defended in Russian.
This essay lays out an analysis of three philosophical arguments against the perceptual model of introspection: the analytical-linguistic criticism of Gilbert Ryle, the phenomenological argument of William Lyons and the infinite-regress argument of Daniel Dennett. It details in turn precisely which aspects of the perceptual account of introspection each type of argument subjects to criticism. This essay also presents two reductive approaches to introspection—Ryle’s reduction of introspection to retrospection of past behavior and Lyons’s reduction of introspection to a replay of previous perceptions—and evaluates their contribution to modern discussions of introspection.
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Объектом исследования является проблематика интроспекции в философии сознания. С целью выяснить э... more Объектом исследования является проблематика интроспекции в философии сознания. С целью выяснить эпистемологические возможности интроспекции применялся метод теоретической реконструкции, а также сравнительный и исторический. Новизна работы состоит в том, что она предлагает фундаментальное теоретическое переосмысление проблематики интроспекции в условиях невозможности принятия как позиции, наделяющей ее абсолютной достоверностью, так и точки зрения, полностью отрицающей ее исследовательские возможности. Практическая значимость исследования состоит в том, что его результаты могут быть применены в преподавании курсов гносеологии, философии психологии, проблем современной философии сознания.
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