Christine Fair | Georgetown University (original) (raw)
Papers by Christine Fair
Social Science Research Network, 2018
Foreign Affairs, Jul 27, 2018
Social Science Research Network, 2016
While there are numerous histories of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program available (e.g. Bhutto 1... more While there are numerous histories of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program available (e.g. Bhutto 1979; F. Khan 2012a, 2012b; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007; Corera 2006; Levy and Scott-Clark 2007; Salik 2009), in this chapter I make two modest interventions to the existing corpus. First, whereas conventional scholarship (inter alia Kapur 2007) presume Pakistan to be a covert nuclear power since 1990, I argue that Pakistan has been a covert nuclear power for much longer, perhaps since as early as 1979. Second, marshalling evidence from the U.S. National Security Archives, I show that India was very much aware of Pakistan’s nuclear developments throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These admittedly reserved alterations of the conventioal wisdom imply that scholars should reconsider how they view earlier conflicts between India and Pakistan such as Operation Brasstacks throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas Cohen and others argue that Brasstacks was not a nuclear dispute because “Pakistan had not yet acquired a nuclear weapon,” the evidence I put forward here suggests that this crisis was, in fact, a nuclearized crisis (Cohen 2016, 250).
Armed Forces & Society, Feb 27, 2017
Oxford University Press eBooks, May 27, 2014
The Journal of Asian Studies, Nov 1, 2011
Abstract requested is temporarily unavailable. Try again later.
Social Science Research Network, 2015
Social Science Research Network, 2018
Little has been written about the political party of the LeT, the Milli Muslim League, and what h... more Little has been written about the political party of the LeT, the Milli Muslim League, and what has been written has been misleading. Some authors have suggested that the MML reflects Pakistan’s sincere desire to defang its nastiest militant group by shunting its stalwarts and cadres into a useful political role, whereby it can counter the army’s civilian enemies within Pakistan. Below, I argue that Pakistan’s move is much more profound than a quest to find an alternative to demilitarizing the LeT/JuD or even manipulating electoral outcomes. I contend that the formation of the MML is part of a more serious effort to use the pro-state organization against the myriad militant groups tearing the state apart, while also investing in another political alternative to the current political parties that will pay dividends over the longer time horizon. Based upon available information about the MML, its ties to the JuD and its mentorship by Pakistan’s security organizations, I reject the claim that the MML’s formation signals a new effort on the part of the Pakistani state to redirect JuD’s external militarism towards a new domesticated political role, and thus serves as a state-directed “de-radicalization” or “demobilization” effort to mainstream Islamist militants. I argue, instead, that the MML will be a complement to JuD’s efforts to stabilize Pakistan internally and enhance LeT’s external activities in the service of the deep state.
RAND Corporation eBooks, 2009
Social Science Research Network, 2017
Social Science Research Network, 2014
Washington Quarterly, Jul 3, 2018
Journal of Strategic Studies
Since the Taliban's seizure of Kabul in August 2021, there has been significant attention... more Since the Taliban's seizure of Kabul in August 2021, there has been significant attention to and debate over China's ties with the Taliban. This article traces the development of China-Taliban relations from the Afghan Civil War in the 1990's to the present day. We find that China has consistently respected the Taliban as legitimate long-term political actors. We also find that the Taliban have found China to be a valuable source of economic and political support for its regime. We conclude with a discussion of the future trajectory of China-Taliban relations and the implications of this relationship for the balance of power in So Q3 uth Asia. KEYWORDS China-Taliban relations; China-Afghanistan relations; CPEC
Current History, 2011
The military will never stay in the barracks until other institutions have developed enough credi... more The military will never stay in the barracks until other institutions have developed enough credibility to counter the army's.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
This paper explores Pakistani public support for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT,also known as Jamaat ul... more This paper explores Pakistani public support for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT,also known as Jamaat ul Dawa, or JuD), which is one of the most competent and lethal Pakistan — based and — backed militant groups operating in India and elsewhere in South Asia. Contrary to common perceptions that Islamist militant groups are inherently revolutionary, this study, using data from a country-wide survey of 7, 653 Pakistanis carried out in 2013, argues form a social psychology perspective that the sense of significance that a violent extremist group may bestow on its in-group members is the essential factor in conditioning sympathy and support for that group. We posit that the LeT, a Salafi group based in Punjab, is most likely to be supported by Salafis and Punjabis as these are the societal groups most likely to believe that the LeT accords them significance. By analyzing data from a novel dataset derived from a nationally-representative survey of Pakistanis, we find strong support for these contentions.
In Their Own Words, 2019
Understanding the tortured history of Pakistan's revisionist agenda with respect to India is ... more Understanding the tortured history of Pakistan's revisionist agenda with respect to India is critical to appreciating the utility of LeT and other militants to Pakistan's deep state. For this reason, this chapter provides a brief history of the independence movement, the inherent communal ideologies that Pakistan's proponents mobilized to achieve an independent state, and a precis of the disastrous Partition process that gave rise to India and Pakistan. Three particular issues remain significant in contemporary Pakistan. First, many Pakistanis continue to pass onto their descendants these tales of communally motivated murder, rape, and mayhem that accompanied the countries' births. Second, Pakistanis continue to assert that the way in which the British parsed the districts of the Punjab was inherently unfair and prejudicial to Pakistan's interests. Third, Pakistanis believe that the princely state of Kashmir should have gone to Pakistan and that the way in which ...
Social Science Research Network, 2018
Foreign Affairs, Jul 27, 2018
Social Science Research Network, 2016
While there are numerous histories of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program available (e.g. Bhutto 1... more While there are numerous histories of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program available (e.g. Bhutto 1979; F. Khan 2012a, 2012b; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007; Corera 2006; Levy and Scott-Clark 2007; Salik 2009), in this chapter I make two modest interventions to the existing corpus. First, whereas conventional scholarship (inter alia Kapur 2007) presume Pakistan to be a covert nuclear power since 1990, I argue that Pakistan has been a covert nuclear power for much longer, perhaps since as early as 1979. Second, marshalling evidence from the U.S. National Security Archives, I show that India was very much aware of Pakistan’s nuclear developments throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These admittedly reserved alterations of the conventioal wisdom imply that scholars should reconsider how they view earlier conflicts between India and Pakistan such as Operation Brasstacks throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas Cohen and others argue that Brasstacks was not a nuclear dispute because “Pakistan had not yet acquired a nuclear weapon,” the evidence I put forward here suggests that this crisis was, in fact, a nuclearized crisis (Cohen 2016, 250).
Armed Forces & Society, Feb 27, 2017
Oxford University Press eBooks, May 27, 2014
The Journal of Asian Studies, Nov 1, 2011
Abstract requested is temporarily unavailable. Try again later.
Social Science Research Network, 2015
Social Science Research Network, 2018
Little has been written about the political party of the LeT, the Milli Muslim League, and what h... more Little has been written about the political party of the LeT, the Milli Muslim League, and what has been written has been misleading. Some authors have suggested that the MML reflects Pakistan’s sincere desire to defang its nastiest militant group by shunting its stalwarts and cadres into a useful political role, whereby it can counter the army’s civilian enemies within Pakistan. Below, I argue that Pakistan’s move is much more profound than a quest to find an alternative to demilitarizing the LeT/JuD or even manipulating electoral outcomes. I contend that the formation of the MML is part of a more serious effort to use the pro-state organization against the myriad militant groups tearing the state apart, while also investing in another political alternative to the current political parties that will pay dividends over the longer time horizon. Based upon available information about the MML, its ties to the JuD and its mentorship by Pakistan’s security organizations, I reject the claim that the MML’s formation signals a new effort on the part of the Pakistani state to redirect JuD’s external militarism towards a new domesticated political role, and thus serves as a state-directed “de-radicalization” or “demobilization” effort to mainstream Islamist militants. I argue, instead, that the MML will be a complement to JuD’s efforts to stabilize Pakistan internally and enhance LeT’s external activities in the service of the deep state.
RAND Corporation eBooks, 2009
Social Science Research Network, 2017
Social Science Research Network, 2014
Washington Quarterly, Jul 3, 2018
Journal of Strategic Studies
Since the Taliban's seizure of Kabul in August 2021, there has been significant attention... more Since the Taliban's seizure of Kabul in August 2021, there has been significant attention to and debate over China's ties with the Taliban. This article traces the development of China-Taliban relations from the Afghan Civil War in the 1990's to the present day. We find that China has consistently respected the Taliban as legitimate long-term political actors. We also find that the Taliban have found China to be a valuable source of economic and political support for its regime. We conclude with a discussion of the future trajectory of China-Taliban relations and the implications of this relationship for the balance of power in So Q3 uth Asia. KEYWORDS China-Taliban relations; China-Afghanistan relations; CPEC
Current History, 2011
The military will never stay in the barracks until other institutions have developed enough credi... more The military will never stay in the barracks until other institutions have developed enough credibility to counter the army's.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
This paper explores Pakistani public support for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT,also known as Jamaat ul... more This paper explores Pakistani public support for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT,also known as Jamaat ul Dawa, or JuD), which is one of the most competent and lethal Pakistan — based and — backed militant groups operating in India and elsewhere in South Asia. Contrary to common perceptions that Islamist militant groups are inherently revolutionary, this study, using data from a country-wide survey of 7, 653 Pakistanis carried out in 2013, argues form a social psychology perspective that the sense of significance that a violent extremist group may bestow on its in-group members is the essential factor in conditioning sympathy and support for that group. We posit that the LeT, a Salafi group based in Punjab, is most likely to be supported by Salafis and Punjabis as these are the societal groups most likely to believe that the LeT accords them significance. By analyzing data from a novel dataset derived from a nationally-representative survey of Pakistanis, we find strong support for these contentions.
In Their Own Words, 2019
Understanding the tortured history of Pakistan's revisionist agenda with respect to India is ... more Understanding the tortured history of Pakistan's revisionist agenda with respect to India is critical to appreciating the utility of LeT and other militants to Pakistan's deep state. For this reason, this chapter provides a brief history of the independence movement, the inherent communal ideologies that Pakistan's proponents mobilized to achieve an independent state, and a precis of the disastrous Partition process that gave rise to India and Pakistan. Three particular issues remain significant in contemporary Pakistan. First, many Pakistanis continue to pass onto their descendants these tales of communally motivated murder, rape, and mayhem that accompanied the countries' births. Second, Pakistanis continue to assert that the way in which the British parsed the districts of the Punjab was inherently unfair and prejudicial to Pakistan's interests. Third, Pakistanis believe that the princely state of Kashmir should have gone to Pakistan and that the way in which ...
In this paper, we explore sectarian and communal intolerance in Bangladesh using a unique dataset... more In this paper, we explore sectarian and communal intolerance in
Bangladesh using a unique dataset derived from a 2017 nationally
representative survey of Bangladeshi respondents, which included
numerous survey items germane to this study. We find deep support
for Sharia among Bangladeshi respondents, including its draconian
physical punishments, as well as a strong preference for upon non-
Muslims. Bangladeshi Muslims not only register high levels of
communal intolerance, but they also evince significance sectarian
intolerance.
We employ regression analysis of 2017 survey data from 4,067 Bangladeshis to exposit the lineamen... more We employ regression analysis of 2017 survey data from 4,067 Bangladeshis to exposit the lineaments of individual support for domestic Islamist violence. Our dependent variables derive from measures of public support for the stated goals and violent means of three Bangladeshi Islamist terrorist groups. Our study variables include participation in communal Friday prayer; indexed measures of other pietic practices; preferences for Shari'a and secularism; and gender. We include several well-established control variables. We find that participation in communal Friday prayers significantly correlates with diminished support for militant groups' while having no effect upon support for their violent means. In four (of ten) models, we find that respondents who view Shari'a as being coterminous with scriptural literalism and harsh physical punishments are significantly more likely to support the groups' goals. Finally, we find women to be consistently more likely to support the goals and means of the militant groups.
About this Course: In its inception, the “war film” and its creators have played prominent role... more About this Course:
In its inception, the “war film” and its creators have played prominent roles in, inter alia, setting political agendas, advocating policies, constructing images of the enemy other, defining civilization, manufacturing consent for or opposition to war, recreating and reproducing race and gender stereotypes, and providing information about a conflict that shapes peoples’ opinion of the conflict irrespective of the film’s accuracy. Most Americans, as well as citizens of other countries, learn of conflicts through the cinematographic depiction of them rather than their formal study. Unfortunately, despite the pervasive influence of film and other forms of media culture, mainstream political science has generally considered these cultural artifacts unworthy of serious inquiry. This course departs from this intellectual position and contends that film can be an important medium through which we can understand international politics but, more importantly, think critically about how films facilitate such understandings.
This course begins with an overview of the essential practices and significant “languages” that film makers and writers use to create meaning through film. Learning the “grammar” of films will enable students to become more cognizant of how war and related concepts are portrayed in the media cultural products they regularly consume and the understandings of those war such films facilitate.
This course will focus upon irregular warfare, which the US military defines as:
“a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”
After providing a foundation on how one reads a film, the subsequent classes will examine various examples of irregular wars through the lens of two films that represent very different points of view about them. I provide several, brief readings intended to inform the student about the conflict depicted in the film. In this class, students will learn about various conflicts while also learning to think critically about irregular wars are depicted through the film.
Topics covered in this course will include British and European colonial wars in Africa and Asia; the Vietnam War from the optics of French, American; Korean and Vietnamese citizens; the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan from the optics of Russian and American films; the War on Terrorism; the use of drones; intelligence failure; nuclear deterrence as well as a reflection upon race and gender in constructing heroism. This course will not cover the great wars or the Korean wars. Because this course relies upon films which depict a variety of brutalities, it may not be suitable for everyone.
In this course, students will construct original arguments about how specific films create, reinforce or destabilize predominant views of war generally and specific wars in American society. To do so, we will closely study the ideas which are embedded in films as well as the techniques which film directors and writers use to convey a message or argument.
Public opinion research shows there is considerable, albeit varied, support for Islamist terroris... more Public opinion research shows there is considerable, albeit varied, support for Islamist terrorism among the world’s Muslim populations. To identify respondent-level determinants of support for suicide bombings (and other forms of political violence) perpetrated by Islamist militants, scholars have used country-specific and multi-national surveys samples as well as novel survey techniques. One explanatory variable which is frequently used in such empirical models is support for Shari’ah (Islamic law). Fair, Littman and Nugent (2018), based upon their analysis of survey data from Pakistan, argued for conceptualizing and instrumentalizing Shari’ah in multivalent ways, including: support for textual literalism such as Hudood punishments; support for good governance; and restrictions on women. They find only the first explains support for terrorism. Here, we explore whether their proposed formalization offers explanatory power for support for Islamist violence beyond the niche case of Pakistan. To do so, we employ data collected by the Pew Foundation in 2011 which allows us to replicate and augment the methods employed by Fair, Littman and Nugent for twenty countries. We find strong evidence that this framework is robust well beyond Pakistan.