Marwa Daoudy | Georgetown University (original) (raw)

Books by Marwa Daoudy

Cambridge University Press, 2020

Does climate change cause conflict? Did it cause the Syrian uprising? Some policymakers and acade... more Does climate change cause conflict? Did it cause the Syrian uprising? Some policymakers and academics have made this claim, but is it true? This study presents a new conceptual framework to evaluate this claim. Contributing to scholarship in the fields of critical security, environmental security, human security, and Arab politics, Marwa Daoudy prioritizes non-Western and marginalized perspectives to make sense of Syria's place in this international debate. Designing an innovative multidisciplinary framework and applying it to the Syrian case, Daoudy uses extensive field research and her own personal background as a Syrian scholar to present primary interviews with Syrian government officials and citizens, as well as the research of domestic Syrian experts, to provide a unique insight into Syria's environmental, economic and social vulnerabilities leading up to the 2011 uprising.

Chap. I in Daoudy (2005) Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l'Irak et la Turquie: négociation, s... more Chap. I in Daoudy (2005) Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l'Irak et la Turquie: négociation, sécurité et asymétrie des pouvoirs, CNRS Editions, Paris (France).

Chap. IV in Daoudy (2005) Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l'Irak et la Turquie: Négociation, ... more Chap. IV in Daoudy (2005) Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l'Irak et la Turquie: Négociation, Sécurité et asymétrie des pouvoirs, CNRS Editions, Paris (France).

Articles by Marwa Daoudy

Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2016

The relation between Syria and Turkey transformed from enmity in the 1990s to détente in the earl... more The relation between Syria and Turkey transformed from enmity in the 1990s to détente in the early 2000s, grew into amity after the rise to power of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in 2002, and reverted to enmity in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. This research suggests that a combination of structural and identity-based factors, at regional and domestic levels, induced the collapse of the decade-long amity. This paper builds on the notion of a " structure-identity nexus " ; and determines the orientation of foreign policy outcomes from the 1990s until 2011. The discussion outlines the merits of a hybrid theoretical perspective by elaborating on Barkin's idea of 'realist constructivism', which draws on two rival traditions, realism and constructivism. The structure-identity framework explains the double transformation in the relationship, considering the return to inter-and intra-state conflict in 2011. The research draws on extensive primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews carried out with key figures. In addition to the relationship between Syria and Turkey, the structure-identity nexus provides potential broader explanations that fuel the shift from amity to enmity in the complex network of states found in the Middle East.

International Negotiation, 2009

This article addresses the conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris waters from the perspective of ... more This article addresses the conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris waters from the perspective of negotiation theories, by examining the role of power in upstream/downstream negotiations. Conceptual and empirical links are established between water, negotiation (structure, process), power (asymmetries, coalition dynamics, strategies, development of alternatives) and security (direct/indirect interests such as national security, border security, territorial claims, economic development and environmental concerns). The study concludes that asymmetries in power have favored upstream/downstream interactions towards bilateral if not basin-wide arrangements. The framework shows that traditional elements of power, such
as upstream positions, military and economic resources, do not constitute the only sources of power. Bargaining power can also determine the dynamics between respective riparians. Time constitutes an important source of power, and interests vary over time when political settings and security concerns shift. Downstream or more vulnerable riparians can invert situations of power asymmetry by acting on the basin-dominant riparian’s interests and thus reduce its alternatives. Syria’s use of ‘issue linkage’ in its interactions with Turkey over water and wider security issues serves as the primary example.

In the Middle East “no war is possible without Egypt, and no peace is possible without Syria,” as... more In the Middle East “no war is possible without Egypt, and no peace is possible without Syria,” as suggested by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. From 1991 to 2000, Syria entered into extensive peace negotiations with Israel, another key actor in the Middle East. The objective of this article is to understand these negotiations, which involved periods of intense discord as well as
moments of rapprochement. Spectacular progress was made, for instance, between 1993 and 1995, when the “Rabin deposit,” Israel’s promise to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the 4 June 1967 border and thus allow Syria to recover access to Lake Tiberias, was proposed to the U.S. mediator. The two actors came close to an agreement but failed to put an end to the Israeli-Syrian conflict at the Shepherdstown negotiations in January 2000 and the Asad-Clinton summit on 26
March 2000 in Geneva. What lessons can be drawn from the process which took place between 1991 and 2000 in terms of the actors’ objectives, motivations and perceptions of each other? Why did the talks fail to produce an agreement? What was the weight of water in stimulating or blocking the process?

Water Policy, 2008

This paper addresses hydro-hegemony from the perspective of International Water Law, by examining... more This paper addresses hydro-hegemony from the perspective of International Water Law, by examining the role of law in upstream/downstream negotiations. It is built on the understanding that International Water Law constitutes an element of power relations, asserting that it is a source of structural and bargaining power. The first section of the paper discusses main principles that have emerged, and their establishment as terms of reference for water cooperation. In the second part, competing claims are analyzed to see how co-riparians in the Euphrates and Tigris basins have provided deliberately conflicting interpretations over “International rivers”, “equitable and reasonable utilization”, “no harm”, “prior notification” and “consultation” to derive negotiating positions and influence from International Water Law. Conclusions point to the understanding of water law as a structural variable, impacting on the actors’ constraints and options and enhancing the structural power of the non hegemonic
riparians. International Water Law appears to operate as well as process-related variable which influences the process and outcome of water negotiations. As a source of bargaining power, legal principles increase the legitimacy of downstream riparians and enhances their bargaining position in the negotiation process.

Inequitable access to water has caused much conflict, especially when water is embedded in larger... more Inequitable access to water has caused much conflict, especially when water is embedded in larger conflicts of a high-politics nature or where limited economic diversification restricts the range of policy options open to governments. Potential solutions tend to involve agreements on volumetric water allocations rather than focusing on the sharing of more broadly conceived potential mutual benefits. Located
in the volatile Middle East, the Euphrates and Tigris river basins are examples of this. Moreover, because this region has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, the potential for conflict is increased.

Book chapters by Marwa Daoudy

in Chetail ed. (2009), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, Oxford University Press.

Water in the Middle East and in North Africa, 2004

Book review by Marwa Daoudy

Natural Resources Forum, 2009

Policy papers by Marwa Daoudy

Cambridge University Press, 2020

Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2016

International Negotiation, 2009

Water Policy, 2008

in Chetail ed. (2009), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, Oxford University Press.

Water in the Middle East and in North Africa, 2004

Natural Resources Forum, 2009

For the last month, Syria has seen popular protests on an unprecedented scale, and blood has drip... more For the last month, Syria has seen popular protests on an unprecedented scale, and blood has dripped on the streets of Deraa, Latakia, al- Sanamein,Douma,Homs, Harasta, Tartous, Qamishli and Banyas. The population has broken the barrier of fear and pressed its demands for dignity, freedom, social justice, economic opportunity, and political reform. Yet many Syrians, including opposition figures, have rejected sectarian divisions as in Iraq or foreign interference as in Libya.

Discussions of transboundary water issues in regions of the developing world other than the Middl... more Discussions of transboundary water issues in regions of the developing world other than the Middle East have tended to focus on development potential and poverty reduction. However, with respect to the Middle East, much of the media coverage and a sizable portion of scholarly writing have been devoted to " water conflicts. " Given the current amount of water available per capita, the high rate of population growth, and the high levels of interstate tension and conflict in the region, images of " water wars " do not seem far-fetched. The water situation and water relations in the Middle East are framed by several undisputed and inescapable basic facts. The first is that the Middle East is a very water-scarce region. According to the 2008 Stockholm Water Prize winner, Tony Allan, the Middle East basically " ran out of water " in the 1970s and today largely depends on water from outside the region being traded into the region, primarily in the form of its food imports. Nevertheless, about 87% of the region's freshwater is allocated to agriculture. Continued water scarcity will affect the region's social and economic potential, increase land vulnerability to salini-zation and desertification, and raise the risk for political conflict around the limited water available. Still, arid zones are no less prone to violent behavior than states sharing water in water humid zones. (See, for example, the Oregon State University's database of the world's 263 international river basins: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu.) At the same time, it is important to mention that there are many examples of cooperative efforts relating to the major transboundary water sources in the region. As highlighted in the FoEME co-directors' contribution on the Jordan River basin, local cross-border cooperation is ongoing. Efforts are being undertaken at a higher political level as well. In fact, water is an integral part of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty; Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have a joint water coordinating committee; and over the years there has been cooperation on the Nile River through the Nile Basin Initiative (See www.nilebasin.org). Marwa Daoudy's article on the Euphrates-Tigris waters also points to the ongoing efforts to identify ways to move forward collaboratively on issues concerning those particular water sources. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES Sometimes analysts have made the water issue in the region into a natural scientific problem (or, for that matter, more of an economic challenge). However, water issues in this region are, arguably, political. Indeed, water was identified as one of the five key issues that should be negotiated in the final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Water also was identified as a key area in the multilateral track that was formed after the Madrid Peace conference in 1991. Even today, the group that focuses on water issues meets regularly and continues to work on joint projects (See www.exact.org). Intertwined with politics, the cooperation over the transboundary water in the MENA region is neither a smooth nor Middle East Institute Viewpoints • www.mideasti.org

De 1991 à 2000, ces deux acteurs-clés du conflit moyen-oriental que sont la Syrie et Israël ont p... more De 1991 à 2000, ces deux acteurs-clés du conflit moyen-oriental que sont la Syrie et Israël ont poursuivi de longues négociations de paix. Que nous apprend ce dialogue sur les objectifs, les motivations, et les
perceptions propres d’un protagoniste syrien qui reste très méconnu ? Telle est la question à laquelle souhaite répondre cette étude, en disséquant les enjeux majeurs du processus : le territoire, la sécurité et les ressources en eau. L’analyse des obstacles rencontrés sur le chemin de la paix permettra en outre de
prendre la mesure des perspectives actuelles de reprise du dialogue, dans un contexte profondément bouleversé. Le décès du président Hafez Al-Assad en juin 2000 et l’arrivée au pouvoir de son fils Bachar, la
détérioration de la situation israélo-palestinienne depuis le déclenchement de la seconde Intifada et l’élection d’Ariel Sharon en Israël, la guerre américaine en Irak, l'assassinat de l'ancien Premier ministre libanais Rafic Hariri, le retrait des troupes syriennes du Liban en avril 2005, et la tenue du 10e Congrès du parti Baas en juin ont transformé l’échiquier intérieur et régional. Cette analyse entend apporter un nouvel éclairage sur les contraintes que subit la Syrie et les opportunités qui s’offrent à elles, en s’efforçant d’apprécier l’impact de
ces changements sur sa position de négociation.

Inequality is a top policy issue in the US presidential campaign. In fact, inequality impacts per... more Inequality is a top policy issue in the US presidential campaign. In fact, inequality impacts perceptions throughout
the world, and the way we think about Syrian lives is no less prejudiced. We all know Syrians are victims of barrel
bombs, torture, sieges, and mass displacement. But their suffering is seen through four distorted lenses. Why have
Syrian lives mattered so little for five years?

The real divide is not religious or sectarian but geopolitical; and foreign intervention is not m... more The real divide is not religious or sectarian but geopolitical; and foreign intervention is not motivated by religious affiliations nor the promotion of democracy. The Great Game being played in Syria is between a broad coalition of US-Israeli-Saudi-Qatari-Turkish interests on the one hand and Syria, Russia, Iran and Hizbollah on the other. From media coverage to academic debate on the Middle East, the dominant narrative since the attack on the twin towers has been about the 'D word' – democracy. The Arab world was traditionally portrayed in western eyes as an exception in terms of modernisation and democratisation. Meanwhile, Iraq was torn to pieces in the name of 'democracy' and its political system remains as authoritarian as ever. Since 2011, the Arab Spring has introduced a powerful counter-narrative, a homegrown narrative of political change and justice. Despite this, the new buzzwords are now about the 'S words'-'Sectarianism' and the 'Sunni-Shi'a divide'. Proponents of the new Sunni-Shia 'Great Game' owe a debt of gratitude to the Bush and Blair governments for putting religion back on the agenda. In Iraq, however, as in Syria, Egypt and other parts of the Arab world, a strong and vibrant national identity has prevailed over the years. Many of the thinkers and founders of Arabism were Syrians and Lebanese of Christian descent. They all strongly identified with a shared identity based on common history and language. Yet, another powerful counter-narrative is now on the rise: the myth of sectarianism. However, states in the region are mainly involved in a battle of realpolitik over conflicting interests. The unintended consequence of the Iraq War of 2003 was to favour the rise of Iran as a powerful challenge to the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies. Sectarian strife in Iraq, however, was a result rather than a cause of war. It is heartbreaking today to see how Syria is drawn into similar patterns. The Syrian revolution was not about Sunnis fighting Alawites to establish a Sunni fiefdom in Syria. Started as peaceful and inclusive popular movements striving for social and economic justice, the uprisings in Syria posed a serious threat to the regime: they carried legitimacy and a powerful narrative. This required the construction of a counter-narrative: the presumed fight against transnational religious extremism exported into Syria by external actors. As discourses are best implemented by practices, the regime's strategy was to bring confrontation onto its favourite ground early on: military and sectarian conflict. The country's harmonious social fabric and long-standing tradition of coexistence was destroyed. Borders with Iraq were made porous for the return of Sunni extremists fighting the US-led occupation of Iraq; and who were later joined by offshoots of al-Qaeda. Syria's secular revolution was tragically transformed into the century's new Jihad – although foreign Jihadis constitute a mere 5-10% of the armed opposition. The regime is indeed dominated by a specific branch of the Alawite community (the Kalbiyyeh tribe from the clan of Karahil) and many within the armed resistance have turned to religion to draw strength and mobilisation. It is also true that Islamic Front militias have taken over areas in the north and northeastern parts of the country where they impose a practice of religion which is foreign to the country's tradition of moderate and tolerant Islam. In the rest of the country, however, the battle lines are not between Sunnis and Shi'as. All communities, Sunnis, Christians and Alawites alike, share a fear of radicalism and a descent to chaos as the country follows in the dreaded footsteps of neighbouring Iraq. Other Christians and Alawites have joined the mainly Sunni-dominated political opposition; and a secular civil society is still actively engaged in Local Coordination Committees. The real divide is not religious or sectarian but geopolitical; and foreign intervention is not motivated by religious affiliations nor the promotion of democracy. The Great Game being played in Syria is between a broad coalition of US-Israeli-Saudi-Qatari-Turkish interests on the one hand and Syria, Russia, Iran and Hizbollah on the other.

The Syrian regime responded to protests with violence, but is this tactic leading them to their e... more The Syrian regime responded to protests with violence, but is this tactic leading them to their eventual suicide? The Syrian regime's response to five months of popular uprising was described by a recent report of the International Crisis Group as "slow motion suicide", resulting from a "mix of uninhibited brutality, sectarian manipulation, crude propaganda and grudging concessions". The regime opted for a survival strategy: responding by violence and threatening the population with chaos and civil war in the event of its demise. The objective was to launch a war of attrition by playing on time to wear out any internal revolt. It chose, however, the wrong combination of brutal repression and gradual concessions. The result was a crisis of confidence which was too deep to be overcome by mere calls for national dialogue and reform. The death toll is estimated at 2,000 civilian casualties (including The Syrian regime's response to five months of popular uprising was described by a recent report of the International Crisis Group as "slow motion suicide", resulting from a "mix of uninhibited brutality, sectarian manipulation, crude propaganda and grudging

International cooperation over shared waters is broadly promoted as a promising means for address... more International cooperation over shared waters is broadly promoted as a promising means for addressing complex and contentious issues. Yet calls for increasing riparian cooperation often overlook crucial intermediate questions about the implementation and effectiveness of transboundary water cooperation: Does transboundary water cooperation live up to its expectations? Does cooperation between riparian states lead to improved resource management? Decreased tensions? Increased prosperity and welfare? Efforts to develop a deeper understanding of the consequences of water cooperation and their causal effects are important for illuminating opportunities for improving institutional design and tailoring strategies to enhance the positive impact of riparian state interaction. This paper provides an overview of existing approaches for assessing the impacts of cooperative initiatives and discusses important considerations for tailoring approaches and widening the scope of analysis for the evaluation of transboundary water cooperation.

The Origins of the Syrian Conflict

Global Sustainability

Non-technical summary We summarize what we assess as the past year's most important findings ... more Non-technical summary We summarize what we assess as the past year's most important findings within climate change research: limits to adaptation, vulnerability hotspots, new threats coming from the climate–health nexus, climate (im)mobility and security, sustainable practices for land use and finance, losses and damages, inclusive societal climate decisions and ways to overcome structural barriers to accelerate mitigation and limit global warming to below 2°C. Technical summary We synthesize 10 topics within climate research where there have been significant advances or emerging scientific consensus since January 2021. The selection of these insights was based on input from an international open call with broad disciplinary scope. Findings concern: (1) new aspects of soft and hard limits to adaptation; (2) the emergence of regional vulnerability hotspots from climate impacts and human vulnerability; (3) new threats on the climate–health horizon – some involving plants and anima...

The Origins of the Syrian Conflict

The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Environmental Politics

Does climate change cause conflict? Syria is often mentioned as a key case where climate change c... more Does climate change cause conflict? Syria is often mentioned as a key case where climate change caused social protest and revolt. Specifically, some scholars and analysts invoke droughts from climate change as an independent variable that caused the 2011 uprisings and civil war. Drawing on various subfields of environmental politics, security studies, and political economy, this case study of Syria focuses specifically on one key facet of how systems of power shape environmental precarity: the relationship between ideology and resource policy. Drawing on primary sources and interviews, this research shows how the exigencies of political ideology and its contingent infrastructure policies exacerbated environmental and socio-economic vulnerabilities. This analysis tells an alternative story of resource scarcity and conflict with the aim of refining the critical study of environmental security and conflict. Lessons drawn from this case help illuminate other instances in the Global Sout...

The Origins of the Syrian Conflict, 2020

L'analyse des relations internationales nous révèle l'importance grandissante de l'ea... more L'analyse des relations internationales nous révèle l'importance grandissante de l'eau, nécessaire aux besoins des populations, du domaine domestique et agricole aux industries. En traversant les frontières nationales, l'eau enchaîne les États riverains dans une situation d'interdépendance. Cette dépendance mutuelle est, parfois, aggravée par l'imbrication des facteurs hydrologiques avec des considérations d'ordre stratégique, économique et politique. Multidimensionnelle, la problématique du partage des eaux a de fortes répercussions sur le plan international, que ce soit par les rumeurs de guerre, l'exacerbation des rapports de force, la consolidation ou la fragilisation des alliances. Les thèmes suivants seront donc abordés dans ce numéro spécial sur l'hydropolitique, à savoir :-La re-définition (ou non) de l'hydropolitique en relations internationales: les concepts, normes et institutions ;-La définition et l'évaluation de la coopératio...

Le partage des eaux entre la Syrie, l’Irak et la Turquie

Cette quête de l’eau aura parcouru des chemins aussi riches et diversifiés que les longs cours de... more Cette quête de l’eau aura parcouru des chemins aussi riches et diversifiés que les longs cours de l’Euphrate et du Tigre. Elle aura, dans une première phase, suivi les méandres parfois torturés du travail de thèse doctorale, soutenue fin 2002 auprès du département de science politique de l’Institut des hautes études internationales (Genève). Le directeur de thèse, le Pr. Keith Krause, et les membres du jury, les Pr. Urs Luterbacher et Laurence Boisson de Chazournes sont vivement remerciés pou..

The Origins of the Syrian Conflict, 2020

The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2007

The concept of benefit-sharing, as employed in the Inter-SEDE model, analyzes potential security,... more The concept of benefit-sharing, as employed in the Inter-SEDE model, analyzes potential security, economic development, and environmental-related benefits to sharing the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris river basins. The article finds that Iraq scores fairly high on security and economics-related indicators, revealing the country's vulnerable downstream position. Syria's security score highlights this actor's vulnerable position as the mid-stream riparian. Turkey is favorably differentiated on some of the economic indicators. To enhance the potential for spill-over between watercooperation and conflict prevention, durable and peaceful relations among riparian states require that water-related benefits be shared.

Scholars of environmental politics and policy experts have long debated whether climate change ca... more Scholars of environmental politics and policy experts have long debated whether climate change can be linked to violent conflict. I present a new framework called human–environmental–climate security (HECS), which integrates critiques of traditional security frameworks while offering a systematized method of process tracing. Using existing concepts of vulnerability and resilience, I illustrate the empirical utility of centering the human subject and local conceptions of security when analyzing the role of climate in armed conflict. I develop this framework using the cases of Syria, Sudan, and Morocco. I argue that the ecological drivers of conflicts in Sudan and Syria are best understood as a result of policy decisions that reflected the ideology and preferences of ruling elites rather than direct functions of climate change. Conversely, I present the case of Morocco as a counterfactual in which sound government policy attenuated environmental drivers of conflict. In doing so, this ...