Daniella Meehan | University of Glasgow (original) (raw)

Uploads

Papers by Daniella Meehan

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (10):25-32 , 2019

One of the first things that comes to mind when we think of the special issue’s theme, “Trust in ... more One of the first things that comes to mind when we think of the special issue’s theme, “Trust in a Social and Digital World” is the epidemic of ‘fake news’ and a cluster of trust- relevant vices we commonly associate with those who share it, click on it, and believe it. Fake news consumers are, among other things, gullible and naïve. Many are also dogmatic: intellectually and/or emotionally tied to a view point, and as a result, too quick to uncritically trust whatever aligns with it. Gullibility, naivety, and dogmatism are all examples of vices that lead to us trust when we shouldn’t. The effects of these kinds of vices can be dangerous. Our aim here, however, is to explore the other side of the coin: those character vices that lead us to refrain from trusting when we should trust. For ease of reference, call these vices of distrust. Vices of distrust are dangerous in their own right, and in ways that often harm others along with oneself. The three vices of distrust we want explore—with a particular focus on their manifestations online—are: closemindedness, emulousness, and arrogance. Each contributes to vicious distrust in its own distinctive way.

pistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications (Collective Studies in Knowledge and Society). pp. 249-261., 2020

‘Bad’ epistemic behaviour is unfortunately commonplace. Take, for example, those who believe in c... more ‘Bad’ epistemic behaviour is unfortunately commonplace. Take, for example, those who believe in conspiracy theories, trust untrustworthy news sites or refuse to take seriously the opinion of their epistemic peers. Sometimes this kind of behaviour is sporadic or “out of character”; however, more concerning are those cases that display deeply embedded character traits, attitudes and thinking styles (Cassam 2016). When this is the case, these character traits, attitudes and thinking styles are identified by vice epistemologists as epistemic or intellectual vices. Considering that these vices often block or subvert the acquisition of epistemic goods such as knowledge or truth, it is important for epistemologists to understand how these kinds of traits can be most effectively mitigated. One currently unexplored way in which we might go about doing so is by employing epistemically paternalistic strategies, particularly the strategy of “epistemic nudging” (here on EN)—the practice of altering an agent’s decision-making capacities toward a desired outcome (Thaler and Sunstein 2009).

By bringing together two underexplored areas of epistemology yet to be discussed in connection to one another, this chapter will examine whether epistemic nudging can be employed as a successful practice to combat our epistemic vices. Despite prima facie appeal, I will argue that epistemic nudging at the very best amounts to a superficial and short-lived way of addressing epistemic vices. Additionally, I argue that the practice of EN can often lead to the creation of further vices, specifically the vice of epistemic laziness, as identified by Ian Kidd (2017).

Logos & Episteme, 2019

In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic bl... more In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as 'epistemic blame skepticism,' seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against a reductionist objection to epistemic blame, offered by Trent Dougherty in "Reducing Responsibility." This paper will object to Dougherty's position by examining an account in favour of epistemic blame and demonstrate concerns over the reductionist methodology employed by Dougherty to argue for his sceptical position.

KEYWORDS: epistemology, ethics, blame, scepticism, reductionism, responsibility

British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy (BJUP), 2017

VOX Journal, The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy , 2015

Personal identity is a topic that many of us have pondered at some point in our lives, and we all... more Personal identity is a topic that many of us have pondered at some point in our lives, and we all have likely asked the question 'Who am I?'. I think identity is the unity of character traits, memories and aspirations a person has. It is everything that makes us who we are. We tend to look to factors such as parental upbringing, religion, social class and appearance to decide what makes up our identity, but to what extent are we born into our identity and to what extent do we possess the freedom to change it? This article will address these two questions by examining three main issues relating to personal identity.

Drafts by Daniella Meehan

Draft May 2020. For Educational Philosophy and Theory (special issue on Education and Epistemic Injustice, (ed.) G. Dunne)

This essay investigates an underappreciated way in which trust and testimonial injustice are clos... more This essay investigates an underappreciated way in which trust and testimonial injustice are closely connected. Credibility deficit and credibility excess cases both (in their own distinctive ways) contribute to a speaker's being harmed in her capacity a knower. But moreover, as we will show-by using the tools of a performance-theoretic framework (e.g., Sosa 2015; 2017; 2016; Carter 2019; forthcoming)-both credibility deficit and credibility excess cases also feature incompetent trusting on the part of the hearer. That is, credibility deficit and excess cases are shown to manifest qualities of thinkers that are inconducive to trust's being reliably fulfilled. What this implies is an interesting result about testimonial injustice: to the extent that we want to mitigate against testimonial injustice-one promising way to do so will be to target incompetent trusting of the sort that underlies it. We conclude by outlining and defending what we take to be a promising substantive version of such a mitigation strategy, one which is centred around the cultivation of higher-order trusting competences.

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (10):25-32 , 2019

One of the first things that comes to mind when we think of the special issue’s theme, “Trust in ... more One of the first things that comes to mind when we think of the special issue’s theme, “Trust in a Social and Digital World” is the epidemic of ‘fake news’ and a cluster of trust- relevant vices we commonly associate with those who share it, click on it, and believe it. Fake news consumers are, among other things, gullible and naïve. Many are also dogmatic: intellectually and/or emotionally tied to a view point, and as a result, too quick to uncritically trust whatever aligns with it. Gullibility, naivety, and dogmatism are all examples of vices that lead to us trust when we shouldn’t. The effects of these kinds of vices can be dangerous. Our aim here, however, is to explore the other side of the coin: those character vices that lead us to refrain from trusting when we should trust. For ease of reference, call these vices of distrust. Vices of distrust are dangerous in their own right, and in ways that often harm others along with oneself. The three vices of distrust we want explore—with a particular focus on their manifestations online—are: closemindedness, emulousness, and arrogance. Each contributes to vicious distrust in its own distinctive way.

pistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications (Collective Studies in Knowledge and Society). pp. 249-261., 2020

‘Bad’ epistemic behaviour is unfortunately commonplace. Take, for example, those who believe in c... more ‘Bad’ epistemic behaviour is unfortunately commonplace. Take, for example, those who believe in conspiracy theories, trust untrustworthy news sites or refuse to take seriously the opinion of their epistemic peers. Sometimes this kind of behaviour is sporadic or “out of character”; however, more concerning are those cases that display deeply embedded character traits, attitudes and thinking styles (Cassam 2016). When this is the case, these character traits, attitudes and thinking styles are identified by vice epistemologists as epistemic or intellectual vices. Considering that these vices often block or subvert the acquisition of epistemic goods such as knowledge or truth, it is important for epistemologists to understand how these kinds of traits can be most effectively mitigated. One currently unexplored way in which we might go about doing so is by employing epistemically paternalistic strategies, particularly the strategy of “epistemic nudging” (here on EN)—the practice of altering an agent’s decision-making capacities toward a desired outcome (Thaler and Sunstein 2009).

By bringing together two underexplored areas of epistemology yet to be discussed in connection to one another, this chapter will examine whether epistemic nudging can be employed as a successful practice to combat our epistemic vices. Despite prima facie appeal, I will argue that epistemic nudging at the very best amounts to a superficial and short-lived way of addressing epistemic vices. Additionally, I argue that the practice of EN can often lead to the creation of further vices, specifically the vice of epistemic laziness, as identified by Ian Kidd (2017).

Logos & Episteme, 2019

In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic bl... more In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as 'epistemic blame skepticism,' seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against a reductionist objection to epistemic blame, offered by Trent Dougherty in "Reducing Responsibility." This paper will object to Dougherty's position by examining an account in favour of epistemic blame and demonstrate concerns over the reductionist methodology employed by Dougherty to argue for his sceptical position.

KEYWORDS: epistemology, ethics, blame, scepticism, reductionism, responsibility

British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy (BJUP), 2017

VOX Journal, The Student Journal of Politics, Economics and Philosophy , 2015

Personal identity is a topic that many of us have pondered at some point in our lives, and we all... more Personal identity is a topic that many of us have pondered at some point in our lives, and we all have likely asked the question 'Who am I?'. I think identity is the unity of character traits, memories and aspirations a person has. It is everything that makes us who we are. We tend to look to factors such as parental upbringing, religion, social class and appearance to decide what makes up our identity, but to what extent are we born into our identity and to what extent do we possess the freedom to change it? This article will address these two questions by examining three main issues relating to personal identity.

Draft May 2020. For Educational Philosophy and Theory (special issue on Education and Epistemic Injustice, (ed.) G. Dunne)

This essay investigates an underappreciated way in which trust and testimonial injustice are clos... more This essay investigates an underappreciated way in which trust and testimonial injustice are closely connected. Credibility deficit and credibility excess cases both (in their own distinctive ways) contribute to a speaker's being harmed in her capacity a knower. But moreover, as we will show-by using the tools of a performance-theoretic framework (e.g., Sosa 2015; 2017; 2016; Carter 2019; forthcoming)-both credibility deficit and credibility excess cases also feature incompetent trusting on the part of the hearer. That is, credibility deficit and excess cases are shown to manifest qualities of thinkers that are inconducive to trust's being reliably fulfilled. What this implies is an interesting result about testimonial injustice: to the extent that we want to mitigate against testimonial injustice-one promising way to do so will be to target incompetent trusting of the sort that underlies it. We conclude by outlining and defending what we take to be a promising substantive version of such a mitigation strategy, one which is centred around the cultivation of higher-order trusting competences.