Jack Goldstone - Profile on Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Jack Goldstone
other approximately two thirds consist of two categories of which he disapproves, so-called "soci... more other approximately two thirds consist of two categories of which he disapproves, so-called "social theory" and classical theorizing. Second, he assumes that the current editors -that is, the Yale contingent Phil Gorski, Ron Eyerman, Jeff Alexander and myself -will necessarily make matters even worse. Thus Sanderson predicts that "we likely face several years' worth of issues filled with articles that do not interest us in the least" (ibid., p. 3). These, one must assume, are the "abstruse and arcane articles, often filled with pretentious Gallicisms, that seem to go nowhere and that have little or no relevance to explaining social life" (ibid., p. 4). Here readers should imagine a deleted paragraph, decorated with highly Frenchified exclamations and asides, not to mention Gallic epithets hurled at Stephen Sanderson for his old-fashioned patriarchal description of the current editorial collective as "Jeffrey Alexander and his colleagues American Sociological Association
American Political Science Review, 2000
Rarely does one see a review that misses the mark in so many areas. Patricia Kachuk's review of m... more Rarely does one see a review that misses the mark in so many areas. Patricia Kachuk's review of my book The Evolution of Inequality: War, State Survival, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective appearing in Volume 6 of the Journal of Political Ecology, happens to be one such rarity. At first, I wasn't even sure the reviewer read the book that I wrote, until I realized that in her review, my book had been distorted virtually beyond recognition. Errors are found in at least four areas. They include misunderstanding, if not outright misrepresentation of 1) intent of the book, 2) specifics of the theory, 3) conclusions from case studies, and 4) the nature of social science modeling. Intent of the book: My purpose in examining democracy clearly was to comprehend the sources and workings of democracy, if only to better understand the democratic peace, a dominant theory in international politics (my primary field of study), which holds that democracies do not make war on each other. Somehow Ms. Kachuk understood this as, "Midlarsky's focus is on how democracies are necessary to keep internal peace by justifying the extreme inequalities within the state in such a way that those who suffer most will continue to believe that supporting those who rule will be in their own best interests, thus protecting the state from any external threat of political violence." After making some sense of this passage, I reluctantly came to the view that only a totalitarian sensibility could have yielded this conclusion, which is quite the opposite of my statements in the book. There, democracy as a sham and opiate of the masses implied by the reviewer is explicitly criticized by me in the context of my denial of the validity of Marxist-Leninist "derogation of parliamentary democracy as a sham foisted on a virtually helpless public by the landed elite. For parliaments changed, and gradually the earlier control by the elite gave way to more inclusive forms" (p.14). Specifics of the theory: In a similar vein, my use of the word "genetic" once at the beginning of the book and twice in one paragraph towards the end of the concluding chapter suggesting some possible implications of the theory, was transformed into a basic component of the theory mentioned five times in her review. Perhaps this is one measure of the extent of Ms. Kachuk's distortions; a word used three times in a 349 page book is mentioned now five times in a 2-3 page review. The book index has not a single entry for either the word "gene" or "genetic." Although my initial mention of genetics was drawn from a quote emanating from Darwinian theory, upon reflection I now believe that there are more important reasons for differential rates of expansion among human groups. Several of these include the overwhelming size of one ethnie relative to another that enables the former to expand its territorial holdings, disparities in levels of militarization between groups, geopolitical vulnerabilities of certain ethnies relative to others, or simply the luck of the draw in having empty space adjacent to a potentially expanding population. But the reason for expansion is not a basic argument of the book. Instead, it is the expansion itself in a fractal pattern establishing the foundation for state formation that is fundamental. This basic fact appears to have eluded Ms. Kachuk. It certainly was not genetics that led the British, Jamaicans, Icelanders, or Trinidadians to be more democratic than others, but island locations that maximized state security and allowed democracy to flourish, as I point out in the book. My use of the word "genetic" in the conclusion, explicitly constrained I might add by the artifice of differential birth rates between the intellectually gifted and those less fortunate, was limited to the question of the potential scarcity of human resources in a technological age to be coupled with the ongoing debate over the scarcity of non-human resources. My solution to the possible existence of such a problem was to suggest a vigorous education program, hardly an emphasis on genetics. For the sake of symmetry and completeness I included availability of human resources in addition to non-human; somehow this brief mention of genetics became the basis for the entire theory in the reviewer's mind. The basics of the theory are not understood by Ms. Kachuk, else she could not ask "why the ultimate winners in this random process, by his own analysis, are always white males of Western European descent." The answer given by my analysis is simple ®¢ they were the first to expand globally in a fractal formation by virtue of Reviews
Cliodynamics, Dec 31, 2017
Three predictive problems bedevil our ability to foresee political crises and state breakdown: (1... more Three predictive problems bedevil our ability to foresee political crises and state breakdown: (1) how to tell when a previously stable state falls into a situation of hidden but dangerous instability; (2) how to tell, once a certain level of instability has appeared in the form of protests, riots, or regional rebellions, whether chaos will grow and accelerate into revolution or civil war, or if the protests are likely to be contained and dampen out; and (3) how to tell which individuals and groups are likely to be the main source of mobilization for radical movements, and whether opposition networks will link up, grow and spread, or be isolated and contained. Prior work has focused on each of these problems separately. However, all three issues are crucial to understanding and foreseeing conflict dynamics. These issues operate on different timescales and require separate models. In this article we discuss how better models of each process could be developed and, crucially, integrated with data for a more effective prediction system. A major theoretical challenge for us is to link these different approaches in order to increase their predictive power. A major empirical challenge is to identify data (direct or proxy) that can be used to parameterize, validate, and test our models.
Charles Tilly. European Revolutions, 1492–1992. (The Making of Europe.) Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 1993. Pp. xv, 262. $24.95
The American Historical Review, Oct 1, 1994
Prospects for Population Policies and Interventions
Springer eBooks, 2022
Waiting for the revolutions
Foreign Policy, 2011
Demography and the Future of Democracy
Perspectives on Politics, Feb 21, 2020
The world is in the midst of a demographic recession. This counters what should be a long-term tr... more The world is in the midst of a demographic recession. This counters what should be a long-term trend toward greater democracy. Recent research has shown that progress toward stable democracy is strongly associated with progress in the demographic transition. Since most of the world is rapidly dropping in fertility as more countries complete this transition, democracy should be spreading. However, a resurgence of anxiety, nationalism, and support for strong-man governance is associated with sudden waves of immigration from unfamiliar sources. Because certain parts of the world—mainly Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East—still have very young and rapidly growing populations who suffer from poor economic prospects, adverse climate change, and bad governance, those regions are sending waves of migrants seeking asylum to Europe and the United States, raising anxieties that undermine liberal democratic governance. Global democracy is thus being tugged in opposing directions by current demographic trends. Improving governance in poorer countries to cope with the negative impact of climate change and to create better economic prospects, as well as efforts to reduce fertility, are essential to diminish the surges of migrants and restore the impetus toward democracy that should prevail in mature societies.
The Once and Future Middle Kingdom: China’s Return to Dominance in the Global Economy
Comparativ, Dec 3, 2018
Im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert fuhrten alle Wege nach China. Die Nachfrage Europas nach chinesischer ... more Im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert fuhrten alle Wege nach China. Die Nachfrage Europas nach chinesischer Seide, Keramik und Tee fuhrte die europaischen Kaufleute in den Orient. Als Europa industrialisiert war, dominierten die Europaer den Welthandel, indem sie eine Reihe von Stutzpunkten und Kolonien in Afrika, im Indischen Ozean und in China errichteten. Heute versucht China, diesen „devianten“ Trend umzukehren und China wieder zu seiner „normalen“ Position als fuhrende Wirtschaftsmacht zu verhelfen. China strebt nach einer Fuhrungsrolle in den Bereichen Wind- und Sonnenenergie, kunstlicher Intelligenz, Elektromobilitat und Quantencomputer, um die beherrschende Macht unter den Volkswirtschaften des 21. Jahrhunderts zu werden. Auserdem errichtet China eigene Stutzpunkte quer durch den Indischen Ozean und nach Sudeuropa, um seine Kontrolle uber diese Handelsrouten wiederherzustellen. Wenn China Erfolghat, wird es die letzten zweihundert Jahre der Weltwirtschaftsgeschichte umkehren und seine fruhere Rolle als Hauptakteur in der globalen Wirtschaft wiederherstellen.
Will COVID-19 Bring Down Governments? Will It Bring Rebellions and Revolutions?
Oxford University Press eBooks, Apr 29, 2022
This chapter examines how the global COVID-19 pandemic has affected political stability and chang... more This chapter examines how the global COVID-19 pandemic has affected political stability and change in both democracies and autocracies. For the most part, the disease has stabilized regimes. In both autocracies that handled the disease well and democracies with populist rulers (even if they handled the disease poorly), leaders have held or increased their popularity in the wake of the pandemic. Only in a few autocracies that handled the pandemic poorly, such as Belarus, has it had any perceptible impact on the risk of political upheaval. It appears that, as with the global flu pandemic of 1918, the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 will be remembered for its health impact, not for any great political consequences.
7. Communist revolutions: Russia, China, and Cuba
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 6, 2014
9. Color revolutions: The Philippines, Eastern Europe and the USSR, and Ukraine
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 6, 2014
11. The future of revolutions
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 6, 2014
Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Dec 28, 2010
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), Aug 1, 2009
World History has only recently emerged as a distinctive and vibrant field of study. Its origins ... more World History has only recently emerged as a distinctive and vibrant field of study. Its origins arose from a cross-fertilization of economics, history, and comparative sociology, and from particular conjunctions of people and places in the 1980s and 1990s. World historians now, thanks to unprecedented access to quantitative historical data and international networks of scholars, can develop increasingly precise, formal, and detailed accounts of changes and comparisons across historical periods. However, our goal is not to create new master narratives or theories that predict a grand historical trajectory for mankind; rather we seek to better understand the similarities and differences among societies, and the likely consequences of those similarities and differences.
Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World
Social Forces, Mar 1, 1992
What can the great crises of the past teach us about contemporary revolutions? Arguing from an ex... more What can the great crises of the past teach us about contemporary revolutions? Arguing from an exciting and original perspective, Goldstone suggests that great revolutions were the product of 'ecological crises' that occurred when inflexible political, economic, and social institutions were overwhelmed by the cumulative pressure of population growth on limited available resources. Moreover, he contends that the causes of the great revolutions of Europe--the English and French revolutions--were similar to those of the great rebellions of Asia, which shattered dynasties in Ottoman Turkey, China, and Japan. The author observes that revolutions and rebellions have more often produced a crushing state orthodoxy than liberal institutions, leading to the conclusion that perhaps it is vain to expect revolution to bring democracy and economic progress. Instead, contends Goldstone, the path to these goals must begin with respect for individual liberty rather than authoritarian movements of 'national liberation.' Arguing that the threat of revolution is still with us, Goldstone urges us to heed the lessons of the past. He sees in the United States a repetition of the behavior patterns that have led to internal decay and international decline in the past, a situation calling for new leadership and careful attention to the balance between our consumption and our resources. Meticulously researched, forcefully argued, and strikingly original, Revolutions and Rebellions in the Early Modern World is a tour de force by a brilliant young scholar. It is a book that will surely engender much discussion and debate.
Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, Revolutionary Struggles, and State Reconstruction
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
Recent efforts to identify the emergence of modern economic growth claim to find its origins in a... more Recent efforts to identify the emergence of modern economic growth claim to find its origins in a "Little Divergence" in northwest Europe beginning in the 1500s, in which Holland and Britain entered on an early phase of modern economic growth. This argument, based on new data on GDP/capita as well as older data on comparative real wages, would overturn the views of the California School world historians who argue for a relatively late economic separation of Britain from the rest of the world, occurring only in the second half of the 1700s. However, on closer examination the new GDP/capita do not support a "Little Divergence." Instead, they show a pattern typical of pre-modern "efflorescences" in Holland and Britain before 1800 that were clearly petering out, just as had occurred in earlier efflorescences in Song China and Renaissance Italy. According to the new data, at no point after 1600 and before 1780 did any nation in Europe experience both significant population growth and significant per capita income growth, as would be necessary for modern economic growth to have emerged. The new GDP/capita data make it clear that in fact China and Europeboth in their leading regions and overallwere on very similar economic trajectories until after 1800. These findings from the new macro-level GDP/capita data are further reinforced by new findings from micro-level data on health and nutrition, based on household income analysis, heights, and mortality. Together, the macro and micro-data make a compelling case that there was no "Little Divergence" launch pad for modern economic growth; modern economic growth arose only in a late "Great Divergence" after 1800.
The Puritan Moment: The Coming of Revolution in an English County
The American Historical Review, 1984
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity
The American Historical Review, 1993
Nationalism is a movement and a state of mind that brings together national identity, consciousne... more Nationalism is a movement and a state of mind that brings together national identity, consciousness, and collectivities. It accomplished the great transformation from the old order to modernity; it placed imagination above production, distribution, and exchange; and it ...
Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis, Jun 15, 2015
other approximately two thirds consist of two categories of which he disapproves, so-called "soci... more other approximately two thirds consist of two categories of which he disapproves, so-called "social theory" and classical theorizing. Second, he assumes that the current editors -that is, the Yale contingent Phil Gorski, Ron Eyerman, Jeff Alexander and myself -will necessarily make matters even worse. Thus Sanderson predicts that "we likely face several years' worth of issues filled with articles that do not interest us in the least" (ibid., p. 3). These, one must assume, are the "abstruse and arcane articles, often filled with pretentious Gallicisms, that seem to go nowhere and that have little or no relevance to explaining social life" (ibid., p. 4). Here readers should imagine a deleted paragraph, decorated with highly Frenchified exclamations and asides, not to mention Gallic epithets hurled at Stephen Sanderson for his old-fashioned patriarchal description of the current editorial collective as "Jeffrey Alexander and his colleagues American Sociological Association
American Political Science Review, 2000
Rarely does one see a review that misses the mark in so many areas. Patricia Kachuk's review of m... more Rarely does one see a review that misses the mark in so many areas. Patricia Kachuk's review of my book The Evolution of Inequality: War, State Survival, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective appearing in Volume 6 of the Journal of Political Ecology, happens to be one such rarity. At first, I wasn't even sure the reviewer read the book that I wrote, until I realized that in her review, my book had been distorted virtually beyond recognition. Errors are found in at least four areas. They include misunderstanding, if not outright misrepresentation of 1) intent of the book, 2) specifics of the theory, 3) conclusions from case studies, and 4) the nature of social science modeling. Intent of the book: My purpose in examining democracy clearly was to comprehend the sources and workings of democracy, if only to better understand the democratic peace, a dominant theory in international politics (my primary field of study), which holds that democracies do not make war on each other. Somehow Ms. Kachuk understood this as, "Midlarsky's focus is on how democracies are necessary to keep internal peace by justifying the extreme inequalities within the state in such a way that those who suffer most will continue to believe that supporting those who rule will be in their own best interests, thus protecting the state from any external threat of political violence." After making some sense of this passage, I reluctantly came to the view that only a totalitarian sensibility could have yielded this conclusion, which is quite the opposite of my statements in the book. There, democracy as a sham and opiate of the masses implied by the reviewer is explicitly criticized by me in the context of my denial of the validity of Marxist-Leninist "derogation of parliamentary democracy as a sham foisted on a virtually helpless public by the landed elite. For parliaments changed, and gradually the earlier control by the elite gave way to more inclusive forms" (p.14). Specifics of the theory: In a similar vein, my use of the word "genetic" once at the beginning of the book and twice in one paragraph towards the end of the concluding chapter suggesting some possible implications of the theory, was transformed into a basic component of the theory mentioned five times in her review. Perhaps this is one measure of the extent of Ms. Kachuk's distortions; a word used three times in a 349 page book is mentioned now five times in a 2-3 page review. The book index has not a single entry for either the word "gene" or "genetic." Although my initial mention of genetics was drawn from a quote emanating from Darwinian theory, upon reflection I now believe that there are more important reasons for differential rates of expansion among human groups. Several of these include the overwhelming size of one ethnie relative to another that enables the former to expand its territorial holdings, disparities in levels of militarization between groups, geopolitical vulnerabilities of certain ethnies relative to others, or simply the luck of the draw in having empty space adjacent to a potentially expanding population. But the reason for expansion is not a basic argument of the book. Instead, it is the expansion itself in a fractal pattern establishing the foundation for state formation that is fundamental. This basic fact appears to have eluded Ms. Kachuk. It certainly was not genetics that led the British, Jamaicans, Icelanders, or Trinidadians to be more democratic than others, but island locations that maximized state security and allowed democracy to flourish, as I point out in the book. My use of the word "genetic" in the conclusion, explicitly constrained I might add by the artifice of differential birth rates between the intellectually gifted and those less fortunate, was limited to the question of the potential scarcity of human resources in a technological age to be coupled with the ongoing debate over the scarcity of non-human resources. My solution to the possible existence of such a problem was to suggest a vigorous education program, hardly an emphasis on genetics. For the sake of symmetry and completeness I included availability of human resources in addition to non-human; somehow this brief mention of genetics became the basis for the entire theory in the reviewer's mind. The basics of the theory are not understood by Ms. Kachuk, else she could not ask "why the ultimate winners in this random process, by his own analysis, are always white males of Western European descent." The answer given by my analysis is simple ®¢ they were the first to expand globally in a fractal formation by virtue of Reviews
Cliodynamics, Dec 31, 2017
Three predictive problems bedevil our ability to foresee political crises and state breakdown: (1... more Three predictive problems bedevil our ability to foresee political crises and state breakdown: (1) how to tell when a previously stable state falls into a situation of hidden but dangerous instability; (2) how to tell, once a certain level of instability has appeared in the form of protests, riots, or regional rebellions, whether chaos will grow and accelerate into revolution or civil war, or if the protests are likely to be contained and dampen out; and (3) how to tell which individuals and groups are likely to be the main source of mobilization for radical movements, and whether opposition networks will link up, grow and spread, or be isolated and contained. Prior work has focused on each of these problems separately. However, all three issues are crucial to understanding and foreseeing conflict dynamics. These issues operate on different timescales and require separate models. In this article we discuss how better models of each process could be developed and, crucially, integrated with data for a more effective prediction system. A major theoretical challenge for us is to link these different approaches in order to increase their predictive power. A major empirical challenge is to identify data (direct or proxy) that can be used to parameterize, validate, and test our models.
Charles Tilly. European Revolutions, 1492–1992. (The Making of Europe.) Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 1993. Pp. xv, 262. $24.95
The American Historical Review, Oct 1, 1994
Prospects for Population Policies and Interventions
Springer eBooks, 2022
Waiting for the revolutions
Foreign Policy, 2011
Demography and the Future of Democracy
Perspectives on Politics, Feb 21, 2020
The world is in the midst of a demographic recession. This counters what should be a long-term tr... more The world is in the midst of a demographic recession. This counters what should be a long-term trend toward greater democracy. Recent research has shown that progress toward stable democracy is strongly associated with progress in the demographic transition. Since most of the world is rapidly dropping in fertility as more countries complete this transition, democracy should be spreading. However, a resurgence of anxiety, nationalism, and support for strong-man governance is associated with sudden waves of immigration from unfamiliar sources. Because certain parts of the world—mainly Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East—still have very young and rapidly growing populations who suffer from poor economic prospects, adverse climate change, and bad governance, those regions are sending waves of migrants seeking asylum to Europe and the United States, raising anxieties that undermine liberal democratic governance. Global democracy is thus being tugged in opposing directions by current demographic trends. Improving governance in poorer countries to cope with the negative impact of climate change and to create better economic prospects, as well as efforts to reduce fertility, are essential to diminish the surges of migrants and restore the impetus toward democracy that should prevail in mature societies.
The Once and Future Middle Kingdom: China’s Return to Dominance in the Global Economy
Comparativ, Dec 3, 2018
Im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert fuhrten alle Wege nach China. Die Nachfrage Europas nach chinesischer ... more Im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert fuhrten alle Wege nach China. Die Nachfrage Europas nach chinesischer Seide, Keramik und Tee fuhrte die europaischen Kaufleute in den Orient. Als Europa industrialisiert war, dominierten die Europaer den Welthandel, indem sie eine Reihe von Stutzpunkten und Kolonien in Afrika, im Indischen Ozean und in China errichteten. Heute versucht China, diesen „devianten“ Trend umzukehren und China wieder zu seiner „normalen“ Position als fuhrende Wirtschaftsmacht zu verhelfen. China strebt nach einer Fuhrungsrolle in den Bereichen Wind- und Sonnenenergie, kunstlicher Intelligenz, Elektromobilitat und Quantencomputer, um die beherrschende Macht unter den Volkswirtschaften des 21. Jahrhunderts zu werden. Auserdem errichtet China eigene Stutzpunkte quer durch den Indischen Ozean und nach Sudeuropa, um seine Kontrolle uber diese Handelsrouten wiederherzustellen. Wenn China Erfolghat, wird es die letzten zweihundert Jahre der Weltwirtschaftsgeschichte umkehren und seine fruhere Rolle als Hauptakteur in der globalen Wirtschaft wiederherstellen.
Will COVID-19 Bring Down Governments? Will It Bring Rebellions and Revolutions?
Oxford University Press eBooks, Apr 29, 2022
This chapter examines how the global COVID-19 pandemic has affected political stability and chang... more This chapter examines how the global COVID-19 pandemic has affected political stability and change in both democracies and autocracies. For the most part, the disease has stabilized regimes. In both autocracies that handled the disease well and democracies with populist rulers (even if they handled the disease poorly), leaders have held or increased their popularity in the wake of the pandemic. Only in a few autocracies that handled the pandemic poorly, such as Belarus, has it had any perceptible impact on the risk of political upheaval. It appears that, as with the global flu pandemic of 1918, the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 will be remembered for its health impact, not for any great political consequences.
7. Communist revolutions: Russia, China, and Cuba
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 6, 2014
9. Color revolutions: The Philippines, Eastern Europe and the USSR, and Ukraine
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 6, 2014
11. The future of revolutions
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 6, 2014
Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Dec 28, 2010
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), Aug 1, 2009
World History has only recently emerged as a distinctive and vibrant field of study. Its origins ... more World History has only recently emerged as a distinctive and vibrant field of study. Its origins arose from a cross-fertilization of economics, history, and comparative sociology, and from particular conjunctions of people and places in the 1980s and 1990s. World historians now, thanks to unprecedented access to quantitative historical data and international networks of scholars, can develop increasingly precise, formal, and detailed accounts of changes and comparisons across historical periods. However, our goal is not to create new master narratives or theories that predict a grand historical trajectory for mankind; rather we seek to better understand the similarities and differences among societies, and the likely consequences of those similarities and differences.
Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World
Social Forces, Mar 1, 1992
What can the great crises of the past teach us about contemporary revolutions? Arguing from an ex... more What can the great crises of the past teach us about contemporary revolutions? Arguing from an exciting and original perspective, Goldstone suggests that great revolutions were the product of 'ecological crises' that occurred when inflexible political, economic, and social institutions were overwhelmed by the cumulative pressure of population growth on limited available resources. Moreover, he contends that the causes of the great revolutions of Europe--the English and French revolutions--were similar to those of the great rebellions of Asia, which shattered dynasties in Ottoman Turkey, China, and Japan. The author observes that revolutions and rebellions have more often produced a crushing state orthodoxy than liberal institutions, leading to the conclusion that perhaps it is vain to expect revolution to bring democracy and economic progress. Instead, contends Goldstone, the path to these goals must begin with respect for individual liberty rather than authoritarian movements of 'national liberation.' Arguing that the threat of revolution is still with us, Goldstone urges us to heed the lessons of the past. He sees in the United States a repetition of the behavior patterns that have led to internal decay and international decline in the past, a situation calling for new leadership and careful attention to the balance between our consumption and our resources. Meticulously researched, forcefully argued, and strikingly original, Revolutions and Rebellions in the Early Modern World is a tour de force by a brilliant young scholar. It is a book that will surely engender much discussion and debate.
Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, Revolutionary Struggles, and State Reconstruction
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
Recent efforts to identify the emergence of modern economic growth claim to find its origins in a... more Recent efforts to identify the emergence of modern economic growth claim to find its origins in a "Little Divergence" in northwest Europe beginning in the 1500s, in which Holland and Britain entered on an early phase of modern economic growth. This argument, based on new data on GDP/capita as well as older data on comparative real wages, would overturn the views of the California School world historians who argue for a relatively late economic separation of Britain from the rest of the world, occurring only in the second half of the 1700s. However, on closer examination the new GDP/capita do not support a "Little Divergence." Instead, they show a pattern typical of pre-modern "efflorescences" in Holland and Britain before 1800 that were clearly petering out, just as had occurred in earlier efflorescences in Song China and Renaissance Italy. According to the new data, at no point after 1600 and before 1780 did any nation in Europe experience both significant population growth and significant per capita income growth, as would be necessary for modern economic growth to have emerged. The new GDP/capita data make it clear that in fact China and Europeboth in their leading regions and overallwere on very similar economic trajectories until after 1800. These findings from the new macro-level GDP/capita data are further reinforced by new findings from micro-level data on health and nutrition, based on household income analysis, heights, and mortality. Together, the macro and micro-data make a compelling case that there was no "Little Divergence" launch pad for modern economic growth; modern economic growth arose only in a late "Great Divergence" after 1800.
The Puritan Moment: The Coming of Revolution in an English County
The American Historical Review, 1984
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity
The American Historical Review, 1993
Nationalism is a movement and a state of mind that brings together national identity, consciousne... more Nationalism is a movement and a state of mind that brings together national identity, consciousness, and collectivities. It accomplished the great transformation from the old order to modernity; it placed imagination above production, distribution, and exchange; and it ...
Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis, Jun 15, 2015
Among different important issues, which are discussed in Political Demography the issue of global... more Among different important issues, which are discussed in Political Demography the issue of global ageing becomes more and more pressing every year. It is sufficient to take
into account the point that within two forthcoming decades a rapid global increase in the number of retirement-age persons will lead to its doubling within this fairly small historical
period. The concerns about population ageing apply to both developed and many developing countries and it has turned into a global issue. In forthcoming decades the population
ageing is likely to become one of the most important processes determining the future society characteristics and the direction of technological development.
A companion volume to Players and Arenas, this concentrates on interactions between protestors an... more A companion volume to Players and Arenas, this concentrates on interactions between protestors and the various players who comprise the state, from courts to police, legislators to bureaucrats. Again, some remarkable contributors are helping to develop a new language for describing political interaction.