James Gledhill | George Mason University (original) (raw)
Papers by James Gledhill
The Cambridge Habermas Lexicon
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Cop... more LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.
Raisons politiques, 2013
Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.). © Presses de Scien... more Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.). © Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.). Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit. dossier Constructivism and Reflexive Constitution-Making Practices James Gledhill T he "third wave" of theorising about global justice has been marked by a turn towards understanding principles of justice as practicedependent. While egalitarian liberal cosmopolitans have argued for extending principles of domestic justice to the global level, and statists and nationalists have rejected the possibility of any such extension, the practice-dependent approach seeks to reconcile the universality of justice with the particular role principles of justice play within the context of different social practices. The practice-dependent approach has significantly enriched debates about global justice, and has coincided with a more positive re-evaluation of the way in which John Rawls understands the relationship between domestic and international justice in The Law of Peoples. I will argue, however, that this "practice turn" in theorising about justice has not gone far enough, either methodologically or substantively. Central to the methodology of the practice-dependent approach is the requirement that theorising about justice begin from a "constructive interpretation" of the point or purpose of social practices. This emphasis on interpretation is important, but from the point of view of the contrast between positivism and interpretivism as this is understood in social science, 1 there are grounds for seeing this approach as retaining a positivistic and instrumentalist approach to social practices in which the meaning of social practices is regarded as objectively determinable and theory is seen as independent of, and applied to, practice. On an interpretivist approach to social practices associated with, amongst others, Charles Taylor, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, by contrast, practices are not seen as functioning to achieve an independent purpose. Rather, social practices function reflexively, reflecting upon the function they themselves serve, and ought to serve, in a dynamic, developmental process. The implication of this approach, I will argue, is that rather than seeing principles of justice as practice-dependent, political philosophy
! 1 Admittedly this is a sweeping claim, but the general assumptions upon which it depends are ne... more ! 1 Admittedly this is a sweeping claim, but the general assumptions upon which it depends are neatly encapsulated in what G. A. Cohen took to be the three central questions of political philosophy: (i) What is justice? (ii) What should the state do? (iii) Which social states of affairs ought to be brought about? G.
European Journal of Philosophy
Hegel and contemporary practical philosophy: Beyond Kantian Constructivism, 2020
The complex debate about proceduralism in deliberative democratic theory is important for underst... more The complex debate about proceduralism in deliberative democratic theory is important for understanding alternative models for bridging theory and practice. In this article, I contrast Jürgen Habermas’ model of epistemic proceduralism with that of David Estlund. I begin by locating the differences between them in terms of contrasting interpretations of Rousseau’s idea of the general will. On this basis, I set out two competing models of democratic proceduralism – an instrumental conception and a constitutive conception – and show how Estlund’s critique of Habermas’ procedural theory of ‘deep deliberative democracy’ mistakenly presupposes that Habermas is committed to an instrumental conception. After clarifying the role of Habermas’ ideal speech situation, I explicate and defend a Habermasian model of reflexive epistemic proceduralism. I conclude by considering the implications of this model for understanding the relationship between normative theory and empirical research.
What do we want from a theory of justice? Amartya Sen argues that what we should not want is to f... more What do we want from a theory of justice? Amartya Sen argues that what we should not want is to follow the social contract approach revived by John Rawls, or transcendental institutionalism, in its preoccupation with perfectly just institutions. Sen makes an effective case against approaches, such as G. A. Cohen’s, concerned with transcendent, fact-independent principles of justice, but not against Rawls’ constructivist approach to justice when this is properly interpreted as making a weak transcendental argument. Situating Rawls’ approach within the tradition of the liberalism of freedom provides a basis for interpreting his Kantian constructivism as a form of transcendental institutionalism, and for revealing the affinities between Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium and Jürgen Habermas’ method of rational reconstruction. Such a Kantian conception of justice, concerned with constituting relations of equal liberty between free and equal citizens, remains essential for orienting our pursuit of justice.
The practice-dependent approach to global justice makes a welcome attempt to steer a course betwe... more The practice-dependent approach to global justice makes a welcome attempt to steer a course between egalitarian liberal cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and statism and nationalism, on the other. In so doing, it seeks to reconcile the universality of justice with the particular role principles of justice play within the context of different social practices. In this paper, I argue, however, that the “practice turn” in theorising about justice has not gone far enough, either methodologically or substantively. Methodologically, it is necessary to move beyond the residual positivism of the practice-dependent approach to an interpretive approach that takes account of the reflexive, developmental nature of social practices. Substantively, focusing on the reflexivity of social practices, and particularly practices of reflexive constitution-making, provides a framework for a republican approach to international justice concerned with reconciling Kant’s idea of the universality of justice with the emphasis on popular sovereignty of Rousseau and Hegel.
Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal... more Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment.
The Cambridge Habermas Lexicon
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Cop... more LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.
Raisons politiques, 2013
Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.). © Presses de Scien... more Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.). © Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.). Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit. dossier Constructivism and Reflexive Constitution-Making Practices James Gledhill T he "third wave" of theorising about global justice has been marked by a turn towards understanding principles of justice as practicedependent. While egalitarian liberal cosmopolitans have argued for extending principles of domestic justice to the global level, and statists and nationalists have rejected the possibility of any such extension, the practice-dependent approach seeks to reconcile the universality of justice with the particular role principles of justice play within the context of different social practices. The practice-dependent approach has significantly enriched debates about global justice, and has coincided with a more positive re-evaluation of the way in which John Rawls understands the relationship between domestic and international justice in The Law of Peoples. I will argue, however, that this "practice turn" in theorising about justice has not gone far enough, either methodologically or substantively. Central to the methodology of the practice-dependent approach is the requirement that theorising about justice begin from a "constructive interpretation" of the point or purpose of social practices. This emphasis on interpretation is important, but from the point of view of the contrast between positivism and interpretivism as this is understood in social science, 1 there are grounds for seeing this approach as retaining a positivistic and instrumentalist approach to social practices in which the meaning of social practices is regarded as objectively determinable and theory is seen as independent of, and applied to, practice. On an interpretivist approach to social practices associated with, amongst others, Charles Taylor, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, by contrast, practices are not seen as functioning to achieve an independent purpose. Rather, social practices function reflexively, reflecting upon the function they themselves serve, and ought to serve, in a dynamic, developmental process. The implication of this approach, I will argue, is that rather than seeing principles of justice as practice-dependent, political philosophy
! 1 Admittedly this is a sweeping claim, but the general assumptions upon which it depends are ne... more ! 1 Admittedly this is a sweeping claim, but the general assumptions upon which it depends are neatly encapsulated in what G. A. Cohen took to be the three central questions of political philosophy: (i) What is justice? (ii) What should the state do? (iii) Which social states of affairs ought to be brought about? G.
European Journal of Philosophy
Hegel and contemporary practical philosophy: Beyond Kantian Constructivism, 2020
The complex debate about proceduralism in deliberative democratic theory is important for underst... more The complex debate about proceduralism in deliberative democratic theory is important for understanding alternative models for bridging theory and practice. In this article, I contrast Jürgen Habermas’ model of epistemic proceduralism with that of David Estlund. I begin by locating the differences between them in terms of contrasting interpretations of Rousseau’s idea of the general will. On this basis, I set out two competing models of democratic proceduralism – an instrumental conception and a constitutive conception – and show how Estlund’s critique of Habermas’ procedural theory of ‘deep deliberative democracy’ mistakenly presupposes that Habermas is committed to an instrumental conception. After clarifying the role of Habermas’ ideal speech situation, I explicate and defend a Habermasian model of reflexive epistemic proceduralism. I conclude by considering the implications of this model for understanding the relationship between normative theory and empirical research.
What do we want from a theory of justice? Amartya Sen argues that what we should not want is to f... more What do we want from a theory of justice? Amartya Sen argues that what we should not want is to follow the social contract approach revived by John Rawls, or transcendental institutionalism, in its preoccupation with perfectly just institutions. Sen makes an effective case against approaches, such as G. A. Cohen’s, concerned with transcendent, fact-independent principles of justice, but not against Rawls’ constructivist approach to justice when this is properly interpreted as making a weak transcendental argument. Situating Rawls’ approach within the tradition of the liberalism of freedom provides a basis for interpreting his Kantian constructivism as a form of transcendental institutionalism, and for revealing the affinities between Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium and Jürgen Habermas’ method of rational reconstruction. Such a Kantian conception of justice, concerned with constituting relations of equal liberty between free and equal citizens, remains essential for orienting our pursuit of justice.
The practice-dependent approach to global justice makes a welcome attempt to steer a course betwe... more The practice-dependent approach to global justice makes a welcome attempt to steer a course between egalitarian liberal cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and statism and nationalism, on the other. In so doing, it seeks to reconcile the universality of justice with the particular role principles of justice play within the context of different social practices. In this paper, I argue, however, that the “practice turn” in theorising about justice has not gone far enough, either methodologically or substantively. Methodologically, it is necessary to move beyond the residual positivism of the practice-dependent approach to an interpretive approach that takes account of the reflexive, developmental nature of social practices. Substantively, focusing on the reflexivity of social practices, and particularly practices of reflexive constitution-making, provides a framework for a republican approach to international justice concerned with reconciling Kant’s idea of the universality of justice with the emphasis on popular sovereignty of Rousseau and Hegel.
Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal... more Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment.
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, 2021