Max Velmans | Goldsmiths, University of London (original) (raw)

Videos by Max Velmans

This talk suggests a dual-aspect, monist way to understand the causal interactions of consciousne... more This talk suggests a dual-aspect, monist way to understand the causal interactions of consciousness and brain where conscious experiences and associated brain states are thought of as complementary first- and third-person ways of knowing the operations of a fundamentally psychophysical mind. The talk also discusses the consequences of this shift in perspective for clinical practice. Featured at a webinar hosted by the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society on 29.4.2021, it can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cm9x_X3HEmI

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Consciousness Papers by Max Velmans

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Sep 1, 2002

My target article (henceforth referred to as TA) presents evidence for causal interactions betwee... more My target article (henceforth referred to as TA) presents evidence for causal interactions between consciousness and brain and some standard ways of accounting for this evidence in clinical practice and neuropsychological theory. I also point out some of the problems of understanding such causal interactions that are not addressed by standard explanations. Most of the residual problems have to do with how to cross the “explanatory gap” from consciousness to brain. I then list some of the reasons why the route across this gap suggested by physicalism won't work, in spite of its current popularity in consciousness studies. My own suggested route across the explanatory gap is more subterranean, where consciousness and brain can be seen to be dual aspects of a unifying, psychophysical mind. Some of the steps on this deeper route still have to be filled in by empirical research. But (as far as I can judge) there are no gaps that cannot be filled—just a different way of understanding consciousness, mind, brain and their causal interaction, with some interesting consequences for our understanding of free will. The commentaries on TA examined many aspects of my thesis viewed from both Western and Eastern perspectives. This reply focuses on how dual-aspect monism compares with currently popular alternatives such as “nonreductive physicalism”, clarifies my own approach, and reconsiders how well this addresses the “hard” problems of consciousness. We re-examine how conscious experiences relate to their physical/functional correlates and whether useful analogies can be drawn with other, physical relationships that appear to have dual-aspects. We also examine some fundamental differences between Western and Eastern thought about whether the existence of the physical world or the existence of consciousness can be taken for granted (with consequential differences about which of these is “hard” to understand). I then suggest a form of dual-aspect Reflexive Monism that might provide a path between these ancient intellectual traditions that is consistent with science and with common sense.

Additional Note for 2012 upload on Academia.edu: This reply responds to thoughtful commentaries on the target article by John Kihlstrom, Todd Feinberg, Steve Torrance, Robert van Gulick, Jeffrey Gray and K. Ramakrisna Rao. One commentary by Ron Chrisley and Aaron Sloman seriously misrepresented my views and then proceeded to criticize their own misrepresentation in ways that I make clear in my response. Ten years after its initial publication, as far as I ca tell, the analysis of consciousness-brain causal interactions presented in "How could conscious experience affect brains?" still conforms closely to both the findings of science and to everyday experience.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2022

This is a commentary on Merker, Williford & Rudrauf (2022), "The integrated information theory of... more This is a commentary on Merker, Williford & Rudrauf (2022), "The integrated information theory of consciousness: Unmasked and identified", a target article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 45, e65. Merker, Williford & Rudrauf argue persuasively that integrated information is not identical to or sufficient for consciousness, and that projective geometries more closely formalize the spatial features of conscious phenomenology. However, these too, are not identical to or sufficient for consciousness. While such third-person specifiable functional theories can describe the many forms of consciousness, they cannot account for its existence. Main Text Merker, Williford & Rudrauf have provided a thoughtful, and, in my view, decisive critique of the IIT claim that "consciousness is one and the same as integrated information" (Tononi, 2008, Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi, 2014). Rather, Φ (the formal measure of integrated information within IIT) is one measure of network efficiency, that can be applied to network information processing in general. For this reason, information integration efficiency can be doubly dissociated from consciousness. For example, there can there be efficient information flows in complex economic, social and transportation systems that are far removed from those usually thought to have a unified, integrated consciousness, and there is extensive evidence for efficient unconscious integrated information processing in systems that do have consciousness, namely human minds (see e.g., Velmans, 1991, Kihlstrom, 1996). If so, integrated information processing is not a sufficient condition for consciousness.

The American Journal of Psychology, 2002

Peter Dodwell’s analysis of what’s wrong with cognitive science suggests that the standard inform... more Peter Dodwell’s analysis of what’s wrong with cognitive science suggests that the standard information processing model of the mind characterises its computational functioning, but fails to capture much of human life, and has for that reason been largely ignored in popular culture. Folk psychology is more useful for organising everyday life, and what a dramatist, a novelist, or an adventurous and imaginative journalist has to say about life, about society and its follies, is simply more arresting, more insightful, more telling than what the cognitive scientist has to offer. Dodwell argues that we need a kind of mathematics of biological forms and mental life similar in power to that used to describe the physical world. This would be a formalisation of the mind’s “deep structure” in the manner of the deep grammatical structures formulated by Chomsky to describe language. In this review I assess both Dodwell’s critique of cognitive science and the prospects for his alternative program.

E. Kelly and P. Marshall (eds) Consciousness Unbound: Liberating Mind from the Tyranny of Materialism , 2021

This chapter examines the integrative nature of reflexive monism (RM), a psychological/philosophi... more This chapter examines the integrative nature of reflexive monism (RM), a psychological/philosophical model of a reflexive, self-observing universe that can accommodate both ordinary and extraordinary experiences in a natural, non-reductive way that avoids both the problems of reductive materialism and the (inverse) pitfalls of reductive idealism. To contextualize the ancient roots of the model, the chapter touches briefly on classical models of consciousness, mind and soul and how these differ in a fundamental way from how mind and consciousness are viewed in contemporary Western philosophy and psychological science. The chapter then travels step by step from such contemporary views towards reflexive monism, and towards the end of the chapter, to more detailed comparisons with Hindu Vedanta and Samkhya philosophy and with Cosmopsychism (a recently emergent, directly relevant area of philosophy of mind).

According to RM there never was a separation between what we normally think of as the “physical world” and what we think of as our “conscious experience”. In terms of its phenomenology, the phenomenal physical world is part-of conscious experience not apart-from it. This phenomenal world can be thought of as a biologically useful representation of what the world is like, although it is not the world as-described-by modern physics, and it is not the thing itself—supporting a form of indirect (critical) realism. The analysis then outlines how 3D phenomenal worlds are constructed by the mind/brain, focusing specifically on perceptual projection, and then demonstrates how normal, first-person conscious experiences (e.g. of phenomenal worlds) and their associated, third-person viewable neural correlates can be understood as dual manifestations of an underlying psychophysical mind, which can, in turn, be understood as a psychophysical form of information processing. This dual-aspect monism combines ontological monism with a form of epistemological dualism in which first- and third-person perspectives on the nature of mind are complementary and mutually irreducible—a principle that turns out to have wide-ranging applications for the study and understanding of consciousness.

The chapter then considers the evolution and wider distribution of consciousness (beyond humans) through a brief analysis of the many forms of discontinuity theory versus continuity theory and argues that to avoid the “hard problem” of consciousness one may need to treat its existence as fundamental, and, as co-evolving with the evolution of its associated material forms. This, in turn, takes one to a central issue: What does consciousness actually do? The analysis argues that its central function is to real-ize existence (to know it in a way that makes it subjectively real). With these foundations in place we then come to the heart of the essay—the ways in which reflexive monism provides a very different view of the nature of the universe to those offered either by dualism or materialist reductionism. As summarised in the last paragraph of this section, “In this vision, there is one universe (the thing-itself), with relatively differentiated parts in the form of conscious beings like ourselves, each with a unique, conscious view of the larger universe of which it is a part. In so far as we are parts of the universe that, in turn, experience the larger universe, we participate in a reflexive process whereby the universe experiences itself.”

The essay then considers the precise ways in which this reflexive monist understanding of “consciousness” and “mind” relates to later developments in Vedic philosophy and suggests a way of bridging contemporary Western and classical Vedic ways of understanding consciousness and mind. Finally, the chapter considers what can be said of mystical experience and the ground of being, following the principle that this ground must have the power to both manifest the universe in the form that science shows it to be and our ability to experience the universe in the way that we do. In this, RM is shown to be a dual-aspect monist form of cosmopsychism—a recent area of development within philosophy of mind. The essay compares and contrasts this with idealist versions of cosmopsychism and argues that RM allows for an integrated understanding of realism versus idealism, dualism versus monism, how ordinary experience relates to mystical experience, and how consciousness relates to mind. RM also provides an ‘open’ conceptual system that can, in principle, incorporate a range of parapsychological effects.

This interview with Richard Bright of Interalia Magazine provides a brief summary of how I define... more This interview with Richard Bright of Interalia Magazine provides a brief summary of how I define consciousness, whether consciousness is incidental or fundamental, and whether, in the light of recent discoveries in neuroscience, the concept of consciousness need revising. I then give a brief introduction to Reflexive Monism, and we go on to discuss whether there is a “hard problem”, the viability of panpsychism and my distinction between continuity and discontinuity theories about the distribution of consciousness. We then turn to the potential benefits of a more collaborative combination of third-person science with first-person methods of the kind used in contemplative practice and review some of the most important questions facing consciousness studies at this time.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Jan 1, 2009

Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious s... more Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a “conscious process” is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of “consciousness” is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time."

Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be redu... more Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate. The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Jan 1, 2008

Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material wor... more Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.

In M. Velmans and Y. Nagasawa (eds.) (2012) Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue on Monist Alternatives to Physicalism, 19 (9-10) pp. 143-165.

This paper provides an initial, multidimensional map of the complex relationships among conscious... more This paper provides an initial, multidimensional map of the complex relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world in a way that follows both the contours of everyday experience and the findings of science. It then demonstrates how this reflexive monist map can be used to evaluate the utility and resolve some of the oppositions of the many other “isms” that currently populate consciousness studies. While no conventional, one-dimensional “ism” such as physicalism can do justice to this web of relationships, physicalism, functionalism, dualism, neutral monism, and dual-aspect monism can all be seen to provide useful ways of understanding different aspects of the relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world when these are viewed in either a first- or a third-person way from within this web of relationships by sentient creatures such as ourselves. For example, physicalism and functionalism provide a useful understanding of consciousness, mind, brain and external world when viewed from a third-person perspective, while neutral monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of external phenomena. On the other hand, dual-aspect monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of mind, including Eastern versus Western views of mind. Dual-aspect monism also provides a useful understanding of the “unconscious ground of being” that gives rise to, supports and embeds all these observable phenomena. For an integrated understanding one needs to understand how these phenomena and relationships combine into an integrated whole.

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2007

Abstract (added for 2013 upload): This chapter compares classical dualist and reductionist views ... more Abstract (added for 2013 upload): This chapter compares classical dualist and reductionist views of phenomenal consciousness with an alternative, reflexive way of viewing the relations amongst consciousness, brain and the external physical world. It argues that dualism splits the universe in two fundamental ways: in viewing phenomenal consciousness as having neither location nor extension it splits consciousness from the material world, and subject from object. Materialist reductionism views consciousness as a brain state or function (located and extended in the brain) which eliminates the consciousness/material world split, but retains the split of subject from object. The chapter argues that neither dualism nor reductionism accurately describes the phenomenal world; consequently they each provide a misleading understanding of phenomenal consciousness. Reflexive monism follows the contours of everyday experience, thereby allowing a more unified understanding of how phenomenal consciousness relates to the brain and external physical world that is consistent both with the findings of science and with common sense. The chapter goes on to consider how phenomenal objects relate to real objects, perceptual projection, how phenomenal space relates to physical space, whether the brain is in the world or the world in the brain, and why this matters for science.

This is a pre-publication version of a paper given at an invitation-only International Symposium ... more This is a pre-publication version of a paper given at an invitation-only International Symposium on The Return of Consciousness: A new science on old questions, on 14th-15th June, 2015 in Avesta Manor, Sweden, hosted by the Ax:son Johnson Foundation. The paper summarizes the basic differences between dualist, reductionist and reflexive models of perception, clarifies why these differences are important to an understanding of consciousness, and provides references to how these contrasts have entered into philosophical and scientific discussions over the 25 years since they were first introduced in Velmans (1990) ‘Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World’, Philosophical Psychology, 3, 77-99. The paper concludes that there never was an unbridgeable divide separating “physical phenomena” from the “contents of consciousness”. Physical objects and events as perceived are part of the contents of consciousness—which alters the nature of the “hard problem of consciousness” and provides the departure point for reflexive monism.

B. S. Prasad (ed.) "Consciousness Gandhi and Yoga: Interdisciplinary, East-West Odyssey of K.Ramakrishna Rao" New Delhi: D.K.Printworld, pp. 107-139., 2013

Over the millennia, there have been irresolvable tensions between monist and dualist thought in b... more Over the millennia, there have been irresolvable tensions between monist and dualist thought in both Eastern and Western analyses of the relations among body, mind and consciousness. This paper compares two approaches to resolving such tensions, Reflexive Monism (RM), a model of the self-observing universe that resolves many of the oppositions in Western thought, and K. Ramakrisna Rao’s Eastern, Body-Mind-Consciousness (BMC) “Trident” model, which focuses on the convergences between dualist Samkya Yoga and monist Advaita Vedanta. According to Reflexive Monism, many opposing analyses of body-mind-consciousness relationships in Western thought can be treated as different (often complementary) views of the one global system by parts of itself, from within itself. According to the BMC Trident model, many of the tensions between dualist Samkya and monist Advaita can be resolved by noting the similarity in their analyses of the human condition and the developmental processes required to provide a release from the limitations of that condition. In spite of the very different (Western and Eastern) traditions that inform them, there are many convergences between RM and BMC although there are also some major differences, for example in their grounding ontology and their respective analyses of body-mind-consciousness causal relationships. In this paper I examine both the convergences and divergences in detail.

(for online upload) The readings in Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness (2000) were developed ... more (for online upload) The readings in Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness (2000) were developed from an International Symposium on Methodologies for the Study of Consciousness: A new Synthesis, " that I organised in April, 1996, funded and hosted by the Fetzer Institute, Wisconsin, USA, with the aim of fostering the development of first-person methods that could be used in conjunction with already well-developed third-person methods for investigating phenomenal consciousness. In this Introduction, we briefly survey the state of the art at that time, the reasons for a resurgence of interest in consciousness, the available methodologies, the reasons for increasing dissatisfaction with the adequacy of reductive third-person methods, various difficulties facing the development of rigorous first-person methods, and various creative approaches to solving these difficulties. Suggestions are also made about how to heal the fragmentation in consciousness studies, by placing different approaches to the study of consciousness into a broader context, establishing their domain of applicability and providing some bases for synthesis.

Investigating phenomenal consciousness: New …, 2000

This overview of Consciousness Studies examines the conditions that one has to satisfy to establi... more This overview of Consciousness Studies examines the conditions that one has to satisfy to establish a scientific investigation of phenomenal consciousness. Written from the perspective experimental psychology, it follows a two-pronged approach in which traditional third-person methods for investigating the brain and physical world are complementary to first-person methods for investigating subjective experience allowing the possibility of finding “bridging laws” that relate such first- and third-person data to each other. Mindful of the relative sophistication of third-person methods the chapter focuses on the problems of developing similarly sophisticated first-person methods. The problems are of three kinds: (1) Epistemological problems: How can one obtain public, objective knowledge about private, subjective experiences? (2) Methodological problems: Given that one cannot attach measuring instruments directly up to experiences, what psychological “instruments” and procedures are appropriate to their study? (3) The relation of the observer to the observed: The more closely coupled an observer is with an observed, the greater the potential influence of the act of observation on the nature of the observed (“observer effects”). Given this, how can one develop introspective and phenomenological methods where the observer is the observed? The chapter argues that the epistemological problems are more apparent than real, although this requires one to construe what is private versus public, and what is subjective or intersubjective versus what is objective in a slightly different way—with some enabling consequences for a science of consciousness. Methodological problems are real, but not fundamentally different to the problems traditionally faced in experimental psychological investigations of mental phenomena. The close-coupling of observer with the observed in first-person investigations can also be a problem, producing “observer effects” that are more acute than in most third-person investigations. The chapter suggests that one can either try to minimise such effects or to harness them, depending on the purpose of the investigation.

Progress in brain research 168. Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational and Psychological Approaches, 2007

Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes i... more Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in cognitive science, neuroscience and related sciences, using relatively conventional third-person research methods. However not all the problems of consciousness can be resolved in this way. These problems may be grouped into problems that require empirical advance, those that require theoretical advance, and those that require a re-examination of some of our pre-theoretical assumptions. I give examples of these, and focus on two problems—what consciousness is, and what consciousness does—that require all three. In this, careful attention to conscious phenomenology and finding an appropriate way to relate first-person evidence to third-person evidence appears to be central to progress. But we may also need to re-examine what we take to be “natural facts” about the world, and how we can know them. The same appears to be true for a trans-cultural understanding of consciousness that combines classical Indian phenomenological methods with the third-person methods of Western science.

Toward a science of consciousness II: The second …, Jan 1, 1998

This paper argues that within consciousness studies, dualist vs. reductionist debates typically c... more This paper argues that within consciousness studies, dualist vs. reductionist debates typically characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience, and that to understand consciousness one must start with an accurate description of its phenomenology. Only then can one develop an understanding of how experiences viewed from a first-person perspective relate to events in the brain viewed from a third-person perspective. The paper then lists some common arguments for conscious experiences (accurately described) being nothing more than brain states along with their fallacies. It concludes that there are fundamental problems with ontological reductionism of conscious experiences to brain states that cannot be resolved.

Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue on Monist Alternatives to Physicalism, Oct 2012

This Introduction to a Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue on Monist Alternatives to P... more This Introduction to a Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue on Monist Alternatives to Physicalism summarises some of the basic problems of Physicalism and common fallacies in arguments for its defence that are found in the philosophical and scientific literature. It then introduces six monist alternatives: 1) a form of emergent panpsychism developed by William Seager; 2) a novel introduction to the process philosophy of A.N. Whitehead by Anderson Weekes; 3) a review of current developments in Russellian Monism by Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa; 4) an analysis of dual-aspect monism and its relation to quantum mechanics originally proposed developed by Pauli and Jung and given a modern interpretation by Harald Atmanspacher; 5) a form of processing monism that might help to resolve ontological differences in Indian philosophy and psychology between dualist Samkya Yoga and nondualist Advaita Vedanta by K. Ramakrisna Rao; and 6) an account of Reflexive Monism, which, viewed as a global system, can incorporate many of the seemingly opposed “isms” that currently populate Consciousness Studies by Max Velmans. Whatever the fundamental nature of Nature might be, it must have the power to give rise to its observable manifestations. Consequently, all the papers in this issue are concerned to give a “natural” account of the relationships among consciousness, mind, and the material world that is entirely consistent with the findings of science, and they all accept that for a unified understanding, mind, consciousness and the material world must have a common base. The aim of the Special Issue is to contribute to a deeper understanding of that base, and to stimulate novel thinking about its nature.

This online version of my review of Stanislas Dehaene’s (2014) book on Consciousness and the Brai... more This online version of my review of Stanislas Dehaene’s (2014) book on Consciousness and the Brain adds a descriptive title, but is otherwise as it appears in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. In it, I conclude that the book offers an excellent introduction to the neuropsychology of consciousness that focuses largely on developments that have taken place over the last 15 years or so. The book ranges widely, starting with an account of how the processes that support consciousness in the brain have become increasingly open to experimental study, giving a fresh analysis of the extent of preconscious/unconscious processing, moving on to suggest what consciousness is good for when it appears, how to detect its presence by use of third-person observable neurophysiological signatures, incorporating these signatures into a version of the currently popular “global workspace model” of consciousness—and finally, suggesting some clinical application of the emerging research and some speculations about new frontiers, for example how the emerging science might be applied to the assessment of consciousness in babies and non-human animals. Dehaene also does not shy away from fundamental philosophical questions, adopting an unashamedly materialist-reductionist view of the nature of consciousness and mind, which, he believes, follows naturally from the advances in research that he surveys. In my review I accordingly address the book’s three central themes: (a) the advances in neuropsychological understanding of the conditions for consciousness in the human brain, (b) whether the emerging research leads naturally to a materialist-reductionist view of the nature of consciousness and mind, and (c) the scope and possible limits of the global workspace model of consciousness. Overall, I applaud the science that the book describes, but unravel the problems associated with Dehaene’s materialist reductionism.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1995

This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousnes... more This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.

Added notes for 2013 online version: Nearly 20 years after its original publication this commentary on Jeffrey Gray’s thoughtful BBS target article still has contemporary relevance as, within an exclusively third-person evolutionary paradigm the evolution and function of first-person consciousness continues to present difficulties. Those interested in these issues may also want to look at my more recent online papers that address this in more detail, particularly The evolution of consciousness (2012) and Can evolutionary theory explain the existence of consciousness? (2011)

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Journal of Consciousness Studies, Sep 1, 2002

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2022

The American Journal of Psychology, 2002

E. Kelly and P. Marshall (eds) Consciousness Unbound: Liberating Mind from the Tyranny of Materialism , 2021

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Jan 1, 2009

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Jan 1, 2008

In M. Velmans and Y. Nagasawa (eds.) (2012) Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue on Monist Alternatives to Physicalism, 19 (9-10) pp. 143-165.

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2007

B. S. Prasad (ed.) "Consciousness Gandhi and Yoga: Interdisciplinary, East-West Odyssey of K.Ramakrishna Rao" New Delhi: D.K.Printworld, pp. 107-139., 2013

Investigating phenomenal consciousness: New …, 2000

Progress in brain research 168. Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational and Psychological Approaches, 2007

Toward a science of consciousness II: The second …, Jan 1, 1998

Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue on Monist Alternatives to Physicalism, Oct 2012

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1995

Philosophical Psychology, 1992

This was the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for R... more This was the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism) initially presented in "Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World" (1990) in Philosophical Psychology. The symposium begins with Velmans' summary of the main arguments in that paper, followed by critiques from two psychologists--Robert Rentoul and Norman Wetherick. Velmans replies to the critiques and the entire treatment is further critiqued by the philosopher Grant Gillett, followed by Velmans' final reply. At the time of this upload (25 years later) many of the points in the original paper have become common currency, however some of the confusions about the implications of the reflexive model persist, so the discussion continues to have contemporary relevance.

Episode 5 of a series of discussions of non-duality between scientist/philosophers of consciousne... more Episode 5 of a series of discussions of non-duality between scientist/philosophers of consciousness (e.g. Karl Friston, Paul Gilbert, Rupert Sheldrake, Susan Blackmore) and individuals who experience non-dual states in response to four simple questions: 1.Who are you? 2.What is this?3. Why is this? 4. What is it like to be you?

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJ_mC-SCMW8

For the full series, devised by Iwan Brioc, see https://www.youtube.com/@foursimplequestions

This talk, given at Totnes Consciousness Cafe on 1st July, 2022, describes some of the major tra... more This talk, given at Totnes Consciousness Cafe on 1st July, 2022, describes some of the major transitions in Max Velmans' own journey into a deeper understanding of consciousness. This included potent extraordinary experiences as well as ordinary experiences along with an in-depth scientific and philosophical study of consciousness for over 50 years. From this he developed Reflexive Monism, an integrative Western understanding of human consciousness as being one manifestation of a conscious, self-observing universe -- an understanding that converges closely with the non-dual Integral Vedanta of Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, and Aurobindo. In this talk he describes one early formative mystical experience along with some of the major intellectual steps that guided his way.

Rendered and edited from the streamed zoom transmission and the original source material by Russ Pariseau.

This presentation has been made into a film, publicly available at https://youtu.be/9-BQsXASRcc, ... more This presentation has been made into a film, publicly available at https://youtu.be/9-BQsXASRcc, which addresses some of the recent challenges to human free will posed by findings in neuroscience. Intended for transmission to both China and the West, the film was the opening episode in a planned series on BAD KNOWLEDGE, created by China Entertainment Ltd., Hollywood, L.A. BAD KNOWLEDGE is intended here to signify "challenging knowledge", posed in this case by evidence that neural activation of voluntary action precedes the conscious intention to carry out those acts, challenging our sense of conscious agency, freedom to act, and moral responsibility. However, the film demonstrates how the neuroscientific evidence is compatible with the agency, freedom and responsibility that we normally experience, provided that one adopts a more inclusive, deeply grounded sense of Self. The presentation is in English, interactions with Chinese professionals are both in Chinese and English, all speech has both Chinese and English subtitles, and all illustrations and animations are created by China Entertainment Ltd. The themes introduced in this presentation are also developed in detail in Velmans, M. (2002) How could conscious experiences affect brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(11), 3-29, Velmans, M. (2003) Preconscious free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(12), 42-61, and Velmans, M. (2014) Conscious agency and the preconscious/unconscious self. In S. Menon, A. Sinha, B.V. Sreekantan (eds) Consciousness and Self: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Springer, 11-25 – all online at Academia.edu.

This talk, given at a seminar on 7th July, 2020, suggest a different way to understand the many w... more This talk, given at a seminar on 7th July, 2020, suggest a different way to understand the many ways in which humans and other sentient beings are natural expressions of a reflexive, self-observing universe and the many ways in which this universe might be conscious. The talk introduces and summarizes the detailed analysis given in Velmans, M. (2021) "Is the Universe Conscious? Reflexive Monism and the Ground of Being", in Kelly, E. and Marshall, P. (eds.) Consciousness Unbound. Rowman and Littlefield (in press). The presentation introduces ancient dualist and monist attempts to understand how consciousness, mind, self and soul relate to brain, body and the material world. It then contrasts modern dualist and materialist- reductionist visions of the universe with reflexive monism, the view that the universe is reflexive and self-observing. It explains ways in which the latter requires a paradigm shift in which consciousness and its material accompaniments are entirely natural consequences of what the universe is like, exempified by the dual-aspect monist nature of the human mind and that of other sentient beings. The presentation then introduces different ways to explore the ground of being, and makes connections with Eastern as well as Western philosophy. Available online at https://youtu.be/6AqijBqX7z0

This is a one-hour Interview on Understanding Consciousness recorded on 25th October, 2018 on Sou... more This is a one-hour Interview on Understanding Consciousness recorded on 25th October, 2018 on Sound Art Radio's "Follow the River" a show devoted to Exploring Consciousness. The themes cover the relation between Eastern and Western approaches, the problems of materialist reductionism, the role of preconscious and unconscious processing in the formation of conscious experiences, the relevance of recent research with psychedelics, a more integrated approach to understanding the nature of self, and the evolution of consciousness

This one-hour interview, hosted by Celia Sue Larson on DreamVisions7 Radio covers how to define c... more This one-hour interview, hosted by Celia Sue Larson on DreamVisions7 Radio covers how to define consciousness, the relation of first to third-person perspectives, and the view that these are complementary and mutually irreducible. It then goes on to explain how this approach allows one to resolve the "causal paradox" - that from a third-person perspective consciousness seems epiphenomenal while from a first-person perspective it appears central to mental life. The conversation then turns to Reflexive Monism, the deeper architecture of the Self, and some links to Eastern philosophy along with mystical and other extra-ordinary experiences.

Drawing on aspects of Reflexive Monism, this talk suggests how one can move from a careful, Weste... more Drawing on aspects of Reflexive Monism, this talk suggests how one can move from a careful, Western analysis of ordinary conscious experience towards a more Eastern understanding of its transformative potential in five simple steps. Step 1: accept that the boundaries of ordinary conscious experience encompass the entire phenomenal world, which requires an understanding of reflexivity and perceptual projection. Step 2: accept that experiences arise from somewhere—that there is a chain of normally unconscious/preconscious causation that precedes the arising of each experience that one can investigate in both a third- and first-person way. Step 3: accept that it is only when entities, events and processes are directly experienced that they become real-ized in the sense of becoming subjectively real, and that this applies not just to everyday conscious processes such as speaking, reading and thinking, but also to one’s conscious sense of Self. Step 4: accept an expanded sense of Self that includes not just one’s conscious Ego but also the unconscious embedding and supporting ground of which it is an expression. Step 5: accept that human consciousness is not a “freak accident of nature”; rather it is one natural expression of what the universe is like (although we have some way to go to discover the precise psychophysical laws that govern how conscious experiences relate to their associated material forms). I then show how these aspects of Reflexive Monism take one in the direction of Advaita Vedanta and other forms of perennial philosophy—although the point of balance between Eastern and Western ways of understanding mind, consciousness and self may need to be somewhere midway between the two. This talk is available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63QdHwnKf5I

Suggested readings: the book Understanding Consciousness Edition 2 (2009-particularly Chapters 12 and 14); online papers: How to arrive at an Eastern Place from a Western direction (2013); Reflexive Monism: Psychophysical relations among mind, matter and consciousness (2012); Reflexive Monism (2008)

We normally perceive only the external surfaces of the human body and other physical objects. How... more We normally perceive only the external surfaces of the human body and other physical objects. However it is obvious from our sciences that physical bodies have a complex internal structure that supports the surfaces that we see. What is less obvious is that the realities perceived by humans are models of nature produced by preconscious reflexive interactions of the human mind with external objects and events and even with our own bodies, and that in a deeper sense the perceived world is a projection of nature onto nature. This applies equally to those thoughts and feelings that we identify most intimately with ourselves. Although we tend to identify our self with our perceived body and our experienced thoughts, feelings, volitions and so on, these too are merely the visible tip of an unconscious ground of being that produces, supports and embeds such experiences. In this talk I explore these relationships and consider some of the consequences of shifting our sense of self away from the conscious surface of experience to the supporting, unconscious ground. The talk is online at http://vimeo.com/9931520

The report describes a multi-centre field trial of a new frequency transposing hearing aid (hence... more The report describes a multi-centre field trial of a new frequency transposing hearing aid (henceforth referred to as the FRED or Frequency REcoding Device). Subjects were sensory-neural deafened adults selected on the basis of their audiograms and their performance on a consonant identification test to be "potential transposer users". All subjects had some residual hearing in the low frequencies but a severe or profound loss in the high frequencies. For this group, transposition produced significant improvements in ability to imitate and identify transposed consonants over a period of imitation training, although there were some inter-centre differences. Subjective comparisons of the FRED aids with subjects' own aids indicated the performance of the FRED to be generally better both for speech and for environmental sound. Ratings of the FRED operating as transposer, furthermore, were significantly better than ratings of the FRED operating as a conventional amplifier (under "blind" conditions). Subsequent assessment of the FRED operating either as a transposer or as a conventional amplifier by informed subjects allowed to experiment with the device, favoured transposition in every situation tested. 71.9% of subjects retained the FRED aids for continued post-experimental use and 84.4% would have done so had it been in a post-aural form. A simplified procedure is proposed for future selection of "potential transposer users" and adjustment of the aids on issue, and a number of recommendations are made regarding future developments of the device.

Report No. 2 to the Department of Health and Social Security, London. Contract No. R/E 1049/84, pp.135., Nov 2, 1982

The report describes a multi-centre field trial of a new frequency transposing hearing aid (hence... more The report describes a multi-centre field trial of a new frequency transposing hearing aid (henceforth referred to as the FRED or Frequency REcoding device). Subjects were sensory-neural deafened adults selected on the basis of their audiograms and their performance on consonant identification test to be potential transposing users. All subjects had some residual hearing in the low frequencies but a severe or profound loss in the high frequencies. For this group, transposition produced significant improvements in ability to imitate and identify transposed consonants over a period of imitation training, although there were some intercentre differences. Subjective comparisons of the FRED aids with subjects' own aids indicated the performance of the FRED to be generally better both for speech and for environmental sound. Rating of the FRED operating as a transposer furthermore were significantly better than ratings of the FRED operating as a conventional amplifier (under blind conditions). Subsequent assessment of the FRED operating either as a transposer or as a conventional amplifier by informed subjects allowed to experiment with the device favoured transposition in every situation tested. 71.9% of subjects retained the FRED aids for continued post-experimental use and 84.4% what have done so if it had been in post-aural form. A simplified procedure is proposed for future selection of potential transposer users and adjustment of the aids on issue, and a number of recommendations are made regarding future development of the device.

Report to the Medical Research Council, Grant No.1 ref. G8319832N, pp 131., Dec 1, 1988

The aim of the present study was to determine whether FRED transposition is of sufficient benefit... more The aim of the present study was to determine whether FRED transposition is of sufficient benefit in learning to discriminate between and produce consonants in the higher speech frequencies (HF consonants) to assist in the language acquisition of sensory neural deaf children with congenital losses. A selection test, using an ABX discrimination task, was developed to assemble a sample of children who could potentially benefit from transposition. Twenty-six children, drawn from both a primary and secondary school were selected for evaluation on the basis of their ability to discriminate consonants in the lower speech frequencies combined with their inability to discriminate HF consonants.

Discrimination training scores with transposition supplementing conventional amplification (T) were found to be significantly higher than training scores using amplification without transposition (NT), although this effect depended on whether hearing loss in the higher speech frequencies was mild or moderate (<70dB) vs. severe or profound (>70dB). Of the 18 children with severe or profound HF losses, 17 performed better under T (up to a maximum of 40.5%) whereas 6 of the 7 children with mild or moderate HF losses deteriorated under T (up to a maximum of 7.6%). Transposition also significantly improved discrimination on post-training discrimination tests using words (up to a maximum of 71.2%) although no effects were observed in similar tests using nonsense syllables.

Ability to produce HF consonants during training was found to be strongly dependent on speech production skills acquired prior to the study rather than on training in the course of the study, with secondary school children performing significantly better than primary school children. Nevertheless, those primary school children without well-developed HF consonant production skills, and with a severe or profound HF loss, performed significantly better under T, with improvements ranging from 13.1% to 67.7%. In post-training production tests, the improvements when subjects were trained and tested under T after having been trained and tested under NT were significantly greater (19.7%) than when they were tested under NT after having been tested under T (5.1%).

Subjective evaluation of how easy it was to discriminate HF consonants under T and NT significantly favoured the T condition, with the number of T choices exceeding the number of NT choices by 80%. This preference for T was even more marked for environmental sounds, with T choices exceeding NT choices by 363%. Secondary school children had significantly greater preferences for T than the primary school children and this extended also to their preference for transposition on a permanent basis, that is 6 of the 12 primary school children and 11 of the 12 secondary school children favoured the inclusion of transposition if it were available in a post-aural aid.

The paper reviews the present status of speech recoding (frequency transposition) devices and con... more The paper reviews the present status of speech recoding (frequency transposition) devices and concludes that convincing evidence for the superiority of recoding devices over, for example, selective amplification, does not yet exist. A number of fundamental questions requiring answers are then outlined, upon which the design of some ‘ideal’ recoding device appears to be contingent. Some interim design principles are, however, proposed and a description is given of a recoding device designed with these principles in mind. Finally, some initial, encouraging results with the device are reported, and various questions relating to the utility of the device, requiring further investigation, are indicated.

Various frequency lowering schemes have been developed for use with deaf people who have little o... more Various frequency lowering schemes have been developed for use with deaf people who have little or no measurable hearing in the high frequencies. In general, results of studies evaluating such schemes have been discouraging, except for studies evaluating a frequency recoding device devised by Velmans (1973a). Previous evaluation studies with this device have demonstrated that FRED transposition can improve the auditory discrimination of certain subjects with sensorineural deafness after training (e.g. Velmans and Marcuson, 1980; Velmans et al., 1982; Velmans et al., 1988). Using selection criteria developed in the 1988 study, the current study evaluated the effect of FRED transposition on the untrained auditory discrimination of eight congenitally deaf students, aged between 7 years 2 months and 14 years 10 months with high frequency hearing losses. Results demonstrated that FRED transposition significantly enhanced the auditory discrimination of consonants in the high speech frequencies for the subject group. This suggests that FRED transposition may produce some benefits in everyday situations even without formal training. Evaluation tests with and without transposition, such as those used in this study, may provide one means of selecting congenitally deaf people who would be likely to benefit from using FRED aids.

Language and Speech, Apr 1, 1975

The effect of a speech " recoding " device on the articulation learning (by imitation) of sensori... more The effect of a speech " recoding " device on the articulation learning (by imitation) of sensori-neural, partially-hearing children was evaluated. It was found that a " frequency shift " of speech components above 4000 c.p.s. down to the residual hearing range of the children, when combined with selective amplification and amplitude compression, led to significantly better articulation learning of consonants with major spectral components in the " shifted " region, than when selective amplification and amplitude compression only were used, the improvement being manifest within only seven training sessions of five to ten minutes, under each condition of amplification. Further, " recoding " produced a small but significant improvement in articulation transfer-of-training, measured by ability to imitate the same consonants occurring in different phonemic contexts, uttered in a different voice to that used in training. However, the superior discrimination and articulation of " recoded " consonants did not suffice to establish the " recoded " words (in which the consonants were embedded) as substitute labels for corresponding pictures (or concepts) in preference to already " known " non-recoded word labels, emphasizing the need in such experiments to separately investigate the effects of a given training procedure or " recoding " technique on discrimination, articulation, and picture (or concept) labelling.

Language and Speech, 18(2), 180-194

Language and Speech, Jan 1, 1973

A technique for the simulation of deafness, and its alleviation by a new frequency transposition ... more A technique for the simulation of deafness, and its alleviation by a new frequency transposition device are described. The effects of visual cues (provided by the experimenter's articulatory movements), and of recoded auditory information provided by the "frequency transposer"), on subjects' ability to make a judged match imitation response to spoken CVC nonsense syllables, were evaluated. The improved imitation when visual cues were provided, of both manner of articulation (p < 0.01), and place of articulation (p < 0.001) of certain fricative, sibilant and stop consonants, together with a highly significant improvement in overall imitation scores (p << 0.0005), supported the conclusion that normal hearing subjects, although untrained in lipreading, had a well developed ability to integrate auditory and visual speech information. Further, the improved imitation of both manner of articulation (p < 0.025), and place of articulation (p < 0.025), of certain fricative, sibilant and stop consonants brought about by recoding the speech signal (without any experimentally guided articulation or discrimination training) supported the hypothesis that the recoding technique would produce a signal which was sufficiently speech-like to be utilised with effect by the ear-brain system, and may therefore be of use in the rehabilitation of the sensory-neural deaf.

Various devices have been constructed to lower the frequency of speech sounds to make them access... more Various devices have been constructed to lower the frequency of speech sounds to make them accessible to those with hearing in the low frequencies only. In the present experiment two such devices are compared. One device, the FRED (frequency recoding device) maps the 4-8 kHz region on to the 0-4 kHz region in a way that preserves the spectral pattern of transposed signals. The other device, the Oticon TP 72, converts signals in the 4-8 kHz region into low frequency noise (below 1.5 kHz). Both devices combine transposed information with conventionally amplified speech. It was found that untrained adults with acquired sensory-neural hearing losses opted to supplement conventional amplification with FRED transposition on 365 out of 576 occasions, to improve the clarity of speech sounds. Under the same conditions they opted to use Oticon transposition on significantly fewer (32 out of 576) occasions. Subjective preferences for FRED as opposed to Oticon transposition were also highly significant. It was concluded that for the subject group in question a transposition which preserves the relative spectrum of transposed sounds is initially more acceptable than one which uses high-frequency signals to modulate low-frequency noise.

This brief research report summarizes a program to evaluate the utility of FRED, a frequency tran... more This brief research report summarizes a program to evaluate the utility of FRED, a frequency transposing/recoding speech training aid and/or hearing aid for the sensory neural deaf, in a number of studies using (a) simulated deafness, (b) a sample of deaf adults with acquired severe or profound hearing losses and (c) samples of congenitally deaf children. The program found the FRED to be speechlike and of potential use in discrimination and articulation learning of fricative and stop consonants that otherwise pose problems for those with low frequency residual hearing. FRED also enhances the perception of a range of high frequency environmenal sounds.
Note added to 2017 upload: The FRED aid was the first to use a spectrum preserving form of what is at the time of this upload termed "linear frequency transposition".

This paper reviews the efficacy of a range of aids available for the alleviation of sensory-neura... more This paper reviews the efficacy of a range of aids available for the alleviation of sensory-neural deafness (circa 1982) including auditory implants and frequency transposing hearing aids. It focuses in particular on FRED, a relatively natural form of frequency transposition and the range of hearing losses for which it may be appropriate.

Report No.1 to the Department of Health and Social Security, London, Contract No. R/E 1049/84, pp 227., Jul 25, 1980

The aim of this project was to evaluate the utility of a frequency transposer devised by Velman... more The aim of this project was to evaluate the utility of a frequency transposer devised by Velmans (1973) (henceforth referred to as FRED (Frequency REcoding Device). The project, which had three phases, explored the use of transposition by sensory-neural deafened adults both under laboratory conditions and in the field. Phase 1 investigated the use and preference for the FRED mode of transposition in comparison to that provided by an Oticon TP 72 in improving the subjective "clarity" of transposed consonants. The relatively greater use and preference for FRED transposition by the naive subjects was highly significant, attesting to the "speechlike" quality of the FRED in contrast to the Oticon device.

In Phase 2 the detailed effects of transposition on the identification of transposed consonants were examined and a procedure for diagnosing subjects likely to benefit from FRED transposition in the field was devised. Subjects diagnosed as potential "users" had immediate improvements in transposed consonant identification ranging from 10.9 percent to 29.7 percent (when transposition was added to conventional amplification). These subjects were all found to have residual hearing at least up to 1 KHz and little or no residual hearing above 4 KHz.

Phase 3 consisted of a field trial of body-worn FRED aids (issued to subjects diagnosed as potential "users" in Phase 2). This involved both objective testing and subjective evaluation. In the objective tests it was demonstrated that training with transposition added to conventional amplification led to an improved ability to identify transposed consonants for the subject group, but that training with conventional amplification only did not do so. Ability of the group to imitate transposed consonants improved with training under both conditions, but the scores with transposition were significantly higher (although considerable individual differences were observed). Subjective evaluation took place firstly under blind and then under informed0 conditions. After extended evaluation one of the six subjects reverted to not wearing a hearing aid. The other five subjects retained their FRED aids and after a period of ten months continue to use these aids in preference to conventional post-aural aids. Subjects report benefit to the perception of both speech and environmental sounds, although the pattern of benefit varies somewhat from subject to subject. The use of the aid in the field over an extended period of time, in spite of its inconvenience, provides strong evidence for the utility of FRED transposition for the subject group in question.

In the quest to provide precise functional models and objective measures for various human functi... more In the quest to provide precise functional models and objective measures for various human functions, a specification of those functions in terms of information theory has from time to time been made. In this paper the analogy of the ear/brain system considered as a communication channel is analysed. In particular, the utility of specifying a transmission rate in ‘bits’/sec for the ear/brain system is evaluated.

British Journal of Psychology, Jan 1, 1993

A number of questions remain largely unanswered about when subjects are likely to employ imagery ... more A number of questions remain largely unanswered about when subjects are likely to employ imagery as opposed to verbal encoding and the subsequent effect this will have on recall. The present experiments examined some of the factors determining such use. Subjects were ...

This is the first of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical C... more This is the first of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London. Each of the Companions presents a pre-publication version of the introduction to one of the Volumes and, for Volume 1, it also sets the stage for the entire, printed collection. As the collection forms part of a Critical Concepts in Psychology series, this selection of major works focuses mainly on works that have a direct psychological relevance. From the mid 19 th Century onwards, psychology began to separate itself from philosophy, and the development of psychological thought about consciousness links intimately to the development of psychology itself. In order to trace this development, the four volumes of this collection follow a rough, historical sequence. Volume 1 deals with The Origins of Psychology and the Study of Consciousness. Volumes 2 and 3 deal with contemporary Cognitive and Neuropsychological Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. And Volume 4 focuses mainly on New Directions: Psychogenesis, Transformations of Consciousness and Non-reductive, Integrative Theories, which deal with issues likely to expand current, mainstream thought in potentially novel, and, sometimes, challenging directions. The printed, 4-Volume collection presents 89 major readings (or salient extracts from major readings) drawn from the entire field of Consciousness Studies, along with these introductions and an extensive index. It also introduces 5 additional readings that were selected for inclusion, but could not be reprinted for the reason that reprint permissions were prohibitively expensive. Although these online Companions cannot substitute for the 2000 page hard copy, they do provide a wealth of additional resources in the form of online links to supplementary readings (marked in pink) and to the readings themselves (marked in blue). In many cases the online sources are freely available or available through institutional subscriptions. Links are also provided for some of the readings that require access to complex colour plates, thereby making the four Companions complementary to the printed collection itself. This Companion to Volume 1 focuses on the selection criteria for the collection, the problems presented by consciousness and how to organize these into groups, the ancient history of thought about consciousness, mind and soul, the emergence of psychology as the empirical study of consciousness and mind, the emergence of behaviorism, cognitive psychology and the re-emergence of the study of mind, initial ideas about the role of consciousness in human information processing, the strengths of functionalist accounts of mind, the weaknesses of functionalist accounts of consciousness, competing psychological theories about the nature and function of consciousness, interdisciplinary influences, and the formation of Consciousness Studies.

Preface This is the second of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (C... more Preface This is the second of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London. The Companion to Volume 2 focuses on the detailed relationship of phenomenal consciousness to mental processing described either functionally (as human information processing) or in terms of neural activity, in the ways typically explored by cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Beginning with reviews of functional differences between unconscious, preconscious and conscious processing and the different senses in which mental processing can be said to be " conscious " , the readings turn to seminal work on blindsight and related phenomena, experimental evidence of perception without awareness, ways to combine " subjective " and " objective " measures of awareness, evidence for distinct neural pathways governing visual awareness and visual control of motor acts, and the complex ways in which consciousness of action relates to both voluntary and involuntary acts. The readings then focus on the intimate links between attention and consciousness, starting with the writings of William James and surveying the extensive work on this subject over the last 60 years that explores the relationships between and attended and non-attended processing, preconscious and conscious processing, and attention, primary (working, short-term) memory and consciousness. The readings go on to survey the evidence that attention contributes to the " neural binding " required for an integrated conscious experience and evidence that attention (in humans) is dissociable from consciousness, necessary for consciousness, but not sufficient for consciousness. The readings then turn to research on " inattentional blindness " , and conclude with a review of Baars' global workspace theory, which integrates many theories and findings in this area into a coherent, global model. The Companion then summarises seminal readings on learning, memory and consciousness; the extensive research on mental imagery, long thought to epitomize private, subjective conscious experience—and consequently ruled out of science by reductive, materialist philosophies of mind; the complex relations of consciousness to sleep and dreaming; the development of consciousness in human infants; and the debates surrounding, and extensive evidence for consciousness in non-human animals, with attendant consequences for their humane treatment. As with the other Companions to these Volumes there are many links to background resources (marked in pink) and to the selected readings themselves (marked in blue).

This is the third of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical ... more This is the third of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London.
The Companion to Volume 3 introduces major phases and findings in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) starting with the time it takes for these to form and the wider research program that might lead to their discovery. This includes the search for mechanisms responsible for “neural binding”—how widely dispersed neural activities support integrated conscious experiences, and the search for neural markers of consciousness that can serve to distinguish conscious from preconscious and unconscious activities in the brain. We then turn to global disorders of consciousness that indirectly reveal the conditions that support consciousness by establishing what abolishes it or impairs it, and conclude this section with reviews of the major challenges in the search for NCCs that still remain. This survey then continues with research on the divided brain with cerebral commissurotomy patients, which proved to be very useful in determining the respective functions of the left and right halves of the brain. It also raised philosophical questions. Could consciousness itself be divided by this operation? And, if so, would such patients have a distinct left-brain and right-brain consciousness? Philosophical issues also combine with methodological and experimental developments in the following sections on the reintroduction of first-person methods and how to combine these with complementary, third-person methods in neurophenomenology and experiential neuroscience—two well-developed research programs for both investigating consciousness and understanding its functions. This Companion (and associated Volume) then concludes with a survey of research on free will, covering both the major findings arising from neuropsychological research and a way to understand these that is consistent with a natural understanding of volition, ethics, and legal responsibility. As with the other Companions to these Volumes there are many links to background resources (marked in pink) and to the selected readings themselves (marked in blue).

This is the fourth of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical ... more This is the fourth of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London. The Companion (and Volume) begins with a review of mental influences on states of the body and brain (psychogenesis), which are often thought of as theoretically problematic for conventional materialist theories of mind. The evidence is nevertheless extensive, for example in psychosomatic illnesses and studies of the physiological consequences of meditation, imagery, biofeedback and hypnosis. Such effects are also central to developments in psychoneuroimmunology and studies of placebos, dealing not only with how to control for such effects in clinical trials, but with how such effects operate, and how to harness them for the benefit of patients. The Companion then surveys altered states of consciousness, including the conditions for their emergence, their adaptive as well as maladaptive potential, and the influences of culture on how these are understood. The analysis deepens with reviews of the major ways in which consciousness can be usefully transformed, starting with the burgeoning literature on the nature and effects of meditation practices, including their effects on neural dynamics and the varied ways in which they have, in recent years, been incorporated into a range of psychological therapies, focusing particularly on mindfulness and its potential consequences for psychological health. The survey then turns to mystical experiences, which, of all the positive altered states of consciousness, are perhaps the most extraordinary and transformative. Reported over millennia and recognized by William James to combine ineffability with a noetic quality, their generation, effects and interpretation have, once more, become the subject of research. In this connection, we also review the resurgent interest in the use of drugs in the transformation of consciousness focusing particularly on recent research on the clinical and neurophysiological effects of major psychedelics such as psilocybin and LSD. It will be apparent that the four Volumes of this Collection cover a vast range of phenomena that cannot comfortably be accommodated into a materialist, reductionist worldview, and so this Companion (and the entire collection) concludes with a diverse sample of non-reductive, integrative theories that offer unifying ways of understanding consciousness, drawing on information theory, neuropsychology, psychodynamics, physics, psychology, parapsychology, and philosophy. As with the other Companions to these Volumes there are many links to background resources (marked in pink) and to the selected readings themselves (marked in blue).

From the Publisher: Featuring many important updates and revisions, the highly-anticipated second... more From the Publisher: Featuring many important updates and revisions, the highly-anticipated second edition of The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness offers a collection of readings that together represent the most thorough and comprehensive survey of the nature of consciousness available today. Chapters delve deeply into the wide variety of scientific and philosophical problems that arise from the study of consciousness—as well as the philosophical, cognitive, neuroscientific, and phenomenological approaches to solving them.

Along with updates to existing scientific readings reflecting the latest research data, this edition features 18 entirely new theoretical, empirical and methodological chapters covering such areas as integrated information theory, the resurgence in panpsychism, the renewed interest in more sophisticated first-person methodologies for the investigation of conscious phenomenology, and many others. Featuring contributions by leading experts in the study of consciousness, from across a variety of academic disciplines, the 54-chapter collection reasserts its role as the most thorough, authoritative, and up-to-date survey of the subject available today. Illuminating and thought-provoking, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Second Edition is an indispensable resource for those wishing to gain insights into the latest contemporary thinking on consciousness.

Towards a Deeper Understanding of Consciousness: Selected Works of Max Velmans, 2017

About the Book (Publisher’s Description) In the World Library of Psychologists series, internati... more About the Book (Publisher’s Description)

In the World Library of Psychologists series, international experts themselves present career-long collections of what they judge to be their finest pieces - extracts from books, key articles, salient research findings, and their major practical theoretical contributions.

In this volume Max Velmans reflects on his long-spanning and varied career, considers the highs and lows in a brand new introduction and offers reactions to those who have responded to his published work over the years. This book offers a unique and compelling collection of the best publications in consciousness studies from one of the few psychologists to treat the topic systematically and seriously. Velmans’ approach is multi-faceted and represents a convergence of numerous fields of study – culminating in fascinating insights that are of interest to philosopher, psychologist and neuroscientist alike.

With continuing contemporary relevance, and significant historical impact, this collection of works is an essential resource for all those engaged or interested in the field of consciousness studies and the philosophy of the mind.

Further details available at
https://www.routledge.com/Towards-a-Deeper-Understanding-of-Consciousness-Selected-works-of-Max/Velmans/p/book/9781138699441

Understanding Consciousness, second edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousn... more Understanding Consciousness, second edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense.

Building on the widely praised first edition of the book, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last ten years.

The book is divided into three parts; Part I surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part II reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part III deals with fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers.

Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.

From the back cover: Understanding Consciousness, 2nd Edition provides a unique survey and eval... more From the back cover:
Understanding Consciousness, 2nd Edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense. Building on the widely praised first edition, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last 10 years.

The book is divided into three parts; Part one surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part two reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part three deals with some of the fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into to the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers.

Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such, will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.

M. Velmans and S. Schneider (2007) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2007

From the Book Cover: The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness is the most thorough and compreh... more From the Book Cover:

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness is the most thorough and comprehensive survey of contemporary scientific research and philosophical thought on consciousness currently available. Its 55 newly commissioned, peer-reviewed chapters combine state-of-the-art surveys with cutting edge research. Taken as a whole, these essays by leading lights in the philosophy and science of consciousness create an engaging dialog and unparalled source of information regarding this most fascinating and mysterious subject.

From the Back Cover: How can one investigate phenomenal consciousness? As in other areas of sc... more From the Back Cover:

How can one investigate phenomenal consciousness? As in other areas of science, the investigation of consciousness aims for a more precise knowledge of phenomena, and the discovery of general truths about their nature. This requires the development of appropriate first-person, second-person and third-person methods. This book introduces some of the creative ways in which these methods can be applied to different purposes, e.g. to understanding the relation of consciousness to brain, to examining or changing consciousness as such, and to understanding the consciousness is influenced by social, clinical and therapeutic contexts. To clarify the strengths and weaknesses of different methods and to demonstrate the interplay of methodology and epistemology, the book also suggests a number of "maps" of the consciousness studies terrain that place different approaches to the study of consciousness into a broader, interdisciplinary context.

Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium, 174, 1993

This Ciba Foundation international symposium in 1992, which I proposed to the foundation in 1991,... more This Ciba Foundation international symposium in 1992, which I proposed to the foundation in 1991, gathered together 25 of the most prominent philosophers and scientists working on consciousness at that time. What is particularly interesting about this collection is that each paper was followed by an in-depth discussion with the participants, which was recorded and then edited for publication as an accompaniment to each paper. Consequently, the collection presents a representative snapshot of the philosophical and scientific problems of consciousness and the varied approaches to their solution at that time.

Of all the problems facing science none are more challenging yet fascinating than those posed by ... more Of all the problems facing science none are more challenging yet fascinating than those posed by consciousness. In The Science of Consciousness leading researchers examine how consciousness is being investigated in the key areas of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and clinical psychology. Within cognitive psychology, special focus is given to the function of consciousness, and to the relation of conscious processing to nonconscious processing in perception, learning, memory and information dissemination. ...

This presentation for a Scientific and Medical Network Galileo Commission webinar in November, 20... more This presentation for a Scientific and Medical Network Galileo Commission webinar in November, 2022, outlines the ways in which both ordinary experiences and mystical experiences are reflexive, supporting the view that we are manifestations of a self-observing universe. It addresses fundamental confusions that prevent a clear understanding of how consciousness relates to the world described by physics, the relationship of consciousness to mind, and the relationship of consciousness to self. Finally, the talk touches on how consciousness relates to matter/energy within the primordial nature of the ground of being, and the various ways in which that can be known. Now available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1kNHuD-plQ8

This was a keynote talk given at an online conference on First Person Science of Consciousness – ... more This was a keynote talk given at an online conference on First Person Science of Consciousness – Methodological Issues and Fields of Application, sponsored by the University of Witten-Herberge, Germany on May 8th, 2021.

Abstract: To understand the ontology of consciousness one has to start with an accurate description of its phenomenology. However, substance dualism and materialist reductionism adopt shared theoretical presuppositions about the phenomenology of consciousness that do not correspond to that phenomenology. Consequently, the age-old dualist vs. reductionist dispute about the ontology of consciousness starts in the wrong place and can never be resolved. Conversely, an accurate description of conscious phenomenology leads to a very different, reflexive understanding of how consciousness relates to the mind and the physical world, with consequences for how first- and third-person perspectives relate to each other in the study of mental processes, and how to understand the causal interaction of consciousness and brain. A full analysis of the consequences also leads to reflexive monism, a more inclusive paradigm for the study of consciousness that is as different from classical dualism and materialist reductionism as they are from each other. In this talk, the basic steps required to arrive at this paradigm and some of its major consequences are described. Available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_qLtQzkkkk

This was a keynote talk given at an online conference on Given at an online conference on First... more This was a keynote talk given at an online conference on Given at an online conference on First Person Science of Consciousness – Methodological Issues and Fields of Application, sponsored by the University of Witten-Herberge, Germany on May 8th, 2021.

Available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_qLtQzkkkk

This presentation on the "Ancient History and Future of Consciousness Studies" was a keynote give... more This presentation on the "Ancient History and Future of Consciousness Studies" was a keynote given at an Annual Gathering of the Scientific and Medical Network (UK) on the "Future of Consciousness Studies" hosted at the Latimer Estate, Chesham, on 6th July, 2019. The presentation ranges over the ancient roots of thinking about consciousness, the formation of scientific explorations of consciousness and the foundation of psychology, the current state of consciousness studies, and emerging trends that suggest a trajectory towards the future. It argues that, ultimately, the future of consciousness studies converges with its ancient past. This presentation is now online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBfp3701oAw&feature=youtu.be

Verlag der �sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften eBooks, 2005

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2014

In April, 2014 I organized an International Workshop on East-West Approaches to the Nature of Min... more In April, 2014 I organized an International Workshop on East-West Approaches to the Nature of Mind, Consciousness and Self, in the beautiful grounds of Dartington Hall, in Devon, England to explore the edges of current understanding of ordinary and extra-ordinary conscious experience. Although Consciousness Studies is now a flourishing area of investigation, ordinary and extra-ordinary human experiences do not fit comfortably into the prevailing materialist-reductionist paradigm, suggesting the need to explore non-reductionist approaches in an open, but nevertheless rigorous way. Consciousness has, of course, also been studied in the East over the millennia, but there are major cultural differences in the ways mind, consciousness and self are conceptualized and investigated in the East and in the West, making it difficult to integrate Eastern with Western ways of thought. This provided the purpose for the workshop—to gather together an invited selection of some of the best current thinkers and researchers in this cross-disciplinary area to present their work, along with a group of discussants that included equally senior, mid-career and more junior researchers from different traditions (both Eastern and Western), to explore the issues in depth, with the aim of moving closer to a more integrated, inclusive worldview. The progression of the workshop over four days broadly followed four themes: 1) how to obtain knowledge additional to that provided by the usual third-person methods of science through subjective ways of knowing and by focusing close attention on the details of ordinary experience 2) the range and significance of extraordinary experiences 3) the potentially transformative effects on the knower of engaging in such explorations, and 4) some integrative ways of thinking about what is revealed by such investigations.

This commentary elaborates on Gray&amp;amp;#x27;s conclusion that his neurophysiological ... more This commentary elaborates on Gray&amp;amp;#x27;s conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the ...

John Benjamins eBooks, Nov 29, 2000

The study of consciousness predates the founding of modern experimental psychology, and was its o... more The study of consciousness predates the founding of modern experimental psychology, and was its original focus of interest. Psychology&amp;amp;#x27;s original method,&amp;amp;quot; experimental introspection&amp;amp;quot;(developed by Wundt) was intended to be a form of&amp;amp;#x27;chemistry of the mind&amp;amp;#x27;in which compound experiences were to be analysed into their constituent elements; early psychologists also attempted to chart the manner in which variations in the elements of consciousness depend on variations in stimulus conditions (psychophysics). However, experimental ...

Routledge eBooks, Apr 30, 2018

John Wiley & Sons, Ltd eBooks, Sep 28, 2007

ABSTRACT Classical theories of consciousness make it difficult to see how it can be a subject of ... more ABSTRACT Classical theories of consciousness make it difficult to see how it can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate conscious experience, which suggests that classical theories must be wrong. An alternative, ‘reflexive’ model is proposed in which the external phenomenal world is viewed as part of consciousness rather than apart from it. Observed events are ‘public’ only in the sense of ‘private experience shared’. Scientific observations are ‘objective’ only in the sense of ‘intersubjective’. Observed phenomena are ‘repeatable’ only in that they are sufficiently similar to be taken for ‘tokens’ of the same event ‘type’. This closes the gap between physical and psychological phenomena. Studies of consciousness face methodological difficulties. An experimenter E and a subject S may have ‘symmetrical access’ to events in the outside world in so far as they perceive those events (from a third-person perspective) using similar exteroceptive systems; but their access to the subject's body, brain and experience is ‘asymmetrical’ (E's third-person perspective versus S's first-person perspective). In so far as E and S each have partial access to such events, their perspectives are complementary. Systematic investigation of experience requires merely that experiences are potentially shareable, intersubjective and repeatable. In this the conditions for a science of consciousness are no different to those for a science of physics. Note added for 2013 upload: This paper, presented at a Ciba Foundation Symposium in 2002 was the first time the epistemological implications of reflexive monism for a science of consciousness were presented to a group of internationally recognised scholars on consciousness, including John Searle, Dan Dennett, Thomas Nagel, Sydney Shoemaker, Colin McGinn, Michael Lockwood, Margaret Boden, Bernie Baars, Peter Fenwick, Michael Gazzaniga, Jeffrey Gray, Stevan Harnad, Marcel Kinsbourne, Nick Humphrey, John Kihlstrom, Ben Libet, Tony Marcel, Jerome Singer, Robert Van Gulick, Howard Shevrin, and Pat Wall. The discussion that follows the paper is of particular historical interest, much of it focusing on the how to interpret the projected nature (or out-thereness) of much of the phenomenal world. Over the following decade, various participants accepted the importance of the out-thereness of the phenomenal world (e.g. Libet, Gray, and Humphrey) along with other theorists such as Lehar, Revonsuo, Hoche, and Tye. However, whether phenomena that seem to be out in the world are really in the brain continued to be a source of contention.

Routledge eBooks, Oct 14, 2016

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Jun 1, 1993

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2005

This paper is a commentary on Rupert Sheldrake’s analysis of theories of perception (in Journal o... more This paper is a commentary on Rupert Sheldrake’s analysis of theories of perception (in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2005, 2006). As Sheldrake points out in his fascinating review of ancient and modern thinking on this subject, theories of vision have ranged from “extramissive” theories that posit some active influence emanating from the eyes that both illuminates and influences the external world, “intramissive” theories that stress the influence of the external world on the (passive) brain, and theories in which intramissive and extramissive influences combine. As Sheldrake notes, up to the 12th Century, extramissive theories were dominant, but with an increasing understanding of the way light reflected from an object is focused on the retina by the lens of the eye, intramissive theories have become dominant. Drawing on his research on staring experiments, Sheldrake defends an extramissive theory. In this commentary I argue for a model of perception that combines intramissive and extramissive influences, which accepts all third-person evidence for intramissive causal antecedents to visual perception while at the same time accepting the phenomenal evidence for the apparent external nature of the perceived world—an extramissive psychological effect that I refer to as “perceptual projection”. I also suggest some additions to the model that might begin to make sense of apparently extramissive causes of the type needed to explain staring experiments. Ultimately, I suggest, we may need to accept that we are in our minds, but might be partly out of our brains!

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness, 1994

British Journal of Psychology, Nov 1, 1999

Brain Research, Jun 1, 2007

Routledge eBooks, Dec 5, 2016

Psychosomatic medicine assumes that the conscious mind can affect the body, and this is supported... more Psychosomatic medicine assumes that the conscious mind can affect the body, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other ‘mental interventions’ can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: 1) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention. 2) One is not conscious of one’s own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? 3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. The present chapter suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggest that “conscious mental control” needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind.

Springer eBooks, Oct 19, 2013

ABSTRACT We habitually think of our Self as a conscious agent operating largely in terms of how w... more ABSTRACT We habitually think of our Self as a conscious agent operating largely in terms of how we consciously experience those operations. However, psychological and neuroscientific findings suggest that mental operations that seem to be initiated by the conscious Self are largely preconscious or unconscious. In this paper I examine how these aspects of the Self and its operations combine in the exercise of free will—and suggest that the conscious wishes, choices and decisions that we normally associate with “conscious free will” result from preconscious processes that provide a form of “preconscious free will”. The conscious experiences associated with other so-called “conscious processing” in complex tasks such as speech perception and production, reading and thinking, also result from preconscious processing—which requires a more nuanced analysis of how conscious experiences relate to the processes with which they are most closely associated. We need to distinguish processes that are conscious a) in the sense that we are conscious of them, b) in the sense that they result in a conscious experience, and c) in the sense that consciousness plays a causal role in those processes. We also examine how consciousness enables real-ization: it is only when one experiences something for oneself that it becomes subjectively real. Together, these findings suggest that Self has a deeper architecture. Although the real-ized aspects of the Self are the consciously experienced aspects, these are just the visible “tip” of a far more complex, embedding preconscious/unconscious ground.

ABSTRACT. The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in... more ABSTRACT. The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in the period 14th to 28th June, 2001. The discussion tries to clarify some essential features of the&amp;amp;quot; heterophenomenology&amp;amp;quot; developed in his book Consciousness Explained (1996), and how this differs from a form of&amp;amp;quot; critical phenomenology&amp;amp;quot; implicit in my own book Understanding Consciousness (2000), and developed in my edited Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: new methodologies and maps (2000). The departure point ...

Abstract: Within psychology and the brain sciences, the study of consciousness and its relation t... more Abstract: Within psychology and the brain sciences, the study of consciousness and its relation to human information processing is once more a focus for productive research. However, some ancient puzzles about the nature of consciousness appear to be resistant to current empirical investigations, suggesting the need for a fundamentally different approach. In Velmans (1991a; b; 1993a) I have argued that functional (information processing) accounts of the mind do notcontain&amp;amp;#x27;consciousness within their workings. Investigations of ...