Alva Stråge | University of Gothenburg (original) (raw)
Books by Alva Stråge
Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment, 2019
It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that people can deserve punishment whe... more It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that
people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or
immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this
retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and
actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature,
then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible
for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment.
It has recently been suggested that this argument can be backed up
by neuroscience, since neuroscientific explanations of human
behavior leave no room for non-determined free actions. In this
thesis, an argument of this sort is discussed. According to this
argument, that I call “the Revision Argument”, we should revise the
legal system so that any retributivist justification of punishment is
removed. I examine some objections to the Revision Argument
according to which compatibilism about free will and responsibility is
a morally acceptable basis of retributive punishment. I argue that
these objections have difficulties in providing a plausible account of
the relevant difference between people who deserve punishment for
their actions and people who do not. Therefore, I argue that they fail
to refute the conclusion of the Revision Argument.
Papers by Alva Stråge
Philosophical Explorations
Philosophical Explorations, 2022
Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued... more Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued that the most popular view of the nature of mental states, i.e. non-reductive physicalism, excludes the existence of mental causation, due to what is known as the ‘exclusion argument’. In this paper, I discuss the difference-making account of mental causation proposed by [List, C., and Menzies, P. 2017. “My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What’s Wrong with It.” In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, & H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press], who argue that their account not only solves the problem of causal exclusion but also saves free will. More precisely, they argue that it rebuts what they call ‘the Neurosceptical Argument’, the argument that if actions are caused by neural states and processes unavailable to us, there is no free will. I argue that their argument fails for two independent reasons. The first reason is that they fail to show that difference-makers are independent causes. The second reason is that physical realizers of mental states can be individuated in a way that makes both mental states and their realizers difference-makers.
Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment, 2019
It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that people can deserve punishment whe... more It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that
people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or
immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this
retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and
actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature,
then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible
for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment.
It has recently been suggested that this argument can be backed up
by neuroscience, since neuroscientific explanations of human
behavior leave no room for non-determined free actions. In this
thesis, an argument of this sort is discussed. According to this
argument, that I call “the Revision Argument”, we should revise the
legal system so that any retributivist justification of punishment is
removed. I examine some objections to the Revision Argument
according to which compatibilism about free will and responsibility is
a morally acceptable basis of retributive punishment. I argue that
these objections have difficulties in providing a plausible account of
the relevant difference between people who deserve punishment for
their actions and people who do not. Therefore, I argue that they fail
to refute the conclusion of the Revision Argument.
Philosophical Explorations
Philosophical Explorations, 2022
Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued... more Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued that the most popular view of the nature of mental states, i.e. non-reductive physicalism, excludes the existence of mental causation, due to what is known as the ‘exclusion argument’. In this paper, I discuss the difference-making account of mental causation proposed by [List, C., and Menzies, P. 2017. “My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What’s Wrong with It.” In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, & H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press], who argue that their account not only solves the problem of causal exclusion but also saves free will. More precisely, they argue that it rebuts what they call ‘the Neurosceptical Argument’, the argument that if actions are caused by neural states and processes unavailable to us, there is no free will. I argue that their argument fails for two independent reasons. The first reason is that they fail to show that difference-makers are independent causes. The second reason is that physical realizers of mental states can be individuated in a way that makes both mental states and their realizers difference-makers.